Jarrell

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

OCALA DIVISION

EMMANUEL JARRELL,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 5:26-cv-39-SPC-PRL

TRUIST BANK,

Defendant.

ORDER

This cause, upon referral,1 comes before the Court on an Amended Motion to Compel

Arbitration and to Stay Case (“Amended Motion to Compel Arbitration”) filed by Defendant

Truist Bank (“Defendant” or “Truist”). (Doc. 25).2 Plaintiff responded in opposition. (Doc.

29). With leave of Court, Defendant filed a reply brief in support of its Amended Motion to

Compel Arbitration. (Doc. 33). Upon due consideration, Defendant’s Amended Motion to

Compel Arbitration is granted, and the case is stayed pending arbitration.

1 “Because a motion to compel arbitration does not address the merits of the dispute but

merely changes the forum, it is a non-dispositive matter that does not require a report and

recommendation.” Eugene v. Ciox Health LLC, No. 2:24-cv-944-SPC-KCD, 2024 WL 4869504, at *1

n.3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2024) (citing Soriano v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 2:22-cv-197-SPC-KCD,

2022 WL 17551786, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 2022)).

2 Defendant initially moved to compel arbitration and stay the case on March 20, 2026. (Doc.

17). After Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (Doc. 22) on April 8, 2026, Defendant filed the instant

Amended Motion to Compel Arbitration (Doc. 25) on April 23, 2026.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 13, 2018, Plaintiff opened a bank account ending in 4424 (the

“Account”) with Truist’s predecessor, SunTrust Bank (“SunTrust”), and signed a Personal

Account Signature Card (“Signature Card”). (See Doc. 25 at p. 3; see also Doc. 25-1 at pp. 2,

5).3 The Signature Card stated that “[i]t is agreed that all transactions between the Bank and

the above signed shall be governed by the rules and regulations for this account and the above

signed hereby acknowledge(s) receipt of such rules and regulations and the funds availability

policy.” (See Doc. 25 at p. 3; see also Doc. 25-1 at p. 5)

Importantly, the Rules and Regulations for Deposit Accounts (“Rules and

Regulations”) governing the Account, provided that “[o]nce the Account is opened, you agree

to be bound by these rules and regulations and that the rules and regulations will continue to

govern your Account and your relationship with us even after your Account is closed.” (See

Doc. 25 at p. 3; see also Doc. 25-1 at pp. 2, 8). According to the Rules and Regulations

applicable to the Account at the time, the rules and regulations “may change from time to

time” and those updated rules and regulations will govern the Account. (See Doc. 25 at pp. 3-

4; see also Doc. 25-1 at p. 8). The original Rules and Regulations contained an Arbitration

Agreement and explained that a cardholder could opt out of the Arbitration Agreement by

sending a written notice within 45 days of opening the Account. (See Doc. 25 at p. 4; see also

Doc. 25-1 at pp. 3, 20-22). According to Truist, Plaintiff chose not to do so, as it has no record

of receipt of any written rejection or opt-out of the Arbitration Agreement associated with the

3 Defendant claims that Plaintiff “opened multiple deposit accounts” with Truist and

SunTrust, but Defendant does not provide any further information or context on these other accounts.

(See Doc. 25 at p. 2).

Account. (See Doc. 25 at p. 4; see also Doc. 25-1 at p. 3). Instead, Plaintiff kept the Account

open and continued to use it.

During Plaintiff’s use of the Account, the Rules and Regulations were updated in July

2020 to reflect SunTrust’s merger with BB&T to form Truist. (See Doc. 25 at p. 4; see also Doc.

25-1 at pp. 2-3, 46-103). Defendant sent notice of these changes to Plaintiff through his

account statements for the Account. (See Doc. 25 at p. 4; see also Doc. 25-1 at pp. 2-3, 36-40,

42-44). The updated Rules and Regulations contained an Arbitration Agreement, which

stated, in pertinent part, the following:

Claims Subject to Arbitration. A ‘Claim’ subject to arbitration is any claim,

dispute or controversy between you and us (other than an Excluded Claim or

Proceeding as set forth below), whether preexisting, present or future, which

arises out of or relates to the Account, these rules and regulations, any

transaction conducted with us in connection with the Account or these rules

and regulations, or our relationship. ‘Claim’ has the broadest possible meaning

and includes initial claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, third-party claims and

federal, state, local and administrative claims. It includes disputes based upon

contract, tort, consumer rights, fraud and other intentional torts, constitution,

statute, regulation, ordinance, common law and equity and includes claims for

money damages and injunctive or declaratory relief. ‘Claim’ also includes

disputes concerning communications involving telephones, cell phones,

automatic dialing systems, artificial or prerecorded voice messages, text

messages, emails or facsimile machines and alleged violations of the Telephone

Consumer Protection Act and other statutes or regulations involving

telemarketing. Upon the demand of you or us, Claim(s) will be resolved by

individual (not class or class-wide) binding arbitration in accordance with the

terms specified in this arbitration agreement.

Special Definition of ‘We,’ ‘Us’ and ‘Our.’ Solely for purposes of this

arbitration agreement, the terms ‘we,’ ‘us’ and ‘our[]’ . . . refer to SunTrust’s

employees, officers, directors, parents, controlling persons, subsidiaries,

affiliates, successors and assigns. ‘We,’ ‘us’ and ‘our’ also apply to third parties

if you assert a Claim against such third parties in connection with a Claim you

assert against us.

. . .

Class Action Waiver. Notwithstanding any other provision of these rules and

regulations, if either you or we elect to arbitrate a Claim, neither you nor we

will have the right: (a) to participate in a class action, private attorney general

action or other representative action in court or in arbitration, either as a class

representative or class member; or (b) to join or consolidate Claims with claims

of any other persons. . . .

Severability and Survival. This arbitration agreement shall survive the closing

of your Account and the termination of any relationship between us, including

the termination of these rules and regulations. . . .

(Doc. 25-1 at pp. 76-79). Plaintiff continued to use and maintain the Account by making

deposits and withdrawals after receiving notice of the changes to the Rules and Regulations

governing the Account. (See Doc. 25 at p. 5; see also Doc. 25-1 at pp. 3, 105-128). Plaintiff later

closed the Account on May 21, 2021. (See Doc. 25 at p. 5; see also Doc. 25-1 at p. 3).

Plaintiff initiated this putative class action against Defendant on January 18, 2026

(Doc. 1), and filed the operative amended complaint on April 8, 2026 (Doc. 22). In the

amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the Telephone Consumer

Protection Act (“TCPA”) by calling his cell phone about alleged debt owed using artificial or

prerecorded voice calls without his consent. (See Doc. 22 at ¶¶ 3-4, 13, 18-19, 29-31, 34, 66-

68). Plaintiff contends that he began receiving calls from Defendant in October 2025, and

despite requests for Defendant to stop the calls, Defendant allegedly continued to make calls

to Plaintiff in an effort to collect a purported debt. (See id. at ¶¶ 13-14, 20-23).

Defendant now moves to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate his claims on an individual basis

and stay the action pending arbitration, arguing that all requirements to compel arbitration

have been met. (Doc. 25). Specifically, Defendant contends that a valid Arbitration

Agreement exists, Plaintiff’s TCPA claims fall within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement,

there has been no waiver of the Arbitration Agreement, and the class action waiver in the

Arbitration Agreement is valid and enforceable. (See id. at pp. 10-16).

Plaintiff filed a response in opposition, arguing that his TCPA claims fall outside the

scope of the Arbitration Agreement because his claims do not arise out of or relate to his

“relationship” with Defendant, and that the class action waiver does not apply, since his

TCPA claims on behalf of a class are not arbitrable. (Doc. 29). With leave of Court, Defendant

filed a reply, explaining why the cases Plaintiff cited in his response are inapposite, and

contending that the question of whether Plaintiff consented to receive calls from Truist is an

issue for the arbitrator to decide, not the Court. (Doc. 33).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, generally governs the validity

and enforcement of arbitration agreements. See Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d

1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Under the FAA, arbitration agreements are

“valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for

the revocation of any contract[.]” See 9 U.S.C. § 2; Walthour v. Chipio Windshield Repair, LLC,

745 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2014). The FAA establishes “a liberal federal policy favoring

arbitration [agreements] and the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of

contract.” See Jones v. Waffle House, Inc., 866 F.3d 1257, 1263-64 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011)); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v.

Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S.

938, 943 (1995); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631

(1985) (recognizing that there is an “emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute

resolution”).

Section 4 of the FAA grants district courts the authority to compel arbitration once the

court is “satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply

therewith is not [a]n issue.” See 9 U.S.C. § 4. In considering whether to compel arbitration, a

court considers the following three factors: (1) “whether a valid written agreement to arbitrate

exists”; (2) “whether an arbitrable issue exists”; and (3) “whether the right to arbitrate has

been waived.” See Exceen v. Ramirez, No. 8:24-cv-00880-WFJ-AEP, 2024 WL 3327509, at *2

(M.D. Fla. June 13, 2024) (citing Williams v. Eddie Acardi Motor Co., No. 3:07-cv-782-J-32JRK,

2008 WL 686222, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2008)); Hilton v. Fluent, LLC, 297 F. Supp. 3d

1337, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2018).

Once a court is satisfied that a lawsuit involves an arbitrable dispute, the FAA provides

that a court must stay the action pending arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 3; Smith v. Spizzirri, 601

U.S. 472, 478 (2024) (“When a district court finds that a lawsuit involves an arbitrable dispute,

and a party requests a stay pending arbitration, § 3 of the FAA compels the court to stay the

proceeding.”); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 699 (11th Cir. 1992) (per

curiam) (“Upon finding that a claim is subject to an arbitration agreement, the court should

order that the action be stayed pending arbitration.”) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 3); Caley, 428 F.3d at

1368 (stating that “the FAA’s enforcement sections require a court to stay a proceeding where

the issue in the proceeding is referable to arbitration” under a written arbitration agreement)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., LLC,

No. 3:13-cv-576-J-34JFK, 2014 WL 757942, at *11 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2014) (“The Eleventh

Circuit has held that the proper course is to stay the proceedings rather than dismiss the

action.”) (citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Here, Plaintiff does not dispute that by opening the Account and signing the Signature

Card, he expressly agreed to the terms of the Rules and Regulations, which governed the

Account and included an Arbitration Agreement that he did not opt out of. Plaintiff contends

that his TCPA claims fall outside the scope of the Arbitration Agreement because his claims

do not arise out of or relate to any “relationship” he had with Defendant, but instead relate

to Defendant’s attempts to collect a third-party’s debt by calling his cell phone number

allegedly in violation of the TCPA. (See Doc. 29 at pp. 6-11).

The subject Arbitration Agreement provides that, among other things, “any claim,

dispute or controversy between you and us . . ., whether preexisting, present or future, which

arises out of or relates to . . . our relationship” must be “resolved by individual (not class or

class-wide) binding arbitration[.]” (See Doc. 25-1 at p. 76). The Arbitration Agreement defines

the term “claim” with the “broadest possible meaning” to include “disputes concerning

communications involving telephones, cell phones, automatic dialing systems, artificial or

prerecorded voice messages, text messages, emails or facsimile machines and alleged

violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act . . . involving telemarketing.” (See id.).

The Arbitration Agreement also states that “[t]his arbitration agreement shall survive the

closing of your Account and the termination of any relationship between us[.]” (See id. at p.

78).

When determining whether a dispute is subject to an arbitration agreement, “[a]bsent

some ambiguity in the agreement, . . . it is the language of the contract that defines the scope

of disputes subject to arbitration.” See E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002)

(citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995)); see also All. Metals.

Inc. v. Hinely Indus., Inc., 222 F.3d 895, 903 (11th Cir. 2000) (“When parties define the terms

used in a contract, those definitions govern the construction of the contract.”) (citations

omitted). Courts must then “consider how the factual allegations in the complaint match up

with the causes of action asserted and measure that against the language of the arbitration

clause” to determine if the claims are within the scope of the arbitration agreement. See Doe

v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1220 n.13 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Mitsubishi Motors

Corp., 473 U.S. at 626).

“[F]ederal courts interpret arbitration clauses broadly where possible,” and “any

doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”

See Solymar Invs., Ltd. v. Banco Santander S.A., 672 F.3d 981, 988-89 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting

First Options of Chicago, Inc., 514 U.S. at 945); Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 626 (stating

that courts are to construe “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues . . . in favor

of arbitration”). Where an arbitration clause is broad, there is a heightened presumption of

arbitrability such that “[i]n the absence of any express provision excluding a particular

grievance from arbitration, . . . only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the

claim from arbitration can prevail.” See AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475

U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S.

574, 585-85 (1960)).

To further the FAA’s purpose of “guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual

arrangements,” arbitration agreements must be interpreted consistent with “the clear intent

of the parties.” See E.E.O.C., 534 U.S. at 294. Indeed, where an agreement “evidence[s] a clear

intent to cover more than just those matters set forth in the contract,” the Eleventh Circuit

has upheld and enforced broad clauses requiring arbitration of “all disputes between the

parties to the agreement.” See Bd. of Tr. of City of Delray Beach Police & Firefighters Ret. Sys. v.

Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 622 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted); Int’l

Underwriters AG v. Triple I: Int’l Invs., Inc., 533 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining

that “an arbitration clause in an agreement sometimes can require arbitration of a dispute

arising not from the agreement itself but from another source, including another agreement,”

so long as “the arbitration clause applies to the dispute at issue”); Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin.

Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1221-22 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that an arbitration provision to

arbitrate “all claims between the parties” was not overly broad or vague and applied not just

to claims arising out of the parties’ contract). In short, “[a] party cannot avoid arbitration . . .

because the arbitration clause uses general, inclusive language, rather than listing every

possible specific claim.” See Brown, 211 F.3d at 1221.

In this case, Plaintiff’s TCPA claims fall within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement

because the arbitration provision is broad and expressly extends to any “relationship” Plaintiff

has, or had, with Defendant. First, the Arbitration Agreement is broadly drafted to cover

Plaintiff’s TCPA claims against Defendant. (See Doc. 25-1 at p. 76) (encompassing “any

claim, dispute or controversy between” Plaintiff and Defendant, including alleged violations

of the TCPA, which “arises out of or relates to” Plaintiff’s “relationship” with Defendant);

Brown, 211 F.3d at 1220-21 (construing arbitration provision with similarly inclusive

language—“any dispute between them or claim by either against the other,” and holding that

“the parties agreed to arbitrate any and all claims against each other, with no exceptions”);

Neal v. Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 918 F.2d 34, 38 (5th Cir. 1990) (explaining that a broad

arbitration clause covering “any and all disputes” inescapably means that the arbitration

provision was intended to “reach all aspects of the parties’ relationship”); see, e.g., Drozdowski

v. Citibank, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-2786-STA-CGC, 2016 WL 4544543, at *6-8 (W.D. Tenn. Aug.

31, 2016) (determining that an arbitration clause covering “[a]ll Claims relating to your

account, a prior related account, or our relationship” was broad and governed plaintiffs’

TCPA claims, even though the bank’s calls to one spouse related to an account held solely by

the other spouse); Garcia v. Kendall Lakes Auto., LLC, No. 18-24397, 2019 WL 1359475, at *7

(S.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2019) (finding that the arbitration provision covering claims “arising out

of or relating to” the Retail Buyers Order or “the parties relationship” was broad and covered

the issues raised in plaintiff’s complaint); Cara’s Notions, Inc. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 140 F.3d

566, 571 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding that an arbitration clause covering “[a]ny controversy or

claim” relating to “any aspects of the relationship” between the parties was very broad and

applied to all conflicts between the parties).

Further, despite Plaintiff’s contention that he closed the Account several years ago (see

Doc. 29 at pp. 3-4, 8, 10), the Arbitration Agreement is still valid and enforceable against

Plaintiff’s TCPA claims, as it explicitly includes a survival and severability clause, providing

that the subject arbitration agreement survives the closing of Plaintiff’s Account and

termination of any relationship between the parties. (See Doc. 25-1 at pp. 78-79); see, e.g.,

Garcia, 2019 WL 1359475, at *5-6 (concluding that plaintiff’s TCPA claim, which was based

on post-agreement conduct, was within the scope of the arbitration clause that explicitly stated

it survived termination of the contract); Shea v. BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-

23324-KMM, 2013 WL 869526, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 7, 2013) (noting that if the court were

to decide defendant’s motion to compel arbitration on the merits, it would find the arbitration

provision valid and enforceable against plaintiff’s TCPA claim based on the express language

providing that “[t]his arbitration provision shall survive termination of this Agreement and

the closing of your Account”).

Second, Plaintiff’s TCPA claims relate to his relationship with Defendant, as

contemplated by the arbitration provision. (See Doc. 25-1 at p. 76). As noted above, Plaintiff

opened the Account and signed the Signature Card in 2018, and continued to use the Account

after the Rules and Regulations were updated in July 2020 to reflect SunTrust’s merger with

BB&T to form Truist. (See Doc. 25-1 at pp. 2-3, 5, 105-128). In the amended complaint,

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by “using an artificial

or prerecorded voice in connection with calls it placed to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number

and the cellular telephone numbers of the members of the class, without consent.” (See Doc.

22 at ¶ 66). TCPA claims rely on the claimant not having consented to the calls. While

Plaintiff alleges that he did not give consent for the specific calls at issue, his TCPA claims

still implicate his relationship with Defendant, as it is undisputed that Plaintiff agreed to the

terms of the Rules and Regulations, which governed the Account and contained a broad

arbitration provision explicitly stating that any claim relating to “our relationship” (including

alleged violations of the TCPA) must be resolved by individual binding arbitration. (See Doc.

25-1 at p. 76); Drozdowski, 2016 WL 4544543, at *6-8 (finding that plaintiff Monika

Drozdowski, who sued Citibank, alleging TCPA violations for calls she received about her

husband’s alleged debt on his account, had an account with Citibank which subjected her to

arbitration for claims concerning her “relationship” with Citibank); see also Princess Cruise

Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d at 1218 (stating that “related to” language in an arbitration provision

requires some direct connection between the dispute and the agreement).

As Defendant correctly notes, in defending against Plaintiff’s TCPA claims, questions

concerning Plaintiff’s possible consent will necessarily arise, which implicate Plaintiff’s

“relationship” with Defendant. See Carr v. Citibank, N.A., No. 15-cv-6993 (SAS), 2015 WL

9598797, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2015) (explaining that “[t]he Card Agreement

contemplate[d] the arbitration of any claim related to the parties’ relationship,” and that issues

of consent in TCPA claims “undeniably implicate[] the parties’ relationship with each

other”); see also Osorio v. State Farm Bank, F.S.B., 746 F.3d 1242, 1253 (11th Cir. 2014)

(recognizing the “consent exception” within the TCPA).4 Because questions of consent relate

to Plaintiff’s relationship with Defendant and ultimately go to the merits of Plaintiff’s TCPA

claims, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant must be arbitrated. See AT&T Techs., Inc., 475

U.S. at 649 (“[I]n deciding whether the parties have agreed to submit a particular grievance

to arbitration, a court is not to rule on the potential merits of the underlying claims.”); see also

Carr, 2015 WL 9598797, at *3 (“[E]ven claims that merely ‘implicate’ parties rights and

obligations under an agreement are subject to arbitration.”) (citing Collins & Aikman Prods. Co.

v. Bldg. Sys., Inc., 58 F.3d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1995)). Such a conclusion is consistent with the

FAA’s goal of enforcing valid arbitration agreements.

4 To the extent Plaintiff challenges such consent, and to the extent this raises any unresolved

ambiguities regarding whether Plaintiff’s claim falls within the scope of the arbitration provision, the

Court points to the well-settled federal policy requiring that “[a]ny doubts concerning the scope of

arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S.

at 24-25; Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 631 (recognizing that there is an “emphatic federal policy

in favor of arbitral dispute resolution”); Sullivan v. Navient Sols., LLC, No. 6:18-cv-1225-ORL-37LRH,

2019 WL 13245871, at *5 n.7 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 2019) (“[I]n accordance with U.S. Supreme Court

precedent, even if there is a dispute concerning the scope of arbitrable issues, the Court is to resolve it

in favor of arbitration. . . . for an arbitrator to decide.”) (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at

24-25).

As a final matter, the subject Arbitration Agreement contains a class action waiver

providing that “neither you nor we will have the right . . . to participate in a class action . . .

in court or in arbitration, either as a class representative or class member[.]” (See Doc. 25-1 at

p. 77). Plaintiff contends that the class action waiver does not apply because his TCPA claims

are not arbitrable. (See Doc. 29 at p. 11). “The overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure

the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms[.]” Concepcion, 563 U.S. at

344. The Eleventh Circuit has “regularly enforced arbitration agreements that contain class

action waivers.” See Otis v. Arise Virtual Sols., Inc., No. 12-62143-CIV, 2013 WL 12106056, at

*4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2013) (collecting cases).

Because the Court finds that the arbitration provision applies to Plaintiff’s claims,

Plaintiff must pursue his claims against Defendant on an individual, non-class basis pursuant

to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement. See Kline v. Getaround, Inc., No. 3:23-cv-06113-

MCR-ZCB, 2023 WL 9325764, at *1 (N.D. Fla. July 5, 2023) (stating that plaintiff “must

individually pursue her claims [brought under the TCPA and the Florida Telephone

Solicitation Act] against [defendant] according to the arbitration procedures established in the

arbitration agreement”) (citing Otis, 2013 WL 12106056, at *4); Shea, 2013 WL 869526, at *3

n.7 (compelling plaintiff’s claims brought under the TCPA to arbitration on an individualized

basis).

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:

(1) Defendant’s Amended Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Case (Doc. 25)

is GRANTED. The parties shall submit all claims to binding arbitration in

accordance with the Arbitration Agreement.

(2) This case is STAYED pending arbitration. On or before October 16, 2026, and

every 90 days thereafter, Defendant Truist Bank shall file a report as to the status

of the arbitration proceeding. Additionally, Defendant Truist Bank shall notify this

Court within 10 days of the final resolution of the arbitration proceeding or other

resolution of this dispute.

(3) The Clerk is directed to administratively close this case.

(4) Defendant’s earlier Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Case (Doc. 17) is

DENIED as moot.

DONE and ORDERED in Ocala, Florida on July 20, 2026.

)

PL ros

PHILIP R. LAMMENS

United States Magistrate Judge

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Parties

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