Virgen

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

LAURA VIRGEN,

Plaintiff, NO. 1:25-CV-12122

v. Judge Edmond E. Chang

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Laura Virgen alleges that her employer, the University of Illinois Chicago, mis-

treated her, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (commonly known as

the ADA), as she recovered from a surgical procedure. See generally R. 25, Am.

Compl.1 Relying primarily on Civil Rule 10(b), the University previously moved to

dismiss Virgen’s original complaint. R. 18, Def.’s Prior Mot. Virgen has since filed an

Amended Complaint, R. 25, but the University contends that the changes are insuf-

ficient and again seek dismissal based on its view that Virgen’s allegations are un-

clear. R. 27, Def.’s Mot. For the reasons discussed below, the motion is denied.

I. Background

The Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations in the Complaint as true.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

1Citations to the record are “R.” followed by the docket entry number and, if needed,

a page or paragraph number. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this federal

question case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

544, 570 (2007)). Virgen has worked at the University since 2011 and currently is a

nurse technician. Am. Compl. ¶ 6. In 2018, she was diagnosed with bilateral fibrocys-

tic breast disease, and she elected to undergo a palliative bilateral mastectomy in

March 2025. Id. ¶¶ 7, 9.

Virgen alleges several claims for relief stemming from her surgery. First, she

had to pay out of pocket for the procedure even though she believes that the Univer-

sity should have allowed her “to access her medical insurance coverage.” Am. Compl.

¶¶ 9, 19, 21(e). Second, the University did not issue paychecks that she claims were

due while on leave. Id. ¶¶ 11, 17–18, 21(a). Third, although her doctors confirmed

that she could return to work, she could do so only if she was not required to lift more

than 10 pounds. Id. ¶¶ 12–14, 16. The University, in her view, wrongly refused to

make this accommodation. Id. ¶¶ 15, 21(b)–(d).

Believing that the University’s actions violated the ADA, Virgen filed suit in

October 2025. See generally R. 1, Original Compl. The University moved to dismiss

the original complaint under both Civil Rule 12(b)(6) and Civil Rule 10(b). Def.’s Prior

Mot. After review of the motion, the Court suggested that Virgen consider amending

her pleadings using her opportunity as of right. R. 22, 01/14/26 Minute Entry (citing

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B)). Virgen took up the offer and filed the Amended Complaint,

R. 25, in January 2026. But the University has moved again to dismiss, arguing that

the pleading remains too opaque in specifying the causes of action, in violation of Civil

Rule 10(b). Def.’s Mot.

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II. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint generally need only

include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must “give the de-

fendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (cleaned up).2 The Seventh Circuit has

explained that this rule “reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended

to ‘focus litigation on the merits of a claim’ rather than on technicalities that might

keep plaintiffs out of court.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)). At the same time, the Su-

preme Court instructs that “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible

claim for relief will … be a context-specific task.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679

(2009). The Seventh Circuit has drawn a context-dependent distinction between rel-

atively straightforward employment discrimination claims versus more complex

claims. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404–05 (7th Cir. 2010).

“A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Ord. of Police

of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). “[A] complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible

2This Opinion uses (cleaned up) to indicate that internal quotation marks, alterations,

and citations have been omitted from quotations. See Jack Metzler, Cleaning Up Quotations,

18 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 143 (2017).

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on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (cleaned up). These allegations “must be enough

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The

allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual,

rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.

III. Analysis

The University argues that the Amended Complaint still fails to comply with

Civil Rule 10(b) because it “improperly muddles multiple purported causes of action”

and “potentially includes multiple causes of action under various state and federal

statutes.” Def.’s Mot. at 4.

Civil Rule 10(b) requires a party to “state its claims or defenses in numbered

paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Civil

Rule 8(a) also directs pleadings to include “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “The primary purpose of these rules is

to give defendants fair notice of the claims against them and the grounds supporting

the claims.” Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 797 (7th Cir. 2011). If a complaint is

too confusing because of a “lack of organization and basic coherence,” then dismissal

may be proper for lack of notice. Id. at 798.

Although the Amended Complaint is far from a model of clarity, it is not con-

fusingly unintelligible. The University asserts that it does not know whether Virgen

advances theories of liability under state law or other federal statutes. Def.’s Mot. at

4. As an initial matter, “a complaint need not plead legal theories.” Alioto v. Town of

Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2011). It is true, however, that if a defendant

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moves to dismiss a complaint for legal viability, then naturally the plaintiff must

specify the grounds for the claims; otherwise, there is no way to assess whether a

plaintiff has adequately stated a claim for relief.

In any event, Virgen did explicitly specify the basis for her claims: the Ameri-

cans with Disabilities Act. The first sentence of the first paragraph says that she

“brings this Amended Complaint pursuant to [t]he Americans with Disabilities Act,

42 U.S.C. § 12101.” Am. Compl. ¶ 1. The next paragraph invokes “jurisdiction” under

“42 U.S.C. § 12101,” id. ¶ 2, again referring to the first section of the ADA. It is true

that the citation to that statutory section for “jurisdiction” is not quite right, because

subject matter jurisdiction arises under federal-question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331. But there is no doubt that Virgen is invoking the ADA. Later, in the para-

graphs containing the explicit allegations of the claims, she again refers to “the re-

quirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act,” id. ¶ 20, and then prefaces the

comprehensive listing of allegations by asserting that the University “failed to act in

one or more of the following ways that amounted to a violation of the ADA,” id. ¶ 21;

see also R. 30, Pl.’s Resp. at 1 (titling argument as placing University “on notice of the

alleged ADA violation”).

Given these explicit invocations of the ADA, it is sufficiently clear that Virgen

is premising her claims on that statute. Having said that, whether all of those alleged

wrongs are validly actionable under the ADA is a very different question. The Uni-

versity presents its motion as seeking dismissal under both Civil Rule 10(b) and

12(b)(6), but makes no arguments on the merits of Virgen’s claims. For now, it is clear

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that Virgen pleads only purported violations of the ADA, but it is understandable

that the University doubted that the ADA was the sole premise of the claims. So the

Court will permit the University an opportunity to file a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal mo-

tion that fully develops merits-based arguments. Of course, Virgen’s legal theories

also may change over the course of litigation, Chessie Logistics Co. v. Krinos Holdings,

Inc., 867 F.3d 852, 860 (7th Cir. 2017), but if, for example, the University believes

that Virgen cannot sue under the ADA for an insurance-coverage dispute (at least on

the basis of the current allegations) and that she was not otherwise entitled to cover-

age, those can be arguments made in the Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

IV. Conclusion

The University’s motion to dismiss, R. 27, is denied. On or before August 21,

2026, the University shall either answer the Amended Complaint or file a Rule

12(b)(6) motion.

ENTERED:

s/Edmond E. Chang

Honorable Edmond E. Chang

United States District Judge

DATE: August 7, 2026

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