The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ELLEAN NANCE (B-60068), )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Case No. 22-cv-4124
v. )
) Hon. Steven C. Seeger
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF )
CORRECTIONS, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
____________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Ellean Nance was incarcerated at Stateville Correctional Center during the COVID-19
pandemic. He believes that the Illinois Department of Corrections did not do enough to contain
the spread of the virus and protect him from potential harm.
So Nance sued various officials at the IDOC in their individual capacities, bringing
claims under the Eighth Amendment and state law. He also sued Wexford Health Sources, the
company that provided medical care to inmates.
After discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment. For the following reasons,
Defendants’ motions are granted.
Non-Compliance with the Local Rules
Before diving in, this Court must address Nance’s failure to comply with the Local Rules.
The punchline is that Nance’s summary judgment submissions were stricken by this Court. The
filing was late, and Nance requested a fourth extension based on false pretenses. So the filings
count for nothing.
Local Rule 56.1 establishes the procedure for filing and opposing a motion for summary
judgment. The moving party must provide a “statement of material facts that complies with
[Local Rule] 56.1(d) and that attaches the cited evidentiary material.” See L.R. 56.1(a)(2). The
statement of facts must rest on evidence in the record, with user-friendly citations. “Each
asserted fact must be supported by citation to the specific evidentiary material, including the
specific page number, that supports it.” See L.R. 56.1(d)(2).
The non-movant must respond to a motion for summary judgment by filing (1) a
memorandum of law; and (2) a response to the movant’s statement of facts. See L.R. 56.1(b)(2).
The response to the movant’s statement of facts must “consist of numbered paragraphs
corresponding to the numbered paragraphs” in the movant’s statement of facts. See L.R.
56.1(e)(1).
Wexford filed for summary judgment on July 28, 2025, and the other defendants moved
for summary judgment on August 4, 2025. This Court set a briefing schedule, and gave Nance a
generous amount of time to respond.
The scheduling order set a deadline of September 15, 2025, for the responses. That’s six
weeks after the filing of the motions. See 7/31/25 Order (Dckt. No. 161).
On August 22, 2025, Nance filed a motion for a two-week extension of time. See Mtn.
for Extension (Dckt. No. 168). This Court granted that request, and reset the deadline for
September 29, 2025. See 9/8/25 Order (Dckt. No. 169).
On September 25, 2025, a few days before the deadline, Nance filed a motion for a
second extension of time. Nance requested a 30-day extension. See Second Mtn. for Extension
(Dckt. No. 170). This Court granted that request, and reset the deadline for October 31, 2025.
See 10/3/25 Order (Dckt. No. 171).
Right before the deadline, Nance filed a motion for a third extension of time. See Third
Mtn. for Extension (Dckt. No. 172). Once again, this Court gave Nance more time. This Court
granted a three-week extension and reset the deadline for November 21, 2025. See 10/29/25
Order (Dckt. No. 173).
Putting that deadline in perspective, Nance had over three and a half months to respond.
Defendants moved for summary judgment by August 4, and the deadline for a response was
November 21.
That’s plenty of time. And this Court let Nance know that the latest extension was the
last extension. The order made clear that it was the “final extension.” Id.
That deadline came and went. And Nance submitted no response.
On December 5, 2025, Nance filed a motion for a fourth extension of time. See Fourth
Mtn. for Extension (Dckt. No. 176). He claimed that he had been placed in segregation and did
not have access to legal materials. See Pl.’s Additional Info. in Supp. of Mtn., at 1–3 (Dckt. No.
178).
This Court was skeptical of the request. Even so, if Nance was in segregation on the due
date, and was physically unable to file anything, that reality might create an extraordinary reason
for a modest extension. So, this Court provisionally granted an extension until January 13,
2026. See 12/29/25 Order (Dckt. No. 179).
The order expressly stated that this Court was “more than a little skeptical of the request,”
given the history of extensions. After all, the motion did not “reveal when Plaintiff was in
segregation.” Id. And Nance mailed the motion more than a week after the deadline.
Even then, Nance sat on his hands after asking for the fourth extension. “To make
matters worse, Nance mailed the request almost a month ago, and has not filed anything since
then.” Id.
This Court wanted to get to the bottom of things, and make sure that it was getting the
full story. This Court directed defense counsel to file a statement and reveal when, exactly,
Nance was in segregation. Id.
Before long, defense counsel cleared things up. Defense counsel answered the question,
and it wasn’t a helpful answer for Nance. See Status Report (Dckt. No. 183).
As it turns out, Nance was in segregation from November 28 to December 26, 2025.
Putting those dates in perspective, on October 29, this Court granted the third request for an
extension, and set the deadline for November 21.
So the deadline was November 21, and Nance entered segregation on November 28. The
deadline passed one week before Nance entered segregation. When he entered segregation,
Nance had already missed the deadline.
What’s more, the status report from defense counsel stated that the Corrections Law
Library Assistant did not receive any law library requests from Nance in November or
December, except on December 23. So Nance did not attempt to go to the law library during
those two months.
Nance had some explaining to do. He later filed a supplemental statement, but it didn’t
help his cause. See Statement (Dckt. No. 185). Nance stated that he couldn’t have been released
from segregation on December 28 because it was a Sunday, but that’s not the issue. Id. Nance
did not deny that he entered segregation after he missed the deadline of November 21.
In the meantime, Nance filed responses to the motion for summary judgment on January
15, 2026, and on January 20, 2026. See Resp. (Dckt. Nos. 184, 186).
Overall, it takes some time to review the nitty-gritty parts of the docket, and put the story
together. But after digging into the filings, it is not hard to see what happened. Nance received a
generous briefing schedule. He then requested and received three extensions of time. This Court
granted each request, and then declared that the third extension was the last.
Nance missed that deadline. And then, he requested a fourth extension based on a false
representation to the Court. He represented that he needed more time because he was in
segregation in November. In reality, he did not enter segregation until November 28, one week
after the deadline.
The long and the short of it is that Nance lied to this Court. He used segregation as a
pretext for getting more time. In reality, he missed the deadline, and then used the segregation as
a false reason for more time.
The legal system depends on truth-telling. Litigants must tell the truth in their statements
to the Court. The judicial system administers justice, and cannot operate based on falsehoods.
Plus, giving false information to the Court wastes judicial resources. Nance wasted this Court’s
time.
So this Court issued an order on April 10, 2026, and vacated its order granting Nance the
fourth extension. See 4/10/26 Order (Dckt. No. 191). This Court found that Nance missed the
deadline of November 21, 2025, and then obtained an extension based on false pretenses. So the
Court struck all of this summary judgment filings as a sanction. Id. “All of the filings are
deemed late, and were filed after making false statements to this Court. So they count for
nothing.” Id.; see also 4/27/26 Order (Dckt. No. 196).
There is plenty of case law saying that pro se litigants must comply with the rules.
“Though courts are solicitous of pro se litigants, they may nonetheless require strict compliance
with local rules.” Coleman v. Goodwill Indus. of Se. Wisconsin, Inc., 423 F. App’x 642, 643 (7th
Cir. 2011). “It is well-settled that a plaintiff’s pro se status does not excuse him from complying
with federal and local procedural rules.” Parker v. Fern, 2024 WL 1116092, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
2024); see also Wilson v. Kautex, Inc., 371 F. App’x 663, 664 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[S]trictly
enforcing Local Rule 56.1 was well within the district court’s discretion, even though [the]
employee was [a] pro se litigant.”); Collins v. Illinois, 554 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2009)
(“[E]ven pro se litigants must follow procedural rules.”); McCladdie El v. United Airlines, Inc.,
2025 WL 2084228, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2025) (“Any party, including a pro se litigant, who fails to
comply with Local Rule 56.1 does so at their own peril.”).
The situation at hand does not involve a mere failure to comply. It involves false
representations to the Court. So everything was stricken.
The long and the short of it is simple. Defendants’ statements of facts are deemed
admitted because Nance failed to respond in a timely manner. See L.R. 56.1(e)(3).
Background
Ellean Nance was incarcerated at Stateville Correctional Center when the COVID-19
pandemic began. See Def. Wexford’s Statement of Facts, at ¶¶ 7, 9 (Dckt. No. 155); IDOC
Statement of Facts, at ¶ 2 (Dckt. No. 164).
On March 9, 2020, Governor J.B. Pritzker issued a disaster proclamation, and on March
13, 2020, President Trump declared a national emergency. See Def. Wexford’s Statement of
Facts, at ¶ 9 (Dckt. No. 155).
David Gomez was Stateville’s Warden at the time. See IDOC Statement of Facts, at ¶ 9
(Dckt. No. 164). Gomez was responsible for running Stateville, including developing policies,
procedures, rules, regulations, and institutional directives for employees and inmates. Id. at ¶ 11.
Rob Jeffreys was IDOC’s Acting Director. Id. at ¶ 10. Clarence Egbe, LaJuana
McGruder, Victoria Jones, Lauren Hoeft Blanchard, Edwin Juarez, Tovanna Taylor, and
Timothy Woodcock were correctional officers at Stateville. Id. at ¶ 8.1
Wexford Health Sources provided medical care to inmates at Stateville as a vendor for
IDOC. See Def. Wexford’s Statement of Facts, at ¶ 44 (Dckt. No. 155).
IDOC’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic
The record includes an in-depth summary of the steps that the IDOC took to protect
inmates in response to the once-in-a-generation (and then some) pandemic.
As early as March 2020, IDOC began issuing bulletins to inmates about its response to
the pandemic. Id. at ¶¶ 10, 12–25, 31–40.2 A March 11, 2020 bulletin advised that “COVID-19
causes upper respiratory disease similar to the flu” and “in most cases . . . resolves without
complications.” See Wexford Ex. 5, at 2 (Dckt. No. 155-4).
The bulletin advised inmates about preventative measures that they could take, and
instructed them to alert a healthcare provider or correctional officer if they had a fever. Id. The
bulletin also advised that there were no confirmed cases in any IDOC facility as of that date. Id.
1 The Court refers to Gomez, Jeffreys, Egbe, McGruder, Jones, Blanchard, Juarez, Taylor, and Woodcock
collectively as the “IDOC Defendants.”
2 In their statement of facts, Wexford repeatedly cited to IDOC’s bulletins with “Id.” even when the prior
citation wasn’t to the particular IDOC bulletin being referenced. But Wexford attached all the bulletins as
exhibits to its submission. The Court cites to the particular exhibit under discussion.
IDOC reported that it was monitoring the situation, and taking guidance from the Illinois
Department of Public Health (“IDPH”). IDOC stated that “[t]here is currently no
recommendation to disrupt normal activities in our facilities, unless told to do so by IDPH.” Id.
On March 16, 2020, IDOC advised inmates that it had consulted with “internal and
external experts” and implemented a plan to quarantine asymptomatic individuals “with
exposure to risk factors” and to isolate symptomatic individuals “with exposure to risk factors.”
Id. at 3. Three days later, IDOC notified inmates that it had suspended in-person visits. Id. at 4.
IDOC also advised that there were no confirmed cases of COVID-19 in IDOC facilities at
the time. Id. at 5. IDOC reiterated the importance of personal preventative measures and
explained that it continued to monitor the situation closely and was taking guidance from the
IDPH. Id. at 5–7.
On March 20, 2020, IDOC implemented an administrative quarantine across its facilities.
See IDOC Statement of Facts, at ¶ 36 (Dckt. No. 164). IDOC continued to provide inmates with
access to showers, telephone calls, cleaning supplies, law library services, and commissary. See
Quarantine Notice (Dckt. No. 164-4). But it restricted movement within IDOC facilities to
protect the health and safety of inmates and staff. Id.
On March 25, 2020, IDOC notified inmates that it had identified the first confirmed cases
of COVID-19 across its facilities, including three staff and three inmates. See Wexford Ex. 5, at
8 (Dckt. No. 155-4). Stateville was one of the affected facilities, among others. Id.
But IDOC assured that “a team of medical professionals and security specialists” was
addressing inmate safety, and that IDOC guidelines “closely follow” the protocols recommended
by the Centers for Disease Control and the IDPH. Id.
During the following weeks, the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases in IDOC
facilities increased. Id. at 9. As of April 2, 2020, Stateville reported 49 cases and one death. Id.
Staff who tested positive for COVID-19 were quarantined at home, and the Illinois National
Guard had been deployed to Stateville. Id. IDOC was “waiting on the results of more than 200”
COVID-19 tests and anticipated additional confirmed cases. Id.
The April 2, 2020 bulletin also advised that IDOC was working with security and
healthcare experts to develop best practices to protect inmates. Id. And the bulletin summarized
measures that IDOC had already implemented, including the administrative quarantine,
suspended in-person visitations, and halted transfers, admissions, and non-emergency furloughs.
Id.
It also continued to push for inmates to adhere to personal protective measures. Id. The
bulletin stated that IDOC provided staff with daily “Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), like
face masks.” Id. at 9–10.
IDOC explained that providing staff with daily PPE was intended to “prevent them from
introducing the virus from an outside source and causing it to spread.” Id. at 10. IDOC advised
that it would “continue to evaluate what measures need to be taken to” keep inmates and staff
safe and healthy. Id.
On April 5, 2020, Warden Gomez issued a Memorandum to the “Men in custody at
Stateville Correctional Center.” Id. at 22–23. Gomez detailed the measures that had been
implemented, or were being implemented, to mitigate spread of the virus at the facility. Id.
Stateville worked to separate symptomatic inmates from asymptomatic inmates,
distribute hand sanitizer and cleaning supplies, and issue inmates a protective surgical mask. Id.
Stateville had started taking inmates’ temperatures three times a day, too. Id. And Statesville
established new shower, commissary, and phone schedules that adhered to the quarantine. Id.
Gomez reported that the safety measures had been developed by Stateville’s
Administrative Team, with guidance from the IDOC Office of Health Services, IDPH, the
Centers for Disease Control, the Illinois Emergency Management Agency, and the Governor’s
Office. Id.
COVID-positive cases continued to increase. On May 4, 2020, IDOC reported that 124
inmates at Stateville had tested positive for COVID-19. Id. at 11. Twelve inmates had died, but
119 recovered. Id.
Testing for COVID-19 continued at IDOC facilities, and IDOC officials anticipated that
positive cases would increase, “just as is predicted throughout Illinois and the United States.” Id.
at 12. Inmates were instructed that they were “require[d]” to wear “the mask issued to you[.]”
Id. Staff also had to wear masks, and the Offender Yard (which had recently reopened) was
closed because of concerns about “cross contamination of offenders.” Id. at 24.
Stateville worked to complete “a goal of contact tracing offender movement to ensure
there is no further spread.” Id. IDOC also reiterated the importance of handwashing and
masking on May 21, 2020. Id. at 14–15.
During the following 19 months, IDOC continued mitigation measures. See Def.
Wexford’s Statement of Facts, at ¶¶ 38–39 (Dckt. No. 155); IDOC Statement of Facts, at ¶ 39
(Dckt. No. 164). For example, safety measures remained in place as of September 22, 2020. See
Wexford Ex. 5, at 16 (Dckt. No. 155-4).
IDOC continued to restrict movement within facilities, and isolated and tested “anyone
who [was] symptomatic,” and quarantined “exposed asymptomatic” inmates. Id. It also
continued to provide masks and conduct temperature checks. Id.
On November 2, 2020, IDOC reminded inmates to stay alert for COVID-19 symptoms
and encouraged masking, social distancing, and hand washing. Id. at 19–20.
When cases increased in January 2022, Warden Gomez notified staff and inmates that
“additional PPE and cleaning supplies” would be distributed and that healthcare staff were
monitoring the situation. See IDOC Statement of Facts, at ¶ 35 (Dckt. No. 164).
Wexford wasn’t responsible for developing or implementing protocols in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic. See Def. Wexford’s Statement of Facts, at ¶ 43 (Dckt. No. 155). As a
vendor for IDOC, Wexford and its employees followed IDOC’s directives, including directives
related to testing and notifying inmates of test results. Id. at ¶ 44.
During the early stage of the pandemic, inmates who tested positive for the coronavirus
were quarantined, which served as a “de facto notification to the offender of a positive test
result.” Id. at ¶ 45. IDOC moved those offenders, not Wexford. Id.
Nance’s Medical History
Nance was diagnosed with asthma before his admission to IDOC and used a rescue
inhaler for years before the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. at ¶¶ 55–56. He also received periodic
medical care at the asthma clinic. Id. at ¶ 57.
Nance’s lung capacity was periodically tested, and his medical records reflect the
following results of peak flow testing during relevant periods:3
Date Peak Flow
July 18, 2019 550 & 500
January 9, 2020 410 & 450
July 2, 2020 600 & 625
January 5, 2021 700, 760 & 700
Id. at ¶¶ 58, 59, 68, 69.
Nance also received medical care at Stateville on six occasions between March 10, 2020,
and April 26, 2020, for complaints of a runny nose, aches and pains, a headache, fatigue, an
occasional cough, his taste being “off,” and shortness of breath. Id. at ¶¶ 60–67.
Notes in Nance’s medical chart show that his blood oxygen readings remained at or
above 97% during that time. In fact, he did not have a body temperature consistent with a fever,
and his lungs sounded clear. Id. On April 8, 2020, Nance tested negative for COVID-19. Id. at
¶ 66.
Importantly, Nance never tested positive for COVID-19. No medical provider ever told
Nance that he tested positive for COVID-19 at any time relevant to this lawsuit. See IDOC
Statement of Facts, at ¶¶ 12, 15 (Dckt. No. 164).
Nance’s Allegations
In his complaint, Nance describes what he experienced at the time. Needless to say, a
complaint isn’t evidence. But the Court will summarize the allegations for purposes of setting
the table.
3 Peak flow differs from one person to another. See Peak Flow Meter, https://my.clevelandclinic.org/heath/
treatments/peak-flow-meter (last visited August 4, 2026). “A drop in your peak flow tells you that your
asthma might be getting worse.” Id.
In March 2020, Nance lived in B House. The complaint alleged that Warden Gomez
placed B House on a Level 1 lockdown beginning March 15, 2020. See Cplt., at ¶¶ 3–4 (Dckt.
No. 9). Prison employees and officials were not wearing face masks at the time. Nance alleged
that they weren’t routinely checking inmates’ temperatures. Id. at ¶ 4. In Nance’s view, business
continued as usual.
Nance later testified at deposition that inmates were confined to their cells during the
lockdown and allowed out only “to use the kiosk, the commissary, the showers [and] sick call.”
See Nance Dep., at 53:1-8 (Dckt. No. 164-1); IDOC Statement of Facts, at ¶ 31 (Dckt. No. 164).
In his complaint, Nance alleged that he received the bulletins issued by IDOC and
Warden Gomez. But Nance alleged that the IDOC was not implementing or enforcing those
policies effectively. See Cplt., at ¶¶ 33–34 (Dckt. No. 9); IDOC Statement of Facts, at ¶ 18
(Dckt. No. 164).
Nance claims that staff didn’t comply with isolation and quarantine policies. See IDOC
Statement of Facts, at ¶ 18 (Dckt. No. 164). He alleges that correctional officers incorrectly
wore face masks or didn’t wear them at all. See Cplt., at ¶¶ 34–54 (Dckt. No. 9). He also says
that the prison had overcrowded showers, bull pens with unmasked inmates, and a lack of
temperature checks, disinfectants and sanitizers. Id.
As an example of how the policies were not enforced, Nance attached an affidavit to his
complaint from another inmate, Martell Hill. See Cplt., Ex. P, at 123–24 of 141 (Dckt. No. 9);
see Def. Wexford’s Statement of Facts, at ¶¶ 50–54 (Dckt. No. 155).
Hill attested that he and his cellmate were tested for COVID-19 on March 26, 2020. Id.
The next day, his cellmate received “a letter in the mail” advising that he had tested negative. Id.
Hill did not receive a similar letter. Id.
Two months later (on June 28, 2020), Hill learned from a nurse that he had tested positive
for COVID-19 on March 26, 2020. Id. In the interim, Hill had been allowed out of his cell and
in contact with other inmates in the showers, kiosks, sick call, and bull pen. Id.
Nance claimed during his deposition that Hill visited his cell (A-11 in B House) several
times during March 2020. See Def. Wexford’s Statement of Facts, at ¶ 49 (Dckt. No. 155).
Based on the “timeframe” – between when Hill visited Nance’s cell and when Nance
began to experience “symptoms” – Nance alleges that he contracted COVID-19 from Hill. Id. at
¶¶ 46, 48.
As another example of policies not being enforced, Nance alleged that in March and
April 2020, he asked Defendant Correctional Officers Anderson and Taylor for a face mask and
was denied. See Cplt., at ¶¶ 51–52 (Dckt. No. 9).
In his complaint, Nance alleges that he spoke up at the time and complained to
Correctional Officers Anderson, Taylor, Egbe, Woodcock, Gruger, Hoeft, and Juarez a number
times “about speaking to him without a mask or wearing their surgical face mask around the
chins and necks.” Id. at ¶¶ 53. But Nance did receive face masks for his own use in April 2020.
See IDOC Statement of Facts, at ¶ 30 (Dckt. No. 164).
In March and April 2020, Nance complained about not receiving medical care when he
complained of symptoms consistent with a COVID-19 infection. See Cplt., at ¶¶ 26–31 (Dckt.
No. 9). According to Nance, he eventually was taken to “urgent care” on April 16, 2020, where
Medical Director Henze told him that he had a “blockage” in his left lung. Id. at ¶ 30.
Nearly two years after the initial outbreak of COVID-19, Nance read about a new
coronavirus outbreak in Illinois prisons. He heard accounts from other inmates that Stateville
was no longer placing inmates who tested positive for COVID-19 in quarantine. Id. at ¶¶ 18–20.
Nance lived in a C House at the time. Id. at ¶ 20. According to Nance, IDOC was not
notifying inmates if they tested positive for COVID-19. Id. at ¶¶ 20–21. Symptomatic inmates
allegedly were allowed to pass out food, use telephones and kiosks, and shower with
asymptomatic inmates. Id. at ¶ 42. Staff and inmates failed to wear face masks. Id. at ¶¶ 53–56.
Communal showers and bull pens remained crowded with unmasked inmates. Id. at ¶¶ 42–48,
65–66, 72–73.
Prescreening
Based on Nance’s allegations, this Court allowed four claims to proceed past screening.
See 11/21/22 Order (Dckt. No. 10).
The first claim is a conditions-of-confinement claim under the Eighth Amendment. See
Cplt., at ¶¶ 82–87 (Dckt. No. 9). The second claim is a deliberate indifference claim under the
Eighth Amendment about his medical care. Id. at ¶¶ 88–95. The third claim is a Monell claim
about the conditions of confinement. Id. at ¶¶ 96–106. The fourth claim alleges intentional
infliction of emotional distress under state law. Id. at ¶¶ 107–15.
After discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment.
Legal Standard
A district court “shall grant” summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists if “the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
To survive summary judgment, the opposing party must go beyond the pleadings and identify
specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
The Court construes all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, giving
the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See Chaib v. Geo Grp., Inc., 819
F.3d 337, 341 (7th Cir. 2016). The Court does not weigh the evidence, judge credibility, or
determine the truth of the matter, but rather determines only whether a genuine issue of triable
fact exists. See Nat’l Athletic Sportswear, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 528 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir.
2008).
Summary judgment is appropriate if, on the evidence provided, no reasonable jury could
return a verdict in favor of the non-movant. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322; Gordon v.
FedEx Freight, Inc., 674 F.3d 769, 772–73 (7th Cir. 2012).
Analysis
I. Eighth Amendment Conditions-Of-Confinement Claim (Counts I and III)
The Court first addresses Nance’s claim under the Eighth Amendment about his
condition of confinement (Counts I and III). Nance alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth
Amendment rights through their inadequate COVID policies, and their failure to effectively
enforce those policies.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. See U.S. Const. amend.
VIII. In evaluating claims under the Eighth Amendment, courts conduct both an objective and a
subjective inquiry. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Smith v. Kind, 140 F.4th
359, 364 (7th Cir. 2025) (“A viable Eighth Amendment claim contains both an objective and
subjective component.”).
The objective component requires a “prisoner challenging conditions of confinement [to]
show that the conditions were sufficiently serious as an objective matter.” See Thomas v.
Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 719–20 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). The subjective component requires
the prisoner to “prove that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference – that they knew of
and disregarded this excessive risk of harm to the inmate.” Id.
Deliberate indifference is a “high hurdle” that requires a showing “approaching a total
unconcern for the prisoner’s welfare in the face of serious risks.” See Rosario v. Brawn, 670
F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2012). Negligence or gross negligence is not enough. Id.
The record does not come close to meeting that standard.
The record shows that, early in the pandemic, IDOC officials acknowledged that
COVID-19 could pose a serious threat to some individuals and began implementing policies and
procedures to address the threat. IDOC officials developed policies with the assistance of IDHP,
which evolved as the pandemic evolved. And Wexford was not responsible for the policies.
Implementation of the policies might not have been perfect, but the Constitution does not
demand perfection. See Rosario, 670 F.3d at 821–22. It requires only that prison officials take
reasonable measures to abate a known and substantial risk of harm. Id. at 821. The IDOC
Defendants did just that.
IDOC officials continued to provide updates to prisoners about measures they were
taking. There’s no evidence in the record that officials disregarded risks to Nance or other
inmates without concern.
Quite the opposite. The record is chock full of examples of how the IDOC took steps to
protect inmates and fight the spread of the virus. They provided cleaning supplies, distributed
masks, imposed quarantines, changed protocols, distributed bulletins, limited person-to-person
interactions, and took countless other steps to protect everyone’s health and safety. See Money v.
Pritzker, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1131 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (Dow, J.) (finding that IDOC prisoners had
“no chance of success” on Eighth Amendment conditions claim stemming from policies and
procedures implemented by IDOC in response to COVID-19 pandemic).
The record shows that officials followed ongoing guidance and acted to make changes as
the COVID situation evolved. And Nance offered no evidence that officials disregarded more
effective policies.
The pandemic posed a serious challenge, and IDOC took it seriously. On this record,
Nance has fallen far short. The record cannot support a finding in his favor on the objective or
the subjective prongs of a claim under the Eighth Amendment.
Defendants Director Jeffreys and Warden Gomez are entitled to summary judgment
stemming from their role in implementing policies responsive to the COVID-19 pandemic
(Counts I and III), along with Wexford (Count III).
Nance also argues that IDOC officials and individual correctional officers violated the
Eighth Amendment because they failed to enforce the COVID-19 policies put in place. The
IDOC Defendants’ briefing on claims stemming from enforcement of the pandemic policies is
not particularly thorough. But even when construed in Nance’s favor, the record does not
suggest that any Defendant acted with the requisite level of culpability.
Liability under section 1983 rests on personal responsibility. See Whitfield v. Spiller, 76
F.4th 698, 706 (7th Cir. 2023). A “government official is liable only if he personally caused or
participated in a constitutional deprivation. Consequently, a claim will not survive a motion to
dismiss unless it pleads that a Government-official defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” See Milchtein v. Milwaukee Cnty., 42 F.4th
814, 824 (7th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).
Section 1983 does not create liability based on respondeat superior or vicarious liability.
Officials are “accountable only for their own misconduct.” See Hess v. Garcia, 72 F.4th 753,
767 (7th Cir. 2023). “Liability for supervisors is individual, not vicarious. For that reason,
simply being atop an organizational food chain does not make a supervisor liable for a
subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.” See Bostic v. Murray, 160 F.4th 831, 841 (7th Cir.
2025).
In the Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement context, a prisoner must be able to
show that the defendant knew of and disregarded “an excessive risk to [the prisoner’s] health or
safety.” See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This burden requires evidence that each defendant was
“aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists,” and the defendant “dr[e]w the inference.” Id.
Nance’s complaint survived screening largely because of broad allegations. He alleged
that inmates who tested positive for COVID-19 were not isolated or quarantined. He also
claimed that prisoners showered without masks and were confined to bull pens with unmasked
prisoners. The complaint says that guards and prisoners failed to wear face masks, and that
prisoners were not informed of their COVID-19 test results.
But few allegations attributed specific conduct to a specific defendant. Sweeping
allegations are not enough to create a triable issue of fact as to a particular Defendant’s state of
mind.
Even in his complaint, many of the allegations do not specify dates or mention a
defendant by name. And at this stage in the game, Nance also failed to offer evidence to back up
his more specific claims.
Specifics are important. IDOC’s pandemic policies were not static. For example, at first,
only correctional officers were given masks to prevent them from bringing COVID-19 into the
prison. Masks eventually were provided to inmates as IDOC officials learned more about
transmission of the novel coronavirus.
Consistent with the evolving policy, Nance received a mask or masks sometime in April
2020 (presumably after IDOC began requiring masks for inmates), even though he might not
have received a mask at the exact moment that he requested one from Defendants Anderson and
Taylor.
Masks were also just one tool used by IDOC to combat the spread of COVID-19. Staff
and inmates were regularly tested for COVID-19. Staff who tested positive quarantined at home,
and inmates who tested positive were isolated. Housing units were locked down, and movement
was restricted to a handful of activities like showers, healthcare visits, and kiosk access.
Keeping inmates and staff safe was a tall order. So, the fact that inmates might have been
unmasked in showers and bull pens on occasion, that a guard did not wear his or her mask
“properly” on occasion, or that a few COVID-positive inmates were not quarantined, simply is
not enough to show that any individual Defendant appreciated that his or her conduct would
necessarily place Nance at substantial risk of harm. See Byrd v. Munoz, 2025 WL 943408, at *2
(7th Cir. 2025) (explaining that prison staff were “careless or negligent by improperly wearing or
refusing to wear masks,” but their conduct did not rise to deliberate indifference); McKinley v.
Gomez, 2026 WL 1031170, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 2026) (finding that Stateville’s failure to implement
an effective isolation policy consistent with IDOC recommendations did not “elevate [Gomez’s]
conduct from negligence to criminal recklessness.”).
The record also does not show a cognizable harm resulting from Defendants’ conduct. A
prisoner cannot prevail on his claim by demonstrating that a Defendant’s conduct “merely
exposed him to a risk of harm.” See Maus v. Murphy, 29 F. App’x 365, 369 (7th Cir. 2002); see
Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1006 (7th Cir. 2016); Byrd, 2025 WL 943408 at *2.
Here, Nance failed to offer evidence of a harm. He never tested positive for COVID-19,
let alone suffered a physical harm from an infection. Nance’s allegation that he contracted
COVID-19 and lung damage from Defendants’ conduct lacks evidentiary support.
So, the IDOC Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the claims alleging
imperfect enforcement of the pandemic policies.
II. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference Claim (Count II)
Nance also alleges that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of
prisoners. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To prevail on a claim that his
medical care violated the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must prove that: (1) he suffered from
an objectively serious medical condition, and (2) the defendant knew about and was deliberately
indifferent to the condition. See Lockett v. Bonson, 937 F.3d 1016, 1022–23 (7th Cir. 2019)
(cleaned up).
The record contains no evidence that Nance suffered from an objectively serious medical
condition. A medical condition is objectively serious if it “has been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment or is so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a
doctor’s attention.” See Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 982 F.3d 451, 458 (7th Cir.
2020) (cleaned up).
Nance failed to show that he suffered an objectively serious medical condition. Nance
did have asthma, which made him more vulnerable to the effects of COVID-19. But the record
confirms that Nance received regular medical treatment for that condition.
Asthma might have increased the risks posed by COVID-19. But that risk didn’t
materialize.
Nance never tested positive. Nance wasn’t diagnosed with COVID-19 during the period
at issue. He experienced only symptoms consistent with a cold or possibly the flu, which is not a
serious medical need. See Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1372 (7th Cir. 1997).
As to his purported lung damage, Nance alleged that Dr. Henze told him that he had a
“lung blockage,” but Nance’s recollection of Dr. Henze’s statement is hearsay. He never offered
admissible evidence to support his claim. That’s not enough to create a triable issue of fact, and
Nance’s medical records show that his lung capacity increased during the time covered by this
lawsuit.
He also failed to show how the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical
needs. When Nance requested medical attention, medical professionals treated his ailments. The
Defendants never stood in his way. There’s no evidence of wrongful conduct, let alone
deliberate indifference.
Nance failed to support his claim that the medical care he received violated the Eighth
Amendment. So, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Nance’s claim of deliberate
indifference to his medical needs (Count II).
C. Qualified Immunity
Director Jeffreys and Warden Gomez also argued that they enjoy qualified immunity on
any claim challenging IDOC’s COVID-19 policies, or their role in developing or implementing
the policies.
Qualified immunity protects public officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Qualified immunity rests on two questions: “first, whether the facts presented, taken in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, describe a violation of a constitutional right; and second,
whether the federal right at issue was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation.” Smith v. Finkley, 10 F.4th 725, 737 (7th Cir. 2021) If the plaintiff fails to prove
either prong, “the defendant official is protected by qualified immunity.” Id. (citing Koh v.
Ustich, 933 F.3d 836, 844 (7th Cir. 2019)).
Nance has come up short on both prongs. He has not established a violation of a
constitutional right, let alone that the right was clearly established at the time.
The pandemic was a historic event in the nation’s history. It posed significant challenges,
and there wasn’t a lot of precedent to draw upon. The playbook didn’t have a lot of play for how
best to deal with a virus sweeping through prisons and every other corner of society.
The situation confronted by prison officials was unique, and established law at the time
didn’t provide them with guidance. Nance had the burden to identify a reasonably analogous
case, and he failed to make that showing. See Villalobos v. Picicco, 168 F.4th 1057, 1063 (7th
Cir. 2026) (explaining that district court “must” grant summary judgment for a defendant if the
plaintiff does not identify “a reasonably analogous case that has both articulated the right at issue
and applied it to a factual circumstance similar to the one at hand”).
So, Jeffreys and Gomez are entitled to qualified immunity.
D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count IV)
The last remaining claim the state-law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over that state-law claim because it was part of the
same controversy as Nance’s federal law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
“To prevail on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim under Illinois law, a
claimant must prove three elements. First, the conduct in question was truly extreme and
outrageous. Second, the actor intended to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that there
was at least a high probability that his conduct would have caused such distress. Third, the
conduct in fact caused severe emotional distress.” Sun v. Xu, 99 F.4th 1007, 1013 (7th Cir.
2024) (internal citations omitted).
“The requirements to prove this tort are rigorous. Liability will lie only where the
conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community.” Wells v. Freeman Co., 94 F.4th 608, 618 (7th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). “The tort
‘does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other
trivialities.’” Sun, 99 F.4th at 1013 (quoting McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ill.
1988)).
Once again, Nance has come up short. He did not present evidence satisfying any of the
elements, let alone all of them.
Conclusion
For those reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. See
Def. Wexford Mtn. for Summ. J. (Dckt. No. 154); IDOC Mtn. for Summ. J. (Dckt. No. 163).
Date: August 8, 2026 : Gy
Steven C. Seege
United States District Judge
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