Winning

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

MELINDA WINNING,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 26-cv-00619-JPG

COPART OF CONNECTICUT, INC. d/b/a

COPART,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This case is before the Court on Defendant Copart of Connecticut’s Motion to Dismiss

(Doc. 20). It asks the Court to dismiss the entirety of Plaintiff Melinda Winning’s complaint for

failure to state a claim. Plaintiff filed a response (Doc. 22), and Defendant filed a reply (Doc.

24).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a loader. During her employment, Plaintiff

alleges she was subjected on multiple occasions to improper conduct, including sexual jokes and

sexualized comments about her because she is female, by multiple employees and contractors,

including Robert Rite. Plaintiff further alleges that one of her co-workers, Curt Coleman,

routinely demanded drivers pay him through CashApp to load cars onto their trailers, even

though loading the cars was part of his job duties.

In May 2024, Plaintiff reported both concerns to her General Manager, Micheal Tover.

After Plaintiff reported the conduct, Defendant promoted Rite to a supervisory role over Plaintiff

and subjected Plaintiff to further harassment. As a result of these actions, Plaintiff resigned from

her employment with Defendant on May 9, 2024.

On April 2, 2026, Plaintiff filed a three-count complaint against Defendant in the St.

Clair County Circuit Court, asserting claims under the Illinois Whistleblower Act and the Illinois

Human Rights Act. Defendant removed the action to this Court on May 8, 2026.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all

allegations in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state

a claim, a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). This requirement is satisfied if the complaint

(1) describes the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests and (2) plausibly suggests that the plaintiff has a right to

relief above a speculative level. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555; EEOC. v. Concentra Health

Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). Although

liberal federal notice pleading standards ensure that even non-detailed complaints can survive a

motion to dismiss, they will not prevent dismissal of complaints that plead too much. A case can

be dismissed because a complaint pleads facts establishing that the plaintiff is not entitled to

prevail. Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 1998); Soo Line R.R. Co. v. St. Louis Sw.

Ry. Co., 125 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1997).

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III. ANALYSIS

A. Counts 2 and 3 – Discrimination and Retaliation Under the Illinois Human Rights Act

(“IHRA”):

The IHRA prohibits employment discrimination based on sex, including sexual

harassment that creates a hostile work environment. See 775 ILCS 5/2-101, 102. It also prohibits

retaliation against a person for opposing or reporting conduct that they reasonably believed

constituted sexual harassment. See 775 ILCS 5/6-101. Defendant argues that the Court should

dismiss Plaintiff’s IHRA claims because (1) they are time-barred, and (2) she fails to plausibly

allege a constructive discharge.

i. Statute of Limitations:

“A limitations defense is not often resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion because ‘a

complaint need not anticipate and overcome affirmative defenses, such as the statute of

limitations.’” Amin Ijbara Equity Corp. v. Vill. of Oak Lawn, 860 F.3d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 2017)

(quoting Cancer Found., Inc. v. Cerberus Cap. Mgmt., LP, 559 F.3d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 2009)).

“But dismissal at this early stage is appropriate when the complaint alleges facts sufficient to

establish that the suit is indeed tardy.” Id. Defendant bears the burden of establishing that the

claim is untimely. See Gunn v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 968 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2020).

To bring a civil action under the IHRA, a plaintiff must file a charge with the IDHR, see

775 ILCS 5/7A-102(A), or with the EEOC, in which case the charge will be deemed to have

been filed with the IDHR, see 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(A-1). Effective January 1, 2025, the IHRA

was amended to extend the deadline for filing a charge from 300 days to two years after the date

of the alleged civil rights violation. See Pub. Act 103-973 (eff. Jan. 1, 2025).

Plaintiff filed her charge on November 20, 2025, which is 560 days after her last day of

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employment with Defendant. Accordingly, her charge is untimely if the former 300-day

limitations period applies but timely if the amended two-year limitations period applies. The

issue, therefore, is whether the amendment applies to Plaintiff’s claims.

Illinois courts apply a two-step analysis to determine whether a statutory amendment

applies retroactively. First, the court examines the statutory language to determine whether the

legislature has expressly prescribed the amendment’s temporal reach. See Commonwealth Edison

Co. v. Will Cnty. Collector, 749 N.E.2d 964, 971 (Ill. 2001). If the legislature has done so, courts

give effect to that intent unless doing so would violate a constitutional prohibition. Id. If the

statute is silent as to its temporal reach, § 4 of the Illinois Statute on Statutes governs. See 5

ILCS 70/4; Allegis Realty Invs. v. Novak, 860 N.E.2d 246, 253 (Ill. 2006). Under § 4, procedural

amendments may be applied retroactively, while substantive amendments may not. Allegis

Realty Invs., 860 N.E.2d at 253.

A statutory amendment is substantive if it “takes away or impairs vested rights acquired

under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability

in respect of transactions or considerations already past.” U.S. Steel Credit Union v. Knight, 204

N.E.2d 4, 6 (Ill. 1965) (citation omitted); see also People ex rel. Madigan v. J.T. Einoder, Inc.,

28 N.E.3d 758, 765 (Ill. 2015). By contrast, a procedural amendment “prescribes a method of

enforcing rights or involves pleading, evidence and practice.” Deicke Ctr. v. Illinois Health

Facilities Plan. Bd., 906 N.E.2d 64, 68 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (quoting Schweickert v. AG Servs. of

Am., Inc., 823 N.E.2d 213, 216 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)).

The Court finds that the amendment to the IHRA extending the statute of limitations from

300 days to two years applies to claims that, like Plaintiff’s, were not time-barred when the

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amendment took effect. It reaches this conclusion for two reasons. First, numerous Illinois

courts, including the Illinois Supreme Court, have said that when a limitations period has not

expired before the enactment of an amendment that lengthens the limitations period, the

amendment controls all actions and remedies not previously barred. See Arnold Eng’g, Inc. v.

Indus. Comm’n, 380 N.E.2d 782, 784 (Ill. 1978); In re Marriage of Davenport, 904 N.E.2d 650,

655 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); see also Barzi v. Fermi Rsch. All., LLC, No. 25 C 9247, 2026 WL

1194748, at *10 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2026). Second, as applied to claims that were not yet barred

when the amendment took effect, the change in the limitations period is procedural. At that time,

the expiration of the limitations period had not yet become an affirmative defense. Thus, the

amendment did not take away or impair any vested rights held by Defendant.

The Court is not persuaded by the administrative decision cited by Defendant, Bianchi v.

Exelon (Commonwealth Edison Co.), ALS Case No. 20-0153, 2022 WL 22745875 (Ill. Hum.

Rts. Com. Dec. 12, 2022). That decision is neither binding on this Court nor consistent with the

Illinois case law discussed above.

Because the two-year limitations period applies to Plaintiff’s IHRA claims, and Plaintiff

filed her charge within that period, her claims are not time-barred.

ii. Fails to Sufficiently Plead Constructive Discharge:

“An employee can assert a claim of constructive discharge when she is forced to resign

because her working conditions, from the standpoint of the reasonable employee, had become

unbearable.” Grube v. Lau Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 723, 728 (7th Cir. 2001). The standard is high

because “a complaining employee is expected to remain on the job while seeking redress.” Id.

(quoting Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1015 (7th Cir. 1997)). If a plaintiff quits

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before “giving his employer a reasonable chance to work out a problem,” he has not been

constructively discharged. Id. (quoting Ulichny v. Merton Cmty. Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 686, 704 n.

16 (7th Cir. 2001)).

The Court rejects Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s claim fails because she resigned

before giving Defendant an opportunity to address and remedy the alleged harassment. Although

“[a]n employee who quits without giving his employer a reasonable chance to work out a

problem has not been constructively discharged,” id. (quoting Ulichny, 249 F.3d at 704 n.16), an

employee is not required to remain indefinitely when an employer’s response suggests that

further efforts to obtain relief would be futile, see Stamey v. Forest River, Inc., 37 F.4th 1220,

1225 (7th Cir. 2022). Here, Plaintiff alleges that she reported the harassment and that Defendant

subsequently promoted one of the individuals she identified as her harasser to be her supervisor.

Despite the close proximity between her complaint and her resignation, these allegations are

sufficient at the pleading stage to create a plausible inference that Defendant refused to take

corrective action.

The Court nevertheless finds that Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege constructive

discharge. Her allegations that she was subjected to multiple sexual jokes and sexualized

comments are conclusory. She does not allege the frequency, nature, or content of those

statements, making it impossible for the Court to determine whether the alleged conduct rises

above ordinary workplace discrimination or harassment. See Drake v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg.

Co., 134 F.3d 878, 886 (7th Cir. 1998) (“More than ordinary discrimination is necessary to

establish a constructive discharge claim; in the ‘ordinary’ case, an employee is expected to

remain employed while seeking redress.”). These conclusory allegations are insufficient to

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plausibly allege that Plaintiff’s working conditions became so intolerable that a reasonable

employee would have felt compelled to resign. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Counts 2 and

3 without prejudice to the extent they are based on a constructive discharge theory.

Plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims, however, do not fail in their entirety. Her

discrimination claim is not based solely on constructive discharge. She also alleges that the

sexual jokes and sexualized comments, standing alone, created a hostile work environment in

violation of the IHRA. Because Defendant does not argue that these allegations are insufficient

to state a hostile work environment claim, the Court will allow Count 2 to proceed. See M.G.

Skinner & Assocs. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Norman-Spencer Agency, Inc., 845 F.3d 313, 321 (7th Cir.

2017) (“Perfunctory and undeveloped arguments are waived, as are arguments unsupported by

legal authority.”).

The same is true of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. She alleges that, after she complained

about the sexual jokes and sexualized comments, Defendant retaliated by promoting one of the

alleged harassers to serve as her supervisor. This claim does not depend on a constructive

discharge theory, and therefore, the Court will allow Count 3 to proceed.

B. Count 1 – Violation of the Illinois Whistleblower Act (“IWA”):

The IWA prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for certain

protected conduct. See 740 ILCS 174/15, 20. Defendant asks the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s

IWA claim for two reasons. First, it argues that her claims are preempted by the IHRA. Second,

it contends that she cannot establish a violation of the IWA provisions in effect in May 2024.

The Court addresses each argument in turn.

i. IHRA Preemption:

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Illinois law provides that a cause of action under the IHRA is the exclusive remedy for

“civil rights violations,” which include sexual harassment by an employer. 775 ILCS 5/8-111(D)

(“Except as otherwise provided by law, no court of this state shall have jurisdiction over the

subject of an alleged civil rights violation other than as set forth in this Act.”); 775 ILCS 5/2-

102(D). Courts have construed the IHRA’s exclusive remedy provision to mean that the Act

preempts state-law causes of action where the IHRA “furnish[es] the legal duty that the

defendant was alleged to have breached.” Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co., 444 F.3d 593, 604 (7th

Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). “If the plaintiff’s allegations against the defendant

implicate only a duty provided by the IHRA, such as the duty of employers to refrain from

discriminating against employees on the basis of their race or national origin, then the plaintiff’s

claim is preempted.” Bannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 503 F.3d 623, 630 (7th Cir. 2007).

Conversely, “if the conduct would be actionable even aside from its character as a civil rights

violation because the IHRA did not furnish the legal duty that the defendant was alleged to have

breached, the IHRA does not preempt a state law claim seeking recovery for it.” Naeem, 444

F.3d at 604 (internal quotations and brackets omitted). This remains true even where the factual

basis of the state-law claim and the IHRA claim overlap. Id.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the IWA by retaliating against her for

reporting two categories of misconduct to her General Manager: (1) she was subjected on

multiple occasions to sexual jokes and sexualized comments about her status as a female; and (2)

one of her co-workers routinely demanded drivers pay him through CashApp to load cars onto

their trailers, even though loading cars was part of his job duties. The first category of allegations

is preempted because the duty not to subject Plaintiff to sexual harassment arises from the IHRA.

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The second category, however, is not preempted because the duty not to demand unauthorized

payments from another person exists independently of the IHRA and does not depend on

Plaintiff’s status as a member of a protected class. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Count 1 with

prejudice to the extent it is based on sexual harassment and will consider whether Plaintiff has

plausibly alleged a violation of the IWA based on her report of unauthorized payment demands.

ii. Cannot Establish Violation of the IWA:

Plaintiff appears to allege violations of two sections of the IWA: § 15 and § 20. Section

15 protects employees who make certain disclosures. See 740 ILCS 174/15. Under the current

version of the statute, an employer may not retaliate against an employee for disclosing

information to a “supervisor, principal officer, board member, or supervisor in an organization

that has a contractual relationship with the employer.” Id. At the time of the alleged conduct in

this case, however, § 15 was narrower. It protected only disclosures made “in a court, an

administrative hearing, or before a legislative commission or committee, or in any other

proceeding” and “to a government or law enforcement agency.” See Pub. Act 95-128 (effective

Jan. 1, 2008). The amendment to § 15 is substantive because it expands the scope of protected

disclosures and correspondently increases an employer’s potential liability. See Allegis Realty

Invs., 860 N.E.2d at 253; Knight, 204 N.E.2d at 6. As such, the amendment does not apply

retroactively, and the version of § 15 in effect at the time of the alleged conduct governs

Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff alleges only that she reported the alleged unlawful conduct to her

supervisor. That allegation is insufficient to state a claim under the applicable version of § 15.

Section 20 protects employees who refuse to participate in activities that “would result in

a violation of a State or federal law, rule, or regulation.” See 740 ILCS 174/20. Plaintiff does not

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allege that she refused to participate in the alleged unlawful conduct. Accordingly, she fails to

state a claim under § 20.

Because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the unauthorized payment demands

violated either section of the □□□ the Court will dismiss Count 1 in its entirety. To the extent

Count 1 attempts to state a claim under § 15, the Court will dismiss it with prejudice. However,

to the extent Count 1 attempts to state a claim under § 20, the Court will dismiss it without

prejudice and give Plaintiff an opportunity to replead.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court:

e GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 20);

o The motion is GRANTED to the extent it seeks to dismiss Count 1:

= Count 1 is DISMISSED with prejudice insofar as it is based on the

alleged sexual harassment or Section 15 of the WA;

= Count 1 is DISMISSED without prejudice insofar as it is based on the

alleged unauthorized payment demands and Section 20 of the [WA;

o The motion is further GRANTED to the extent it seeks to dismiss Counts 2

and 3 insofar as those claims are based on a constructive discharge theory, and

those theories are DISMISSED without prejudice;

o The motion is DENIED in all other respects;

e ORDERS that Plaintiff shall have up to and including September 14, 2026, to file an

amended complaint; and

e DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly at the close of the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED. oO “al LY ha

DATED: August 13, 2026

J.PHILGILBERT

10

United States District Judge

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