FULLER-WOODSON

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RONALD FULLER-WOODSON, ) .

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) Case No. 1:26-CV-89

)

WEAVER, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Susan Paradise Baxter, United States District Judge

Pending before the Court in the above-captioned case is a Motion for a Temporary

Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause for a Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiff

Ronald Fuller-Woodson. ECF No. 21. For the reasons set forth below, this motion will be

denied.

I. Introduction

On March 31, 2026, Plaintiff, an inmate at SCI-Forest, commenced this pro se civil rights

against Correctional Officers “Weaver” and “Hulings,” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. At this

juncture, Plaintiff's “Amended Complaint” is the operative pleading. See ECF Nos. 23, 25, □□□□

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint asserts claims against Defendants Weaver and Hulings in

both their official and individual capacities. It alleges violations of Plaintiffs Eighth

' Plaintiffs amended factual averments and legal claims are set forth at ECF No. 23, which is

styled as his “Motion to Amend Complaint.” On July 20, 2026, U.S. Magistrate Judge Maureen

P. Kelly granted Plaintiff's motion to amend and directed the Clerk of Court to file the Amended

Complaint at ECF No. 23. However, the docket entry at ECF No. 25, presently docketed as

Plaintiff s “Amended Complaint,” consists solely of a one-page “Memorandum of Law,” which

does not conform to the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Plaintiff

has also filed a declaration at ECF No. 26, which is presently docketed as a “Supplement.” For

present purposes, the Court collectively construes Plaintiff's filings at ECF Nos. 23, 25, and 26

as his amended pleading.

Amendment rights based on the Defendants’ alleged deliberate indifference and failure to protect

him from an assault by a fellow inmate. It also alleges violations of Plaintiff's First Amendment

rights based on the Defendants’ alleged retaliation in response to Plaintiff's efforts to obtain

redress for perceived misconduct.

According to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff was engaged in a heated argument with

fellow inmate Juan Cristo Munoz (“Cristo”) on February 26, 2026. ECF No. 23, (10. During

this argument, Cristo threatened to throw urine and feces at Plaintiff when he “came out for

group.” Id. While Defendants Weaver and Hulings were conducting “wellness rounds,” they

smiled and laughed at Plaintiff, which Plaintiff interprets as an acknowledgement of Cristo’s

threat “because B.M.U. program staff are stationed on the housing unit at the staff desk.” Id.

Subsequently, Plaintiff was brought of his of cell and seated at the “restart desk,” while

Cristo was strip-searched by the Defendants. ECF No. 23 at §12. Cristo “took twice as much

time being strip searched [as] the whole housing unit.” Id. During the search, Defendant Weaver

informed Cristo that he could not bring out a bottle, which allegedly contained the urine and

feces that Cristo had threated to “throw on” Plaintiff. Id. at (12-13. Despite Cristo being non-

compliant, the officers allowed him to come out of his cell. Id. 13. Defendant Weaver

allegedly asked Hulings whether he “still want[ed] to let [Cristo] out,” and Hulings responded, “I

don’t give a f*ck, if he does anything we will just f*ck him up.” Id.

Prior to Cristo exiting his cell, Defendants Weaver and Hulings pointed in Plaintiff's

direction, laughed, and joked about sitting Cristo in the seat behind Plaintiff. ECF No. 23, 914.

When Cristo exited his cell, he asked to sit behind Plaintiff. The Defendants denied Cristo’s

request “but allowed him to take two steps” in Plaintiff's direction, at which point Cristo spit

2 The Court refers to this inmate in the same manner in which he is referred to in the Amended

Complaint.

feces and urine on Plaintiff. Id. Several inmates then vowed to attack and assault Plaintiff if he

told on Cristo. Id. 415. Plaintiff was seen by medical personnel at his cell and then lodged a

grievance about the manner in which the Defendants had handled the strip-search of Cristo. Id.

Plaintiff claims that, shortly after he lodged his grievance, “both defendants began

retaliating” against him by “grooming inmates in the program to assault [him],” telling inmates

that Plaintiff was “a rat” and saying that Plaintiff “told on them and Inmate Cristo by writing the

grievance[.]” ECF No. 23, 18. Plaintiff states that “[b]oth officers began to place [him] in a stat

of immenant [sic] danger, planning attacks, and setting up scenarios that would leave [him]

vulnerable to assault.” Id.

As an example, Plaintiff alleges that, on April 4, 2026, Defendant Hulings tried to

“eoerce” him to go to the “level 2 yard (unrestrained yard) with a rival inmate that was trying to

assault [him].” Id. When Plaintiff refused, Hulings “began threatening” Plaintiff and “vowing to

enter [his] cell and attack [him].” Id. 419.

On April 6, 2026, that same inmate, who was allegedly “tasked” by Defendants Weaver

and Hulings “to assault” Plaintiff, approached Plaintiff's cell and sprayed a bottle of cleaning

chemicals in his face. ECF No. 23, 419.

On May 5, 2026, Defendants Hulings and Weaver allegedly threatened to allow Cristo to

spit on Plaintiff. ECF No. 23, §20. Plaintiff states that he and Cristo were placed in cage

modules that were next to each other and the officers “attempt[ed] to open both cages at the same

time” when Cristos had feces in his mouth. Id. Plaintiff refused to exit at the same time,

however, and asked to speak to a supervisor. Id., (21.

Plaintiff claims in his Amended Complaint that Defendants Hulings and Weaver continue

to retaliate against him because of pending litigation. ECF No. 23, §23. He states that both

Defendants have restricted him from making phone calls pertaining to this lawsuit and have

threatened to move Cristo next door to him. Id. Subsequently, on July 4, 2026, Cristo was in

fact moved to a cell adjacent to Plaintiff's, leading Plaintiff to file the pending motion for

injunctive relief. Id. Plaintiff then submitted a separation request to the Program Review

Committee, to no avail. See ECF No. 26 at 2.

Finally, on July 12, 2026, after Cristo threatened to throw a mixture of feces and urine at

Plaintiff's door, Plaintiff asked corrections officers to close Cristo’s food aperture. ECF No. 26

at 2. Defendant Hulings allegedly instructed that Cristo’s food aperture remain open and, at

some point thereafter, Cristo stuck his hand out of the aperture and threw urine and feces at

Plaintiffs cell window and aperture two times. Jd. Plaintiff states that, after this incident,

“correctional officers left the mixture of urine and feces on [his] window, did not conduct an

incident report[,] did not place the inmate in ‘recovery status,’ [and] congratulated him for

throwing the waste at [Plaintiffs] cell[.]” Jd.

I. Standard of review

Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are governed under the same

standard. See Brown v. Wolf, No. 2:16-cv-1081, 2026 WL 691386, *1 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 21,

20216), report and recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 688634 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 20216). A

preliminary injunction is appropriate only where: (1) the movant demonstrates a reasonable

probability of success on the merits; and (2) the movant demonstrates irreparable harm if the

injunction is denied; (3) the issuance of an injunction will not result in greater harm to the non-

moving party; and (4) the public interest would best be served by granting the injunction.

Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1997); Opticians

Ass'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1990). As

the moving party, Plaintiff bears the burden of producing evidence to support the first two

factors. See Acierno v. New Castle Cty., 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994). Absent support for

either of the first two factors, a court must deny the request for a preliminary injunction. See id.,

Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000).

Injunctive relief is an “’extraordinary remedy ... which should be granted only in limited

circumstances.’” American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc.,

42 F.3d 1421, 1426-27 (3d Cir. 1994) (ellipsis in the original) (quoting Franks GMC Truck

Center, Inc. v. General Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)). “Moreover, in the

prison context, a request for injunctive relief must always be viewed with great caution because

judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of

prison administration.” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). Preliminary injunctive relief is “not a tool for prisoners to use to

regulate ‘in every way, every day, the terms and conditions of plaintiff's confinement simply

because they are ‘in court’....” Stiel v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2017 WL 2656646, at *4 (D.N.J.

June 19, 2017) (quoting Muhammad vy. Director of Corrections, 2009 WL 161075, at *1 □□□□

Ca. Jan. 22, 2009)). And because the pending motion implicates the administration of a state

prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the

availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). “The

federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require

broad discretionary authority as the ‘operation of a correctional institution is at best an

extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Peterson v. Harry, No. 2:24-CV-01591, 2026 WL

1975383, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2026) (quoting Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566

(1974)), report and recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 1871826 (W.D. Pa. June 30, 2026)

(quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566.(1974)).

WI. Analysis

In his motion, Plaintiff indicates that he seeks to “stop both defendants from planning

attacks against [him]” and “keep the defendants from using injury as a means to evade the

practice of [his] protected conduct to petition against the government.” ECF No. 21 at 3. While

the Court does not take Plaintiffs allegations of physical endangerment lightly, his suggestion

that Defendants are planning future “attacks” on him is entirely speculative and predicated on

conclusory statements and/or tenuous inferences, rather than specific language or concrete

threats. Plaintiff's averments regarding the February 26, 2026 incident do not suggest that the

Defendants encouraged Cristo to assault Plaintiff with feces and urine. On the contrary, his

averments show that the officers conducted a strip-search of Cristo prior to the incident,

interdicted a bottle of feces and urine, and denied Cristo’s request to sit behind Plaintiff in the

group session. As for the April 6, 2026 incident in which a different inmate sprayed Plaintiff

with cleaning chemicals, Plaintiff loosely avers that the Defendants “tasked” the inmate to do so;

however, Plaintiff provides no further details to substantiate this claim. Plaintiff alleges that

Hulings tried to “coerce” him to go to the yard on April 4, 2026 and made a generalized threat of

violence, but his allegations suggests that no harm or violence came to pass from that incident.

Plaintiff also avers that Cristo was placed in an adjacent cell and that the Defendants endangered

him on May 5, 2026 by “attempting to open both cages at the same time,” but he refused to step

out until he could speak to a supervisor.

As the movant in this case, Plaintiff must show “that [he] is more likely than not to

suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief.” Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858

F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017), as amended (Sune 26, 2017). To do so, he “must demonstrate a

potential harm which cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following a trial.”

Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir, 1989). “The risk of

irreparable harm cannot be speculative; mere risk of irreparable harm is insufficient—the movant

must make a clear showing of immediate irreparable injury, or a presently existing actual threat;

an injunction may not be used simply to eliminate the possibility of a remote future injury, or a

future invasion of rights.” McCafferty v. Wolf, Case No. 2:20-CV-02008, 2021 WL 1340002, at

*4 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2021) (alterations and internal quotes omitted) (citing Holiday Inns of Am.

v. B & B Corp., 409 F.2d 614, 618 (3d Cir. 1969); Continental Grp., Inc. v. Amoco Chems.

Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1980); Hadeed v. Advanced Vascular Res. of Johnstown, LLC,

No. 3:15-CV-22, 2016 WL 7176658 at *3, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169709 at *8 (W.D. Pa. Dec.

8, 2016)).

Based on the facts set forth in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a

likelihood of irreparable injury in the absence of injunctive relief. And under the law of this

Circuit, “[a] failure to demonstrate irreparable injury must necessarily result in the denial of a

preliminary injunction.” Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. Wachovia Ins. Agency Inc., 306 F. App'x 727, 732

(3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Because Plaintiff's allegations of future harm are too

speculative and tenuous to show irreparable injury in the absence of injunctive relief, his request

for injunctive relief must be denied.

Plaintiff also indicates in his motion that he is seeking a TRO that would restrict

Defendants Hulings and Weaver from working on the K-B housing unit where Plaintiff is

housed. Giving due consideration to principles of federalism, the Court would be disinclined to

grant this form of relief in any event, as it necessarily implicates matters of prison administration

and institutional security as to which the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections must be given

serious deference.

Finally, it should be noted that, throughout Plaintiff's pleading and motion, he complains

that Lt. Deimer improperly failed to preserve and/or provide certain video footage which,

Plaintiff believes, would substantiate his claims.. Plaintiff also suggests that Lt. Deimer

improperly handled a grievance that was directed against herself. To the extent Plaintiff seeks

injunctive relief against Lt. Deimer, his motion fails because Lt. Deimer is not a party to this

lawsuit. See Peterkin v. McIntyre, Civil Action No. 25-02137, 2025 WL 3295527, at *1 □□□□□□□

Nov. 26, 2025); Kramer v. City of New Kensington, Civil Action No. 13-606, 2014 WL

5464848, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2014) (“The general rule is that a court may not enter an

injunction against a person who has not been made a party to the case before it.”) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

IV. Conclusion

Because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any entitlement to a temporary restraining

order or preliminary injunctive relief, his motion at ECF No. [21] will be denied. An appropriate

Order follows.

\ Satan Vt pea

SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER

United States District Judge