The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
KEYRON THOMAS, ) Case No. 1:25-cv-45
)
Plaintiff, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese
)
v. ) Magistrate Judge
) Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER )
KUNEZ, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Keyron Thomas, a pretrial detainee at the outset of this case who now
resides at the Trumbull Correctional Institution, filed this action without a lawyer
against Officer Kuntz (incorrectly spelled as Kunez on the docket) and Officer Adams
in their official capacities and against the Cuyahoga County jail. The complaint
alleges violations of State law and Mr. Thomas’s federal civil rights under Section
1983 for incidents that allegedly occurred during his pretrial detention at the jail.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. For the following reasons,
the Court GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ motion for summary judgement and
DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court construes the facts in
Plaintiff’s favor in ruling on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and in
Defendants’ favor in ruling on Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
At issue are two separate incidents. First, on November 2, 2024, Mr. Thomas
alleges that he was assaulted by two fellow inmates, resulting in a broken nose,
medical complications, and an alleged loss of purchased commissary items. (ECF
No. 1, PageID #5; see ECF No. 32-4, PageID #350.) Second, from December 19, 2024,
to December 24, 2024, Mr. Thomas fell ill and alleges that Officers Kuntz and Adams
denied him care. (ECF No. 1, PageID #5.) Mr. Thomas submitted minimal evidence
(beyond the complaint) to support his claims. But the record, including evidence
submitted by Defendants, establishes the following facts.
A. The November Incident
On November 2, 2024, Mr. Thomas was assaulted by fellow inmates, which
resulted in a broken nose. (ECF No. 30-1, PageID #277–78.) Corrections Officers
Adams and Kuntz were not on shift during this incident and not otherwise involved.
(Id., PageID #275.) Different officers were working at the time. (Id.)
Staff at the MetroHealth Emergency Department evaluated Mr. Thomas the
same day, diagnosed him with a fractured nasal bone, discharged him back to the jail,
and prescribed Tylenol and similar pain medication. (ECF No. 35-1, PageID #430.)
The next day, Mr. Thomas submitted a health care grievance form complaining of
pain. (ECF No. 32-4, PageID #351.) On November 4, 2024, the corrections health
staff examined Mr. Thomas and prescribed him Motrin for the pain. (ECF No. 35-1,
PageID #453.)
Mr. Thomas alleges that, while he was hospitalized, corrections staff lost his
property. (ECF No. 1, PageID #12; see ECF No. 32-4, PageID #350.) His complaint
does not specify what property was lost, but a grievance filing on the same day as the
hospital visit indicates that the property at issue consisted of food he had purchased
from the commissary. (ECF No. 32-4, PageID #350.)
B. The December Incident
About a month and a half after the attack, Mr. Thomas fell ill. (ECF No. 30-1,
PageID #246.) He asserts that while he was sick the corrections personnel denied
him access to medical treatment. (ECF No. 1, PageID #12, #14–18; see ECF No. 30-1,
PageID #244–48.) According to Mr. Thomas, his “throat was clogging up when [he]
ate [his] food.” (ECF No. 30-1, PageID #249.) Based on his trouble eating, corrections
officers allegedly called medical staff. (Id.) But Mr. Thomas claims that the medical
staff never came to get him. (Id.)
Mr. Thomas alleges black mold caused his illness. (ECF No. 1, PageID #5.)
However, he later conceded that he was never diagnosed with a mold-related illness
and that Officers Kuntz and Adams did not expose him to the mold. (ECF No. 30-1,
PageID #274.) Further, an affidavit from a health and safety manager at the jail
indicates that he inspected the areas around Mr. Thomas’s facility in both November
and December 2024, but did not note any presence of black mold. (ECF No. 33, PageID
#370–71.)
Because the December incident took place over several days, the Court outlines
the relevant events below.
B.1. December 19, 2024 to December 21, 2024
Mr. Thomas first asked officers to call medical staff on December 19, 2024.
(ECF No. 30-1, PageID #255.) According to the medical records, a nurse saw
Mr. Thomas that same day for facial dryness and prescribed medication. (ECF
No. 35-1, PageID #449.) During that appointment, there is no indication that
Mr. Thomas mentioned a sore throat or other related issues. (Id.; ECF No. 30-1,
PageID #255.) Nothing in the record indicates the status of Mr. Thomas on December
20, 2024, but the logbook for the following day labeled his condition as “good.” (ECF
No. 34-2, PageID #397.)
B.2. December 22, 2024
Early on the morning of December 22, 2024, the corrections officer logbook
indicates that an officer called medical staff to speak with a nurse about
Mr. Thomas’s “bad back.” (Id., PageID #401.) The logbook further indicates that the
nurse would “make [Mr. Thomas] an appointment to be seen by a doctor.” (Id.)
About four and a half hours later, Mr. Thomas filed an initial grievance about
his medical care using the inmate healthcare grievance form. (ECF No. 32-4,
PageID #354.) In the grievance form, Mr. Thomas complained that the medical staff
were not adequately addressing his concerns and made a request to see a doctor. (Id.)
The grievance did not specify a sore throat but rather concerned other pain. (Id.)
However, the grievance did acknowledge that the corrections officers were contacting
the medical staff for Mr. Thomas. (Id.)
The next day, a reply to the grievance informed Mr. Thomas that he had an
upcoming primary care appointment. (Id.) Contemporaneous with the filing of the
initial grievance, an officer wrote in his logbook that medical staff was called on
behalf of Mr. Thomas and indicated that medical “will have to look at his chart and
speak to a charge nurse to see what can be done.” (ECF No. 34-2, PageID #405.) A
nurse arrived in the area with a medical cart less than two hours later. (Id.)
The nurse met with Mr. Thomas, who specifically complained of a sore throat
and indicated that he “cannot hardly swallow.” (ECF No. 35-1, PageID #447.) Also,
Mr. Thomas “[r]efused the Motrin at this time because he said it hurts when he
swallows.” (Id.; see ECF No. 30-1, PageID #256.)
According to Mr. Thomas he had been having a problem with his throat “off
and on for a little while” but did not think it was serious until he started struggling
to swallow. (ECF No. 30-1, PageID #255.) Further, the medical records indicate that
a charge nurse informed a certified nurse practitioner that Mr. Thomas complained
of a “sore throat,” was “able to swallow but [had] soreness,” and the nurse planned to
perform a strep test on Mr. Thomas. (ECF No. 35-1, PageID #447.) Later in the day,
a doctor visited Mr. Thomas to perform a strep test; however, Mr. Thomas refused
because he did not know that a sore throat was a symptom of strep throat. (ECF
No. 30-1, PageID #256–57.)
In the evening, a corrections officer informed the nurse that Mr. Thomas did
not go to the medical cart for his pain medicine. (ECF No. 35-1, PageID #447.)
Further, the corrections officer noted that Mr. Thomas did not inform the officers that
his throat hurt and that he ate his dinner. (Id.) Mr. Thomas, however, disputes that
he ate his dinner and accuses the officer on duty of lying to medical staff about him
eating his dinner. (ECF No. 30-1, PageID #258.) According to Mr. Thomas, he did
not eat breakfast, lunch, or dinner on the days the officers said he did. (Id., PageID
#251.)
Officer Kuntz began his shift on December 22, 2024 at 6:00 p.m. and was on
duty until 10:00 p.m. (ECF No. 34-2, PageID #407.) Officer Kuntz did not receive a
briefing at the beginning of shift or any information related to Mr. Thomas and his
ailments. (Id.) Mr. Thomas claims that he spoke to Officer Kuntz during his shift
about his illness (ECF No. 30-1, PageID #250), but Officer Kuntz did not note
anything about Mr. Thomas in his logbook for that shift (ECF No. 34-1. PageID
#407–08). According to Mr. Thomas, Officer Kuntz called medical and was told that
Mr. Thomas was lying about being sick. (ECF No. 30-1, PageID #250.)
B.3. December 23, 2024 to December 24, 2024
Early in the morning on December 23, 2024, the officer logbook noted that
Mr. Thomas reported intense body pain to the officer on duty and that medical was
called. (ECF No. 34-2, PageID #412.) Although nurses were in Mr. Thomas’s pod
area twice on December 23, 2024, in the morning and the afternoon, there is no
indication that they saw or examined Mr. Thomas. (Id., PageID #413.)
Officer Adams assumed duty later in the day (ECF No. 30-1, PageID #249) and
was on shift from 6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. (ECF No. 34-2, PageID #415). Once on shift,
Mr. Thomas complained to Officer Adams about his pain. (ECF No. 30-1, PageID
#249.) Also, Mr. Thomas claimed that his throat was “clogging up” whenever he ate.
(Id.) Therefore, Mr. Thomas asked Officer Adams to go to medical. (Id.) However,
there is nothing in the logbook from Officer Adams about Mr. Thomas’s complaints
or whether he was seen by medical staff. (ECF No. 34-2, PageID #415.)
On December 24, 2024, about two hours after Officer Adams was relieved of
his shift, the new officer on duty called medical for Mr. Thomas. (Id., PageID #416;
ECF No. 35-1, PageID #446.) Mr. Thomas was seen by medical shortly after. (Id.)
He informed medical staff that his throat started hurting “after he cracked his neck
and he woke up feeling like he couldn’t breath[e] or swallow.” (ECF No. 35-1, PageID
#446.) Medical staff noted that Mr. Thomas’s exam revealed that he was able to
“swallow without difficulty or grimacing” and they placed him on a follow-up list. (Id.)
Seven hours later, Mr. Thomas returned to medical. (Id.) This time,
Mr. Thomas complained that he was having an allergic reaction to a chicken patty he
ate the previous night. (Id.) Medical staff noted that Mr. Thomas had a low-grade
fever and had a sore throat for three days but no sign of a rash or shortness of breath.
(Id.) Doctors ordered a strep test but, upon noting that his left tonsil was swollen,
elected to transfer Mr. Thomas to an outside hospital to rule out a peritonsillar
abscess. (Id.)
Mr. Thomas was taken to a local emergency room, where it was determined
that he had strep throat, and his tonsil would need to be drained by a specialist. (Id.,
PageID #428.) The examining physician noted that Mr. Thomas was calm and
cooperative during the examination, there were no signs of acute distress, and his
breathing was unlabored. (Id.) The emergency room elected to transfer Mr. Thomas
to MetroHealth, where the specialist drained his abscess. (Id., PageID #426.)
According to Mr. Thomas, he was given medicine for the strep throat and a follow-up
appointment was scheduled. (ECF No. 30-1, PageID #265.)
C. Grievances and Appeals
Upon his arrival at the Cuyahoga County jail, Mr. Thomas received a copy of
the inmate handbook. (ECF No. 30-1, PageID #244.) The inmate handbook contains
the grievance procedure that inmates must follow, including the procedure for
general grievances and medical grievances. (ECF No. 32-3, PageID #329–30 &
#339–40.) Mr. Thomas indicated that he understands the grievance procedure. (ECF
No. 30-1, PageID #244.)
During his pretrial detention, Mr. Thomas filed a multitude of grievances
between November 2024 and mid-January 2025, including four general grievances
and eleven healthcare grievances. (ECF No. 32-5, PageID #365–66.) By the close of
discovery in this case, all the healthcare grievances had either been passively or
actively accepted. (Id.) Of the remaining four general grievances, one was accepted,
one was still awaiting assignment, and two were completed with an objection. (Id.)
The general grievance awaiting assignment, which has yet to be responded to, was
filed on November 2, 2024. (ECF No. 32-4, PageID #350.) In that grievance,
Mr. Thomas complained about commissary that was lost during his visit to the
emergency room for his broken nose because of the assault. (Id.) Five days later,
Mr. Thomas filed another general grievance raising the same complaint. (Id.,
PageID #352.) Mr. Thomas updated this grievance roughly thirteen months later in
December 2025 to complain that no one ever responded to the original grievance. (Id.)
The corrections staff responded the same day as the update informing Mr. Thomas
that the commissary would not reimburse him for any lost property that was
purchased more than 30 days ago. (Id.) This grievance is now considered complete
and notes Mr. Thomas’s objection that no one responded to the grievance. (ECF
No. 32-5, PageID #366.)
Mr. Thomas filed a third general grievance a month after his initial one in
December 2024. (ECF No. 32-4, PageID #356.) This time, Mr. Thomas requested the
identity of the corrections officers who worked the days he was in the hospital getting
his tonsil drained. (Id.) Corrections staff responded to the grievance twelve days
later and asked Mr. Thomas if he had spoken with a corporal. (Id.) Mr. Thomas
accepted this response. (ECF No. 32-5, PageID #365.)
The underlying content of the remaining general grievance with an objection,
filed on December 28, 2024, was a complaint related to the general medical care
Mr. Thomas received in the preceding weeks, without specifically identifying the
medical treatment to which he referred. (Id., PageID #359.) Corrections staff
responded two days later and forwarded Mr. Thomas’s complaint to nursing
management. (Id.) Mr. Thomas appealed this answer. (Id.) In doing so, he claimed
that various corrections and medical staff, including Officers Kuntz and Adams,
should be held accountable and “start taking people[‘s] medical care more serious.”
(Id.) Three days later, Mr. Thomas updated the appeal and alleged that he was
exposed to black mold. (Id.) Corrections staff responded the same day as the update
informing Mr. Thomas that the corrections staff “does not direct the medical staff in
medical matters.” (Id.) Mr. Thomas did not appeal this response. (Id.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Based on these events, Mr. Thomas filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Officers Kuntz and Adams in their official capacities and against the
corrections facility itself. (ECF No. 1, PageID #2–3.) Additionally, Mr. Thomas
asserts State-law claims for dereliction of duty under Sections 2921.44 and 2921.45
of the Ohio Revised Code. (Id., PageID #16.)
The Court held a case management conference and set deadlines for the case,
including a fact discovery deadline. (ECF No. 22.) Then, the Court referred the
matter to the Magistrate Judge to hear and decide all non-dispositive pretrial
matters. (ECF No. 23.) Defendants sought leave to depose Mr. Thomas. (ECF
No. 24), which the Magistrate Judge granted (Order, Dec. 1, 2025). In response,
Mr. Thomas filed a “Motion to Ignore any request from the Defendants” (ECF No. 26),
which the Magistrate Judge denied (Order, Dec. 19, 2025). In discovery, Mr. Thomas
filed a single motion: “Motion to Release Documents.” (ECF No. 27.) The Magistrate
Judge denied this motion because Mr. Thomas did not timely request production of
documents from Defendants and did not confer with Defendants before filing the
motion as required. (Order, Mar. 5. 2026.)
At the close of discovery, Defendants and Mr. Thomas each moved for summary
judgment. (ECF No. 36; ECF No. 38.) In the following weeks, and well after the close
of discovery, Mr. Thomas filed a flurry of discovery-related motions. (ECF No. 39;
ECF No. 44; ECF No. 47; ECF No. 49; ECF No. 50; ECF No. 51.) To the extent that
the motions can be construed as motions to compel, the Magistrate Judge denied them
because of Mr. Thomas’s failure to try and confer with Defendants before filing the
motions. (Order, Mar. 6, 2026; Order, Mar. 13, 2026; Order, Mar. 27, 2026.) However,
in so ruling, the Magistrate Judge noted that to the extent the motions presented
arguments related to summary judgment, they would be addressed in ruling on the
parties’ motions for summary judgment. (Order, Mar. 6, 2026). Accordingly, the
Court addresses the motions as necessary.
Additionally, on March 25, 2026, Mr. Thomas filed a supplement to his
complaint. (ECF No. 52.) In the supplement, Mr. Thomas attempted to join
additional parties that were not named in the original complaint. (ECF No. 52.) The
Magistrate Judge granted a motion to strike that supplement for several reasons.
(Order, Apr. 1, 2026.) Finally, on April 10, 2026, Mr. Thomas filed a 55-page affidavit
and numerous medical records. (ECF No. 54.) Defendants moved to strike these
documents as disregarding the Court’s orders that discovery was closed. (ECF
No. 55.)
Based on this procedural background, two matters remain for the Court to
decide: (1) whether the Court can consider Mr. Thomas’s affidavit and medical
records; and (2) the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.
CONSIDERATION OF THE AFFIDAVIT
On April 10, 2026, Mr. Thomas filed an affidavit, which included many medical
records. (ECF No. 54.) Defendants move to strike the affidavit as improper. (ECF
No. 55.) In doing so, Defendants argue that, in filing the affidavit, Mr. Thomas
ignored the Court’s repeated admonishment that discovery in this case is closed and
will not be reopened. (Id., PageID #842.)
To be considered by a court on summary judgment, an affidavit must satisfy
three requirements: it must (1) be made on personal knowledge; (2) set out facts
that would be admissible in evidence; and (3) show that the affiant is competent to
testify on the matters stated. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). Where an affidavit contains a
mix of personal knowledge, which is admissible, and belief, which is not, courts must
admit the parts based on personal knowledge as long as that knowledge is
distinguishable from belief. Ondo v. City of Cleveland, 795 F.3d 597, 605 (6th Cir.
2015). If the court cannot tell the difference, then it must strike the entire affidavit.
(Id.)
To the extent that Mr. Thomas attempts to add new parties and/or claims or
to request new or additional discovery, the Court denies those requests and gives the
affidavit no consideration. The deadline to add new parties or to amend the
pleadings was October 17, 2025. (ECF No. 15.) An amendment after that deadline
requires a showing of good cause. Plaintiff fails to make such a showing, and the
Court discerns no good cause on this record to allow a belated amendment. The
deadline for discovery was December 31, 2025. (Id.) As the Court repeatedly stated,
it will not reopen discovery in this case. Therefore, Mr. Thomas’s attempt to, once
again, reopen discovery after he had ample opportunity to participate in discovery
and the workup of the case is improper. In any event, the discovery sought does not
bear on the pending cross-motions for summary judgment.
That eliminates much of the affidavit. For example, pages three to fourteen
appear to request additional video footage and medical records. (ECF No. 54, PageID
#789–800.) Pages twenty and twenty-one contain what appear to be signed witness
statements. (Id., PageID #807–08.) And page thirty-one appears to attempt to add
parties not named in the original complaint. (Id., PageID #817.) Accordingly, the
Court will not consider these aspects of the affidavit.
That leaves the remainder of the affidavit, which contains a mix of
Mr. Thomas’s personal knowledge and belief. (See generally id.) For example, on
page twenty-two of the affidavit, Mr. Thomas states that Officer Kuntz knew he was
sick and “denied me medical treatment which allowed my throat infection to get so
severe, which led me to getting admitted into the ER at MetroHealth.” (Id., PageID
#808.) This claim is only one of many that blurs the line between personal knowledge
and belief. Ondo, 795 F.3d at 605. But such claims in an affidavit are improper. Id.
On this record, attempting to differentiate between the two is not possible or
practicable. Id. Because the Court cannot distinguish between Mr. Thomas’s
personal knowledge and his belief throughout the remainder of the affidavit, the
Court disregards these portions of the affidavit.
However, the one item that the Court can differentiate involves the medical
records that Mr. Thomas included with his affidavit. (See ECF No. 54-1, PageID
#837.) If otherwise admissible, and the Court treats them as such, those records are
proper evidence on summary judgment. Indeed, both parties rely on medical records
in establishing the facts, and Defendants also submitted medical records.
Accordingly, the Court will consider the medical records in ruling on the parties’
cross motions for summary judgment.
ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movement is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). On a motion for summary judgment, the Court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Kirilenko-Ison v. Board of Educ. of Danville Indep. Schs., 974 F.3d 652, 660 (6th Cir.
2020) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587 (1986)).
The Court’s function at this stage is not “to weigh the evidence and determine
the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “The party seeking
summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its
motion” and identifying the portions of the record “which it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Tokmenko, 488 F. Supp. 3d at 576 (citing
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322). Then, the nonmoving party must “set forth specific
facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at
250). “When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent
must do more than show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586.
“[W]here, as here, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, ‘the
court must evaluate each party’s motion on its own merits, taking care in each
instance to draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under
consideration.” McKay v. Federspiel, 823 F.3d 862, 866 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Taft
Broad. Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 240, 248 (6th Cir. 1991)). Therefore,
cross-motions for summary judgement do not warrant granting summary judgment
unless one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on facts that are
not genuinely disputed. Langston v. Charter Twp. of Redford, 623 F. App’x 749, 755
(6th Cir. 2015).
I. Exhaustion
In moving for summary judgment, Defendants argue that Mr. Thomas failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies as the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996
requires. (ECF No. 36, PageID #466–70; ECF No. 41, PageID #601–02.) Defendants
argue that Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing
the suit suffices to grant summary judgment in their favor. (ECF No. 36, PageID
#466–70.)
I.A. The Prison Reform Litigation Act
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, a prisoner may not bring an
action “with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . until such
administrative procedures as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see
also Surles v. Andison, 678 F.3d 452, 455 (6th Cir. 2012). Complete exhaustion is a
mandatory requirement, meaning failure to exhaust cannot be excused, even under
special circumstances. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 638–39 (2016) (citing Woodford
v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007)); see also Porter
v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (holding that the “PLRA’s exhaustion requirement
applies to all inmate suits about prison life” including “whether they allege excessive
force or some other wrong”). Even if the administrative process does not provide the
monetary relief an inmate seeks, the inmate must first pursue all available
administrative remedies before initiating suit. Porter, 534 U.S. at 524.
However, the Act does not provide a uniform exhaustion standard. Instead,
the inmate’s correctional institution defines the applicable administrative rules and
procedures. Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. To comply with the exhaustion requirement, an
inmate must “take advantage of each step the prison holds out for resolving the claim
internally and by following critical procedural rules of the prison’s grievance process.”
Lamb v. Kendrick, 52 F.4th 286, 292 (6th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up); see also Woodford,
548 U.S. at 90–91. Compliance with these rules and procedures is required “even if
the prisoner subjectively believes the remedy is not available, . . . even when the state
cannot grant the particular relief requested, . . . and ‘even where [the prisoners]
believe the procedure to be ineffectual or futile.’” Napier v. Laurel Cnty., Ky., 636
F.3d 218, 222 (6th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Further, “an inmate cannot simply
fail to file a grievance or abandon the process before completion and claim that he has
exhausted his remedies.” Hartsfield v. Vidor, 199 F.3d 305, 309 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing
Wright v. Morris, 111 F.3d 414, 417 n.3 (6th Cir. 1997)).
Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, meaning “inmates are not
required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” Jones,
549 U.S. at 216. Instead, if an inmate fails to exhaust, the defendants may raise
exhaustion as an affirmative defense on which they bear the burden of proof. Lamb,
52 F.4th at 295 (quoting Surles, 678 F.3d at 457 n.10). “[J]udges may resolve factual
disputes relevant to the exhaustion issue without the participation of a jury.” Lee v.
Willey, 789 F.3d 673, 677–78 (6th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
“Although the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is strictly construed, the
statute ‘contains its own, textual exception to mandatory exhaustion’ that applies
when remedies are not ‘available.’” Lamb, 52 F.4th at 292 (quoting Ross, 578 U.S. at
642). The statute expressly forecloses a federal action “until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). An administrative
remedy is not available within the meaning of the statute to inmates and not subject
to the exhaustion requirement where: (1) the administrative grievance procedure
“operates as a simple dead end”; (2) the administrative grievance procedure is “so
opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use”; or (3) “prison
administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through
machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Ross, 578 U.S. at 643–44.
I.B. The Cuyahoga County Jail’s Grievance Process
To determine whether Mr. Thomas exhausted his administrative remedies
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court examines the Cuyahoga County
jail’s grievance process. Lamb, 52 F.4th at 292. To do so, the Court relies on the jail’s
inmate handbook, which details the grievance process. (ECF No. 32-3.) Under that
policy, inmates, like Mr. Thomas, can submit grievances, to which designated jail
staff respond. (ECF No. 30-1, PageID #239 & #244.) When submitting a grievance,
the inmate must include the date of the incident underlying the grievance and ensure
that each grievance concerns only a single incident. (ECF No. 32, PageID #302.)
Generally, once a detainee receives a response to the grievance, the detainee has
three options: (1) accept the response; (2) accept the response with objections; or (3)
appeal the response. (Id., PageID #243.) If a detainee does not appeal the response,
then the grievance is considered resolved. (ECF No. 32; ECF No. 32-1; ECF No. 32-3.)
Depending on the type of grievance the inmate has; the handbook contains two
separate processes—one for healthcare related complaints and another for
non-healthcare related complaints. (ECF No. 32-3, PageID #329–30; Id., PageID
#339–41.) To file a healthcare related grievance, an inmate must follow four steps.
First, the inmate must send an “Inmate Request Form” to the medical department to
try to resolve his concerns. (Id., PageID #329.) Second, if the inmate is not satisfied
with the medical staff’s answer, the inmate may request a medical grievance form
from the medication cart nurse, who visits inmates’ cells to dispense medicine. (Id.)
Third, if the inmate is not satisfied with the response to that grievance, the inmate
may then appeal the response in writing. (Id.) Fourth, if an inmate is still unsatisfied
with the second response, the inmate can file a grievance with the box checked for
“Committee Review,” triggering review by the MetroHealth Grievance Committee.
(Id., PageID #330.) The Committee’s response is final. (Id.)
The general grievance process is more straightforward. An inmate may submit
a grievance through the digital Securus ConnectUs Platform using either a tablet or
a kiosk located in each housing unit. (Id., PageID #339.) Corrections staff must
respond within twenty-one days. (Id., PageID #340.) If the inmate is not satisfied
with the response, then the inmate may appeal the issue to the jail administrator or
his designee within seven days of receiving the response. (Id.) Then, the
administrator has fourteen days to respond with a final decision. (Id.)
I.C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Plaintiff filed a mix of healthcare-related and general grievances for the two
incidents in question. (ECF No. 32-5, PageID #365–66.) The Court addresses
whether Plaintiff properly exhausted each type of grievance in turn.
I.C.1. Healthcare-Related Grievances
Plaintiff filed eleven grievances using the inmate healthcare grievance form
related to his medical concerns. (Id.) These eleven grievances timely received
responses, and all responses were either passively or actively accepted. (Id.) There
is no indication in the record that Mr. Thomas appealed these responses. (See ECF
No. 32-4, PageID #346–64.) By not appealing these grievances, Plaintiff failed to
exhaust his grievances. See Hartsfield, 199 F.3d at 309 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Wright,
111 F.3d at 417 n.3). Accordingly, Plaintiff did not exhaust all available
administrative remedies before bringing suit.
Plaintiff filed a twelfth medical grievance. Instead of using the healthcare
grievance form, he filed it following the general grievance procedure. (ECF No. 32-4,
PageID #359.) He received a reply from corrections staff two days after filing this
grievance, informing him that his concerns were directed to nursing management.
(Id.) Plaintiff appealed this response and received a reply within three days. (Id.)
However, there is no indication that Plaintiff further appealed this response as
required under the general grievance process. Nonetheless, Plaintiff filed this
grievance using the wrong procedure, as the inmate handbook makes clear. (ECF
No. 32-4, PageID #359; see ECF No. 32-3, PageID #329–30.) Accordingly, Mr. Thomas
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90–91
(holding proper exhaustion requires compliance with all procedural rules).
Overall, Plaintiff did not properly appeal his healthcare grievances as the
procedures outlined in the inmate handbook require. Indeed, Mr. Thomas never went
past step one in the healthcare grievance process—he only submitted the grievances
(excluding the improperly filed healthcare grievance using the general grievance
process) using the inmate healthcare grievance form. He did not even attempt to
follow the remaining processes to appeal these grievances and receive a final
response. Accordingly, Mr. Thomas did not exhaust his administrative remedies with
respect to his medical concerns.
I.C.2. Lost Property Grievance
Plaintiff filed three general grievances related to his lost property. (ECF
No. 32-4, PageID #350, #352, & #356.) The first, filed the same day as his assault on
November 2, 2024, never received a response from corrections staff. (ECF No. 32-4,
PageID #350; ECF No. 32-5, PageID #366.) While this is a violation of the process
set forth by the grievance procedure, Plaintiff failed timely to object as the procedure
requires. (ECF No. 32-3, PageID #339–40.) Five days later, he filed a second
grievance requesting reimbursement for the lost items. (ECF No. 32-4, PageID #352.)
Similarly, Mr. Thomas did not receive a response to his second grievance. (Id.) Again,
while this is a violation of the grievance process by corrections staff, Mr. Thomas did
not file an appeal for this violation until well over a year later. (Id.; ECF No. 32-5,
PageID #339–40.)
Third, Plaintiff filed general grievance requesting the identity of staff the who
were working while Mr. Thomas was treated at the hospital for his tonsil draining.
(ECF No. 32-4, PageID #356.) Corrections staff responded asking if Plaintiff had
spoken to a corporal. (Id.). Plaintiff accepted this response and, once again, did not
appeal this grievance. (Id.) By not timely objecting to the grievances or appealing
the responses, Plaintiff did not comply with all the procedural rules of the grievance
process as required. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90–91. Accordingly, he failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies.
Additionally, Plaintiff’s three general grievances all related to lost property
(ECF No. 32-4, PageID #350, #352 & #356.) But the grievance procedure only allows
for an inmate to file one grievance related to a single incident. (ECF No. 32-2, PageID
#340.) By filing multiple grievances related to the same underlying incident, he did
not follow the grievance process. And by not following the required grievance process,
Plaintiff did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies. See Woodford, 548
U.S. at 90–91.
I.C.3. Exceptions to Exhausation
Plaintiff cannot argue that the grievance procedure was not available to him.
Ross, 578 U.S. at 643–44. First, Plaintiff cannot claim that the appeal process was
simply a dead end; he was able to file grievances and appeals and, except for the
general grievances he did not appeal, corrections staff timely responded. (See ECF
No. 32-4.) Second, the grievance process is not so opaque that it cannot be used.
Rather, the inmate handbook, which Mr. Thomas acknowledges he received and
understood, lays out the process that an inmate must follow to exhaust a grievance.
(ECF No. 32-1; ECF No. 30-1, PageID #244.) Further, Mr. Thomas had the medical
grievance process explicitly explained to him by medical staff. (ECF No. 30-1, PageID
#245.) Third, Plaintiff presents no evidence that corrections staff thwarted his use of
the process. Again, Plaintiff filed many grievances, received responses, and filed
several appeals. (ECF No. 32-4.) Nothing in the record suggests that there were
“machinations” or “misrepresentations” by corrections staff. Indeed, Plaintiff chose
not to exhaust the grievance process and either accept responses or abandon the
appellate process.
* * *
For these reasons, the Court determines that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. It is unclear whether Plaintiff’s claims that there was black
mold near his cell, his food was poisoned, and the water in the correctional facility
was contaminated constitute healthcare-related or general grievances. Whatever the
case, the record leaves no doubt that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies with respect to these claims. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’
motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s federal claims.
II. State-Law Claims
Because the Court determines that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies for his federal claims, the Court considers whether it has
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining State-law claims for violations of Sections
2921.44 and 2921.44 of the Ohio Revised Code. (ECF No. 1, PageID #16.)
Under federal law, “the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction
over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III.” 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a). This grant of jurisdiction brings all claims arising from a common
nucleus of operative fact before the Court. Soehnlen v. Fleet Owners Ins. Fund, 844
F.3d 576, 588 (6th Cir. 2016). Even then, a court “may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction” in certain circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
Supplemental jurisdiction “is a doctrine of discretion.” United Mine Workers of Am.
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). To determine whether to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction, “a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every
stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and
comity[.]” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988); see also James
v. Hampton, 592 F. App’x 449, 462–63 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Landefeld v. Marion
Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1882 (6th Cir. 1993)). Pursuant to Section 1367, the
Court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . [it]
has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3).
Because the Court dismisses all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,
it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s State-law claims.
Indeed, because the Court decided this case on exhaustion grounds, it did not assess
the merits of Plaintiff’s claims. Therefore, the local courts are better positioned to
interpret and analyze the State-law claims in the first instance. Accordingly, the
Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Defendants’ summary judgment motion
on Plaintiff’s State-law claims.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN
PART Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs affidavit (ECF No. 55), GRANTS IN
PART Defendants’ motion for summary judgement (ECF No. 36) and DENIES
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 38). Further, the Court
DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs State-law claims.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 10, 2026
J.Philip Calabrese”
United States District Judge
Northern District of Ohio
24