Tesfalem

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TEWELDEBRHAN BERHE No. 4:26-CV-01573

TESFALEM,

(Chief Judge Brann)

Petitioner,

v.

WARDEN, PIKE COUNTY

CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JULY 31, 2026

Teweldebrhan Berhe Tesfalem is an immigration detainee in the custody of

the United States Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (ICE). He is currently detained at Pike County Correctional Facility

in Lords Valley, Pennsylvania. He commenced this action by filing a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking a bond hearing or

immediate release based on his claim that his continued post-removal detention has

become unconstitutional. The Court will deny Tesfalem’s Section 2241 petition.

I. BACKGROUND

Tesfalem is a native and citizen of Eritrea.1 On October 6, 2024, he entered

the United States near Calexico, California, without inspection or any valid entry

documents.2 He was apprehended by ICE shortly thereafter.3 On October 24,

2024, Tesfalem was issued a notice to appear following a determination that he had

expressed a credible fear of removal to his home country.4 On July 25, 2025, an

Immigration Judge found that Tesfalem had abandoned his only pending

application for relief from removal and ordered him removed to Eritrea.5 Tesfalem

appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), but then moved to

voluntarily withdraw that appeal.6 On March 30, 2026, the BIA granted the motion

to withdraw and dismissed the appeal.7 Thus, Tesfalem’s order of removal became

final on March 30, 2026.8

During the time Tesfalem’s BIA appeal was pending, DHS had been

working to obtain travel documents for Tesfalem’s removal. DHS first applied for

a travel document from the Embassy of Eritrea on September 15, 2025, seeking an

identification replacement for Tesfalem.9 On December 10, 2025, DHS

determined that a national passport of travel documents could not be obtained for

Tesfalem’s travel to Eritrea.10 DHS further discovered that the passport in

Tesfalem’s travel documents was a Greek passport issued by their asylum service,

2 Id. ¶ 3.

3 Id. ¶ 4.

4 Id. ¶ 5.

5 Id. ¶ 6; Doc. 7-4.

6 Doc. 7-2 ¶ 10; Doc. 7-5 at 4.

7 Doc. 7-5 at 4.

8 See 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(a).

9 Doc. 7-2 ¶ 8.

10 Id. ¶ 11.

which passport was not valid for travel to Eritrea.11 On May 28, 2026, DHS

contacted the Greek Consulate to confirm whether Tesfalem retained his asylum

status in Greece.12 On July 7, 2026, DHS received confirmation from the Greek

Consulate that Tesfalem has a current Uniform-Format Residence Permit that is

valid until November 19, 2026, and the Greek Consulate issued Tesfalem a travel

document for his return to Greece with an expiration date of December 5, 2028.13

Tesfalem, in fact, has a ticketed travel itinerary for removal to Greece in early

August 2026.14

Tesfalem lodged the instant Section 2241 petition in this Court on June 9,

2026, seeking either a bond hearing or immediate release.15 Respondent promptly

answered that petition.16 Because it is plainly obvious that no habeas relief is due,

the Court will deny Tesfalem’s Section 2241 petition without waiting to receive a

traverse.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c), a prisoner or detainee may receive habeas relief

only if he “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

11 Id. ¶ 12.

12 Id. ¶ 15.

13 Id. ¶ 17.

14 Id. ¶ 18; see Doc. 7 at 4-5 & n.1 (indicating that the exact date of the flight has been redacted

for security reasons).

15 See generally Doc. 1.

16 See generally Doc. 7.

United States.”17 Because Tesfalem filed the instant petition while he was detained

within the jurisdiction of this court, is still currently detained by ICE, and asserts

that his continued detention violates due process, this court has jurisdiction over

his Section 2241 petition.18

III. DISCUSSION

Tesfalem appears to bring an as-applied due process challenge to his

continued detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). He argues that his removal is not

reasonably foreseeable, so he should receive an individualized bond hearing or be

released.19 The government counters that Tesfalem’s removal is reasonably

foreseeable—and in fact scheduled for a date certain—and thus his continued

detention under Section 1231(a) is constitutional.

Section 1231(a) of Title 8 of the United States Code “governs the detention,

release, and removal of individuals ‘ordered removed.’”20 Section 1231(a)(1)(A)

provides that, following entry of a final order of removal, the United States

generally must effectuate the noncitizen’s removal during a 90-day “removal

period.”21 That 90-day period generally begins to run, for noncitizens who are

17 See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989).

18 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688, 699 (2001); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998);

Khalil v. President, United States, 164 F.4th 259, 277-79 (3d Cir. 2026) (holding that detention

specific claims, like length and conditions of confinement, do not “arise from” removal

proceedings and can be addressed by district courts).

19 See Doc. 1 at 7.

20 Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573, 578 (2022).

21 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A).

detained or confined for criminal offenses, on “the date the alien is released from

[non-immigration] detention or confinement.”22 Detention is mandatory during

this first 90 days.23

Following expiration of the 90-day removal period, certain noncitizens

“may” be detained if they fall into one of four distinct categories: “(1) those who

are ‘inadmissible’ on certain specified grounds; (2) those who are ‘removable’ on

certain specified grounds; (3) those [determined] ‘to be a risk to the community’;

and (4) those [determined] to be ‘unlikely to comply with the order of removal.’”24

How long a noncitizen may be detained pursuant to Section 1231(a)(6) following

the 90-day removal period has been the subject of considerable litigation.

In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court held that

Section 1231(a)(6) “does not permit indefinite detention,” but rather “limits an

alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring

about that alien’s removal from the United States.”25 Of course, the phrase “a

period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal” provides no easily

ascertainable guidelines.26 According to Zadvydas, a period reasonably necessary

22 Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(iii).

23 Id. § 1231(a)(2) (“During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.”

(emphasis added)).

24 Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. at 578-79 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)).

25 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689.

26 See Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. at 586 (Thomas, J., concurring in part); see also Guerrero-

Sanchez v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 905 F.3d 208, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2018), abrogated on

other grounds by Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573 (2022). In Johnson v. Arteaga-

Martinez, the Supreme Court abrogated the Third Circuit’s holding in Guerrero Sanchez that

to bring about a noncitizen’s removal from the United States is presumptively six

months.27

Thus, noncitizens detained under Section 1231(a)(6) past the six-month

presumptively constitutional period may bring an as-applied Due Process Clause

challenge to their continued detention should that detention become prolonged and

potentially unlawful.28 Specifically, if the noncitizen “provides good reason to

believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future, the Government must either rebut that showing or release the

[noncitizen].”29

Tesfalem’s habeas petition fails for two reasons. First, his removal order did

not become final until March 30, 2026, when the BIA dismissed his appeal. Thus,

the 90-day removal period with mandatory detention required by Section

1231(a)(1)(A) did not expire until June 28, 2026. Accordingly, Tesfalem has only

Section 1231(a)(6) presumptively “requires the Government to offer detained noncitizens bond

hearings after six months of detention in which the Government bears the burden of proving

by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen poses a flight risk or a danger to the

community.” Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. at 576. The Court did not address the merits of the

petitioner’s individualized Due Process Clause challenge or hold that such a claim could not

be pursued. See id. at 583-84. Moreover, the United States reassured the Arteaga-Martinez

Court that “as-applied constitutional challenges” to prolonged detention under Section

1231(a)(6) “remain available.” Id. at 583.

27 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.

28 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699-701; Guerrero-Sanchez, 905 F.3d at 225; see also Johnson v.

Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 529 (2021) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689, 701).

29 Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. at 529 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Zadvydas, 533

U.S. at 701); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4, 241.13 (establishing agency procedures for

determining whether noncitizens detained under 1231(a) past 90-day removal period should

be released on supervision or remain in detention).

been detained for approximately four months into the presumptively constitutional

six-month period described in Zadvydas, and during the first three of those months

his detention was mandatory. Tesfalem has not rebutted the presumption of

reasonableness, which alone is a sufficient basis to deny his habeas petition.30

Furthermore, even if Tesfalem could make the initial showing that there is

good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future, the government has firmly rebutted that contention.

To wit: travel documents have been obtained for Tesfalem to be removed to

Greece and a flight with a date certain has been booked for early next month. As

such, Tesfalem’s due process claim fails.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Tesfalem’s petition for a writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

30 See, e.g., Yevheni v. Ahrendt, No. 18-cv-14246, 2019 WL 1293581, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 20,

2019) (denying Section 2241 petition where petitioner had been detained under Section

1231(a) for just over three months); Perez Mujica v. Sage, No. 3:26-cv-01571, 2026 WL

1859352, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2026) (Mehalchick, J.).