Goldberg

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

DUNCAN ABRAHAM GOLDBERG, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) No. 4:25-cv-01406-SEP

)

STATE OF MISSOURI, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is the application of self-represented Plaintiff Duncan Abraham

Goldberg for leave to commence this action without prepayment of the required filing fee. Doc.

[2]. Based on the financial information provided, the application will be granted. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). On initial review, the Complaint is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b).

LEGAL STANDARD ON INITIAL REVIEW

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma

pauperis if it is frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim

for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief” is “a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense.” Id. at 679. The court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal

conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016); see also Brown v.

Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) (court is not required to “accept

as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).

When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it

the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal

construction” means that, “if the essence of an allegation is discernible . . . then the district court

should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered

(quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). But even pro se complaints must

“allege facts, which if true, state a claim as a matter of law.” Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d

1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004)

(federal courts not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional

factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”).

BACKGROUND

This is the second time Plaintiff has filed a federal action alleging his father was

discriminated against in the St. Louis City Circuit Court. The Court dismissed his first action,

Goldberg, et al. v. State of Missouri, et al., 4:23-cv-00089-SEP (E.D. Mo. Apr. 21, 2023),

because it was brought outside the statute of limitations, it pointed to no discriminatory act

occurring at the state court, and it alleged claims against people and entities not subject to suit.

See id., Doc. [4]. Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which

dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Id., Doc. [10]. Later, the Eighth Circuit denied

Plaintiff’s motion for clarification, motion to transfer to the Ninth Circuit, and petition for

rehearing en banc. Id., Docs. [12], [13], [14]. The United States Supreme Court denied

Plaintiff’s petition for writ of certiorari and his petition for rehearing. Id., Docs. [17], [18].

THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges Defendants discriminated against his father, Robert Goldberg, because of

his brain injury. The discrimination allegedly occurred in the St. Louis City Circuit Court during

Robert Goldberg’s litigation of a wrongful death action arising out of the death of his wife.1

Plaintiff alleges Defendants have violated the following federal laws:

(1) The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Title II, (2) The Americans with

Disabilities Amendment Act of 2009, Title II, (3) The Civil Rights Act of 1871,

42 U.S.C. Section 1983, Deprivation of Civil Rights under Color of Law, (4) The

Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, (5) The Older Americans Act of 1965,

Section 101, (6) The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Section 504, (7) The Patient

Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Section 1557, (8) Article I, Section

8, of the US Constitution, The Spending Clause, (9) Article VI, of the US

Constitution, The Supremacy Clause, (10) The First Amendment of the US

Constitution, Right to Petition the Government, (11) The First Amendment of the

US Constitution, Rights of Association, (12) The Ninth Amendment of the US

Constitution, Unenumerated Rights, (13) The Fourteenth Amendment of the US

1 For additional background on Plaintiff’s father Robert Goldberg’s litigation in the Circuit Court of the

City of St. Louis, see Goldberg, et al. v. State of Missouri, et al., No. 4:23-cv-00089-SEP, Doc. [4] at 2.

US Constitution, Equal Protection Clause.

Doc. [1] at 5-6.

Plaintiff states that Robert Goldberg suffered from “Anoxic Brain Injury,” and the St.

Louis City Court discriminated against him as a litigant. Because the Complaint is difficult to

understand, the Court will quote it directly:

R.M. Goldberg was medically and legally recognized to have lived with an Anoxic

Brain Injury that burdened him with severe cognitive impairments to his Executive

Function and Short-term Memory Retention and yet he remained of his own legal

capacity without a guardianship at the time of his attempted legal efforts in the

Missouri Judicial System. However, R.M. Goldberg was denied full, fair, safe and

equal access to the Missouri Judicial System on account of the Defendants

deliberate indifference to the needs and challenges that people living with cognitive

disabilities face due to these cognitive disabilities, such as R.M. Goldberg faced

living with his Anoxic Brain Injury, and the Defendants’ utter failure to provide

any reasonable accommodation at any and all points of contact with the Public

Services they provide (let alone any accommodation) specific to the needs and

challenges of cognitive disabilities, to the detriment of such litigants living with

cognitive disabilities and their families by association such as [Plaintiff], and for

the Defendants subjecting litigants living with ongoing disabilities to an unfair

standard of agency in the Missouri Judicial System namely to that of litigants

unburdened by cognitive disabilities, and holding the cognitively disabled to this

double standard, and effectively punishing them for being wanting of it and thereby

punishing litigants with cognitive disabilities for having cognitive disabilities, as

they did to the Plaintiff’s Father, to his hurt and harm, dismissing his otherwise

strong asbestos case on basis of delays directly related to his Anoxic Brain Injury

(ABI) and thusly to the Plaintiff’s hurt and harm by association as well.

. . .

To this point, he had no accommodation, nor was any available from the Missouri

Judicial System to compensate for the delays complicated his effort due to his ABI.

Neither was quarter given him by the Talc-industrial parties who charged him with

failing to file on time as to a wrongful death case in Missouri, and Missouri held

him to that and held him to a default standard of the Missouri Judicial System to

that of non-Brain Injured people and effectively punished him for having his

disability.

Doc. [1] at 2, 7.

For relief, Plaintiffs seek $50 million, which he states is the average settlement awarded

to victims of asbestos exposure. Doc. [1] at 16. He alleges that, had Defendants not

discriminated against his father in state court, his father would have been awarded similar

damages in his wrongful death action. Id.

The Complaint is subject to dismissal on initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) for the same reasons Plaintiff’s first action was dismissed: It falls outside the

statute of limitations, and Plaintiff sues entities and individuals not subject to suit.

The United States Supreme Court “has held that § 1983 claims accruing within a

particular state should be governed by that state’s statute of limitations governing personal-injury

claims.” Walker v. Barrett, 650 F.3d 1198, 1205 (8th Cir. 2011). The five-year statute of

limitations for personal injury actions found in Missouri Revised Statute § 516.120(4) applies to

§ 1983 actions arising in Missouri. Sulik v. Taney Cnty., Mo., 393 F.3d 765, 767 (8th Cir. 2005).

A district court may dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 if the

statute of limitations has expired. Myers v. Vogal, 960 F.2d 750, 751 (8th Cir. 1992).

Plaintiff complains of events between July 2016 and early January 2017. Doc. [1] at 7;

see also Goldberg v. Borg Warner Morse Tec LLC, et al., No. 1622-CC01232 (St. Louis City

Cir. Ct. 2016). The five-year limitations period expired between July 2021 and early January

2022.2 Plaintiff did not file this case until September 15, 2025, more than three years after the

statute of limitations had expired; therefore, it must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In

addition, Plaintiff has named two new Defendants, but neither is subject to suit: the Office of the

State Court Administrator of Missouri and Kathy S. Lloyd, State Court Administrator. The

Office of the State Court Administrator is an arm of the State of Missouri and is not subject to

suit under § 1983. See Oaker ex rel. K.R. v. Skiles, No. 2:21-cv-4242-MDH, 2022 WL 2881407,

*2 (W.D. Mo. Jul. 21, 2022). And Plaintiff sues Kathy S. Lloyd in her official capacity, which is

equivalent to a suit “against the governmental entity itself.” See White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d

1064, 1075 (8th Cir. 2017). To prevail on an official capacity claim, Plaintiff must establish the

governmental entity’s liability for the alleged conduct. Kelly v. City of Omaha, Neb., 813 F.3d

1070, 1075 (8th Cir. 2016). But Plaintiff cannot state a claim against the State of Missouri,

because “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are ‘persons’ under

§ 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

2 Missouri’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims also governs claims for alleged violations of

Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. See, e.g., Castelino v. Rose-Hulman Inst. of Tech., 999

F.3d 1031, 1037 (7th Cir. 2021). Missouri Revised Statute § 516.120(4) sets forth a five-year statute of

limitations for filing a personal injury action.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs claims are barred by the statute of limitations, and the Complaint fails to state a

claim against any Defendant. Therefore, this case is dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Duncan Abraham Goldberg’s application to

proceed in the district court without prepaying fees or costs, Doc. [2], is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B), Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel, Doc.

[3], is DENIED as moot.

An order of dismissal accompanies this Memorandum and Order.

Dated this Sth day of August, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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