Blount

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

ROBIN BLOUNT, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

Case No. 4:25-cv-1485-RHH

)

ST. LOUIS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF )

PUBLIC HEALTH, ET AL., )

)

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 31.) The

parties consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to

Rule 636(c)(1). (ECF No. 25). For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant in part and deny

in part Defendants’ motion.

I. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of a

complaint. When considering a 12(b)(6) motion, the court assumes the factual allegations of a

complaint are true and construes them in the non-movant's favor. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

319, 326–27 (1989).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” In Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court clarified that Rule 8(a)(2) requires complaints to contain

“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). Specifically,

“[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The issue in considering such a motion is not whether the plaintiff will

ultimately prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to present evidence in support of the claim.

See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Self-represented Plaintiff Robin Blount filed the instant action on October 1, 2025,

pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq.,

against her former employer St. Louis County Department of Public Health.1 Plaintiff attached an

EEOC Right to Sue Letter dated September 20, 2025, to her original Complaint. (ECF No. 1-1.)

After reviewing her Complaint, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file a copy of her EEOC Charge of

Discrimination (“EEOC Charge”) to ascertain whether Plaintiff exhausted her administrative

remedies. (ECF No. 5.) In response, Plaintiff filed the EEOC Charge dated July 20, 2023. (ECF

No. 7.)

On January 2, 2026, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against Defendants.2 (ECF No.

21.) For purposes of the pending motion to dismiss, all facts alleged in the Amended Complaint

are accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.3 Waters v. Madson, 921

F.3d 725, 734 (8th Cir. 2008).

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff “based

on race, religion, and retaliation, including hostile work environment and failure to promote.”

1Plaintiff states that she is bringing this action against St. Louis County Department of Public Health and St. Louis

County Government. The Court will treat these as the same entity/employer instead of two separate defendants. See

infra, Section V.

2 Plaintiff was not required to seek leave of Court to file an Amended Complaint, as Defendants had not yet filed a

responsive pleading to the original Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(A)(1)(b).

3 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint includes very few dates, making the timeline of the events alleged unclear.

Consequently, the summary of the allegations is not in chronological order; rather, the summary mirrors the order of

events as described in the Amended Complaint.

(ECF No. 21, at 6.) Plaintiff was employed as a Secretary for the Saint Louis County Department

of Public Health from about December 19, 2019, until December 2023. She is an African-

American woman and a practicing Christian, and while employed by Defendants, she consistently

performed her job satisfactorily or above expectations and received merit-based pay increases.

In or around 2022, Plaintiff requested and was granted a religious accommodation

exempting her from her employer’s COVID-19 vaccination requirement due to her Christian

beliefs. In lieu of the vaccination, Plaintiff was to submit proof of weekly COVID-19 testing.

Plaintiff timely and consistently completed the testing on-site. After receiving the accommodation,

she received “repeated anonymous emails.” The emails accused her of failing to comply with the

testing and reporting requirements and threatened disciplinary action up to and including

termination. The emails did not identify a sender or any dates or times of alleged non-compliance.

Plaintiff promptly informed Defendants of the emails and provided documentation confirming

compliance, but Defendants failed to investigate the source of the emails or correct the

misinformation. Defendants issued disciplinary actions based on the emails, and these warnings

were partially removed after Plaintiff sought intervention through the Saint Louis County Civil

Service Commission.

Defendants also assigned additional staff to supervise Plaintiff, ordered additional keys to

access Plaintiff’s desk, and withheld approved postal deliveries until Plaintiff produced proof of

authorization to place the orders. These actions were not imposed on other team members and

secretaries within her division, and they “were not imposed on Plaintiff prior to filing her internal

grievance.” The allegations do not elaborate on the date(s) or circumstance(s) for which Plaintiff

filed a grievance.

Defendants excluded and removed Plaintiff from team assignments, meetings and routine

employee interactions. Her assigned desk was relocated to another area within the building, and

she was “the only known team member isolated from core job functions.” Plaintiff alleges that

after she filed an internal grievance and an EEOC complaint, Defendants increased her workload,

assigned duties involving extensive physical labor, and required her to track and report daily tasks

in a manner not required of other similarly situated employees. Again, the allegations do not

indicate the date(s) or circumstance(s) for which an internal grievance was filed.

Plaintiff alleges that she previously performed duties that required specialized training, but

“[a]fter engaging in protected activity, Plaintiff was removed from those duties, while employees

outside Plaintiff’s protected classes—who lacked the specialized training—were permitted to

retain them.” The allegations do not indicate the date(s) of the protected activity and/or removal

from specialized duties, nor do they identify the specific protected activity.

Plaintiff alleges she followed Defendants’ five-step internal grievance process for nearly a

year, and once she escalated her grievance to the final step, HR informed her she had no rights to

the grievance procedures, despite all other team members being eligible to use the same process.

Defendants did not provide an alternative means for Plaintiff to address “the harassment and

discrimination following a denial of her access to the grievance process.”

Plaintiff alleges that following her EEOC complaint, Defendants surveilled and monitored

Plaintiff but did not impose this conduct on other team members or clerical staff. She further

alleges that she was constructively discharged from employment at an unspecified time. After her

constructive discharge and in connection with her request for unemployment benefits, Defendants

submitted false and misleading information to the Missouri Department of Labor regarding

Plaintiff’s employment and separation.

In or around July 2022, Plaintiff applied for the position of Community Outreach

Coordinator. Plaintiff met all posted qualifications and ranked among the top three candidates

eligible for a second-round interview. Before reviewing Plaintiff’s application, the Program

Manager stated that Plaintiff was “not a good fit” and attempted to exclude Plaintiff from further

consideration for the position. Plaintiff’s supervisor reported the attempted exclusion to HR, and

Defendants required that Plaintiff be granted a second-round interview. During the interview, the

Program Manger subjected Plaintiff to repeated interruptions and interrogatory questioning not

directed at other candidates. After the interview, the Program Manager made negative comments

about Plaintiff’s religious jewelry and disclosed Plaintiff’s confidential religious-accommodation

information to other staff without Plaintiff’s consent.

In a written response to Plaintiff’s internal grievance, the Program Manager admitted to

disclosing Plaintiff’s confidential information without authorization. Defendants were aware of

the disclosure but took no corrective or remedial action. The Program Manager selected the

interview panel and served as the final decision-maker for the position. Plaintiff was not selected

for the position. Plaintiff alleges, “[u]pon information and belief, Defendants selected a candidate

outside Plaintiff’s protected class who did not experience the discriminatory treatment imposed on

Plaintiff.”

Plaintiff alleges that from October 2022 through December 2023, Defendants’ actions and

omissions created a hostile work environment that escalated in severity over time and altered the

terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s employment. Defendants knowingly permitted an individual

who was the subject of Plaintiff’s grievance to remain Plaintiff’s supervisor with full authority

over her assignments and working conditions. Defendants prolonged Plaintiff’s exposure to

discrimination, harassment, and retaliation by failing to provide timelines for responses or

intervention following Plaintiff’s repeated requests for assistance.

According to the EEOC Charge4, Plaintiff experienced “continuing” discrimination based

on race, religion, and retaliation; and the discrimination took place on September 7, 2022 at

“earliest” and July 12, 2023 at “latest.” (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff and her supervisor are the only

African American employees on Plaintiff’s team. Plaintiff is the only member of her team that is

a “term” employee rather than a permanent employee, despite each member of her team being paid

through grant funding.

The EEOC Charge states that Plaintiff was granted the accommodation of not receiving the

COVID vaccine based on her religion, and Plaintiff believes that her supervisor’s manager holds

it against her. The manager has mentioned Plaintiff’s COVID status to other employees and has

belittled and admonished Plaintiff in the presence of other employees. In September 2022, Plaintiff

filed a grievance against the manager based on her treatment of Plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s religious accommodation for the vaccine mandate was contingent on her weekly

testing for COVID. The charge of discrimination identifies three instances wherein Plaintiff states

she received an email with a verbal warning that she was out of compliance for not receiving her

weekly COVID test, despite Plaintiff’s compliant status. These emails were received on or about

December 2, 2022, in or around April 2023, and on July 12, 2023, respectively. These verbal

warnings in her personnel record keep her from applying for other positions, and she does not have

the right to file a grievance because of her status as a “term” employee. Plaintiff is “aware of other

4 In filing an Amended Complaint against Defendants, Plaintiff did not include her Right to Sue Letter or her EEOC

Charge of Discrimination as attached exhibits. Nevertheless, the Court finds that consideration of these documents are

appropriate and do not convert Defendant’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. In ruling on a

motion to dismiss, a court may consider “matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to

judicial notice, [and] matters of public record.” Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab., Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 931 n. 3 (8th

Cir. 2012). The EEOC Charge and Right to Sue Letter satisfy that standard in that they are integral to Plaintiff's claim

and matters of public record. See, e.g., Smith v. UPS Freight, No. 4:15-CV-382 JAR, 2015 WL 4274594, at *1 (E.D.

Mo. July 14, 2015) (citing Faibisch v. Univ. of Minnesota, 304 F.3d 797, 803 (8th Cir. 2002)) (taking judicial notice

of Right-to-Sue Letter and Charge of Discrimination without converting motion to dismiss into a motion for summary

judgment).

African American employees who were harassed until the point of constructive discharge or

termination.” (ECF No. 7.)

III. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES UNDER TITLE VII

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any

individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,

sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). It also makes it unlawful for an employer “to

limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way [that] would

deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely

affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national

origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(2). In sum, Title VII prohibits “employer discrimination on the

basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, in hiring, firing, salary structure, promotion

and the like.” Winfrey v. City of Forrest City, 882 F.3d 757, 758 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Univ. of

Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 342 (2013)). Prior to initiating a Title VII action, a

plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the event giving rise to the cause of

action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1).

Here, Defendants’ motion raises two related procedural barriers to litigation of a Title VII

claim: (1) whether Plaintiff complied with the 300-day deadline to file a charge with the EEOC;

and (2) whether the EEOC Charge adequately notified Defendant of the claims in the present

lawsuit.

A. Timeliness

1. Legal Standards

Untimeliness under a statute of limitations and failure to exhaust administrative remedies

are affirmative defenses that a defendant bears the burden to plead and prove. Jessie v. Potter, 516

F.3d 709, 713 n.2 (8th Cir. 2008); Miles v. Bellfontaine Habilitation Ctr., 481 F.3d 1106, 1107

(8th Cir. 2007).

Deciding whether a claim is untimely requires a court to determine when the clock began

to run on the statute of limitations. Under Title VII, the clock starts on the date that “the alleged

unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). If the challenged

employment practice is a “discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act,” the act “‘occurred’ on the

day that it ‘happened.’” Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110 (2002). This

means the “date on which the adverse employment action [was] communicated to the employee.”

Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 403 F.3d 1026, 1032 (8th Cir. 2005); see also Hutson v. Wells

Dairy, Inc., 578 F.3d 823, 826 (8th Cir. 2009). “Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock

for filing charges alleging that act.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114. Once the limitations period has run

on a particular act, any claim based on that act is “no longer actionable.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114–

15.

A court may dismiss a claim as precluded by the statute of limitations if the complaint itself

establishes that the claim is time-barred. Richardson v. Omaha School District, 957 F.3d 869, 873

(8th Cir. 2020). Put differently, dismissal on this ground is only appropriate if the complaint—and

materials embraced by the complaint—“clearly indicate[ ]” that a claim is untimely. 5B Arthur R.

Miller, Mary K. Kane, and A. Benjamin Spencer, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (3d ed.

Oct. 2020 Update). If there are unresolved factual questions concerning a claim’s timeliness, the

claim should proceed. See, e.g., Dida v. Ascension Providence Hosp., No. 4:22-CV-0508-AGF,

2022 WL 2438347, at *5 (E.D. Mo. July 5, 2022) (acknowledging that although plaintiff did not

file a copy of the charge for his ADA claim, defendant bears the burden to establish that dismissal

is warranted for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the present record precluded the

court from making a determination with respect to exhaustion or equitable tolling); Scruggs v.

Greyhound Lines, Inc., No. 4:12-CV-01443SNLJ, 2013 WL 5406615, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 25,

2013) (where plaintiff explained she went to the EEOC within 300 days but someone there told

her she could not file her Charge of Discrimination until her union-based arbitration proceedings

had completed, the Court declined to dismiss the claim as time-barred, explaining “without the

benefit of a factual record, the Court is simply unable to ascertain whether the doctrine of equitable

tolling is available to plaintiff in these circumstances”).

2. The Parties’ Arguments

According to Defendant, Plaintiff was notified she was not selected for the Community

Outreach Coordinator role on May 31, 2022; and so, she had up until March 27, 2023—300 days

later—to file her claim of discrimination based on not being chosen for the position. (ECF No.

32, at 3.) Defendant argues she filed her EEOC charge 415 days after the alleged unlawful

employment practice, and therefore is precluded from filing the lawsuit.

Plaintiff argues that the delay was caused by the EEOC’s scheduling outside Plaintiff’s

control. In her opposition brief, Plaintiff states that she submitted an online inquiry alleging

employment discrimination on or about January 21, 2023, and was issued an EEOC identification

number confirming her submission. She states that the EEOC then instructed her to schedule an

intake interview before a charge could be filed. (ECF No. 33, at 2.) She argues she had no ability

to accelerate the EEOC’s scheduling process or file a formal charge because due to EEOC

scheduling constraints and administrative backlog, her interview was not scheduled until July 13,

2023. The facts surrounding Plaintiff’s communications with the EEOC are not alleged in the

Amended Complaint.

3. Analysis

Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff filed her EEOC charge against Defendants on July 20,

2023. (ECF Nos. 7, 21.) Therefore, it appears the relevant 300-day period preceding the Charge-

filing date began on September 23, 2022, and claims based on unlawful conduct that occurred after

September 23, 2022, are timely. In arguing Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred, Defendant relies

exclusively on one date—the May 31, 2022 notification to Plaintiff that she was not selected for

the Community Outreach Coordinator position. (ECF No. 32, at 3.) Defendant’s reliance on May

31, 2022 is flawed for two reasons.

First, Defendant’s reliance on the failure to promote date as the basis for a timeliness

argument ignores the other allegations in Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge and in the Amended Complaint.

The Amended Complaint does not include specific dates for each allegedly unlawful

unemployment practice, making it difficult to ascertain timeliness. However, Plaintiff alleges

several events took place after September 23, 2022: the July 27, 2023 filing of a grievance against

the manager who failed to promote Plaintiff and treated Plaintiff differently due to her religious

accommodation; and the subsequent three verbal warnings that went into Plaintiff’s personnel file

and prevented her from applying for other opportunities within the organization. Assuming

arguendo that equitable tolling does not apply and the 300-day period preceding the Charge-filing

date began on September 23, 2022, several employment actions described in the Amended

Complaint occurred after September 23, 2022. Defendant is silent on the timeliness of claims based

on those events, and there is no indication in the Amended Complaint that those claims are

untimely. “It would be premature to conclude that any acts within the time period alleged in the

charge of discrimination are time-barred at this stage in the proceedings, and the Court declines to

do so.” Frey v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of St. Louis, No. 4:15-CV-737 CEJ, 2015 WL 4526963, at *3 (E.D.

Mo. July 27, 2015) (where plaintiff claimed he was denied training opportunities and subjected to

different terms and conditions of his employment based on his age from 2009 to November 2010,

the unlawful conduct “cannot be said to occur on any particular day,” and “[a]ccepted as true, these

acts plausibly constitute repeated conduct that is part of the same unlawful employment practice

with liability based on the cumulative effect of individual acts.”).

Second, although Defendant cites to the Amended Complaint for the date Plaintiff was

notified she was not hired for the position, the Amended Complaint is silent as to the date of the

notification. In fact, the Amended Complaint alleges Plaintiff applied for the position in July 2022,

a direct contradiction to Defendant’s statement that she was notified she was not selected in May

2022.5 (ECF No. 21-1, at 3.) Because Defendant’s argument relies on allegations not included in

the Amended Complaint, the undersigned does not consider the May 31, 2022 date in ruling on

the motion to dismiss.

In response, Plaintiff does not address the discrepancy in dates. Instead, as discussed above,

Plaintiff makes an equitable tolling argument based on the EEOC’s delay in scheduling her intake

interview. She argues that she initiated the process on or about January 21, 2023, and that is before

the March 27, 2023, deadline Defendant seeks to impose on Plaintiff. Because Plaintiff’s

allegations are not included in the Amended Complaint, the undersigned does not consider them

here in ruling on the motion to dismiss.

The doctrine of equitable tolling permits a plaintiff to sue after the statutory time period

has expired if she has been prevented from doing so due to inequitable circumstances. Firstcom v.

5 To the extent Defendant could support its contention with evidence and requests the opportunity to resolve this

disputed fact, it may require the Court to convert the motion to a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 56. See Brooks v. Midwest Heart Grp., 655 F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 2011) (“With some exceptions,

we have required strict compliance with the rule that a motion to dismiss must be converted into a motion for summary

judgment if a party and the court rely on materials outside the pleadings.”). However, it does not appear that Defendant

desires the opportunity to develop the record, as Defendant opposes the Court’s consideration of extrinsic evidence

submitted by Plaintiff. (See ECF No. 34.)

Qwest Corp., 555 F.3d 669, 675 (8th Cir. 2009). Equitable tolling is an “exceedingly narrow

window of relief,” Muffuletto v. Client Services, Inc., No. 4:12CV1982, 2012 WL 6216865, at *1

(E.D. Mo. Dec. 13, 2012), and is reserved for “circumstances which were truly beyond the control

of the plaintiff.” Hill v. John Chezik Imports., 869 F.2d 1122, 1124 (8th Cir. 1989). “Generally, a

litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has

been diligently pursing his rights; and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”

Luckett v. Herbster-Hellweg Painting, No. 4:08CV00187 FRB, 2008 WL 2620894, at *2 (E.D.

Mo. June 27, 2008) citing Walker v. Norris, 436 F.3d 1026 (8th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court

has noted four circumstances in which the application of equitable tolling may be appropriate: (1)

the EEOC provided inadequate notice to plaintiff; (2) the court has not ruled on a pending motion

for appointment of counsel and equity justifies tolling the statutory period until the motion is acted

upon; (3) the court led the claimant to believe that he or she did everything required of him; and

(4) defendant lulled the claimant into inaction through affirmative misconduct. Baldwin Cty.

Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984). “The Eighth Circuit has also applied

equitable tolling where an administrative agency has made a mistake of law and/or has provided a

plaintiff with misleading information that led the plaintiff into reasonably believing that her actions

would suffice to protect her rights.” Ousley v. ResCare Homecare, No. 4:13-cv-00898-SPM, 2013

WL 5966050, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 8, 2013) (citations omitted).

Both parties’ arguments are based on information that is not presently in the record or

appropriate for consideration at this stage. Simply put, the Court does not have sufficient

information to determine whether Defendant’s timeliness argument or Plaintiff’s equitable tolling

argument has merit.6 Therefore, the Court finds that, on this record, Defendant has not met its

burden to establish that Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred. The motion is denied on this basis.

B. Scope of Exhausted Claims

1. Legal Standards

A plaintiff suing under Title VII must first exhaust administrative remedies, meaning he

must “give notice of all claims of discrimination in the administrative complaint,” which is the

Charge filed with the EEOC. Tart v. Hill Behan Lumber Co., 31 F.3d 668, 671 (8th Cir. 1994).

The Charge must be “sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally the action

or practices complained of.” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b). However, “[b]ecause persons filing charges

with the EEOC typically lack legal training, those charges must be interpreted with the utmost

liberality in order not to frustrate the remedial purposes of Title VII.” Cobb v. Stringer, 850 F.2d

356, 359 (8th Cir. 1988).

“Each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision

constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice that must be individually

addressed before the EEOC.” Sellers v. Deere & Co., 791 F.3d 938, 943 (8th Cir. 2015) (internal

citation omitted). “A plaintiff will be deemed to have exhausted administrative remedies if the

6 The undersigned notes that following the Supreme Court’s decision in Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U.S. 106

(2002), some courts consider whether an intake questionnaire can satisfy Title VII’s statutory requirement for

administrative charges. See, e.g., Sifferman v. Bd. of Regents, Se. Missouri State Univ., 250 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1143

(E.D. Mo. 2003) (observing that Edelman appears to overrule the Eighth Circuit cases finding that intake

questionnaires which are neither signed under oath nor verified do not satisfy the statutory requirement for an

administrative charge); Marez v. Saint-Gobain Containers, Inc., No. 4:09CV999MLM, 2009 WL 5220160, at *5 (E.D.

Mo. Dec. 31, 2009) (“the EEOC’s Intake Questionnaire is considered a valid charge under Title VII for purposes of

the statute of limitations when it is signed under oath.”) (citing Henry v. Missouri Dept. of Transp., 2009 WL 995546,

at *5 (E.D.Mo. Apr.14, 2009)); Wilkes v. Nucor-Yamato Steel Co., 2015 WL 5725771, at *6 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 29,

2015) (“Based on Edelman, this Court recently considered an intake questionnaire as a charge under Title VII for

purposes of resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion where the defendants challenged the questionnaire for lack of a

verification, date, or signature.”) (citing Univ. of Ark. at Pine Bluff, 2014 WL 4630459, at *11 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 16,

2014)); Ries v. Winona Cnty., 2010 WL 3515722, at *6 (D. Minn. July 28, 2010), report and recommendation adopted,

2010 WL 3515716 (D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2010) (“This Court concludes that, after Edelman, intake questionnaires are

not foreclosed from being considered a charge in Title VII cases.”). Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s intake questionnaire is

not currently before the Court.

allegations of the judicial complaint are like or reasonably related to the administrative charges

that were timely brought.” Anderson v. Block, 807 F.2d 145, 148 (8th Cir. 1986). “A plaintiff is

not permitted to “bring allegations in a Title VII action if they go beyond those that ‘could

reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination’ filed with the EEOC.” Brooks

v. Midwest Heart Grp., 655 F.3d 796, 801 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Tart v. Hill Behan Lumber Co.,

31 F.3d 668, 671–72 (8th Cir.1994)).

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper if the plaintiff's EEOC charge shows that he failed

to exhaust a claim. Brown v. Meridian Med. Techs., Inc., No. 4:23CV675 HEA, 2024 WL

3984631, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 28, 2024) (citing Brooks, 655 F.3d at 801). “To determine what

federal claims a plaintiff exhausted, the court is to look to the boxes the complainant checked on

the charge of discrimination” as well as “the narrative description of the allegations.” Thomas v.

St. Louis Bd. of Educ., No. 4:19-CV-198 CAS, 2019 WL 3323028, at *2 (E.D. Mo. July 24, 2019)

(citing Blakley v. Schlumberger, 648 F.3d 921, 931 (8th Cir. 2011); Tyler v. Univ. of Ark. Bd. of

Trustees, 628 F.3d 980, 989 (8th Cir. 2011)).

2. The Parties’ Arguments

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint alleges Title VII violations

which were not alleged in her Charge of Discrimination, such that they are subject to dismissal for

failure to exhaust. Specifically, Defendant contends the following allegations from the First

Amended Complaint are not raised in her EEOC charge:

25. Defendants assigned additional staff to supervise Plaintiff exclusively, ordered

additional keys to access Plaintiff’s desk without prior notice or consent, and

withheld approved postal deliveries until Plaintiff produced proof of authorization

to place the orders. These actions were not imposed on Plaintiff prior to filing her

internal grievance and were not applied to similarly situated employees, including

other team members and secretaries within the division.

27. After Plaintiff filed an internal grievance and EEOC complaint, Defendants

increased Plaintiff’s workload, assigned duties involving extensive physical labor,

and required Plaintiff to track and report daily tasks in a manner not required of

other similarly situated employees.

38. During the interview, the Program Manager subjected Plaintiff to hostile and

disparate treatment, including repeated interruptions and interrogatory questioning

not directed at other candidates.

45. Defendants prolonged Plaintiff’s exposure to discrimination, harassment, and

retaliation by failing to provide timelines for responses, or intervention, following

Plaintiff’s repeated requests for assistance.

(ECF No. 21-1.)

Plaintiff responds that her allegations arose from the same course of conduct described in

her EEOC filing, and her claims form part of a continuing pattern of adverse treatment and fall

within the scope of a reasonable EEOC investigation. (ECF No. 33, at 3.)

3. Analysis

Plaintiff’s Charge indicates claims of discrimination based on race and religion and

retaliation. Plaintiff asserts in the narrative of her Charge that her supervisor’s manager holds

Plaintiff’s religious accommodation against her. Specifically, the manager has mentioned

Plaintiff’s COVID status to other employees, the manager made a comment regarding a religious

bracelet that Plaintiff wore to an interview for a new position, and the manager did not want to

consider Plaintiff for the position but included Plaintiff in the second-round interviews because

HR told the manager she had to. The manager belittles and admonishes Plaintiff in the presence of

other employees, and Plaintiff filed a grievance against her based on this treatment. After filing

the grievance, Plaintiff received three verbal warning emails regarding noncompliance with

COVID testing, despite Plaintiff being in compliance. Plaintiff believed she was receiving these

warning emails because the warnings go in her personnel record and keep her from applying for

other positions. (ECF No. 7, at 2.)

“[A]n EEOC charge is to be liberally construed.” Stephens v. Keefe Commissary Network,

No. 4:06CV1048SNL, 2006 WL 8458735, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2006). In light of this liberal

construction, the Court finds that the allegations in paragraphs 25, 27, 38, and 45 of the Amended

Complaint are like or reasonably related to the administrative charges. Paragraph 25 states that

Defendant imposed punitive measures on Plaintiff that were not imposed prior to filing her internal

grievance and were not applied to similarly situated employees. (ECF No. 21-1, ¶ 25.) Notably,

this immediately followed an allegation that Defendant issued multiple disciplinary actions based

on the verbal warning emails Plaintiff discussed in her EEOC Charge. (Id. ¶ 24.) The Court

liberally construes the allegations in paragraph 25 to describe additional disciplinary actions based

on the emails discussed in the Charge. Similarly, the increased workload, assigned duties involving

extensive physical labor, and additional tracking and reporting requirements imposed on Plaintiff

after the filing of an internal grievance are reasonably related to the treatment and harassment

referenced in the Charge. (See id. ¶ 27.) The allegations regarding hostile treatment during her

interview with the Program Manager (¶ 38) and the failure to timely respond or intervene following

Plaintiff’s requests for assistance (¶ 45) are reasonably related to the allegations regarding

Plaintiff’s application process and interview for the Community Outreach Coordinator position

and the issues arising from the HR warning emails as described in the EEOC Charge. Therefore,

Defendant has not shown that Plaintiff’s claims are so unrelated to her administrative charge as to

warrant dismissal at this stage.

IV. SUFFICIENCY OF PLEADINGS

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for discrimination based on race or

discrimination or retaliation based on religion, and that the case should be dismissed in its entirety

“due to her failure to establish all four elements required to establish a prima facie case for

discrimination.” (ECF No. 32, at 7.) Defendant misunderstands plaintiff’s burden at this stage.

At the pleading stage, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a plaintiff need only offer “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that [she] is entitled to relief.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

A complaint is sufficient if it provides the defendant with fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and

the grounds upon which it rests. Ring v. First Interstate Mortg., Inc., 984 F.2d 924, 928 (8th Cir.

1993). Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “a court may dismiss a complaint only if it is

clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the

allegations.” Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Grp. L.L.C., 635 F.3d 1106, 1109 (8th

Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original).

Moreover, at the pleading stage in a discrimination case, the prima facie model is not a

pleading standard. Warmington v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minn., 998 F.3d 789, 796 (8th Cir.

2021). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Wilson v. Ark. Dep't. of Hum. Servs., 850 F.3d 368,

371 (8th Cir. 2017). The elements of the prima facie case create the prism that informs the

plausibility determination of a claim. Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051, 1056 (8th Cir. 2016);

Warmington, 998 F.3d at 796. In this context, the complaint “must include sufficient factual

allegations to provide the grounds on which the claim rests.” Warmington, 998 F.3d at 796.

(quoting Blomker, 831 F.3d at 1056).

To establish a prima face case of discrimination on the basis of race or religion, a plaintiff

must demonstrate: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was meeting his employer’s

legitimate job expectations; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the

circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination. See Shirrell v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 793

F.3d 881, 887 (8th Cir. 2015) (religious discrimination); Gibson v. Am. Greetings Corp., 670 F.3d

844, 853-54 (8th Cir. 2012) (race discrimination).

A. Race Discrimination

Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to plead any facts whatsoever that would permit an

inference of discrimination based on race. The undersigned agrees. Plaintiff met the first two

criteria of the framework because she alleges that she is a member of a protected group by alleging

she is an African American and consistently performed her job satisfactorily or above expectations

and received merit-based pay increases during her employment. However, the Amended

Complaint completely lacks allegations to support an inference of discrimination based on race.7

In fact, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint allegations include headers for various sections of factual

allegations: “Religious Accommodation and Protected Activity,” “Harassment and Retaliation

After Accommodation,” “Retaliatory Acts Affecting Reputation and Benefits,” “Failure to

Promote,” and “Hostile Work Environment and Constructive Discharge.”8 (ECF Nos. 21, 21-1.)

7 Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge contains additional facts that speak to the issue, although these facts are not alleged in the

Amended Complaint. In the EEOC charge, Plaintiff alleges that other than her supervisor, she is the only African

American employee on her team, and the only employee that her white manager belittles and admonishes in the

presence of other employees. She further alleges that she is the only member of her team who is considered a term

employee and all other team members are permanent, but no one in HR could explain why Plaintiff is the only

employee not considered permanent. She stated “I am aware of other African American employees who were harassed

until the point of constructive discharge or termination.” (ECF No. 7, at 2.)

However, because this claim was not included in Plaintiff’s amended complaint, it may not be considered by

this court. See Culpepper v. Vilsack, 664 F.3d 252, 259 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[W]here ... the claims at issue do not appear

in the plaintiff's pleadings, they are not properly before the court regardless of whether they were reasonably related

to prior allegations found in an administrative charge.”). Even were I to consider the EEOC charge allegations, they

do not allege sufficient facts to permit an inference of discrimination. See, e.g., Birchfield v. Compass Health Network,

No. 4:24-CV-01575-SRC, 2025 WL 2467710, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 27, 2025) (where plaintiff references “a series of

victimizations and harassment that spanned over 4 years due to race, national origin, and for supporting a client

achieving their goals in line with their Treatment Plan,” the complaint lacked factual detail to support a reasonable

inference of discrimination against her based on race); Stokes v. Complete Mobile Dentistry, No. 4:21-CV-1252 RLW,

2023 WL 2474511, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 13, 2023) (granting dismissal of race discrimination claim because Plaintiff’s

“unadorned ‘defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me’ accusations” were not enough to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion);

Scruggs v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., No. 4:12-CV-01443SNLJ, 2013 WL 5406615, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 25, 2013)

(Plaintiff’s allegations that the employer took the word of some customers rather than her word, she was aware of

other black drivers who have been suspended and/or terminated based on customer complaints, and she is not aware

of any white drivers about whom customers have complained were insufficient to state a claim).

8 Despite the header “Hostile Work Environment and Constructive Discharge,” this section of the First Amended

Complaint contains few factual allegations to support a hostile work environment. (See ECF No. 21-1, ¶¶ 43-46.) The

section contains no allegations to indicate if and when Plaintiff’s employment ended or any circumstances surrounding

the termination of her employment.

None of these headers or the allegations contained therein support a connection between Plaintiff’s

race and any adverse actions taken by Defendants. See, e.g., Pointer v. Walmart Corp., No. 4:19-

CV-28 PLC, 2019 WL 2869905, at *2 (E.D. Mo. July 3, 2019) (dismissing race discrimination

claim where plaintiff “plead only one conclusory allegation of race discrimination: Plaintiff met

the requirements and qualifications described in defendant’s job description, but defendant

continued to hire younger candidates and not African Americans to fill shipping and receiving

positions.”). Accepting all of Plaintiff’s allegations as true, there is no basis on which a reasonable

inference of racial discrimination can be drawn. Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s race

discrimination claim.

B. Religious Discrimination

Defendant’s arguments regarding the religious discrimination claim seem to relate to the

third and fourth requirements. Defendant argues that Plaintiff “must show background

circumstances that show” it discriminates against Christianity. Defendant argues Plaintiff has only

pointed to a stray comment which is insufficient to state a claim, Plaintiff was granted a religious

accommodation exempting her from receiving the COVID vaccine, and the alleged subsequent

disclosure of her religious accommodation is not connected to any adverse employment action or

discriminative act.

Here, Plaintiff again meets the first two criteria of the framework, as she alleges she is a

practicing Christian and is qualified for her position. The third criterion, an adverse employment

action, is a disadvantageous change to the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment. See Muldrow v. St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 354 (2024); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

2(a). The claimed injury need not be significant, material, or serious. Cole v. Grp. Health Plan,

Inc., 105 F.4th 1110, 1114 (8th Cir. 2024) (citing Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 356 n.2). As such, Plaintiff

“is only required to plead ‘some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of

employment.’” Id. (quoting Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 355).

Plaintiff pleads a number of potential adverse employment actions. She alleged that

following her request for and receipt of a religious accommodation, she received repeated warning

emails accusing her of failing to comply with the testing and reporting requirements and

threatening disciplinary action up to and including termination. She alleged the warnings were

based on accusations of noncompliance with testing that were incorrect, yet she was issued

multiple disciplinary actions based on the unsubstantiated emails. When she contested the emails,

Defendant failed to investigate, and only partially removed them from her file after she sought

intervention through the Saint Louis County Civil Service Commission. She alleges that despite

meeting all qualifications and being ranked among the top three candidates eligible for a second-

round interview for the Community Outreach Coordinator position, the manager attempted to

exclude Plaintiff from consideration. During her interview for the position, the manager acted

hostile towards Plaintiff, “including repeated interruptions and interrogatory questioning not

directed at other candidates.” After the interview, the manager made negative comments about

Plaintiff’s religious jewelry and disclosed Plaintiff’s confidential religious-accommodation

information to other staff without Plaintiff’s consent. Plaintiff was ultimately not selected for the

position.

“Whether these changes resulted in ‘some harm’ to a term or condition of [Plaintiff’s]

employment requires further factual development.” Cole v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc., 105 F.4th 1110,

1114 (8th Cir. 2024) (allegations that a badge lock requirement was designed to publicly identify

the plaintiff’s vaccination status and to subject her to scorn and ridicule from her vaccinated co-

workers and that plaintiff was reassigned to different patient care areas were sufficient, at the

pleadings stage, to state a claim for religious discrimination under Title VII). Although it is

certainly a closer call, the facts alleged in the complaint also plausibly raise an inference of

discrimination, despite the lack of dates clarifying the timing of the events. See Cole, 105 F.4th at

1114 (“The failure to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious practices and singling out

religious adherents for inequitable treatment both constitute religious discrimination under Title

VII.”); see also LUCIA BIRCHFIELD, Plaintiff, v. COMPASS HEALTH NETWORK et al., No.

4:24-CV-01575-SRC, 2026 WL 2017228, at *4 (E.D. Mo. July 13, 2026) (“the Court does not

make any findings at this stage regarding the ultimate merits of Birchfield’s claim, but notes that

Count I of the Second Amended Complaint raises enough factual allegations to survive initial

review…”); Anderson v. US Polymers-Accurez, LLC, No. 4:22-CV-1022-MTS, 2022 WL

17496062, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2022) (rejecting Defendant’s argument that specific factual

allegations did not amount to adverse employment actions as a matter of law and explaining “[t]he

question for the Court to address at this preliminary stage is not whether Plaintiff might at some

later stage be able to prove his claims—the question is whether he has adequately asserted facts

(as contrasted with naked legal conclusions) to support his claims.”) (internal quotation omitted).

At this stage, Plaintiff plausibly states a claim for religious discrimination, and the Court denies

Defendant’s motion as to this claim.

C. Retaliation

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating, or retaliating, against their employees

because they have “opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice” by Title VII. 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To create the prism for plausibility assessment, a prima facie retaliation claim

includes that: (1) a plaintiff engaged in protected conduct; (2) she suffered a materially adverse

employment action; and (3) the adverse action was causally linked to the protected conduct. See

Sellars v. CRST Expedited, Inc., 13 F.4th 681, 694 (8th Cir. 2021) (elements of prima facie case

of retaliation under Title VII). Complaints regarding discriminatory conduct may constitute

protected activity. Bakhtiari v. Lutz, 507 F.3d 1132, 1137 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting that “protected

activity” includes opposition to discriminatory employment practices prohibited under Title VII).

A plaintiff need not establish that the conduct she opposed was in fact discriminatory; rather she

need only demonstrate that she had a “good faith, reasonable belief that the underlying challenged

conduct violated the law.” Buettner v. Arch Coal Sales Co., 216 F.3d 707, 714 (8th Cir. 2000).

Although Defendant’s motion includes a header arguing that “Plaintiff Fails to State a

Claim for Discrimination or Retaliation Based on Religion” (ECF No. 32, at 7 (emphasis added)),

Defendant makes no argument regarding whether Plaintiff adequately stated a claim for retaliation.

Plaintiff alleges she “engaged in protected activity by reporting discrimination, harassment, and

retaliation to Human Resources and by filing internal grievances.” She does not specify what acts

of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation were reported, nor does she provide a time frame for

the activity. Nevertheless, construing the allegations liberally and reading the Amended Complaint

as a whole, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged a claim. Plaintiff alleges that after receiving a religious

accommodation in the form of weekly COVID-19 testing, she received repeated unsubstantiated

emails accusing her of failure to comply with the testing and reporting requirements, the emails

threatened disciplinary action up to and including termination, and she was issued disciplinary

actions based on the emails. Plaintiff identified a specific protected activity (requesting and

receiving a religious accommodation), a specific adverse employment action (the warning emails

that resulted in disciplinary action), and a potential causal connection (the warning emails started

after she began weekly testing as her religious accommodation). These allegations, accepted as

true, establish a plausible claim of unlawful retaliation under Title VII. The Court is satisfied that

Plaintiff has adequately alleged a retaliation claim at this stage and denies Defendant’s motion as

to a retaliation claim.

V. PROPER DEFENDANT

Lastly, Defendants move for dismissal on the basis that St. Louis County Department of

Public Health and St. Louis County Government are not suable entities. Plaintiff responds that if

Plaintiff did not name the proper municipal defendant, she requests leave to amend to substitute

or clarify the proper defendant.

Where a department of a city is not legislatively created but instead serves as an

administrative arm of the city, “it lacks a legal identity apart from the City and is therefore not a

suable entity unto itself.” Shockley v. St. Louis Div. of Corr., No. 4:10CV638 FRB, 2011 2011 WL

1304751, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 6, 2011). In Shockley, the Court determined that the Department of

Corrections serves as an administrative arm of the City of St. Louis, and therefore is not a suable

entity. Id. Using similar logic, the Court in Gore ruled that the Department of Personnel of St.

Louis serves as merely an administrative arm of the City of St. Louis, and thus lacks a legal identity

apart from the City and is not a suable entity. Gore v. Wochner, 475 F. Supp. 274, 280 (E.D. Mo.

1979).

Like the Department of Corrections and the Department of Personnel, the Saint Louis

County Department of Public Health serves as an administrative arm of St. Louis County, as shown

by the Saint Louis County Charter, where the creation of the Department is memorialized. See

Saint Louis County Charter, Art. IV, § 4.010, et al. Because the Department is not a legislatively

created separate legal entity from the County, the Court finds that the Department and “St. Louis

County Government” are not suable entities. As such, Plaintiff’s claims of employment

discrimination and retaliation should be brought solely against St. Louis County, Missouri.

Accordingly, given the liberal construction accorded pro se complaints, the Court will construe St.

Louis County as the proper defendant for Plaintiff’s claims, and will deny Defendants’ motion to

dismiss on this basis.

VI. LEAVE TO AMEND

In Plaintiff’s opposition, she asks that if the Court identifies any pleading deficiencies,

Plaintiff be granted leave to amend pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

Although leave to amend should be freely given “when justice so requires,” parties do not

have the automatic nor absolute right to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); U.S. ex rel. Lee v. Fairview

Health Sys., 413 F.3d 748, 749 (8th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff has not only failed to file a motion for

leave to amend but also ignores this Court’s local rules by not submitting a proposed amended

petition. E.D. Mo. L.R. 4.07 (“A proposed amendment to a pleading or amended pleading itself

must be submitted at the time any motion for leave to amend any pleading is filed. All new material

in the amended pleading must be underlined and all material being removed must be struck

through…”); see Clayton v. White Hall Sch. Dist., 778 F.2d 457, 460 (8th Cir. 1985) (preserving

the right to amend requires the submission of proposed amendments alongside a formal motion).

Moreover, a “plaintiff’s pro se status does not excuse [her] from following the Local Rules of this

Court.” Oduro-Amoako v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 23-CV-3400 (ECT/JFD), 2024 WL 3183176,

at *10 (D. Minn. June 26, 2024) (denying pro se plaintiff’s request to amend in his motion to

dismiss briefing for failure to comply with Local Rule) (cleaned up); Maxwell v. Express Scripts,

Inc., No. 4:11CV1315 CDP, 2012 WL 996651, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 22, 2012) (while courts hold

a pro se complaint to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys, “this

standard does not excuse pro se complaints from alleging facts to support the claims advanced”)

(internal citations omitted); Smith v. City of Kansas City, No. 4:21-00087-CV-RK, 2021 WL

4483066, at *1 n.2 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 29, 2021) (“While courts liberally construe a complaint by a

pro se litigant, this does not mean that procedural rules in civil litigation must be interpreted ‘so

as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.’”) (quoting McNiel v. United States,

508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993)). Therefore, Plaintiff's request to amend the Amended Complaint is

denied.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 31] is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as set forth above.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs claim for discrimination based on race is

DISMISSED.

Dated this 11th day of August, 2026.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

25