The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JS-6
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES -- GENERAL
Case No. CV 26-4533-JFW(KSx) Date: July 13, 2026
Title: Pedro Paulo Mansur Pagano Sampaio -v- Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al.
PRESENT:
HONORABLE JOHN F. WALTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Shannon Reilly None Present
Courtroom Deputy Court Reporter
ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFS: ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS:
None None
PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION UNDER THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND SECTION
504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT [filed 5/8/26;
Docket No. 31];
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S RENEWED MOTION
TO REMAND [filed 5/8/26; Docket No. 33];
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT WELLS FARGO
BANK, N.A.’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [filed 5/25/26; Docket
No. 47];
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE
DEFENDANT WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.’S MOTION
TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT (ECF NO. 47) FOR (1) FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH LOCAL RULE 7-3 AND THE COURT’S
STANDING ORDER ¶ 5(b); (2) FILING WITHOUT A
GOOD-FAITH MEET-AND-CONFER ON THE NEW
MOTION; AND (3) THE PERPETRATION OF MULTIPLE
FALSE SWORN STATEMENTS UPON THIS COURT IN
VIOLATION OF FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 11(b)(3) [filed 5/26/26; Docket No. 52];
and
ORDER DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE
APPLICATION FOR REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT AND SECTION 504 OF THE
REHABILITATION ACT; APPLICATION FOR WAIVER
OF THE COURTESY COPY REQUIREMENT UNDER
THIS COURT’S STANDING ORDER ¶ 3(c) AT ECF NO.
9 BASED ON PLAINTIFF’S OUT-OF-COUNTRY
RESIDENCE, TERMINAL DISABILITY, AND FINANCIAL
HARDSHIP [filed 5/27/26; Docket No. 55]
On May 8, 2026, Plaintiff Pedro Paulo Mansur Pagano Sampaio (“Plaintiff”) filed a Motion
for Reasonable Accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act (“Motion for Reasonable Accommodation”). Docket No. 31. On June 15, 2025,
Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“WF Bank”), erroneously sued as Wells Fargo Company (“WF
Company”), filed its Notice of Non-Opposition. Docket No. 62. On May 8, 2026, Plaintiff filed a
Renewed Motion to Remand (“Motion to Remand”). Docket No. 33. On June 15, 2026, WF Bank
filed its Opposition. Docket No. 64. On May 25, 2026, WF Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“Motion to Dismiss”). Docket No. 47. On May 26, 2026,
Plaintiff filed his Opposition. Docket No. 53. On June 22, 2026, WF Bank filed a Reply. Docket
No. 70. On May 26, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 47) for (1) Failure to Comply with
Local Rule 7-3 and the Court's Standing Order ¶ 5(b); (2) Filing without a Good-Faith
Meet-and-Confer on the New Motion; and (3) the Perpetration of Multiple False Sworn Statements
upon this Court in Violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(3) (“Motion to Strike”). Docket
No. 52. On June 15 2026, WF Bank filed its Opposition. Docket No. 65. On May 27, 2026,
Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Application for Reasonable Accommodation under the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; Application for Waiver of the Courtesy
Copy Requirement under this Court's Standing Order ¶ 3(c) at ECF No. 9 Based on Plaintiff's
Out-of-country Residence, Terminal Disability, and Financial Hardship (“Application for Reasonable
Accommodation”). Docket No. 55. On May 27, 2026, WF Bank filed its Notice of Non-Opposition.
Docket No. 56. Pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 7-15,
the Court found the matter appropriate for submission on the papers without oral argument. The
matter was, therefore, removed from the Court’s July 6, 2026 hearing calendar and the parties
were given advance notice. After considering the moving, opposing, and reply papers, and the
arguments therein, the Court rules as follows:
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff is an economist and quantitative trader who owns Yellow Canary Capital. On
December 20, 2025, Plaintiff was diagnosed with Glioblastoma Multiforme, the most aggressive
and common type of brain cancer and which has a median survival from diagnosis of
approximately twelve to fifteen months. According to Plaintiff, there were “multiple waves of
identity theft and unauthorized electronic fund transfer[s]” on his account with WF Bank between
December 17, 2024, and February 20, 2026. First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ¶ 3. Plaintiff
alleges that he exchanged numerous emails and had multiple phone calls with WF Bank regarding
the purported identity theft and unauthorized electronic fund transfers. WF Bank investigated
Plaintiff’s claims and issued credits to Plaintiff’s accounts when its investigation concluded that
funds had been wrongfully removed from Plaintiff’s account. WF Bank also denied some of
Plaintiff’s claims where its investigation concluded that “no error occurred.” FAC, ¶¶ 44 and 51. In
addition, WF Bank took a number of steps in an attempt to stop the unauthorized electronic fund
transfers, including replacing Plaintiff’s WF Bank debit card, restricting Plaintiff’s online and mobile
banking access in November 2025, and finally closing Plaintiff’s account in February 2026. FAC,
¶¶ 27 and 29. Plaintiff also alleges that EF Bank furnished unspecified, but inaccurate, information
about Plaintiff’s account to “ChexSystems, Inc., Early Warning Services, LLC, and/or the three
nationwide consumer reporting agencies.” FAC, ¶ 70. Plaintiff claims that he disputed the
inaccurate information with ChexSystems and that ChexSystems “issued its Reinvestigation
Results validating Plaintiff as a victim of identity theft.” FAC, ¶ 40. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he
notified WF Bank of his “terminal cancer diagnosis” on January 9, 2026. FAC, ¶ 39.
On March 3, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against WF Bank and WF Company in Los
Angeles County Superior Court (“LASC”). On April 22, 2026, Plaintiff filed a FAC, alleging causes
of action for: (1) violation of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (“EFTA”) and Regulation E, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1693, et seq., and 12 C.F.R. § 1005; (2) violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b); (3) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42
U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq.; (4) retaliation in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203; (5) violation of
the California Business & Professions Code § 17200 (“UCL”); (6) negligence and negligence per
se; (7) violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), California Civil Code §§ 51(f) and 52;
(8) breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (9)
conversion; (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (11) financial abuse of a dependent
adult in violation of the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, California Welfare &
Institutions Code §§ 15610.30 and 15657.5 (“Dependent Adult Protection Act”).
On April 28, 2026, WF Bank filed a Notice of Removal, alleging that this court had subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(diversity).
II. Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand
In his Motion, Plaintiff argues that this action should be remanded to LASC because there is
a lack of complete diversity. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that both Plaintiff and WF Company are
citizens of California and the sham defendant doctrine is inapplicable in this case.1 Plaintiff also
argues that because WF Company is a citizen of California, removal is barred by the forum
defendant rule. In addition, Plaintiff argues that the removal was procedural defective because it
does not satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A) regarding written joinder and the
consent of all defendants. Plaintiff also argues that if none of his federal claims survive WF Bank’s
Motion to Dismiss, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law
claims. Finally, Plaintiff seeks an award of fees, costs, and sanctions for improper removal. In its
Opposition, WF Bank argues that it properly removed Plaintiff’s action because federal question
jurisdiction exists. WF Bank also argues that its removal on the alternative basis of diversity
1 WF Company is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in San
Francisco, California. WF Bank is a citizen of South Dakota.
jurisdiction was proper because WF Bank, not WF Company, is the only appropriate defendant in
this action. WF Bank argues that although Plaintiff had a contractual relationship with WF Bank,
he never had any relationship with WF Company and, in fact, Plaintiff has failed to ever serve WF
Company. WF Bank argues that Plaintiff’s request for an award of fees, costs, and sanctions for
improper removal is baseless because the removal was proper.
A. Legal Standard
A motion to remand is the proper procedure for challenging removal. See N. Cal. Dist.
Council of Laborers v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co., 69 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 1995). The
removal statute is strictly construed, and any doubt about the right of removal is resolved in favor
of remand. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Prize Frize, Inc. v.
Matrix, Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1999). Consequently, if a plaintiff challenges the
defendant’s removal of a case, the defendant bears the burden of establishing the propriety of the
removal. See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566; see also Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir.
1996) (citations and quotations omitted) ("Because of the Congressional purpose to restrict the
jurisdiction of the federal courts on removal, the statute is strictly construed, and federal jurisdiction
must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance."). A defendant
may remove any action from state court to federal court when the federal court has original
jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
B. WF Bank’s Removal was Proper
Although Plaintiff devotes a significant portion of his Motion to Remand arguing that there is
not complete diversity between the parties and other issues related to diversity jurisdiction (such as
the sham defendant doctrine and local defendant rule), the Court need not consider those
arguments because WF Bank’s removal of this action on the basis of federal question jurisdiction
was proper and appropriate. A district court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear “all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In
this case, Plaintiff’s first four causes of action are for violation of federal statutes – the EFTA, the
ADA, and the FCRA – and WF Bank specifically stated that it was removing this action pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal question jurisdiction. See Notice of Removal, ¶ 8 (“This case is also
properly removable to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331 because the primary issues to be
adjudicated, and the first four causes of action asserted by Plaintiff are fundamental federal
questions: whether Wells Fargo violated the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, Regulation E, the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, or Americans with Disabilities Act”). As a result, the Court concludes that it
has subject matter jurisdiction over this action on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal question
jurisdiction.
In addition, the Court finds unpersuasive Plaintiff’s argument that WF Bank’s removal was
procedurally defective because it does not satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A)
regarding written joinder and the consent of all defendants. Section 1446(b)(2)(A) only applies to
“defendants who have been properly joined and served” and Plaintiff admits that WF Company has
not been served.2 The Court also denies Plaintiff’s request for fees, costs, and sanctions against
WF Bank for improper removal.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is denied.
III. WF Bank’s Motion to Dismiss
In its Motion, WF Bank seeks an order dismissing Plaintiff’s FAC pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. WF Bank argues that Plaintiff’s FAC
“contains a mash of allegations” regarding “Plaintiff’s grievance that Wells Fargo did not provide
him with enough free money.” Motion to Dismiss, 1:3-4. Specifically, WF Bank argues that the
factual basis for Plaintiff’s claims is “inconsistent and internally contradictory” and that the legal
basis is “non-existent.” Id., at 1:5-6. In his Opposition, Plaintiff argues that WF Bank’s Motion to
Dismiss must be denied because each of his claim is adequately pleaded. Plaintiff also argues
that WF Bank has refused to produced required documents and failed to properly authenticate the
Deposit Account Agreement attached to WF Bank’s Request for Judicial Notice.3
A. Legal Standard
A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the
legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. “A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only
where there is either a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory’ or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged
under a cognizable legal theory.’” Summit Technology, Inc. v. High-Line Medical Instruments Co.,
Inc., 922 F. Supp. 299, 304 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d
696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). However, “[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of
2 WF Bank also stated in its Notice of Removal that WF Company “contests that it is a
proper defendant, but nevertheless consents to and joins in this notice of removal.” Notice of
Removal, 2:22-23.
3 Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Strike, arguing that WF Bank’s Motion to Dismiss should be
stricken for failure to comply with Local Rule 7-3 and paragraph 5(b) of the Court’s Standing Order.
Plaintiff argues that this is the reason why the Court previously struck WF Bank’s Motion to
Dismiss. However, on May 6, 2026, the Court struck WF Bank’s Motion to Dismiss because the
requested hearing date (June 8, 2026) was closed. See Docket No. 19. As a result, WF Bank
appropriately re-filed its Motion to Dismiss for a different and available hearing date. In addition,
WF Bank did comply with Local Rule 7-3 and paragraph 5(b) of the Standing Order. See Docket
No. 37. Although the meet and confer conference was brief, WF Bank explained in its Opposition
to Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike the brevity of the conference was due to: (1) Plaintiff stating that he
was unable to participate in an oral or video meet and confer conference and, as a result, the
parties engaged in an extensive written meet and confer process; and (2) Plaintiff’s statement
during the meet and confer conference that WF Bank could “file the motion to dismiss and I will
respond in writing because I will not give up.” As a result, it appears that the brevity of the meet
and confer conference was Plaintiff’s choice. The Court has also considered the other arguments
made by Plaintiff in his Motion to Strike and finds them unpersuasive. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
Motion to Strike is denied.
his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) (internal citations and alterations omitted). “[F]actual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In deciding a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint
and must construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g.,
Wyler Summit Partnership v. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998).
“However, a court need not accept as true unreasonable inferences, unwarranted deductions of
fact, or conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual allegations.” Summit Technology,
922 F. Supp. at 304 (citing Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981) cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981)).
“Generally, a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19
(9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). However, a court may consider material which is properly
submitted as part of the complaint and matters which may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal
Rule of Evidence 201 without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment. See, e.g., id.; Branch v. Tunnel, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994).
Where a motion to dismiss is granted, a district court must decide whether to grant leave to
amend. Generally, the Ninth Circuit has a liberal policy favoring amendments and, thus, leave to
amend should be freely granted. See, e.g., DeSoto v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 957 F.2d 655,
658 (9th Cir. 1992). However, a Court does not need to grant leave to amend in cases where the
Court determines that permitting a plaintiff to amend would be an exercise in futility. See, e.g.,
Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Denial of leave to
amend is not an abuse of discretion where the pleadings before the court demonstrate that further
amendment would be futile.”).
B. Plaintiff’s FAC Should Be Dismissed for Failure to State a Claim
1. Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action for Violation of the EFTA
In his first cause of action, Plaintiff alleges violation of the EFTA. The EFTA creates a
private right of action for violation of its substantive provisions. 15 U.S.C. § 1693m. Indeed, the
EFTA is a consumer protection law aimed at “provid[ing] a basic framework [to] establish[] the
rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of participants in electronic fund transfer systems.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1693e. However, “broad averments of violations of the EFTA are inadequate” to state a claim,
and courts routinely dismiss EFTA claims that fail to sufficiently allege which provision has been
violated. Nordberg v. Trilegiant Corp., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Barvie v.
Bank of Am., N.A., 2018 WL 4537723, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2018) (“Without further factual
allegations – or even an allegation as to which provision of the EFTA allegedly was violated –
Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for this cause of action”); I.B. ex rel. Fife v. Facebook, Inc., 905 F.
Supp. 2d 989, 1007 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing EFTA claim “[b]ecause the 2AC fails to allege a
violation of any specific provision of the EFTA”). Instead, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts
establishing that a bank determined that there was no error and did not conduct a good faith
investigation into the alleged error. See Tian v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2025 WL 1377767, at *4-*5
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2025) (dismissing EFTA claim where plaintiff did not plead facts indicating bank
denied fraud dispute or acted unreasonably in investigating the dispute); Chen v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., 2019 WL 9633650, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2019) (dismissing EFTA claim where plaintiff
did not allege facts establishing bad faith investigation). In addition, “[a] complaint that doesn’t
allege that a consumer provided timely notice doesn’t state a claim under the EFTA.” In re Bank of
Am. California Unemployment Benefits Litig., 674 F.Supp.3d 884, 906 (S.D. Cal. 2023), on
reconsideration in part, 2024 WL 3174380 (S.D. Cal. June 25, 2024).
In this case, Plaintiff’s EFTA claim is woefully deficient. Plaintiff fails to allege any
information to identify the transactions he contends were unauthorized other than the dates he
provided WF Bank with notice of purported fraudulent transactions. See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 65-66
(alleging the date Plaintiff provided notice to WF Bank on Claims Nos. 3737, 5212, and 7347, but
no other identifying information). Indeed, Plaintiff fails to allege the amount of the transactions, the
merchant, or any other basic identifying details. Id. As a result, Plaintiff has failed to state an
EFTA claim. See, e.g., Creager v. Bank of Am. NA, 2023 WL 12177315, at *5 (D. Ariz. Dec. 19,
2023) (dismissing EFTA claims for the plaintiffs who alleged that the defendant “froze their
account, but [did] not allege that an unauthorized transfer occurred”). In addition, Plaintiff has
failed to allege any facts to support his conclusory allegations that WF Bank did not conduct a
good faith investigation into the purported fraudulent transactions. See, e.g., Chen 2019 WL
9633650, at *7–8; see also Tian, 2025 WL 1377767, at *5 (“Plaintiffs have not described
Defendant’s response or any communications relating to their reports (aside from not issuing a
refund) . . . or alleged any facts that would support an inference of the unreasonableness or bad
faith of Defendant’s investigations”); Gilbert v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2014 WL 12644029, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. 2014) (dismissing EFTA claim based on conclusory allegations); Sundahl v. Comerica Bank,
2026 WL 112059, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2026) (“Plaintiff does not assert any facts about the
sufficiency of Defendants’ investigation or their determination as to whether an error had occurred .
. . As Plaintiff’s factual allegations do not support a plausible inference that Defendants’
investigation was unreasonable or performed in bad faith, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief
under § 1693f”); Widjaja v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 21 F.4th 579, 584 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he
consumer must allege facts plausibly suggesting that the bank’s conclusion is wrong in order to
state a claim that the bank has violated § 1693g”). Moreover, the Court finds Plaintiff’s argument
that the necessary facts are solely within the possession and control of the WF Bank unpersuasive.
Plaintiff alleges that the “specific transactions, destinations, dates, and amounts appear on
Plaintiff’s Wells Fargo Premier Checking statements, copies of which are in Defendants’ exclusive
possession.” FAC, ¶ 24. However, Plaintiff has access to those statements, as demonstrated by
Plaintiff’s submission of at least one of those statements as an exhibit to a declaration Plaintiff
submitted under penalty of perjury in LASC. See, Notice of Removal (Docket No. 1), Exh. 3
(pp.200-207). Plaintiff’s EFTA claim cannot survive such glaring contradictions. See, e.g., Airs
Aromatics, LLC v. Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 744 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 2014)
(denying leave to amend for futility because “[a] party cannot amend pleadings to ‘directly
contradict an earlier assertion made in the same proceeding”) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s first cause of action for violation of the EFTA is dismissed.
2. Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action for Violation of the FCRA
In his second cause of action, Plaintiff alleges violation of the FCRA. The FCRA generally
prohibits “[a] person” from furnishing information “relating to a consumer” to any consumer
reporting agency (“CRA”) “if the person knows or consciously avoids knowing that the information
is inaccurate.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2(a). However, a consumer cannot sue a furnisher based
simply on the communication of inaccurate information. Id.; see also Nelson v. Chase Manhattan
Mortg. Corp., 282 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir.2002). Instead, a consumer has a private right of
action against a furnisher if, after receiving notice that information is disputed, the furnisher fails to
reasonably undertake one of the following duties: (1) “conduct an investigation with respect to the
disputed information”; (2) “review all relevant information provided by the consumer reporting
agency”; (3) “report the results of the investigation to the consumer reporting agency”; and (4) “if
the investigation finds that the information is incomplete or inaccurate, report those results to all
other consumer reporting agencies to which the person furnished the information and that compile
and maintain files on consumers on a nationwide basis.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2(b). As a result, in
order to state a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b), a plaintiff must allege: (1) he found an
inaccuracy in his credit report; (2) he notified a CRA; (3) the “CRA notified the furnisher of the
information about the dispute; and (4) the furnisher failed to investigate the inaccuracies or
otherwise failed to comply with the requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2(a)(1)(A)–(E). See Biggs
v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 209 F.Supp.3d 1142, 1144 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
In this case, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts establishing the first, third, or fourth
elements. Specifically, Plaintiff fails to allege what information WF Bank furnished about his
account to any CRA that was inaccurate. Instead, Plaintiff merely asserts in conclusory fashion
that WF Bank “furnished information” and that he “disputed the accuracy of the information.” FAC
¶¶ 70-71. In addition, WF Bank’s duties under Section 1681s-2(b) “arise only after [it ] receives
notice of dispute from a CRA; notice of a dispute received directly from the consumer does not
trigger [WF Bank’s] duties.” Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1154 (9th Cir.
2009). Although Plaintiff alleges he filed a dispute with ChexSystems, he does not allege that
ChexSystems notified WF Bank of the dispute. The FAC also does not allege that Plaintiff filed a
dispute with any other CRA or that any such agency notified WF Bank. Finally, Plaintiff merely
alleges in conclusory fashion that WF Bank failed to conduct a reasonable investigation. However,
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts detailing the purported investigation and why it was unreasonable.
Id.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s second cause of action for violation of the FCRA is dismissed.
3. Plaintiff’s Third and Fourth Causes of Action for Violation of the ADA
In his third and fourth causes of action, Plaintiff alleges violation of the ADA and retaliation
in violation of the ADA, respectively. An ADA claim requires the plaintiff to plead: (1) the plaintiff
has a disability; (2) the defendant owns, leases, or operates a place of “public accommodation”;
and (3) the plaintiff was denied public accommodations by the defendant because of their
disability. See Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730-31 (9th Cir. 2007); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12181. An ADA retaliation claim requires a plaintiff to plead: (1) involvement in a protected
activity; (2) an adverse action; and (3) a causal link between the two. See Pardi v. Kaiser Found.
Hosps., 389 F.3d 840, 849 (9th Cir. 2004); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).
In this case, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he has standing to bring his ADA claims.
A private ADA plaintiff may not seek monetary damages for any type of ADA claim and, instead, is
entitled to only injunctive relief. See Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2021)
(explaining that damages are not available in private action under ADA Title III); Alvarado v. Cajun
Operating Co., 588 F.3d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that damages are not available in
private ADA retaliation action). To bring a claim for injunctive relief, there must be a real and
immediate threat of continued future ADA violations in the absence of an injunction. See Midgett
v. Tri–Cty. Met. Trans. Dist. of Or., 254 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that isolated past
incidents of ADA violations do not support an inference that a plaintiff faces a real and immediate
threat of continued future violations of the ADA in the absence of injunctive relief); Chapman v. Pier
1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 948 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 111 (1983)) (explaining that, in addition to experiencing ADA violations, “a plaintiff seeking
injunctive relief must additionally demonstrate ‘a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged
in a similar way’”). It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s WF Bank account is now closed. As a result,
although Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to injunctive relief, there is no accommodation that
Plaintiff could be granted by WF Bank because he is no longer a customer. Therefore, the Court
concludes that Plaintiff’s ADA claims fail due to lack of standing. See Chapman, 631 F.3d at 948.
In addition, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating any plausible “but-for” causal
link between his purported protected activity – Plaintiff’s written “invocation” of the ADA – and the
purported adverse action – the denying of Plaintiff’s disputes and the closing of his account.
Indeed, Plaintiff alleges that many of his disputes were denied prior to the alleged protected
activity. See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 26, 33, 52(e), 66(d), 113, and 124(c). Plaintiff has also failed to allege
that the dispute denials would not have happened but for his protected activity. Indeed, although
Plaintiff’s account was closed after his purported protected activity, Plaintiff alleges that WF Bank
took similar steps – restricting his access to his account – prior to his protected activity. As a
result, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to allege an ADA claim. See, e.g., Royston v.
City of Scottsdale, 2024 WL 4277871, at *7 (D. Ariz. Sept. 24, 2024), aff’d, 2025 WL 3110639 (9th
Cir. Nov. 6, 2025) (citation omitted) (concluding that protected activity occurring after the alleged
adverse action could not constitute a causal link).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s third cause of action for violation of the ADA and fourth cause of
action for retaliation in violation of the ADA are dismissed.
4. Plaintiff’s Seventh Cause of Action for Violation of the Unruh Act
In his seventh cause of action, Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Unruh Act. To allege an
Unruh Civil Rights Act claim, a plaintiff must plead (1) discriminatory treatment; (2) motivated in
substantial part by discriminatory animus; (3) harm; and (4) a causal link between the
discriminatory action and harm. Frazier v. City of Fresno, 2023 WL 4108322, at *58 (E.D. Cal.
June 21, 2023). In addition, a plaintiff may use a violation of the ADA to establish a violation of the
Unruh Civil Rights Act. Cullen v. Netflix, Inc., 880 F.Supp.2d 1017, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing
Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club, 36 Cal.4th 824, 854 (2005)). However, Plaintiff has
failed to state a claim under the ADA. As a result, in order to allege an independent basis for an
Unruh Act claim, Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating intentional discrimination. See Martinez
v. Cot'n Wash, Inc. , 81 Cal. App. 5th 1026, 1036 (2022) ("Unless an Unruh Act claim is based on
an ADA violation, the act requires a claimant to prove intentional discrimination . . . Thus, absent
an ADA violation, the Unruh Act requires allegations supporting willful, affirmative misconduct with
the specific intent to accomplish discrimination on the basis of a protected trait") (citations and
quotations omitted). In this case, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts demonstrating intentional
discrimination. Instead, Plaintiff alleges in conclusory fashion that WF Bank closed his account
after learning that Plaintiff had cancer. However, such conclusory allegations are insufficient. Id.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action for violation of the Unruh Act is dismissed.
5. Plaintiff’s Sixth Cause of Action for Negligence and Negligence Per Se
In his sixth cause of action, Plaintiff alleges a claim for negligence and negligence per se.
To state a negligence claim under California law, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a legal duty of care
owed by the defendant to her, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) proximate causation of that breach
to (4) the plaintiff's injury. Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 116 (2001); see also Steinle v. City &
Cty. of San Francisco, 230 F. Supp. 3d 994, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2017). “The threshold element of a
cause of action for negligence is the existence of a duty to use due care toward an interest of
another that enjoys legal protection against an unintentional invasion.” Paz v. State of California,
22 Cal. 4th 550, 559 (2000). The existence of a duty is a question of law to be resolved by a court
on a case-by-case basis. Id. Negligence per se is an evidentiary presumption which “creates a
presumption of negligence” if certain elements are met. Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr., 140 Cal. App.
4th 1256, 1285 (2006). The failure to exercise due care (the second element of negligence) can be
presumed if the following elements are shown: (1) the defendant “violated a statute, ordinance, or
regulation of a public entity”; (2) the “violation proximately caused death or injury to person or
property”; (3) the “death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the statute,
ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent”; and (4) the “person suffering the death or the
injury to his person or property was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute,
ordinance, or regulation was adopted.” See Elsner v. Uveges, 34 Cal. 4th 915 n.7 (2004).
However, negligence per se does not, on its own, lead to liability. Instead, the plaintiff still must
prove all elements of negligence but may use negligence per se to do so. See Quiroz, 140 Cal.
App. 4th at 1285 (meeting the elements of negligence per se “alone does not entitle a plaintiff to a
presumption of negligence in the absence of an underlying negligence action . . . Instead, [the
doctrine] operates to establish a presumption of negligence [for the purpose of] providing evidence
of an element of a preexisting common law cause of action”). In other words, negligence per se
may be used to prove the elements of negligence – particularly breach of duty – but is not a
standalone claim.
In this case, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for negligence or
negligence per se. In his FAC, Plaintiff does not allege that WF Bank breached any duty that
applies between a bank and a depositor. Instead, Plaintiff vaguely alleges that WF Bank breached
the “common-law duty of care a bank owes its depositor under California law.” FAC, ¶ 98.
However, California law is clear that a financial institution does not owe a general legal duty of care
to customers where the parties operate in conventional roles. See Nymark v. Heart Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass’n, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1095 (1991) (“The existence of a duty of care owed by a
defendant to a plaintiff is a prerequisite to establishing a claim for negligence”) (citation omitted);
See, e.g., Hegyes v. Unjian Enters., Inc., 234 Cal. App. 3d 1103, 1111 (1991) (“A complaint [for
negligence] which lacks allegations of fact to show that a legal duty of care was owed is fatally
defective”) (citations omitted). Although a bank has a duty to act with “reasonable care in its
transactions with its depositors,” the parties’ contract defines the scope of a bank’s duties. See
Gray v. Ben, 2022 WL 16859609, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2022); See, e.g., Kurtz-Ahlers, LLC v.
Bank of Am., N.A., 48 Cal. App. 5th 952, 956 (2020) (finding that bank owes customer a “narrow
scope” of duties arising from deposit agreement, including honoring valid checks, dishonoring
unsigned checks and providing an accurate accounting). Moreover, the “contractual relationship
does not involve any implied duty ‘to supervise account activity’ or ‘to inquire into the purpose for
which the funds are being used.’” Chazen v. Centennial Bank, 61 Cal. App. 4th 532, 537 (1998);
OEM Materials & Supplies, Inc. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2023 WL 4291979, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 16,
2023) (concluding that imposing such a requirement on a bank would “imperil both customer
privacy and the expedited processing of banking transactions so crucial to a modern economy”);
Software Design & Application, Ltd., v. Hoefer & Arnett, Inc., 49 Cal. App. 4th 472, 481 (1996)
(finding that a bank owes no duty to police customer accounts by “supervis[ing] account activity or
otherwise track[ing] frequent and/or large dollar transactions”).
In addition, a party generally does not have a duty to protect another from the criminal acts
of third parties, like the acts allegedly perpetrated by unidentified individuals purportedly making
unauthorized transfers from Plaintiff’s WF Bank account, or to aid the plaintiff in mitigating or
recovering from such harm. See, e.g., Brown v. USA Taekwondo, 11 Cal. 5th 204, 214-15 (2021);
Venture Gen. Agency, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2019 WL 5213005, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16,
2019) (“Wells Fargo owed no duty to Plaintiffs vis-à-vis the third-party account in this case, or to
cooperate with Plaintiffs to remedy the fraud, or to disclose to Plaintiffs information related to the
third-party account.”) aff’d, 829 F. App’x 837 (9th Cir. 2020). Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff’s
negligence and negligence per se claim overlaps with his FCRA claim, it is preempted by the
FCRA. See Mamboleo v. Wells Fargo Bank NA, 2015 WL 9691022, at *4 (D. Ariz. Feb. 25, 2015),
aff’d, 688 F. App’x 418 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that the FCRA preempts state law claims
regardless of whether an FCRA claim is pled).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for negligence and negligence per se is
dismissed. See Kurtz-Ahlers, LLC, 48 Cal. App. 5th at 961 (rejecting argument that duty should be
imposed on bank to detect fraud as “depositors are often, if not always, in a better position than
their banks to protect themselves from fraud by simple steps such as using due diligence in hiring
bookkeepers and by occasionally checking their financial records”).
6. Plaintiff’s Eighth Cause of Action for Breach of Contract and Breach of
the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
In his eighth cause of action, Plaintiff alleges a claim for breach of contract and breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. To state a viable breach of contract claim, a
plaintiff must allege: (1) a contract; (2) the plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance;
(3) the defendant's breach, and (4) damages to the plaintiff. Coles v. Glaser, 2 Cal. App. 5th 384,
391 (2016). It is “absolutely essential to plead the terms of the contract either in haec verba or
according to legal effect.” Twaite v. Allstate Ins. Co., 216 Cal. App. 3d 239, 252 (1989); see also
Kaar v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2016 WL 3068396, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 1, 2016) (“To claim a
breach of contract in federal court the complaint must identify the specific provision of the contract
allegedly breached by the defendant”). Although a plaintiff is not required to “attach the contract or
recite the contract's terms verbatim,” they “must identify with specificity the contractual obligations
allegedly breached by the defendant.” Kaar, 2016 WL 3068396, at *1 (citation omitted).
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that WF Bank committed numerous breaches of the Deposit
Account Agreement (“DAA”). FAC, ¶ 109. However, the purported breaches alleged by Plaintiff
are unrelated to WF Bank’s responsibilities and obligations under the DAA.4 For example, Plaintiff
alleges that WF Bank breached the DAA by processing unauthorized transactions on his account.
See FAC, ¶¶ 109(a) and (f). However, the DAA provides that transactions may be processed on
WF Bank’s checking accounts. DAA (attached as Exh. A to the Declaration of Maxwell Levins), pp.
13-14. To the extent Plaintiff claims that WF Bank should have monitored his account to prevent
unauthorized transactions, that duty belongs to Plaintiff, not WF Bank. See DAA, p. 6. Plaintiff
also alleges that WF Bank violated the DAA by denying one of his claims within two business days.
FAC, ¶ 109(b). However, as WF Bank points out, a prompt investigation and response constitutes
prompt customer service, not the breach of a contractual duty. Plaintiff fails to allege any
additional facts demonstrating why such a prompt resolution of a dispute constitutes a breach of
the DAA. See DAA, p. 26 (allowing WF Bank to take up to 45 days to investigate disputes, if
needed). In addition, Plaintiff alleges that WF Bank breached the DAA by reversing provisional
credits. See FAC, ¶ 109(c). However, the DAA specifically provides that WF Bank “can reverse
any credit made to your account resulting from a claim of unauthorized transaction or error if [WF
Bank] determine[s] the transaction was authorized.” See DAA, p. 7. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that
WF Bank breached the DAA by imposing and maintaining a three-month lockout on Plaintiff’s
account and then closing Plaintiff’s account. FAC, ¶¶ 109(d) and 119(e). However, the DAA
specifically provides that if WF Bank “suspect[s] any suspicious, irregular, fraudulent, unauthorized
or unlawful activities…[WF Bank] may, in [its] sole discretion: prevent, delay or decline transactions
account activities; freeze all or some of the funds in any account with us that you keep or control;
and/or otherwise restrict access to your account(s).” DAA, p. 42. The DAA also provides that WF
Bank “may close [Plaintiff’s] account at any time. DAA, p. 33. As a result, the Court finds that not
only did WF Bank’s actions not violated the DAA, but WF Bank’s actions were specifically
authorized by it. Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to allege a claim for breach
of contract.
A breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is established by evidence
that the defendant unfairly interfered with plaintiff’s right to receive the benefits of the contract as
opposed to a breach of an express contractual term. Racine & Laramie, Ltd. v. Department of
Parks & Recreation, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1026, 1031-32 (1992). Because WF Bank’s actions were
authorized by its contract with Plaintiff, there can be no breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. See Jurin v. Google Inc., 768 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1073 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (citing
4 Plaintiff does not attach the DAA to the FAC and does not allege the terms of the DAA in
the FAC. WF Bank submitted a copy of the DAA with its Motion to Dismiss and requested that the
Court take judicial notice of it. Plaintiff has raised various objections to the Court taking judicial
notice of the DAA. The Court has considered all of Plaintiff’s objections and overrules those
objections. Accordingly, the Court grants WF Bank’s request for judicial notice with respect to the
DAA. See, e.g., Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding
the contents of disclosure documents to be incorporated by reference because the question of
whether the plaintiff “had access to and reviewed the proffered documents is a matter unrelated to
their authenticity”); Smith v. Google, LLC, 735 F. Supp. 3d 1188, 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (taking
judicial notice of the defendant’s terms of service because they were “publicly available from a
source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned and [their] contents [could] be accurately
determined”).
Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Dev. Cal., Inc., 2 Cal.4th 342, 373 (1992)) (“Good faith
and fair dealing
is satisfied where the conduct at issue is either expressly permitted or at least not prohibited”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action for breach of contract and breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is dismissed.
7. Plaintiff’s Ninth Cause of Action for Conversion
In his ninth cause of action, Plaintiff alleges a claim for conversion. The elements of a claim
for conversion are: (1) a plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of property; (2) defendant’s
disposition of that property in a manner inconsistent with such property rights; and (3) damages.
Lee v. Hanley, 61 Cal. 4th 1225, 1240 (2015).
“[A] depositor has no claim to any specific assets in his bank,” because once a depositor
deposits their money into a bank, the depositor is “no longer the owner or entitled to the
possession of any specific money which was the subject of conversion.” Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
San Francisco Bank, 58 Cal. App. 2d 528, 534 (1943); see Reliance Ins. Co. v. U.S. Bank of
Wash., N.A., 143 F.3d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Except for special kinds of accounts in some
jurisdictions, bank accounts generally cannot be the subject of conversion, because they are not
specific money, but only an acknowledgment by the bank of a debt to its depositor”); Lawrence v.
Bank of Am., 163 Cal. App. 3d 431, 437 n. 2 (1985) (holding that money on deposit with a bank
may not be the subject of conversion). In this case, Plaintiff’s allegations exclusively related to
money that was on deposit in his WF Bank account and additional funds that he wanted WF Bank
to deposit into his account. As a result, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim
for conversion. See Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo & Co., 622 F.Supp.2d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 2009);
Adanna Jiagbogu v. Bank of Am., 2016 WL 7626429, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2016).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action for conversion is dismissed.
8. Plaintiff’s Tenth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress
In his tenth cause of action, Plaintiff alleges a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are “(1)
extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless
disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or
extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by
the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” Lawler v. Montblanc N. Am., LLC, 704 F.3d 1235, 1245 (9th
Cir. 2013) (quoting Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035 (2009)). “A defendant’s conduct is
‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized
community.’” Hughes, 46 Cal. 4th at 1051. The conduct must be “intended to inflict injury or
engaged in with the realization that injury will result.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In
addition, “[s]evere emotional distress means emotional distress of such substantial quality or
enduring quality that no reasonable person in civilized society should be expected to endure it.”
Id. at 1051 (emphasis added). To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must allege the extreme and
outrageous acts with “great specificity.” Yau v. Santa Margarita Ford, Inc., 229 Cal. App. 4th 144,
161 (2014).
In this case, Plaintiff identifies seven purportedly “outrageous” actions. FAC, ¶ 116.
However, none of those actions constitute “outrageous” conduct, and most do not even constitute
improper conduct. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that WF Bank: (1) “received actual written notice of
Plaintiff’s terminal Glioblastoma diagnosis on January 9, 2026 at 12:37 PM”; (2) “[w]ithin 14 days,
reversed a $1,918.95 provisional credit their own investigators had determined appropriate”; (3)
“[w]ithin 27 days, Defendants closed the Account of a terminally ill customer on pretextual
grounds”; (4) “[w]ithin 28 days, Defendants denied Plaintiff’s 28-transaction fraud claim in fewer
than two business days”; (5) “[t]hroughout the period, Defendants continued 203 daily calls after
Plaintiff’s ‘can barely speak’ notice”; (6) Defendants took each action with full knowledge of
Plaintiff’s disabilities and terminal diagnosis”; and (7) “Defendants removed Ashley C. - Plaintiff’s
only documents line of communication during his terminal illness – and replaced her with an
unnamed male investigator who never contacted Plaintiff.” The Court concludes that, without
further factual support, these allegations are insufficient to establish “extreme and outrageous
conduct” by WF Bank.
In addition, Plaintiff’s mere conclusory allegations that he suffered severe emotional
distress, without more, are insufficient to demonstrate the “substantial quality or enduring quality”
of emotional distress necessary to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Moreover, Plaintiff fails to plead any facts demonstrating that WF Bank’s conduct (or lack thereof)
was done with the intent of causing Plaintiff distress.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s tenth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is
dismissed.
9. Plaintiff’s Eleventh Cause of Action for Violation of the Dependent Adult
Protection Act
In his eleventh cause of action, Plaintiff alleges a claim for violation of the Dependent Adult
Protection Act. To allege a claim under the Dependent Adult Protection Act, a plaintiff must allege
that the defendant “assist[ed] in taking, secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or retaining real or
personal property of an elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or
both.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 15610.30(a)(2) (citation modified).
In this case, the Court concludes that Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, has failed to
demonstrate that he qualifies as a dependent adult. A dependent adult means a person who:
has physical or mental limitations that restrict his or her ability to carry out normal
activities or to protect his or her rights, including, but not limited to, persons who have
physical or developmental disabilities, or whose physical or mental abilities have
diminished because of age.
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 15610.23. Plaintiff alleges that WF Bank violated the Dependent Adult
Protection Act by denying his claims regarding purportedly unauthorized transactions in January
and February 2026. However, Plaintiff also alleges that he filed more than a dozen complaints in
those same months with WF Bank, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Los Angeles Police Department. As a
result, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that he had physical or mental
limitations restricting his ability to carry out normal activities or to protect his rights. See Tanya A.
v. City of San Diego, 2015 WL 1197550, *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 16 2015) (noting that even on a motion
to dismiss “some threshold of plausibility must be crossed at the outset) (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 558).
In addition, the crux of the Dependent Adult Protection Act requires the “taking, secreting,
appropriating, obtaining, or retaining real or personal property.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §
15610.30(a)(2). However, Plaintiff does not, and cannot, plead a direct taking by WF Bank
because Plaintiff alleges that the unauthorized transactions were the result of “identity theft” by
unknown third parties, not WF Bank. FAC, ¶¶ 3, 49, 56, and 60. Plaintiff also cannot state a direct
taking claim against WF Bank based on the reversal of provisional credits because provisional
credits are temporary credits that WF Bank has the statutory and contractual right to reverse. See,
e.g., Kanji v. Bank of Am., 2020 WL 8175548, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2020) (dismissing a
Dependent Adult Protection Act claim that was based entirely on allegation that the bank failed to
reimburse funds stolen by a third-party). Similarly, the denial of a claim is not a direct taking. Id.
As a result, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Dependent Adult Protection Act claim fails.
Moreover, to establish a claim of assisting financial elder abuse by a third party, Plaintiff
must allege that WF Bank actually “knew of the third party’s wrongful conduct.” See Ma v. Bank of
Am., N.A., 2025 WL 2180792, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 2025) (citing Das v. Bank of Am., N.A., 186
Cal. App. 4th 727, 745 (2010)); Casey v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 127 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1145
(2005) (“California courts have long held that liability for aiding and abetting [an intentional tort]
depends on proof the defendant had actual knowledge of the specific primary wrong the defendant
substantially assisted”). Plaintiff alleges that WF Bank permitted transactions he contends he did
not authorize. FAC ¶ 124(a) and (e). However, Plaintiff does not allege that WF Bank actually
knew that the transactions in question were unauthorized. As a result, the Court concludes that
Plaintiff’s Dependent Adult Protection Act claim fails.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s eleventh cause of action for violation of the Dependent Adult
Protection Act is dismissed.
10. Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action for Violation of the UCL
In his fifth cause of action, Plaintiff alleges a violation of the UCL. The UCL makes
actionable any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §
17200. “The UCL is a broad remedial statute that permits an individual to challenge wrongful
business conduct ‘in whatever context such activity might occur.’” Lozano v. AT&T Wireless
Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 731 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cel-Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles
Cellular Tele. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 181 (1999)). The UCL is an equitable statute that authorizes
only restitution and injunctive relief, not damages. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203 When a
plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, he cannot maintain a UCL claim seeking the same relief.
See Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834, 844 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that “traditional
principles governing equitable remedies in federal courts, including the requisite inadequacy of
legal remedies, apply when a party requests restitution under the UCL”).
In this case, Plaintiff has failed to establish that his other causes of action for breach of
contract, negligence, and violation of various statutes do not provide an adequate remedy at law.
See Prudential Home Mortgage Co. v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. App.4th 1236, 1249 (1998) (finding
that to obtain equitable relief, plaintiff must establish there is no adequate remedy at law). More
importantly, Plaintiff’s UCL claim is based on the same allegations underlying his other causes of
action. Because the Court has found those allegations insufficient and dismissed Plaintiff’s other
causes of action, Plaintiff’s UCL claim also fails. Antonov v. General Motors LLC, 2024 WL
217825, *12 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2024) (“Because Plaintiff's claim for a violation of the UCL's
‘fraudulent prong’ relies on the same theories of fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent
concealment that the court found to be insufficient [ ], the court concludes Plaintiff has also failed to
allege a violation of the ‘fraudulent prong’ of the UCL”); Pellerin v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 877 F.
Supp. 2d 983, 992 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (“A UCL claim must be dismissed if the plaintiff has not stated
a claim for the predicate acts upon which he bases the claim”); In re Intel Corp. CPU Mktg., Sales
Prac. and Prod. Liab. Litig., 2023 WL 7211394, at *2 (9th Cir. Nov. 2, 2023) (affirming a district
court's dismissal of the plaintiffs’ UCL unfair conduct claim because the plaintiffs’ allegations “were
coextensive with those of the previously dismissed omission-based claims”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for violation of the UCL is dismissed.
11. WF Bank’s Motion to Dismiss is Also Granted for Plaintiff’s Failure to
File a Proposed Statement of Decision
The Court's Standing Order, filed on May 6, 2026 (Docket No. 9), provides in relevant part:
"Not more than two days after the deadline for filing the Reply, each party shall lodge a Proposed
Statement of Decision, which shall contain a statement of the relevant facts and applicable law with
citations to case law and the record." Standing Order, § 5(f). The deadline for filing the Reply was
June 22, 2026, and, as a result, the deadline for filing the Proposed Statement of Decision was
June 24, 2026. See L.R. 7-10. Plaintiff failed to timely file and still has not filed the required
Proposed Statement of Decision.
Pursuant to Local Rule 7-12, "[t]he failure to file any required document, or the failure to file
it within the deadline, may be deemed consent to the granting or denial of the motion . . . ." In
addition, the Standing Order expressly provides that the "[f]ailure to lodge the Proposed Statement
will result in the denial or granting of the motion." Standing Order, § 5(f). Accordingly, pursuant to
Local Rule 7-12 and the Standing Order, WF Bank’s Motion to Dismiss is granted on the
alternative ground that Plaintiff failed to file a Proposed Statement of Decision.
12. Leave to Amend Would Be Futile
The Ninth Circuit has instructed that “a district court should grant leave to amend even if no
request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly
be cured by the allegation of other facts.” See, e.g., Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir.
2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). However, “[a]
district court may dismiss a complaint without leave to amend if amendment would be futile.” Airs
Aromatics, LLC v. Opinion Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 744 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir.
2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted); Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2009)
(finding no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile);
Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Denial of leave to
amend is not an abuse of discretion where the pleadings before the court demonstrate that further
amendment would be futile").
In this case, the Court concludes that it would be futile and, thus, unnecessary to provide
Plaintiff another opportunity to amend the claims alleged in the FAC. See, e.g., Chaset v.
Fleer/Skybox Int'l, 300 F.3d 1083, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that amendment would be futile
because “[t]he basic underlying facts have been alleged by plaintiffs and have been analyzed by
the district court and us. We conclude that the plaintiffs cannot cure the basic flaw in their
pleading”); Lipton v. Pathogenesis Corp., 284 F.3d 1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Because any
amendment would be futile, there was no need to prolong the litigation by permitting further
amendment”); Klamath–Lake Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276,
1293 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that “futile amendments should not be permitted”). Plaintiff has had
two opportunities to allege his claims against WF Bank and has failed to do so despite being
afforded multiple opportunities. In addition, Plaintiff has failed to engage in good faith meet and
confer conferences with WF Bank or take any other actions that might assist him in alleging viable
claims. Instead, Plaintiff has indicated that he intends to continue pursuing these claims regardless
of the Court’s ruling.
Accordingly, the claims alleged in Plaintiff’s FAC are dismissed without leave to amend.
IV. Conclusion
For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Docket No. 33) and Motion to
Strike (Docket No. 52) are DENIED. WF Bank’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 47) is GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s FAC is DISMISSED without leave to amend as to WF Bank. In addition, the Court
exercises its discretion and sua sponte DISMISSES without leave to amend Plaintiff's FAC as to
WF Company. See, e.g., Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's , 3 F.3d 156, 161 (7th Cir. 1993) ("A court
may grant a motion to dismiss even as to nonmoving defendants where the nonmoving defendants
are in a position similar to that of moving defendants or where the claims against all defendants are
integrally related"). This action is DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reasonable
Accommodations (Docket No. 31) and Application for Reasonable Accommodations (Docket No.
55) are DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.