The opinion
1
2
3
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7 SERGEY FIRSOV, et al., Case No. 26-cv-00304-JSC
8 Plaintiffs,
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’
9 v. MOTIONS TO DISMISS, PLAINTIFFS’
MOTIONS TO AMEND, TO RECOVER
10 TURKISH AIRLINES INC., et al., THE COSTS OF SUMMONS, AND FOR
DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Defendants.
11
Re: Dkt. Nos. 11, 13, 17, 19, 30, 48
12
Plaintiffs Sergey Firsov and Iana Rodionova, proceeding without attorney representation,
13
bring several claims arising out of several international flights. (Dkt. No. 1.)1 Two defendants are
14
airlines: Turkish Airlines, Inc. and Aerovias Del Continento Americano S.A. Avianca
15
(“Avianca”). The other two defendants, Sabre GLBL, Inc. (“Sabre”) and Amadeus North America
16
(“Amadeus”), are companies which operate globally-used software for airline bookings. Plaintiffs
17
allege the airline defendants advised them to purchase fake flight tickets and discriminated against
18
Plaintiffs because they had Russian passports. Plaintiffs bring claims against the software
19
company defendants based on the airlines’ conduct and the companies’ removal of Russian
20
airlines from the software.
21
Pending before the Court are three Defendants’ motions to dismiss and Plaintiffs’ motions
22
to amend their complaint, to recover the costs of formal summons against, and for default
23
judgment against Avianca. (Dkt. Nos. 11, 13, 17, 19, 30, 48.) After carefully considering the
24
parties’ submissions, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss, GRANTS Plaintiffs’
25
motion to recover the cost of formal summons only as to Amadeus, and DENIES Plaintiffs’
26
27
1 remaining motions for the reasons set forth below. As amendment would be futile and Plaintiffs’
2 claims are frivolous, dismissal is without leave to amend. Additionally, if Plaintiffs intend to
3 request the clerk enter default against Avianca, they must do so by July 29, 2026.
4 BACKGROUND
5 I. Mr. Firsov’s “Abusive” Litigation Campaign Against Airlines
6 On June 23, 2026, after Plaintiffs filed the instant suit, Judge Chen granted a motion by a
7 Scandinavian airline to declare Mr. Firsov a vexatious litigant and entered a pre-filing order
8 against Mr. Firsov. (Sergey Firsov v. Scandinavian Airlines System Denmark-Norway-Sweden,
9 No. 25-cv-03691-EMC; Dkt. No. 113.) In that case, Mr. Firsov “complained about being served a
10 vegetarian meal because he is a man and needs to eat meat.” (Id. at 21.) Judge Chen noted “Mr.
11 Firsov has filed 30 cases in this District” between March 26, 2025 and June 1, 2026. (Id. at 2.)
12 All but 3 of those cases named at least one airline as a defendant and two-thirds are now closed.
13 (Id.) Judge Chen recounted Mr. Firsov’s “abusive” litigation tactics and frivolous allegations in
14 his many suits against airlines, then entered an order “requir[ing] prefiling review […] where a
15 named defendant is an airline.” (Id. at 19-22.) “Any action filed in violation of th[e] order will be
16 subject to sua sponte dismissal.” (Id. at 22.)
17 II. Plaintiffs’ Allegations
18 Plaintiffs took several international flights throughout 2025 and 2026, beginning with a
19 departure from San Francisco. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4-5, 14.) To view their bookings, Plaintiffs used
20 “Global Distribution System (GDS),” a “travel industry software” owned by Defendants Sabre and
21 Amadeus which “connects travel agencies to airlines.” (See id. at 12-14.) Defendants Sabre and
22 Amadeus promised the software would be “global” and “support all airlines” and “all passengers.”
23 (Id. at 12-13.) But, in response to Western countries’ imposing economic sanctions against
24 Russia, Sabre and Amadeus made a “political decision” to “remov[e] all Russian airlines from”
25 the platform and to “not provide[ an] alternative [for] airlines to check bookings” going into
26 Russia. (Id. at 12-13.)
27 In December 2025, Plaintiffs arrived at an airport in Panama “to drop-off baggage” for a
1 ATM to bring boarding pass/baggage tag,” and “refused to pickup baggage due to [Plaintiffs’]
2 Russian passports.” (Id. at 4 (cleaned up).) Plaintiffs pleaded with Avianca to get onto their
3 flight, but, among other difficulties, Plaintiffs’ screenshot of their booking did not have a ticket
4 number and Plaintiffs “were not able to open [the] airline App and show [their] ticket” due to “bad
5 internet.” (Id. at 4-5.) During back-and-forth discussions with Plaintiffs, Avianca repeatedly
6 “denied boarding” then “adviced [sic] to make a fake purchase of refundable ticket and ‘fool’
7 Chile.” (Id. at 5.) “Plaintiffs showed [a] screenshot” of a “fake ticket” to Avianca “and after that
8 Avianca allowed to board [sic].” (Id. at 5; see id. at 6-7.)
9 A similar incident took place nearly two weeks later, but only involving Ms. Rodionova.
10 On January 3, 2026, in Bogota, Colombia, a representative of Turkish Airlines “called [her] to
11 came-in to check documents” and “demanded a return ticket from Kazakhstan to Russia” because
12 her ticket was one-way. (Id. at 5.) The representative initially “denied boarding” and “started
13 deboarding of baggage,” which Ms. Rodionova asserts is “discriminat[ion]” due to her Russian
14 origin. (Id.) Subsequently, a Russian-speaking Turkish Airlines representative approached her
15 and “adviced [sic] to purchase fake return ticket to ‘fool’ Kazakhstan.” (Id.) Ms. Rodionova then
16 showed a screenshot of a fake ticket and was “allowed to board” her flight. (See id. at 5-7.)
17 Plaintiffs bring 11 claims, seven of which are against Turkish Airlines and Avianca:
18 (1) “Delay passenger and baggage” under the 1999 Montreal Convention and the Airline
19 Deregulatory Act of 1978 (“ADA”),
20 (2) “Civil rights, discrimination, fraud, integrity of board control system,”
21 (3) “Fraud,”
22 (4) “Unfair and deceptive business practices” under the ADA and California’s Consumer
23 Legal Remedies Act,
24 (5) “Breach of international contract,”
25 (6) “Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED),” and
26 (11) “Covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”
27 (Id. at 6-11 (cleaned up).) Plaintiffs request over $2.5 billion in punitive damages. (Id. at 11.)
1 (7) “Detrimental reliance / promissory estoppel,”
2 (8) “Tortious interference with international contracts under Montreal convention,”
3 (9) “False advertising under ADA 1978,” and
4 (10) “California UCL – unfair and deceptive business practices under ADA 1978.”
5 (Id. at 12-15.) Plaintiffs assert Sabre’s and Amadeus’s decision to remove Russian airlines from
6 its software made the software “local,” which contravenes the companies’ promises and
7 advertisements of a “global” software. (Id. at 14 (cleaned up).) Additionally, the removal of
8 Russian airlines and bookings led to Turkish Airlines and Avianca initially refusing to let
9 Plaintiffs board their flights. (Id. at 13.)
10 ***
11 Defendants Turkish Airlines,2 Sabre, and Amadeus move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint.
12 (Dkt. Nos. 17, 19, 42.)
13 DISCUSSION
14 I. Motions to Dismiss and for Leave to Amend
15 A. The Court Does Not Have Personal Jurisdiction Over Turkish Airlines
16 Turkish Airlines moves to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2),
17 asserting the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over it. Plaintiffs bear the burden of
18 demonstrating that the Court has jurisdiction over Turkish Airlines. Schwarzenegger v. Fred
19 Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004). “Where, as here, a motion to dismiss is
20 based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima
21 facie showing of jurisdictional facts.” Love v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 611 F.3d 601, 608
22 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court “only inquire[s] into whether [the plaintiff’s] pleadings and affidavits
23 make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction.” Caruth v. Int’l Psychoanalytical Ass’n, 59
24 F.3d 126, 128 (9th Cir. 1995). To make a prima facie showing, Plaintiffs “need only demonstrate
25
2 The motion was filed by Turk Hava Yollario A.O. (“THY”), specially appearing on behalf of
26
Turkish Airlines. (Dkt. No. 17 at 1 n.1.) THY believes Plaintiffs intended sue it, not Turkish
Airlines, because it is “the national flag carrier of Turkey and operates under the trade name
27
‘Turkish Airlines.’” (Id.; Dkt. No. 17-1 ¶ 3.) Turkish Airlines, by contrast, is “not an air carrier;”
1 facts that if true would support jurisdiction over” Turkish Airlines. Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d
2 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995). “Uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken as true,”
3 and inferences from those allegations “must be resolved in [Plaintiffs’] favor.” Love, 611 F.3d at
4 608. But courts are “not required to accept as true conclusory allegations[.]” Steckman v. Hart
5 Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295–96 (9th Cir. 1998). Courts may dismiss a complaint when “a
6 plaintiff […] plead[s] himself out of a claim by including […] details contrary to his claims.”
7 Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 989 (9th Cir. 2001).
8 “Where, as here, there is no applicable federal statute governing personal jurisdiction, the
9 district court applies the law in which the district court sits.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800.
10 Because California's long-arm jurisdictional statute is coextensive
with federal due process requirements, the jurisdictional analyses
11 under state law and federal due process are the same. For a court to
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, that
12 defendant must have at least minimum contacts with the relevant
forum such that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend traditional
13 notions of fair play and substantial justice.
14 Id. at 800–01 (cleaned up). Courts have general personal jurisdiction over a defendant engaged in
15 “continuous and systematic general business contacts” which “approximate physical presence in
16 the forum state,” and have specific personal jurisdiction when a defendant purposefully avails
17 itself of the privilege of doing benefits in California and Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of or relate to
18 the defendant’s forum-related activities. Id. at 801–03.
19 Drawing inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to
20 support an inference the Court has general or specific personal jurisdiction over Turkish Airlines.
21 Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts regarding Turkish Airlines’ contacts with the United States,
22 except that its address is in New York City and the conclusory allegation “Defendants have
23 regular flights to/from California and doing business here.” (See Dkt. No. 1 at 1, 6; see generally
24 id.) So, drawing inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, Plaintiffs’ do not allege facts that plausibly
25 support an inference Turkish Airlines has “continuous and systematic” contacts which
26 “approximate physical presence” in California. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 801. Moreover,
27 Plaintiffs’ allegations do not support an inference the Court has specific jurisdiction over Turkish
1 Turkish Airlines’ contacts with California. Plaintiffs allege they took several international flights,
2 but only one flight involves Turkish Airlines, and that flight routed from Chile to Kazakhstan.
3 (See id. at 4-5.) Consequently, Turkish Airlines’ motion must be granted.
4 Because the Court grants Turkish Airlines’ motion on jurisdictional grounds, the Court
5 does not reach Turkish Airlines’ arguments regarding improper service, improper venue,
6 preemption, and failure to state a claim.
7 B. Sabre’s and Amadeus’s Motions to Dismiss
8 Plaintiffs’ claims against Sabre and Amadeus are primarily rooted in California law. (See
9 Dkt. No. 1 at 6-15 (alleging Plaintiffs live in California, referencing common law claims, and
10 citing various California statutes).) Plaintiffs also style their claims “under” the ADA and the
11 Montreal Convention. (See generally id.; see id. at 3 (asserting federal question subject matter
12 jurisdiction under the ADA and the Montreal Convention); 6 (asserting the ADA “provides
13 framework [sic] to sue any airline in federal court for breach of contract”).)
14 Sabre and Amadeus contend neither the ADA nor the Montreal Convention provides
15 Plaintiffs a private right of action against companies that operate travel booking software, and
16 Plaintiffs’ state-law claims fail to state a claim.3
17 i. Plaintiffs Do Not Have a Cause of Action Under the ADA or the
18 Montreal Convention
19 Plaintiffs incorrectly assert the ADA allows them “to sue any airline in federal court for
20 breach of contract.” (Id. at 6.) Across their complaint and several opposition filings, Plaintiffs do
21
3 Sabre and Amadeus also argue the ADA preempts Plaintiffs’ claims. The ADA provides a state
22
“may not enact or enforce any law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of
law related to rates, routes, or services of an air carrier[.]” 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (emphasis
23
added). But Sabre and Amadeus are not air carriers; the complaint expressly alleges they operate
the GDS software. Sabre and Amadeus nonetheless assert “ADA preemption extends to claims
24
against entities that are ‘not air carriers themselves’ when those claims have a ‘significant
economic effect’ on airline services.” (Dkt. No 19-1 at 4 (quoting Travel All Over the World, Inc.
25
v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1432 (7th Cir. 1996)).) The only ADA preemption
case Sabra and Amadeus cite is Travel, which did not address whether the ADA preempts claims
26
against entities which are not air carriers. The phrase “not air carriers themselves” appears
nowhere in the opinion and the defendant there was a Saudi Arabian airline company. See Travel,
27
73 F.3d at 1428 n.1; see generally id. Given Sabre and Amadeus do not cite any authority for
1 not cite any case or statutory text for this argument. The ADA does not have a provision
2 authorizing breach of contract suits to be brought directly under the statute. See generally 49
3 U.S.C. §§ 47101-41729; see also Buck v. Am Airlines, Inc., 476 F.3d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 2007)
4 (collecting cases which held the ADA’s consumer protection provisions do not create an implied
5 private right of action). Rather, it appears Plaintiffs are referring to case law holding the ADA
6 does not preempt state-law breach-of-contract claims. See, e.g., American Airlines Inc., v. Wolens,
7 513 U.S. 219, 228–33 (1995); Hickcox-Huffman v. US Airways, Inc., 855 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th
8 Cir. 2017) (“[I]f [Plaintiff] adequately pleaded breach of contract, then her claim is not preempted.
9 The Supreme Court's subsequent Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg decision did not change the Wolens
10 rule that state law breach of contract claims are not preempted.”) These cases did not hold the
11 ADA authorizes contract claims; they held the ADA does not preempt such claims. Therefore, to
12 the extent Plaintiffs assert claims directly under the ADA, the Court grants Defendants’ motions to
13 dismiss those claims.
14 Plaintiffs also appear to bring claims directly under the Montreal Convention of 1999, but
15 to the extent the treaty authorizes Plaintiffs to sue in federal court, drawing all inferences in
16 Plaintiffs’ favor, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not support an inference the treaty applies to Sabre’s
17 and Amadeus’s alleged conduct. The article defining the treaty’s “scope of application” provides
18 the treaty “applies to all international carriage of persons, baggage, or cargo performed by aircraft
19 for reward.” Montreal Convention of 1999, Ch. I, Art. I. Additionally, the treaty imposes “duties”
20 upon international carriers, and the duties pertains to cargo deliveries, injuries that occur “on board
21 the aircraft,” “damage to cargo” which takes place “during the carriage” of cargo, and carriage
22 delays. See generally id. Ch. II, Arts. 3-16; Ch. III, Arts. 17-21. Accordingly, the Convention
23 “provides the exclusive remedy for international passengers seeking damages against airline
24 carriers.” Narayanan v. Brit. Airways, 747 F.3d 1125, 1127 (9th Cir. 2014). Drawing inferences
25 in Plaintiffs’ favor, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts showing Sabre and Amadeus are engaged in
26 “international carriage of persons, baggage, or cargo” such that they have duties under the treaty
27 because Plaintiffs allege Sabre and Amadeus created and took actions within a “travel industry
1 motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims under the Montreal Convention.
2 ii. Detrimental Reliance / Promissory Estoppel
3 Under California law, a claim for promissory estoppel requires Plaintiffs to allege (1)
4 Sabre and Amadeus made a “clear and unambiguous” promise, (2) Plaintiffs relied on the promise,
5 (3) Plaintiffs’ reliance was “both reasonable and foreseeable,” and (4) Plaintiffs were “injured by”
6 their reliance. Laks v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 60 Cal. App. 3d 885, 889 (1976). Sabre and
7 Amadeus argue Plaintiffs’ allegations do not satisfy any of these elements.
8 Drawing inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to
9 support an inference Sabre and Amadeus made a “clear and unambiguous” promise to Plaintiffs.
10 Id. Plaintiffs allege Sabre and Amadeus “promised to support world [sic]” and “promised to
11 support all airlines, all passengers, travel agents” through the GDS software. (Dkt. No. 1 at 12.)
12 A vague promise to “support” airlines and passengers is not “clear and unambiguous” because
13 “support” is a broad, ambiguous term; to “support” someone means “to promote the interests of”
14 them. See Merriam-Webster, “support,” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/support
15 (last visited July 14, 2026). Plaintiffs also do not allege the exact words of this promise, its
16 contours, or any circumstances surrounding Defendants’ statements containing this promise.
17 Therefore, drawing inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not support an
18 inference Sabre and Amadeus made a “clear and unambiguous” promise because the alleged
19 promise does not have “sufficient definitiveness and clarity[] to justify applying promissory
20 estoppel.” See Lange v. TIG Ins. Co., 68 Cal. App. 4th 1179, 1186 (1998).
21 Plaintiffs’ allegations also do not permit an inference Plaintiffs reasonably relied on that
22 promise to their detriment. Plaintiffs allege they “purchased” two “separate” one-way tickets with
23 Turkish Airlines and Avianca in reliance on Sabre’s and Amadeus’s promise, which led to their
24 boardings being delayed in Bogota and Chile, causing “emotional distress and financial lost [sic].”
25 (Dkt. No. 1 at 12.) Plaintiffs do not allege why or attempt to explain how a decision to purchase
26 one-way tickets was made in reliance on promises to “support the world” and support “all
27 passengers,” let alone why that decision is reasonable. Nor do Plaintiffs allege any facts in
1 two separate one-way tickets, except that when they arrived at the airports for those flights, they
2 were delayed in boarding those flights and somehow “lost all tickets/hotels” during those delays.
3 (Id. at 8; see generally id.) But Plaintiffs expressly allege the airlines “allowed” them to board
4 their flights and Plaintiffs successfully “visited multiple cities” during their trip. (Id. at 4-7.)
5 Plaintiffs’ allegations they suffered emotional distress and damages are therefore “conclusory” and
6 “contradicted by” the complaint, meaning the Court is “not required to accept [them] as true.”
7 Steckman, 143 F.3d at 1295–96. Consequently, drawing inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, Plaintiffs’
8 allegations do not permit an inference they reasonably relied on a promise to their detriment.
9 So, the Court grants Sabre’s and Amadeus’s motion as to Plaintiffs’ promissory estoppel
10 claim.
11 iii. Tortious Interference with Contracts
12 Under California law, a claim for tortious interference with a contract requires Plaintiffs
13 allege “(1) a valid contract between [P]laintiff[s] and a third party; (2) [D]efendant[s’] knowledge
14 of this contract; (3) [D]efendant[s’] intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of
15 the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5)
16 resulting damage.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 50 Cal. 3d 1118, 1125 (1990).
17 Sabre and Amadeus contend Plaintiffs have not alleged an “intentional act[] designed to induce a
18 breach or disruption” or an “actual breach or disruption.” The Court agrees.
19 Drawing inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to
20 support an inference of an “actual breach or disruption of [a] contractual relationship” or an
21 inference Sabre and Amadeus acted intentionally to induce such a breach or disruption. Id.
22 Plaintiffs allege Sabre’s and Amadeus’s decision to remove Russian airlines interfered with
23 Plaintiffs’ flights. But Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts showing Sabre’s and Amadeus’s
24 decision was “designed to” interfere with those flights. (See generally Dkt. No. 1 at 13.) Nor
25 have Plaintiffs alleged an “actual breach or disruption” of their contracts for flights because
26 Plaintiffs expressly allege they were allowed board their flights. (Id. at 4-7.) So, drawing
27 inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not permit an inference Sabre or Amadeus
1 Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ tortious interference with contracts claim.
2 iv. False Advertising Law (“FAL”)
3 Plaintiffs’ false advertising claim requires Defendants made an “‘untrue or misleading’”
4 statement in connection with a sale of personal property which Plaintiffs relied on and which
5 Defendants knew or should have known the statement was false or misleading. Demetriades v.
6 Yelp, Inc., 228 Cal. App. 4th 294, 300 n.3 (2014) (quoting Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500).
7 California courts interpreting the FAL distinguish between false statements of fact, which are
8 actionable, and “mere puffery or opinion.” Id. at 311.
9 “A statement is considered puffery if the claim is extremely unlikely
to induce consumer reliance. Ultimately, the difference between a
10 statement of fact and mere puffery rests in the specificity or generality
of the claim. The common theme that seems to run through cases
11 considering puffery in a variety of contexts is that consumer reliance
will be induced by specific rather than general assertions. Thus, a
12 statement that is quantifiable, that makes a claim as to the specific or
absolute characteristics of a product, may be an actionable statement
13 of fact while a general, subjective claim about a product is non-
actionable puffery.”
14
15 Id. (quoting Newcal Indus., Inc. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038, 1053 (9th Cir. 2008))
16 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
17 Sabre and Amadeus correctly assert their alleged statements are mere puffery or opinion
18 regarding the GDS software and therefore, drawing inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, Plaintiffs have
19 not alleged Sabre or Amadeus made false or misleading statements. Plaintiffs allege Sabre and
20 Amadeus made two false or misleading statements: (1) a “promise[] to support all airlines, all
21 passengers, [and] travel agents” “globally,” and (2) the GDS software “connects business and
22 people.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 14.) Statements about the GDS software’s ability to “support” and
23 “connect” people are not “‘quantifiable’” and do not “‘make[] a claim as to the specific or absolute
24 characteristics of’” GDS. See Yelp, 228 Cal. App. 4th at 311 (citing Newcal, 513 F.3d at 1053).
25 So, Sabre’s and Amadeus’s alleged statements are not false or misleading as a matter of law.
26 Therefore, Plaintiffs’ false advertising claim must be dismissed because drawing inferences in
27 Plaintiffs’ favor, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to support an inference Sabre or
1 v. Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”)
2 Plaintiffs allege Sabre’s and Amadeus’s decision to remove Russian airlines from its
3 software violates California’s UCL, which “prohibits, and provides civil remedies for, unfair
4 competition, which it defines as ‘any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.’”
5 Kwikset Corp. v. Sup. Ct., 51 Cal. 4th 310, 320 (2011) (quoting Cal. Bus & Prof. Code § 17200).
6 Plaintiffs’ UCL claim is largely derivative of their other claims because an act is “unlawful” under
7 the UCL when it violates another law. See Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel.
8 Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999); (Dkt. No. 1 at 15 (referencing the companies’ “intention
9 interference [sic]” and asserting the UCL “allows consumers to sue for unlawful conduct”).) So,
10 the Court dismisses any UCL claims deriving from other dismissed claims. Additionally, to sue
11 under the UCL, Plaintiff must have “standing,” i.e., they must “(1) establish a loss or deprivation
12 of money or property sufficient to qualify as an injury in fact” and “(2) show that the economic
13 injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice or false advertising that is the
14 gravamen of the claim.” Kwikset, 51 Cal. 4th at 322 (italics in original).
15 Sabre and Amadeus argue Plaintiffs have not established standing under Kwikset. The
16 Court agrees. Plaintiffs allege the companies’ decision to remove Russian airlines from the
17 platform was unfair and caused the delays in boarding their flights with Turkish Airlines and
18 Avianca because the airlines’ representatives were unable to see Plaintiffs’ plane tickets purchased
19 from Russian airlines. (Dkt. No. 1 at 15.) But, as explained above, Plaintiffs’ allegations of
20 damages and emotional distress are conclusory and contradicted by the complaint. As also
21 explained above, drawing inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, Plaintiffs have not alleged a statement
22 that is false or misleading as a matter of law. So, drawing inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, Plaintiffs
23 have not alleged facts supporting an inference they lost “money or property” sufficient to confer
24 UCL standing, or an inference such an injury “was the result of” Sabre’s and Amadeus’s “false
25 advertising” or their decision to remove Russian airlines from the GDS software. Kwikset, 51 Cal.
26 4th at 322.
27 Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ UCL claims.
1 C. No Leave to Amend
2 Dismissal is without leave to amend as to all claims because amendment would be futile.
3 See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Plaintiffs’ opposition filings do not identify any
4 allegations that, if accepted as true, would establish personal jurisdiction over Turkish Airlines.
5 (See Dkt. No. 25 at 5-6 (conceding “Turkish airline has not any DIRECT contract with Plaintiff
6 [sic],” arguing this concession “does not matter” because Plaintiffs can assert claims under the
7 Montreal Convention, and requesting leave to amend simply “to substitute” Turkish Airlines’ legal
8 name); Dkt. No. 44 (addressing only Amadeus’s arguments).) Additionally, Plaintiffs’ motion for
9 leave to amend proposes two new claims against the would-be Turkish Airlines defendant, but
10 both claims are frivolous. The claims, labeled “fraud” and “USA/State business registration
11 laws,” allege Turkish Airlines falsely represented it is “incorporated in USA as Turkish Airlines”
12 and the company “must register in California Secretary of state immmidiately [sic].” (Id. at 6-7.)
13 Plaintiffs’ proposed claims do not cite any federal or state statute, and instead broadly gesture to
14 “States/USA revenue and Taxation codes.” (See id.) Therefore, dismissal without leave to amend
15 is appropriate. Cf. Bradshaw v. MI5, Off. of Inspector Gen., No. 25-4397, 2026 WL 1258776, at
16 *1 (9th Cir. May 7, 2026) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of pro se complaint without leave to
17 amend because the plaintiff’s claims were “wholly insubstantial and frivolous and thus fail[] to
18 confer federal subject matter jurisdiction”) (cleaned up); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127
19 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (“When a case may be classified as frivolous or malicious, there is, by
20 definition, no merit to the underlying action and so no reason to grant leave to amend.”).
21 Likewise, amendment would be futile as to Plaintiffs’ claims against Sabre and Amadeus.
22 As explained above, the ADA does not provide a private right of action and the Montreal
23 Convention does not authorize suits against companies like Sabre and Amadeus, so amending
24 these claims would be futile. Additionally, Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend does not include
25 any new claims against Sabre. Rather, Plaintiffs propose adding a claim alleging Amadeus “failed
26 to register” their business “in any state,” meaning “all” of Amadeus’s contracts are “void” and the
27 company “must stop doing business in” the United States. (Dkt. No. 30 at 5 (cleaned up).) Like
1 and is frivolous. Accordingly, dismissal is without leave to amend.
2 II. Motions to Recover Cost of Summons
3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(d)(1) provides “[a]n individual, corporation, or
4 association that is subject to service under Rule 4(e), (f), or (h) has a duty to avoid unnecessary
5 expenses of serving the summons. The plaintiff may notify such a defendant that an action has
6 been commenced and request that the defendant waive service of a summons.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
7 4(d)(1). The plaintiff’s “notice and request” for waiver “must,” among other things, “be
8 accompanied by […] a prepaid means for returning the form.” Id. 4(d)(1)(C). This District’s
9 Local Rules also require a plaintiff’s request for waiver of service to include a copy of the
10 assigned judge’s standing order and instructions for preparing a case management statement. N.D.
11 Cal. Civ. L.R. 4-2(a)-(c).
12 If a defendant located within the United States fails, without good
cause, to sign and return a waiver requested by a plaintiff located
13 within the United States, the court must impose on the defendant:
14 (A) the expenses later incurred in making service; and
15 (B) the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, of any motion
required to collect those service expenses.
16
17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2)(A)-(B).
18 Plaintiffs request the Court require Turkish Airlines and Sabre to each pay $30.40,
19 asserting they “personally served [their] Summons and Complaint” to the companies’ “registered
20 agent” on February 19, 2026 and April 2, 2026 and the defendants “refused to sign and return” a
21 waiver of service. (Dkt. No. 11 at 1-2.) The Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion. In both documents,
22 a process server attests he served a summons on “Henry Liwag, who is designated by law to
23 accept service on behalf of CT Corporation System” in Glendale, California. (Id. at 3, 4.) Turkish
24 Airlines’ attorney attests CT Corporation System is its agent for service, but the documents
25 provided to CT Corporation System on April 2, 2026 did not include a request for waiver of
26 service. (See generally Dkt. No. 32-3.) Nor did the documents served on either date include, as
27 required by this District’s Local Rules, a copy of the assigned judge’s standing order and
1 4.)
2 Plaintiffs also request the Court order Amadeus to pay $60 and order Avianca to pay $150
3 for refusing to return a waiver of service. (Dkt. No. 13.) Amadeus does not oppose the motion,
4 (Dkt. No. 43), so the Court grants the motion only as to Amadeus and orders Amadeus to pay
5 Plaintiffs $60. The Court denies the motion as to Avianca. Plaintiffs’ proof of service upon
6 Avianca is signed by someone who lives in Plaintiffs’ apartment building. (Compare id. at 1
7 (caption showing Mr. Firsov’s address), with id. at 9.) The declarant attests they served the
8 Summons and Complaint on “supervisor ELiza [sic],” and this “supervisor” is the registered
9 service agent of “LAX Airport, Aisle A, Departure level Aerovias Del Continente Americano S.A.
10 Avianca.” (See id. at 9.) Given Avianca has not appeared in this action, Mr. Firsov’s abusive
11 litigation history, and the declarant lives in Mr. Firsov’s apartment and is not a registered process
12 server, Plaintiffs’ service upon Avianca by virtue of serving an airport employee is almost
13 certainly defective.
14 III. Motion for Default Judgment
15 The Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion for a default judgment against Avianca. (Dkt. No. 48.)
16 A default judgment can be entered only after the clerk enters default. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)
17 (providing “the clerk must enter default” when a party has “failed to plead or otherwise defend” a
18 suit); id. 55(b)(1), (2) (outlining the clerk or the Court may enter a default judgment) (emphasis
19 added). If Plaintiffs wish to request the clerk enter a default against Avianca, they must do so by
20 July 29, 2026. If Plaintiffs do not do so, or if the clerk’s office denies Plaintiffs’ request for a
21 default, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against Avianca without prejudice.
22 CONCLUSION
23 As explained above, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ complaint, without leave to amend.
24 Drawing inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not support an inference the
25 Court has personal jurisdiction over Turkish Airlines. Nor do Plaintiffs’ allegations support an
26 inference Sabre or Amadeus are liable under the ADA, the Montreal Convention, tort theories, or
27 California’s FAL or UCL. The Court also grants Plaintiffs’ motion to recover the cost of formal
] motion for a default judgment. If Plaintiffs intend to request the clerk enter a default against
2 || Avianca, they must so request by July 29, 2026.
3 This Order disposes of Docket Nos. 11, 13, 17, 19, 30, and 48.
4 IT IS SO ORDERED.
5 || Dated: July 15, 2026
7 ne
ACMUELINE SCOTT CORLE
8 United States District Judge
9
10
1]
a 12
13
14
15
16
17
Z 18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28