LOWRY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ERIE DIVISION

)

) Case No. 1:25-cv-00308-SPB-RAL

SAMUEL LEE LOWRY,

)

) SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER

Plaintiff

) United States District Judge

)

v.

) RICHARD A. LANZILLO

) Chief United States Magistrate Judge

SUPERINTENDENT SCI FOREST,

)

) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Defendant

)

I. Recommendation

It is recommended that Plaintiff Samuel Lee Lowry’s complaint be dismissed

for failure to state a claim in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

II. Report

A. Background

Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Forest

(SCI-Forest), commenced this action by filing a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against the Superintendent of SCI-Forest. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff’s

complaint was lodged pending disposition of his motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis. Id. The Court granted his in forma pauperis motion on June 30, 2026.

ECF No. 8.

In his complaint, Plaintiff states that he was transferred from SCI-Coal

Township to SCI-Forest on or about June 4, 2026. ECF No. 1 at p. 1. It appears that

his television set was lost during the transfer. Id. Plaintiff immediately submitted

a timely grievance with the grievance coordinator at SCI-Coal Township but was told

that he needed to file at SCI-Forest. Id. at 4. His subsequent grievance, filed at SCI-

Forest, was denied as untimely. Id. Plaintiff contends that the untimeliness of his

second grievance was a direct result of the time that he spent waiting for a response

from SCI-Coal Township. Id.

Plaintiff asserts three causes of action based on this incident. Id. In his first

two grounds for relief, he maintains that unidentified prison officials violated his

right to due process by denying his grievance as untimely. Id. at pp. 4-5. His final

claim for relief seeks monetary damages for the loss of his television set. Id. at p. 5.

B. Standard for review

Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, Plaintiff is subject to the screening

provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).1 Among other things, that statute requires the

Court to dismiss any action in which the Court determines that the action is “frivolous

or malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2); Muchler v. Greenwald, 624 Fed. Appx. 794, 796-97 (3d Cir. 2015). A

frivolous complaint is one which is either based upon an indisputably meritless legal

theory (such as when a defendant enjoys immunity from suit) or based upon factual

contentions which are clearly baseless (such as when the factual scenario described

1 Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his allegations, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). Moreover,

under the liberal pleading rules, during the initial stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations

in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997).

is fanciful or delusional). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). The

determination as to whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. D’Agostino v. CECOM RDEC,

436 Fed. Appx. 70, 72 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236,

240 (3d Cir. 1999)).

C. Analysis

1. Personal involvement

Applying the principles above, the Court must first screen and dismiss

Plaintiff’s claim against the Superintendent of SCI-Forest for lack of personal

involvement in the deprivation of a constitutional right. It is axiomatic that a § 1983

plaintiff “must show that each and every defendant was ‘personal[ly] involve[d]’ in

depriving him of his rights.” Kirk v. Roan, 2006 WL 2645154, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2006)

(quoting Evancho v. Fischer, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2006)). This means that each

defendant must have played an “affirmative part” in the complained-of misconduct.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“In a § 1983 suit ... [a]bsent vicarious liability, each

Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own

misconduct.”); Oliver v. Beard, 358 Fed. Appx. 297, 300 (3d Cir. 2009). In the absence

of specific allegations that a defendant played a role in depriving the plaintiff of a

constitutional right, dismissal is appropriate. See, e.g., Mearin v. Swartz, 951

F.Supp.2d 776, 781-82 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (dismissing claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

because the plaintiffs had failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish that certain

defendants had played an affirmative part in the alleged Eighth Amendment

violation).

These principles apply with equal force where the defendants are supervising

prison officials. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998)

(noting that liability for supervisory officials must still be based on “personal

involvement in the alleged wrongs”); Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir.

2005) (“[L]iability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat

superior.”). Although a supervisor cannot encourage constitutional violations, “a

supervising public official has [no] affirmative constitutional duty to supervise and

discipline so as to prevent violations of constitutional rights by his or her

subordinates.” Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 1986); Brown v.

Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1120 (3d Cir. 1990). Moreover, it is “well established that

the filing of a grievance is not sufficient to show the actual knowledge necessary for

a defendant to be found personally involved in the alleged unlawful conduct.” Mearin

v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 782 (W.D. Pa. 2013). See also Mincy v. Chmielsewski,

508 Fed. Appx. 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[A]n officer’s review of, or failure to

investigate, an inmate’s grievances generally does not satisfy the requisite personal

involvement.”). Rather, a supervisor-defendant may only be liable for

unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates if the supervisor either: (1) with

deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy,

practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm; or (2) participated

in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in

charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate’s unconstitutional

conduct. A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d

Cir. 2004).

In the instant case, Plaintiff is plainly attempting to hold the Superintendent

responsible for the unconstitutional actions of other individuals based entirely upon

his supervisory role in the prison system and his response to Plaintiff’s grievance. As

described above, this type of averment is insufficient to establish personal

involvement in the deprivation of a constitutional right. See, e.g., Mincy v.

Chmielsewski, 508 Fed. Appx. 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[A]n officer’s review of, or

failure to investigate, an inmate’s grievances generally does not satisfy the requisite

personal involvement.”); Kloss v. SCI-Albion, 2018 WL 4609144, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Aug.

15, 2018) (allegation that supervisory defendant was “made aware of several issues

of the plaintiff’s and . . . failed to help him” is insufficient to state a claim for reliefs)

participation in an administrative appeal process); Rogers v. United States, 696

F.Supp.2d 472, 488 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“If a grievance official’s only involvement is

investigating and/or ruling on an inmate’s grievance after the incident giving rise to

the grievance has already occurred, there is no personal involvement on the part of

that official.”). Because Plaintiff’s claim against the lone Defendant is based entirely

upon his supervisory role in the prison system, that claim must be dismissed, with

prejudice.

2. Failure to state a claim

Even if Plaintiff had identified a viable Defendant, he has failed to state an

actionable claim for relief. It is well-settled that inmates “do not have a

constitutionally protected right to a grievance process.” Jackson v. Gordon, 145 Fed.

Appx. 774, 777 (3d Cir. 2005). As such, “allegations of improprieties in the handling

of grievances do not state a cognizable claim under § 1983.” Glenn v. DelBalso, 599

Fed. Appx. 457, 459 (3d Cir. 2015). While prison officials’ alleged mishandling of

Plaintiff’s grievances “may have excused his obligation to exhaust administrative

remedies before filing suit, it did not give rise to an independent cause of action

against the Defendants.” Scutella v. Erie County Prison, 2020 WL 5366043, at *4

(W.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2020).

As to Plaintiff’s loss of property claim, an unauthorized intentional deprivation

of property by a state official does not violate the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment so long as “a meaningful post deprivation remedy for the loss

is available.” Grant v. Venango Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 2026 WL 1335939, at *4 (W.D.

Pa. Apr. 13, 2026) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)). Courts have

widely held that Pennsylvania provides a sufficient remedy for purposes of the Due

Process Clause in the form of the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act. See, e.g., Grant,

2026 WL 1335939, at *4; Shakur v. Coelho, 421 Fed. Appx. 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2011)

(explaining that the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act provides an adequate remedy for

a willful deprivation of property by state officials); Grega v. Vroman, 2023 WL

3585758, at *7 n. 9 (W.D. Pa. May 22, 2023) (same). The availability of this state law

remedy precludes Plaintiffs due process claim. Dismissal is warranted.

If. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that this action be

dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Moreover,

because the deficiencies identified above cannot be cured by amendment, leave to

amend should also be denied as futile. The Clerk should be directed to mark this case

closed.

IV. Notice

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties must

seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and

Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and

Recommendation. Any party opposing the Objections shall have fourteen (14) days

from the date of service of the Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P.

72(b)(2). Extensions of time will not be granted. Failure to file timely objections may

constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193

n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).

DATED this day of July, 2026.

SUBMITTED BY:

RICHARD A. none

Chief United States Magistrate Judge