The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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TEMIMA SPETNER et al.,
Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM & ORDER
19-CV-5 (EK)(JAM)
-against-
PALESTINE INVESTMENT BANK,
Defendant.
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ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:
The plaintiffs in this case are American victims of
terrorist attacks, their families, and their estates. They
allege that defendant Palestine Investment Bank (“PIB”)
facilitated the transfer of U.S. dollar-denominated funds to
terrorist groups. These funds included “martyr payments” made
by terrorist groups to the families of suicide bombers that
incentivized and rewarded such attacks. Plaintiffs bring claims
under several provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, as amended
by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act.
PIB has moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, and for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction as to certain plaintiffs’ claims. For the reasons
that follow, the claims brought by the plaintiffs who are
foreign-resident relatives of surviving American victims are
dismissed, as the statutes provide them no cause of action.
Count I — asserting that PIB is liable for conspiring to provide
material support to terrorists — is also dismissed, as the
complaint does not plausibly allege that PIB entered a
conspiracy. Lastly, Count III — alleging that PIB aided and
abetted the terror attacks at issue — is dismissed because the
complaint does not plausibly plead that PIB intended to
facilitate those attacks. PIB’s motion is otherwise denied:
Count II may proceed because plaintiffs have plausibly pled that
PIB knowingly provided material support to terrorists.
Background
This is the second time this case has come before the
Court on a motion to dismiss. Previously, the Court determined
that plaintiffs had not established personal jurisdiction over
PIB, and dismissed the case on that basis. See generally Mem. &
Order, ECF No. 53. The Second Circuit reversed and remanded,
holding that New York’s long-arm statute reached PIB and that
exercise of long-arm jurisdiction comported with due process.
See Spetner v. Palestine Inv. Bank, 70 F.4th 632 (2d Cir. 2023).
The facts were recited in this Court’s prior order; familiarity
with them is assumed.
To briefly summarize, we assume the following
allegations to be true. The terrorist attacks at issue occurred
in Israel during the Second Intifada, between November 2001 and
October 2002. The complaint describes multiple murders of
civilians and grievous injuries inflicted on other civilians.
Plaintiffs allege that these attacks were incentivized by Saddam
Hussein, who diverted money sent to Iraq under the United
Nations’ “humanitarian” Oil-for-Food Program to pay the families
of terrorists killed in suicide missions. See Third Am. Compl.
(“TAC”) ¶¶ 596-600, ECF. No. 78.
As explained in the Court’s prior order, PIB allegedly
facilitated these “martyr payments” through the account of a
customer, Rakad Salem. Salem led an organization called the
Arab Liberation Front (“ALF”), the Palestinian proxy for Saddam
Hussein’s regime. TAC ¶ 2. Plaintiffs attach copies of two
checks dated January 22, 2002, allegedly drawn on Salem’s
account at PIB, in the amount of $15,000 each. See id. Ex. A.
These are made out to the families of two suicide bombers who
carried out the Ben Yehuda Street attack in Jerusalem on
December 1, 2001. Both checks are marked with the notation
“martyr” in Arabic.1 See id.
Plaintiffs allege that PIB employees “manually
reviewed checks,” as “banks must review checks to process them”
and “[optical character recognition] technology could not,” at
that time, “accurately process handwriting.” Id. ¶ 552 n.15.
1 Also attached to the Complaint are two checks drawn on the same
account at PIB, in the amount of $10,000 each, which are marked with the same
notation. See TAC Ex. A. The Complaint does not connect these two payments
to any of the specific attacks that injured plaintiffs.
ALF handed out checks like these at well-attended ceremonies
that were reported on widely in the Palestinian press and
elsewhere. See id. ¶¶ 512-25. These ceremonies “focused on
incentivizing and glorifying terrorism . . . and often involved”
families receiving certificates “on behalf of Saddam Hussein” as
well as checks issued by PIB. Id. ¶ 533.
Based on PIB’s alleged role in processing martyr
payments and other funds transfers, plaintiffs bring claims
under the Anti-Terrorism Act (“ATA”), as amended by the Justice
Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (“JASTA”). 18 U.S.C.
§ 2333(a) and (d). Plaintiffs bring two “primary liability”
claims against PIB under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), alleging that the
bank both conspired to commit, and actually committed, the
offense of providing material support for international
terrorism. Plaintiffs also bring a “secondary liability” claim
under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d), alleging that PIB aided and abetted
the terrorist groups that perpetrated the attacks detailed in
the complaint. TAC ¶ 840.
After oral argument, PIB claimed it could not have
processed the attached “martyr” checks because the checks lacked
the stamps that would indicate PIB had done so. Def.’s Ltr. in
Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Third Am. Compl. (“Ltr. Br.”) 2, ECF
No. 80. PIB submitted what it says are the “actual” versions of
the checks Plaintiff attached. Id.; ECF No. 80-2 (“PIB
Checks”). The documents submitted by PIB do not include the
“martyr” designation. See PIB Checks. PIB has also provided a
declaration from its internal audit manager, indicating that PIB
checks did not include a memo line, and that PIB did not process
the checks plaintiffs provided. Aghbar Decl. ¶¶ 27, 29, ECF No.
80-1. For now, however, the Court will not consider the
documents PIB has provided. See Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp.,
Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[I]t is not our task at
the motion to dismiss stage to weigh the evidence and evaluate
the likelihood that [the plaintiff] would prevail[.]”).
Standard of Review
“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court
lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.”
Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000).2
The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. One component of federal jurisdiction is
standing to sue. In that regard, the plaintiff is obligated to
“demonstrate standing for each claim that they press and for
each form of relief that they seek.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,
594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021). In assessing the standing question at
the motion-to-dismiss stage, the Court takes all uncontroverted
2 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order
accepts all alterations and omits all citations, footnotes, and internal
quotation marks.
facts in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable
inferences therefrom in favor of the plaintiff. Fountain v.
Karim, 838 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2016).
To overcome a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a
complaint must plead facts sufficient “to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially
plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). The district court must accept all factual
allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See Lundy v. Catholic
Health Sys. Of Long Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir.
2013). However, the court need not construe legal conclusions
dressed as facts in favor of the plaintiff. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 663 (“[T]he tenet that a court must accept a complaint’s
allegations as true is inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a
cause of action’s elements, supported by mere conclusory
statements.”).
Discussion
Because subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold
matter, we begin there. We then proceed to consider whether the
complaint plausibly states a claim.
A. Standing Disputes
PIB has moved to dismiss the claims of two sets of
plaintiffs for lack of standing. First, PIB has moved to
dismiss all claims brought by members of the Steinherz family.
PIB argues that the Steinherz family has not adequately alleged
that their injuries are fairly traceable to PIB’s conduct (or to
a terror attack at all).
Second, several plaintiffs are foreign-national
relatives of American nationals who were injured in — but
survived — terror attacks. PIB argues that the ATA provides no
cause of action for these plaintiffs. Though PIB refers to
“standing” on this issue, their arguments actually invoke what
has been termed the “misleading” concept of “statutory standing”
— that is, “whether the particular plaintiff has a cause of
action under the statute.” Am. Psychiatric Ass’n v. Anthem
Health Plans, Inc., 821 F.3d 352, 359 (2d Cir. 2016). This
argument does not implicate Article III.
The first motion is denied; the second is granted.
1. The Steinherz Family Claims (Altea, Jonathan,
Temima, Joseph, Peter, and Laurel Steinherz)
PIB challenges the Steinherz family’s Article III
standing, arguing that their injuries are not “fairly traceable”
to terror attacks “or PIB’s conduct.” Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of
Mot. to Dismiss Second Am. Compl. (“Def.’s Br.”) 42-43, ECF No.
70-1.3 Plaintiffs Altea Steinherz and her husband Jonathan were
at a restaurant in December 2001. TAC ¶ 78. After two bombs
exploded nearby, they left to walk home, thinking the bombing
had ended. Id. ¶ 80. While walking home, they “saw a crazed-
looking man run past them.” Id. ¶ 81. Thinking this individual
might be a terrorist, Altea turned to flee. Id. She fell while
running and broke her arm. Id. ¶ 82. Jonathan “felt tremendous
anxiety and stress, had significant difficulty sleeping, and
underwent psychological counseling.” Id. ¶ 87. Other members
of the Steinherz family — Temima, Joseph, Peter, and Laurel —
suffered “mental anguish and extreme emotional distress” as a
result of the attack. Id. ¶¶ 91, 93, 96. The complaint does
not allege that these four plaintiffs were at the scene of any
attack.
PIB argues that the complaint does not identify the
“crazed-looking man” as a beneficiary of PIB’s services, or even
as a terrorist. Def.’s Br. 42-43.
Altea has met the relatively low bar to establish
traceability at this point. Traceability requires a plaintiff
to plead “that the injury was likely caused by the defendant.”
TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 423. However, “[t]he fairly traceable
3 The TAC is the operative complaint. However, when it was filed, the
motion to dismiss for the second amended complaint was already fully briefed.
The Court directed the parties to brief only the new allegations. This Order
therefore draws from briefs submitted in connection with both motions to
dismiss.
standard is lower than that of proximate cause.” Rothstein v.
UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2013). And substantiating
traceability is “a burden that is relatively modest at the
motion-to-dismiss stage.” Moreira v. Societe Generale, S.A.,
125 F.4th 371, 386 (2d Cir. 2025).
As discussed below, plaintiffs have plausibly alleged
that PIB facilitated the transfer of money to pay suicide
bombers. Taking the complaint’s allegations as true, Altea fell
in the chaos and aftermath of a coordinated suicide attack.
Such injury, indirect as it may be, suffices for traceability
purposes. See Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 47,
55-56 (2d Cir. 2016) (“A defendant’s conduct that injures a
plaintiff but does so only indirectly, after intervening conduct
by another person, may suffice for Article III standing.”).
As one court explained when considering a similar
motion to dismiss claims by the Steinherz family, “the very
nature of terrorism is the use of violence or the threat of
violence to create a climate of fear in a population, impacting
the psyches of all those around the event not just the immediate
victims.” Averbach v. Cairo Amman Bank, No. 19-CV-4, 2020 WL
486860, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2020), report and
recommendation adopted sub nom. Averbach for Est. of Averbach v.
Cairo Amman Bank, 2020 WL 1130733 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2020).
It is for this reason that the remaining members of
the Steinherz family have plausibly alleged traceability as
well. “[A] terrorist attack — by its nature — is directed not
only at the victim but also at the victims’ families.” Est. of
Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 659 F. Supp. 2d 20, 27
(D.D.C. 2009). Courts consistently hold that the ATA allows
family members who were not present at the scene of an attack to
recover for emotional distress. See Raanan v. Binance Holdings
Ltd., No. 24-CV-697, 2025 WL 605594, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25,
2025) (collecting examples).
Thus, the Steinherz family members have, at this
stage, established standing. PIB’s motion to dismiss their
claims is denied.
2. Claims of Foreign Relatives of Victims
Six plaintiffs are non-U.S. national family members of
Steven Braun, a plaintiff who was injured in a suicide bombing
but survived. TAC ¶¶ 184-99.4 The complaint also includes
claims brought by Revital Bauer, a non-U.S. national, who is the
wife and mother to two other plaintiffs injured in a suicide
bombing. Id. ¶¶ 382-87.
4 The ATA defines “national of the United States” as “(A) a citizen of
the United States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the United
States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 2331(2)
(incorporating 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22)).
These seven non-U.S. nationals must be dismissed. The
ATA provides a cause of action for “[a]ny national of the United
States injured in his or her person, property, or business by
reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her
estate, survivors, or heirs.” 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (emphasis
added). These non-U.S. nationals are neither survivors, nor
heirs, of American nationals.5 Thus, the plain text of the ATA
does not allow them to proceed. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC,
584 U.S. 241, 267 (2018) (explaining that the ATA “excludes
[non-U.S.] nationals (with the possible exception of foreign
survivors or heirs)” from its cause of action). In fact,
several of these seven plaintiffs were dismissed for similar
reasons in a different case. See Miller v. Arab Bank, PLC, 372
F. Supp. 3d 33, 42 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
Plaintiffs ask the Court to conclude that the ATA
“intends to reach the family members of a U.S. national
. . . regardless of citizenship.” Pls.’ Opp. 44, ECF No. 71.
But because “the statute’s language is plain,” “that
is . . . where the inquiry should end.” Culbertson v.
Berryhill, 586 U.S. 53, 58 (2019) (interpreting 42 U.S.C.
§ 406(b)(1)(A)). And the pre-Jesner authority that plaintiffs
5 As to the Brauns, Steven Braun, an American national, was injured in a
suicide bombing. TAC ¶¶ 184-186. He is a plaintiff in this case. Id.
¶ 184. And as to Ms. Bauer, Alan and Yehonaton Bauer, American nationals,
were injured in a suicide bombing in 2002. Id. ¶¶ 370-381. They are both
plaintiffs in this case. Id. ¶¶ 370-71.
cite is not persuasive. For example, plaintiffs cite a case in
which the plaintiffs were U.S. nationals and were suing for
“emotional distress and loss of consortium, after their family
members, who were not U.S. nationals, became victims of acts of
international terrorism.” Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp.
2d 571, 589 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). That case is inapposite.
So too is Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 453 F.
Supp. 2d 609, 620 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). There, the non-U.S. national
plaintiffs “sufficiently alleged that they [were] the heirs or
survivors of U.S. nationals.” Id. That case did not involve
victims who survived terrorist attacks. Of course, “under the
ATA, someone who survived the attack . . . has no ‘survivors’ or
‘heirs’ that can recover for his injuries on his behalf.”
Miller, 372 F. Supp. 3d at 41.
B. Primary Liability Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a)
The ATA provides a private right of action for
American nationals “injured . . . by reason of an act of
international terrorism.” 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). To survive a
motion to dismiss, a primary liability claim “must allege: (1)
an injury to a U.S. national, (2) an act of international
terrorism [perpetrated by the defendant], and (3) causation.”
Freeman v. HSBC Holdings PLC, 413 F. Supp. 3d 67, 82 (E.D.N.Y.
2019). Plaintiffs allege that PIB’s financial services
constituted acts of international terrorism.
PIB acknowledges that the complaint alleges injuries
to U.S. nationals, but disputes both that its financial services
meet the elements of international terrorism and that they
caused the plaintiffs’ injuries.
1. An Act of International Terrorism
To qualify as international terrorism, PIB’s alleged
conduct “must satisfy four separate requirements: (1) it must
involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life; (2) it
must qualify as a violation of the criminal laws of the United
States or of any State if it were committed within a United
States jurisdiction; (3) it must appear to be intended to
intimidate a civilian population, influence government policy,
or affect the conduct of government by certain specified means;
and (4) it must occur primarily outside the United States or
transcend national boundaries.” Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese
Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 68 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing
18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A)–(C)).
Plaintiffs submit that PIB’s financial services give
rise to two predicate violations satisfying the second element:
(i) knowingly providing material support for terrorist attacks
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, and (ii) conspiring to
provide such support.
a. Provision of Material Support to Terrorists
(Count II)
First, plaintiffs argue that the complaint plausibly
pleads an act of international terrorism predicated on knowing
material support for terrorist attacks under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A.
i. PIB’s alleged conduct plausibly
involved acts dangerous to human life.
The Second Circuit has instructed that “providing
routine financial services to members and associates of
terrorist organizations” is not enough to “compel a finding that
as a matter of law, the services [are] violent or life-
endangering acts that appeared intended to intimidate or coerce
civilians or to influence or affect governments.” Linde v. Arab
Bank, PLC, 882 F.3d 314, 327 (2d Cir. 2018). PIB argues that
its services to Salem were of this routine sort. See Def.’s
Br. 20.
But the Second Circuit has recognized that the type of
payments at issue here, even if routine, can constitute acts of
terrorism. In Linde, the Second Circuit recognized that a bank
processing transfers “explicitly identified as payments for
suicide bombings” could be held liable under Section 2333(a)
because a jury could find that they were life-endangering acts.
Id. at 321, 327.
In Linde, the bank manually processed transfers “As
Per the Request of the Saudi Committee For Support of the
Intifada Al Quds” to the families of those killed in what the
request called “martyrdom operations.” Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC,
97 F. Supp. 3d 287, 304-05 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated on other
grounds, 882 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2018). As the Circuit has since
explained, “[t]he evidence in Linde thus sufficed to present a
triable issue as to whether [the bank] had committed an act of
international terrorism by processing transfers that involve
violence and that appear to intend intimidation or coercion of a
population or government.” Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank,
PLC, 993 F.3d 144, 162 (2d Cir. 2021).
Since Linde, “numerous district court cases . . . have
suggested that primary liability may still lie where banking
services are directed at a specifically identifiable violent or
dangerous act.” King v. Habib Bank Ltd., No. 20-CV-4322, 2022
WL 4537849, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2022) (collecting cases).
Here, the complaint pleads that two checks drawn from
Salem’s account bore the notation of “martyr.” PIB Checks.
Those checks are made out to the families of two suicide
bombers. Thus, plaintiffs have plausibly pled that the services
were explicitly identified as involving discrete acts of
violence.
ii. PIB’s provision of financial services
qualifies as a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339A.
To satisfy an act of international terrorism’s second
element, plaintiffs allege that PIB’s provision of financial
services qualifies as a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A.
Section 2339A criminalizes “provid[ing] material
support . . . knowing or intending that [it is] to be used in
preparation for, or in carrying out” violations of various
enumerated criminal statutes. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a). One such
statute that plaintiffs point to — 18 U.S.C. § 2332 — penalizes
the “kill[ing] a national of the United States, while such
national is outside the United States.” To prevail at this
stage, plaintiffs must plausibly plead that PIB (a) provided
material support and (b) knew or intended that its material
support be used to prepare for, or carry out, a violation of an
enumerated statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a). As to the first
element, “material support” to terrorists includes the provision
of “financial services.” Id. § 2339A(b)(1). PIB argues that
the complaint does not plausibly allege that it knew or intended
the checks would be used to facilitate a crime. See Def.’s Br.
12-15.
On this point, Section 2339A’s use of “or” is
noteworthy: while Title 18 violations generally require
knowledge and intent, this one explicitly requires only one or
the other. With that in mind, plaintiffs have met their burden
at this stage. The complaint attaches checks made out to the
families of suicide bombers in Palestine, which (as discussed
above) included the “martyr” notations. They have also
plausibly alleged that PIB employees would have seen these
checks when processing them — among other things, the lack of
optical character recognition meant that the checks would have
had to have been reviewed manually. TAC ¶ 552 n.15. The
knowledge of these employees is imputed to PIB because “manually
reviewing . . . the memorandum line,” id., plausibly fell within
the scope of their duties. See Restatement (Third) of Agency
§ 5.03 cmt. c (2006); cf. Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 636
(2d Cir. 1997) (“An official’s actual or constructive knowledge
. . . will be imputed to the employer when principles of agency
law so dictate.”).
Taking these allegations together, the plaintiffs have
plausibly pled that PIB knew the financial services it provided
Salem would be used to incentivize terrorist attacks. Whether
the checks did not actually indicate that they were for
“martyrs,” as PIB contends, is an issue that involves a factual
dispute that cannot be resolved on the motion to dismiss. See
Ltr. Br. 1.
PIB cites Ahmad v. Christian Friends of Israeli
Communities, No. 13-CV-3376, 2014 WL 1796322 (S.D.N.Y. May 5,
2014), aff’d, 600 F. App’x 800 (2d Cir. 2015), for the
contention that Section 2339A’s knowledge requirement “cannot be
satisfied unless PIB knew that Salem had publicly stated
terrorist goals or was an associate of an established terrorist
organization.” Ltr. Br. 4. But this misreads Ahmad, which
described this knowledge as a type of evidence “from which a
finder of fact could conclude that the defendant either knew, or
was deliberately indifferent to the possibility, that it was
supporting international terrorism.” 2014 WL 1796322, at *3.
Ahmad explained that plaintiffs “allege[d] no facts suggesting
that Defendants were aware — or even deliberately indifferent to
the possibility — that the financial support they provided to
[the purported terrorists] would be used to support any violent
activity.” Id. That is not so here. And, in any event,
plaintiffs do allege that Salem’s affiliations were common
knowledge. See Compl. ¶ 823 (“[PIB] knew Rakad Salem was the
well-known leader of the ALF, a group well-known for its
financial support for terrorist operatives.”).
iii. PIB’s life-endangering acts plausibly
“appear” intended to intimidate a
civilian population.
Finally, just as we cannot conclude that PIB’s
financial services did not “involve . . . acts dangerous to
human life,” neither can we conclude — at this stage — that
PIB’s alleged conduct did not “appear to be intended to
intimidate a civilian population.” Licci, 673 F.3d at 68.
“Whether a defendant appeared to have intended its activities to
intimidate or coerce is not a question of the defendant’s
subjective intent but rather a question of what its intent
objectively appeared to be.” Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank,
PLC, 993 F.3d at 161. And that question “depends on whether the
consequences of the defendant’s activities were reasonably
foreseeable.” Id. The complaint plausibly pleads that PIB
facilitated payments explicitly identified for suicide bombings,
attacks which foreseeably and “objectively would appear intended
to intimidate a population or government.” Id. at 162.
For the foregoing reasons, and because PIB’s alleged
conduct took place primarily outside the United States —
satisfying the act of international terrorism’s fourth element —
Plaintiffs have met their burden, at this stage, to allege an
act of international terrorism premised on the violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2339A.
b. Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to
Terrorists (Count I)
In addition to their primary liability claim
predicated on material support for terrorism under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339A, plaintiffs also bring a primary liability claim
alleging that PIB conspired to do the same.
“The crux of any conspiracy is an agreement between
the co-conspirators.” Kemper v. Deutsche Bank AG, 911 F.3d 383,
395 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Ocasio v. United States, 578 U.S.
282, 286 (2016)). Although “a conspirator need not agree to
commit or facilitate each and every part of the substantive
offense,” she must “reach an agreement with the specific intent
that” the conspiratorial goal be completed. Ocasio, 578 U.S. at
288 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Svoboda, 347
F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he fundamental legal question
is . . . whether the evidence establishes . . . an agreement
with others with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the scheme
and with the specific intent to aid in the accomplishment of
those unlawful ends.”).
This requirement of specific intent marks a meaningful
distinction between this count and the underlying material
support count that required only a showing of knowledge or
intent.
Moreover, plaintiffs’ plausible allegation of the
fourth element of an act of international terrorism — that PIB’s
conduct “appear[ed] to be intended to intimidate a civilian
population” — does not necessarily suffice to plausibly allege
specific intent to join a conspiracy. The two inquiries require
different factual allegations. The Circuit has held that
international terrorism’s fourth element implicates a
defendant’s objective intent and is satisfied when the
“consequences of the defendant’s activities were reasonably
foreseeable.” Weiss, 993 F.3d at 161. Whether a defendant
intends to join a conspiracy is a question of subjective intent
— what the defendant actually intended. See United States v.
Morgan, 385 F.3d 196, 206 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Conspiracy is a
specific intent crime.”). A defendant’s conduct can therefore
‘appear to be intended to intimidate a civilian population’
without the defendant actually intending to do so — a fine
distinction, perhaps, but an important one all the same.
Indeed, “[p]roof that [a] defendant knew that some crime would
be committed is not enough” to sustain a conspiracy conviction.
United States v. Rodriguez, 392 F.3d 539, 545 (2d Cir. 2004).
Here, plaintiffs purport to allege a conspiracy among
Saddam Hussein’s regime, the ALF, Salem, and PIB to incentivize
and reward suicide attacks. The complaint alleges that PIB
“knowingly accepted U.S. dollar-denominated assets from Iraqi
regime-controlled banks” in Jordan and transferred them to
Salem’s account. TAC ¶ 821. It further alleges that PIB knew
Salem “was distributing and providing” checks to “terrorist
operatives and their families” and that Salem “was the well-
known leader of the ALF.” Id. ¶¶ 822-23. Relying on media
reports, the complaint alleges that ALF was “well-known” for
“distributing checks with certificates describing their
purpose.” Id. ¶ 823. “For the same reasons,” that is, that PIB
knew that payments were being made in exchange for suicide
bombings, the complaint also alleges that PIB “knew and agreed
to serve as the mechanism” whereby the Hussein regime “made U.S.
dollar-denominated payments to reward and incentivize suicide
terrorist attacks.” Id. ¶ 824 (emphasis added).6
But this all would plausibly establish — at most —
that PIB knew about the conspiracy. The conclusion that PIB
agreed to join the conspiracy or that it sought to “promote [the
illegal] venture” does not follow from the facts plaintiffs have
alleged. See United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d
Cir. 1940). At best, plaintiffs have alleged that PIB’s conduct
is consistent with a conspiracy because that conduct furthered
the interests of the other purported conspiracy members. That
is not enough. “Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest
conspiracy, and a conclusory allegation of agreement at some
unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to show
illegality. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57.
6 The complaint also alleges PIB “worked with [the Arab Jordan
Investment Bank] to ‘break the sanctions’ to ‘transfer money from Iraq.’”
Id. ¶ 600 (quoting Justin Huggler, Palestinians Mourn Fall of Their Hero
Saddam After Flow of Dollars for ‘Martyrs’ Dries Up, THE INDEPENDENT (May 7,
2003), https://perma.cc/Y859-RJUH). The quoted article, however, makes no
such assertion. At most, it says that some Jordanian banks coordinated with
entities in Palestine to circumvent sanctions against Iraq. The article does
not speak to PIB’s conduct and therefore does not render plaintiffs’ relevant
allegation plausible.
In Kemper, the Seventh Circuit rejected a plaintiff’s
argument that a bank defendant had joined a conspiracy with
Iranian financial institutions, companies, and the “various
terrorist organizations that committed” an attack. Kemper, 933
F.3d 395. That was because the complaint there — like the one
here — did not “suggest that [the bank] cared how its [ ]
customers obtained or spent the funds that it processed.”
Kemper, 911 F.3d at 395; cf. Freeman v. HSBC Holdings PLC, 57
F.4th 66, 80 (2d Cir.) (explaining that under JASTA’s conspiracy
provision, “[i]n the absence of any allegation that the Banks
and the terrorist groups engaged in a common pursuit, we cannot
identify any agreement that could form the basis of a JASTA
conspiracy between the Banks and the terrorist groups, whether
they conspired directly or indirectly with one another”). All
that the complaint plausibly alleges is that PIB engaged in
market transactions, which “by definition . . . benefit both
parties[.]” Kemper, 911 F.3d at 395. Thus, it cannot be
assumed, “ab initio, that [these transactions] carry with them
the excess baggage of conspiracy.” Id.
Plaintiffs cite United States v. Gurary, 860 F.2d 521
(2d Cir. 1988), for the proposition that “PIB’s own
‘motivations’ and ‘primary purpose’ in participating in the
conspiracy are irrelevant to their liability as long as they
possessed ‘some knowledge’ of the Hussein’s regime’s unlawful
aims and objectives.” Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot.
to Dismiss 45, ECF No. 42. But, in Gurary, the defendants sold
fictitious invoices to corporations that enabled the
corporations to illegally lower their taxable income. These
were not ordinary market transactions — they had no underlying
economic substance beyond enabling corporate tax fraud. See
Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 605
U.S. 280, 294-95 (2025) (secondary liability may run if the
defendant “actively stimulates” illegal sales, but not if it
simply “sells a product to a known lawbreaker, as it would to
all others”). That is unlike this case, in which PIB is
plausibly accused only of providing ordinary banking services.
Finally, plaintiffs’ theory of liability has a more
fundamental flaw. Plaintiffs assert a primary liability claim
premised on an underlying conspiracy to provide material support
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. When the ATA was enacted,
courts were divided on whether a primary liability claim under
the ATA could rest on a predicate violation premised on
secondary liability. Compare Boim v. Holy Land Found. for
Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 691 (7th Cir. 2008) (claiming the
ATA authorized secondary civil liability), with Rothstein v. UBS
AG, 708 F.3d 82, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2013) (opposite). Thus, in
2016, Congress enacted JASTA to explicitly provide a limited
form of secondary civil liability. See Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130
Stat. 852 (2016) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2333 by adding subsection
(d)).
If litigants could proceed under a primary liability
theory by alleging a conspiracy “including a state sponsor of
terror, a designated terrorist organization, or anyone else,”
they “would never need to use the more limited conspiracy
liability authorized by [JASTA in Section 2333(d).]” Kemper,
911 F.3d at 396. Allowing such a theory to proceed would thus
run afoul of “one of the most basic interpretive canons, that a
statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its
provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous,
void or insignificant.” Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 583
U.S. 202, 213 (2018).
In sum, plaintiffs have satisfied the second element
of an ATA claim — an act of international terrorism — as to
their claim predicated on material support of terrorism, but not
for conspiracy to do the same.7 For liability to run for the
material support claim, however, plaintiffs still need to
plausibly plead the ATA’s third element — that PIB’s act of
international terrorism caused the plaintiffs’ injuries.
7 The first element, an injury to a U.S. national, is uncontested as to
the remaining plaintiffs.
2. Causation
To recover under the ATA, a plaintiff must have been
injured “by reason of an act of international terrorism.”
18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (emphasis added). That requires “a showing
that defendant’s conduct was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s
harm.” Miller, 372 F. Supp. 3d at 46.
Proximate cause exists where a defendant’s actions
were a “substantial factor in the sequence of responsible
causation” that caused injuries to the plaintiff which were
“reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural
consequence.” Rothstein, 708 F.3d at 91. The usual rule,
however, is that “[t]he act of a third person in committing an
intentional tort or crime is a superseding cause of harm to
another resulting therefrom.” Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 448. But when a defendant negligently creates a situation
that affords a third party the opportunity to commit a tort or
crime, the proximate-cause requirement is satisfied when the
defendant “realized or should have realized . . . that a third
person might avail himself of the opportunity to commit such a
tort or crime.” Id.; see also Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S.
411, 420 (2011) (“A cause can be thought superseding only if it
is a cause of independent origin that was not foreseeable.”).
Plaintiffs have adequately alleged proximate cause.
As discussed in the previous section, the complaint adequately
pleads that PIB knew it was processing payments that
incentivized terrorists to perpetrate suicide bombings. See TAC
¶ 549 (quoting an ALF officer who explained that “support
payments for relatives ma[d]e it easier for some potential
bombers to make up their minds”). It was therefore reasonably
foreseeable that PIB’s conduct would lead to plaintiff’s
injuries because PIB made it more likely that a terrorist might
carry out a suicide bombing.
PIB protests that “after-the-fact” processing of
payments cannot “cause” an attack. Def.’s Br. 28-29. PIB
largely cites cases outside the proximate cause context,8 at the
summary-judgment stage,9 or that involved only one or two
attacks.10 None of these cases are on point at this preliminary
stage, in which plaintiffs have alleged a campaign of attacks
made possible, in part, because terrorists knew (based on past
8 See, e.g., Def.’s Br. 29. (citing Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation
Org., 60 F. Supp. 3d 509, 517 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (evidence of a bank’s
post-attack ratification of its employee’s actions is admissible to prove
that the bank employees were acting within the scope of their employment but
was not itself evidence of a violation of the ATA).
9 Id. (citing Shatsky v. Palestine Liberation Org., No. 02-CV-2280, 2017
WL 2666111, at *10 (D.D.C. June 20, 2017), vacated and remanded, 955 F.3d
1016 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (granting summary judgment because “plaintiffs have
pointed to no evidence suggesting that Hafez knew his family would receive
martyrdom payments, or that Hafez was motivated by the prospect of such
payments,” but not suggesting, as a matter of law, that after-the-fact
payments cannot cause an attack).
10 Id. (citing In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, No. 03-MD-
1570, 2021 WL 5449825, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2021) (concerning only a
single terrorist attack); Owens v. BNP Paribas S.A., 235 F. Supp. 3d 85, 98
(D.D.C. 2017), aff’d, 897 F.3d 266 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
events) that their family’s martyr payments would be processed
in the future.
PIB also relies on Averbach v. Cairo Amman Bank, No.
19-CV-4, 2022 WL 2530797, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2022), in
which the court found proximate cause inadequately pled. Def.’s
Br. 28. But unlike in Averbach, there are present in this case
“allegations that specific funds processed by [PIB] were
designated for terrorist purposes,” that PIB “was on actual
notice that funds it was processing were in fact going to
[terrorist purposes],” and allegations that the attacks “were
only possible due to [PIB’s] actions.” Averbach, 2022 WL
2530797, at *21.
Accordingly, plaintiffs have plausibly pled all
elements of 18 U.S.C. § 2333 and their primary liability claim
predicated on PIB’s provision of material support may proceed
past this stage.
C. Secondary Liability Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)
As previously explained, JASTA establishes liability
for “any person who aids and abets [an act of international
terrorism], by knowingly providing substantial assistance.”
18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2). Plaintiffs allege that PIB aided and
abetted the terrorists who perpetrated the nine terrorist
attacks detailed in the complaint. See TAC ¶ 839.
In passing JASTA, Congress “explicitly endorsed the
D.C. Circuit’s analysis in Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472
(D.C. Cir. 1983), as the proper legal framework for assessing
aiding-and-abetting claims.” Ashley v. Deutsche Bank
Aktiengesellschaft, 144 F.4th 420, 435 (2d Cir. 2025). As
summarized by the Second Circuit, Halberstam outlined three
elements:
First, the party whom the defendant aids must perform
a wrongful act that causes an injury. Id.
Second, the defendant must be generally aware of his
role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the
time that he provides the assistance. Id.
Finally, the defendant must knowingly and
substantially assist the principal violation. Id.
The first element is — unsurprisingly — uncontested.
PIB instead argues that it lacked general awareness of its role
in any tortious activity related to international terrorism and
that it did not knowingly or substantially assist any attack.
1. The Complaint Plausibly Pleads that PIB Was
Generally Aware of Its Role
To be liable under an aiding-and-abetting theory, a
defendant must be “generally aware of his role as part of an
overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that he
provides the assistance.” Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 598 U.S.
471, 486 (2023). Though the “defendant need not be aware of its
role in the specific terrorist attack that caused the
plaintiff’s injury, it must be generally aware of its role in
some illegal activity from which the terrorist attack was
foreseeable.” Ashley, 144 F.4th at 438.
In cases involving allegations that a bank indirectly
aided the principal via its customers, the Second Circuit has
instructed district courts to focus on two inquiries. First,
“whether the bank was aware of the customers’ connections with
the terrorist organization before the relevant attacks.” Id.
Second, “whether the customers were so closely intertwined with
the terrorist organization’s violent terrorist activities that
one can reasonably infer that the bank was generally aware of
its role in unlawful activities from which the attacks were
foreseeable while it was providing financial services to those
customers.” Id.
“Plaintiffs typically seek to establish a bank's
awareness of its customers’ ties to terrorist organizations by
citing public sources, such as media articles predating the
attacks.” Id. In Kaplan v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, for
example, a plaintiff successfully relied on media reporting that
a bank’s customers were “integral parts of Hizbollah” to
establish the bank’s general awareness. 999 F.3d 842, 862 (2d
Cir. 2021).
The complaint plausibly alleges PIB’s general
awareness. It invokes reporting by dozens of news sources —
much of it predating the attacks described in the complaint —
alleging that Salem helped induce violent terrorist activities.
For example, in January 2001, Agence France Presse reported
that:
[Salem] . . . told AFP that the families of 300
“martyrs” of the intifada . . . have each been
bestowed 10,000 dollar checks . . . . “President
Saddam Hussein pledged a billion euros (940 million
dollars) to the Palestinian people in addition to an
open amount for the martyrs and the injured,” [Salem]
said.
TAC ¶ 505.
The next month, The Daily Telegraph reported:
Mr. Salem is a popular figure himself. He is charged
with handing out sizeable compensation payments on
behalf of Saddam to the families of the dead and
wounded in the uprising. For every martyr, the family
receives $10,000 . . . about six years’ average salary
. . . . “Even if there were 2,000 martyrs, His
Excellency would continue to pay,” [Salem] said.
Id. ¶ 507.
Other reporting described the Hussein regime’s
decision in August 2001 to increase compensation for
“Palestinians who carried out martyrdom attacks” specifically,
quoting a representative in Gaza. Id. ¶ 512.
This level of detail is sufficient. Like in Kaplan,
the sources clearly identify Salem as an “integral part” of the
ALF. This is not a case in which the defendant bank provided
“services to customers that appeared to have legitimate business
purposes and without any direct link to terrorist organizations
beyond the plaintiff’s conclusory allegations.” Moses v. BNP
Paribas, S.A., 802 F. Supp. 3d 567, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2025).
Additionally, the complaint alleges sufficient details about
these statements, namely the “status of the speaker” (often
Salem himself), the circumstances in which statements were made,
and the media in which they were made. Kaplan, 999 F.3d at 864.
PIB argues that the complaint must allege that it
reviewed these sources. Def.’s Br. 14; see also Tr. of
Proceedings on May 13, 2024, ECF No. 77 (“There has to be a
reason to infer, even under Kaplan, that the bank would have
read media outside of Palestine.”). But the Second Circuit has
instructed otherwise: namely, that a “plaintiff does not have to
allege that the bank actually knew of or should have seen those
public sources.” Ashley, 144 F.4th at 438. “Such a requirement
at this juncture would be too exacting.” Honickman v. BLOM Bank
SAL, 6 F.4th 487, 501 (2d Cir. 2021).
2. The Complaint Does Not Plausibly Plead That PIB
Knowingly and Substantially Aided Any Principal
The final issue is whether PIB knowingly and
substantially assisted the terrorists who perpetrated the
attacks described in the complaint. These twin requirements
exist “lest mostly passive actors like banks become liable for
all of their customers’ crimes by virtue of carrying out routine
transactions.” Twitter, 598 U.S. at 491. Knowledge and
substantial assistance function on a sliding scale: “a lesser
showing of one” demands “a greater showing of the other.” Id.
at 491-92.
Despite the need for “conscious, culpable conduct,”
the act requirement is not stringent. Id. at 492. “The
quantity of assistance [is] immaterial, so long as the
accomplice did something to aid the crime.” Rosemond v. United
States, 572 U.S. 65, 73 (2014) (emphasis in original). Further,
the aid need not be direct; it may be supplied through an
intermediary. See Kaplan, 999 F.3d at 856.
The mental state requirement depends on the degree of
substantial assistance. The core inquiry is whether the
defendant “intend[ed] to facilitate the offense’s commission.”
Smith & Wesson, 605 U.S. at 291. But because substantial
assistance and knowledge operate on a sliding scale, “[i]f the
assistance [is] direct and extraordinary, then a court might
more readily infer conscious participation in the underlying
tort.” Id. at 492. In other words, intent can sometimes be
inferred from knowledge when the degree of assistance is
substantial. That is especially so when the defendant gave the
principal some sort of “special treatment.” Id. at 498; see
also Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711-12
(1943) (inferring mail-order pharmacy intended to facilitate
illegal morphine sales because it used “high-pressure sales
methods” and steep bulk discounts). It follows then that “less
substantial assistance require[s] more scienter before a court
[can] infer conscious and culpable assistance.”11 Twitter, 598
U.S. at 492.
In the Twitter case, Twitter (and other companies)
were alleged to have aided and abetted an ISIS terrorist attack.
The social media companies “allegedly knew that ISIS was using
their platforms” to recruit and to spread propaganda, but
“failed to stop it from doing so.” Twitter, 598 U.S. at 478.
The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ allegations
were insufficient to establish aiding and abetting liability.
Even if Twitter knew that ISIS was using its platform, the
complaint was devoid of any “allegations that [Twitter] treated
ISIS any differently from anyone else” or that Twitter “[was]
consciously trying to help or otherwise participate in the
[ISIS] attack.” Id. at 500. In fact, “there [was] not even
11 The D.C. Circuit recently interpreted Twitter as establishing a
virtually per se rule that a “conscious intent may be required to impose
liability on one who aids and abets a tort by silence and inaction, but a
lesser degree of knowledge can support liability for one who aids and abets
by affirmative assistance toward commission of a tort.” Atchley v.
AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 165 F.4th 592, 608 (D.C. Cir. 2026) (citing Woodward v.
Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 96-97 (5th Cir. 1975)). Other courts have
gone almost this far, demanding a showing of conscious intent where — despite
the defendant rendering affirmative assistance — the “evidence shows no more
than transactions constituting the daily grist of the mill.” Woodward, 522
F.2d at 97.
reason to think that [Twitter] carefully screened any content
before allowing users to upload it onto their platforms.” Id.
at 498–99. Intent, therefore, could not be inferred from
knowledge.
The plaintiffs in Twitter had an especially difficult
time establishing liability because “aiding and abetting is
inherently a rule of secondary liability for specific wrongful
acts.” Id. at 494. Even though Twitter may have aided ISIS
generally, the plaintiffs did not allege that Twitter aided ISIS
in the specific nightclub terrorist attack that led to their
harm. That was not to say, however, that Twitter needed to have
known “all particulars of [ISIS’s] plan” for liability to run.
Id. at 495. The “specific wrongful act” requirement does not
demand “a strict nexus between the alleged assistance and the
[principal’s wrongful] act.” Id. at 497.
Here, the complaint does plausibly allege that PIB
substantially assisted specific terror attacks. It contains
allegations of case-specific, affirmative behavior by PIB — via
review and processing of the checks at issue in the specific
terrorist attacks alleged — rather than mere “passive
nonfeasance.” Id. at 500. Reflecting this distinction in
Twitter, the Court distinguished and separately addressed
allegations brought against Google, which — unlike the other
defendants — had “reviewed and approved ISIS videos” in
connection with its revenue-sharing system. Id. at 505.
The Twitter Court still held that the complaint did
not plausibly plead substantial assistance as to Google because
it was “devoid of any allegations about how much assistance
Google provided,” such as the amount of money shared with ISIS
or the content of the videos that were approved. Id. But here,
as discussed above, the complaint alleges systematic aid in the
form of financial services to process martyr payments of
substantial sums that “ma[d]e it easier for some potential
bombers to make up their minds.” TAC ¶ 549.
Moreover, the allegations here speak to a far tighter
nexus between PIB’s conduct and the attacks than in other cases
that did not proceed past the motion to dismiss. PIB processed
the very checks that rewarded the families of the suicide
bombers.
The complaint fails, however, to allege that PIB
“intend[ed] to facilitate the offense’s commission.” Smith &
Wesson, 605 U.S. at 291. As discussed above, the complaint does
not plausibly “suggest that [PIB] cared how its [ ] customers
obtained or spent the funds that it processed.” Kemper, 911
F.3d at 395. Plaintiffs cite Force v. Palestinian Authority,
No. 25-CV-8582, 2026 WL 2295893, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10,
2026), to resist this conclusion, but that case is inapposite
because the defendants there were alleged to have actually
created and promoted a martyr payments program that benefited
Hamas terrorists. See Ltr. from plaintiffs dated Aug. 12, 2026,
ECF No. 109.
At best, plaintiffs in the instant case have alleged
that PIB had intimate knowledge of its customers’ illegal
schemes and yet chose to transact with them anyway. That is not
enough to substantiate intent where, as here, PIB is not alleged
to have afforded “special treatment” to the terrorists at issue.
Twitter, 598 U.S. at 498.
Special treatment would suggest that PIB intended the
attacks to be completed so that it could process — and profit
from — future martyr payments. Or it might suggest that PIB
intended the attacks to succeed simply because it was
sympathetic to the aims of the terrorist groups described in the
complaint. In Kaplan, for example, the Second Circuit held that
the defendant-bank gave special treatment by allowing some
customers to “deposit large sums in various accounts at
different [bank] branches . . . without disclosing their source,
thereby circumventing sanctions imposed in order to hinder
terrorist activity.” 999 F.3d at 866. And in Direct Sales, as
discussed above, the defendant mail-order pharmacy stimulated
illegal sales of morphine by offering steep bulk discounts for
such enormous quantities of drugs that the Court found a jury
could conclude the defendant “join[ed] both mind and hand with
[the distributor] to make its accomplishment possible.” 319
U.S. at 713.
But Kaplan and Direct Sales are unlike this case, in
which PIB is essentially alleged to have treated its terror-
affiliated customers like all other customers — “selling to
everyone, and on equivalent terms.” Smith & Wesson, 605 U.S. at
295.
Plaintiffs argue that PIB did provide services in an
unusual way because processing martyr checks flouted the
recommendations of international banking bodies, violated U.S.
and Israeli law, and risked PIB losing access to U.S. and
Israeli banks on which it relied. TAC ¶ 556-81. None of their
arguments succeed.
First, plaintiffs say that it was unusual for PIB to
disregard the recommendations of international banking bodies
such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision — “a
consortium of central banks” that “was established to enhance
financial stability by improving the quality of banking
supervision worldwide.” Id. ¶ 559 n.16. But the complaint
acknowledges that the recommendations from the international
banking bodies it identifies — such as implementing ‘Know Your
Customer’ procedures — are non-binding. See id. ¶ 556-656; see
also id. ¶ 559 n.16 (“[The Basel Committee] issued the industry-
standard and highly influential ‘Basel Accords’ policy
recommendations.”). In the end, it is not enough to say that
PIB “could” have adopted “measures to reduce [its] users’
downstream crime.” Smith & Wesson, 605 U.S. at 293 (no aiding
and abetting liability where gun manufacturers had no legal duty
to design serial numbers resistant to defacement by cartels).
Second, plaintiffs maintain that PIB violated
extraterritorial U.S. and Israeli law when it provided services
to known terrorist-affiliates. See TAC ¶ 578. Their argument
reflects the Supreme Court’s guidance in Twitter that even
“inaction can be culpable in the face of some independent duty
to act.” 598 U.S. at 489. Setting aside the reach of Israeli
law, the ATA does apply extraterritorially to PIB. The U.S. may
exercise extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over foreign
actors who harm U.S. nationals. See United States v. Yousef,
327 F.3d 56, 91 n.24 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Customary international
law recognizes . . . the ‘passive personality principle,’ which
provides for jurisdiction over acts that harm a State’s citizens
abroad.”). And plaintiffs ATA claim is predicated on the
violation of a statute that is explicitly extraterritorial:
killings of Americans abroad in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2332(a). Cf. RJR Nabisco v. Eur. Cmty., 579 U.S. 325, 338-39
(2016) (RICO statute applies extraterritorially at least for
claims predicated on a violation of Section 2332(a)).
But the Twitter Court did not go so far as to hold
that the knowing violation of any legal duty is enough to
substantiate aiding and abetting liability. The Court explained
that “[e]ven if there were such a [legal] duty” owed by the
social media companies to remove ISIS content from their
platforms, “it would not transform [their] distant inaction into
knowing and substantial assistance that could establish aiding
and abetting the [ ] attack.” Twitter, 598 U.S. at 501.
That makes good sense. A knowing violation of a legal
duty can support an inference that the defendant “intend[ed] to
facilitate the offense’s commission.” Smith & Wesson, 605 U.S.
at 291. But this inference does not invariably follow —
particularly when the legal duty is remote from the underlying
conduct.
Here, PIB’s alleged violation of an independent legal
duty does not support the plausible inference that it intended
to bring about the attacks described in the complaint. The
better inference is that PIB “executed financially suspect
transactions writ large, not in a manner that actively sought to
‘associate [itself]’ with the [principals’] ‘operations.’”
Ashley, 144 F.4th at 445; see also Freeman v. HSBC Holdings PLC,
No. 18-CV-7359, 2026 WL 880107, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2026)
(“[E]ven assuming Defendants’ aid was pervasive and systemic,
the [complaint] does not support the inference that their money
laundering operations were designed or performed with the intent
to aid Hezbollah.”). True, PIB’s conduct is less remote than
that of the social media companies in Twitter. Nevertheless,
without more, PIB’s violations of U.S. law suggest only a desire
to profit from illicit transactions generally.
For the same reason, plaintiffs’ final argument fails.
Plaintiffs contend that PIB was “highly dependent” on
transacting with U.S. and Israeli banks and that processing
payments on behalf of terrorist affiliates came at the
“considerable risk of losing its access to either or both
Israeli and U.S. correspondent banking privileges.” TAC ¶¶ 571-
72, 578. The complaint is compatible with the theory that PIB
processed funds destined to terrorists at great financial risk
to itself because it wished the terror attacks to succeed. But
the complaint is at least equally compatible with the theory
that PIB did not care what happened to the money it processed
and simply did not think it would be caught despite the
commercial risks. See Freeman, 2026 WL 880107, at *16 (“[T]he
financial services Defendants provided suggest a general desire
to obtain the business of any sanctioned entity, Iranian or
otherwise, rather than the desire to ‘form a near-common
enterprise’ with Hezbollah-affiliated entities, such as the
IRGC.”) (emphasis in original) (quoting Ashley, 144 F.4th at
445). Intent, therefore, cannot be plausibly inferred.
Plaintiffs “need to allege more by way of factual content to
nudge [their] claim . . . across the line from conceivable to
plausible.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 683.
* * *
Knowledge and substantial assistance operate on a
sliding scale, as noted above. PIB provided substantial
assistance, at least insomuch as it manually approved checks
marked “martyr.” But the assistance was not so substantial as
to excuse the complaint’s failure to plausibly allege that PIB
had the requisite intent to see through to fruition the terror
attacks it helped incentivize. Nor does the complaint plausibly
allege any “special treatment” by PIB that would allow intent to
be inferred from knowledge absent an actual plausible allegation
of what PIB intended. For this reason, plaintiffs’ secondary
liability claim cannot proceed.
Conclusion
PIB’s motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied
in part. The motion to dismiss plaintiffs Chaviva Braun, Yehuda
Braun, Yoni Braun, Eliana Braun Peretz, Oriella Braun, Matanya
Braun, and Revital Bauer as well as Count I is granted with
prejudice. The motion to dismiss Count III of the complaint is
granted without prejudice. The motion is otherwise denied.
If plaintiffs wish to amend their complaint to cure
the defects identified herein, they must do so within twenty-
eight days. The parties are directed to confer and schedule a
conference with Magistrate Judge Marutollo for the purpose of
adjusting the discovery schedule, if necessary, in light of this
Order.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Eric Komitee
ERIC KOMITEE
United States District Judge
Dated: August 13, 2026
Brooklyn, New York