SWAFFORD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ERIE DIVISION

JEFF SWAFFORD, )

)

Plaintiff ) NO. 1:25-CV-00218

)

VS. ) RICHARD A, LANZILLO

) Chief United States Magistrate Judge

MR. GREENFIELD, et al., )

) MEMORANDUM OPINION ON

Defendants ) DEFENDANTS GREENFIELD AND

) FAIR'S MOTION TO DISMISS

) AMENDED COMPLAINT

)

) ECF NO. 41

)

Defendants Greenfield and Fair have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs second

Amended Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons explained below,

the motion will be granted.!

I. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, Jeff Swafford (“Swafford”), a former inmate at the Crawford County

Correctional Facility (“CCCF”’), commenced this pro se civil rights action on July 14,

2025. ECF No. 1. Due to filing deficiencies, Swafford’s Complaint was not filed until

November 24, 2025. ECF No. 8. The Complaint named CCCF Warden Greenfield

(“Greenfield”), CCCF Deputy Warden Fair (“Fair”), and Prime Care Medical as

Defendants. Defendants Greenfield and Fair moved to dismiss the Complaint on

1 All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge in these

proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

April 27, 2026. See ECF Nos. 27, 28. On that same date, the Court dismissed this

action as to Prime Care Medical based on Swafford’s withdrawal of claims against it.

See ECF No. 29.

On May 1, 2026, the Court ordered Swafford to file a response to Defendants

Greenfield and Fair’s motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, to file an amended

complaint. See ECF No. 31. On May 11, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to

File an Amended Complaint. ECF No. 32. Swafford’s motion stated that unidentified

Crawford County Jail staff members, not Warden Greenfield or Deputy Fair, gave

certain of his personal belongings to his sister without his consent. Jd. On June 4,

2026, Swafford filed an Amended Complaint consisting of these four sentences:

I, Jeff Swafford, am accusing the Crawford County Jail and

staff, not specifically Warden Greenfield or Deputy Fair,

for handing out my personal belongings (apartment keys)

without my consent. They violated my rights as a prisoner,

by breaking there (sic) own rule. These actions

subsequently left me homeless, living in a homeless

shelter. I don't know how to amend this complaint any

further.

ECF No. 36.

On June 25, 2026, Swafford filed a second Amended Complaint, alleging as

follows:

1. On or about the last 2 weeks of March, 2023, or the first

2 weeks of April, 2023, (I don’t know the exact date) a

correction officer at the Crawford County Jail, I will call

“John Doe,” because I truly don’t know the identity of

this man, because I was incarcerated. This said “John

Doe’, willingly did give out my personal property (a set

of my apartment keys) without my consent.

2. These actions eventually led me to homelessness, after

I got out of jail. I ended up in St. James Home. It lisa

homeless shelter in Meadville, PA

3. These actions violated my rights as a prisoner, by giving

out my personal belongings without my consent. They,

meaning, Crawford County Jail, broke there (sic) own

rule

4. I am suing Crawford County Jail for Fifty Thousand

Dollars total.

ECF No. 38.

Defendants Greenfield and Fair have moved to dismiss the second Amended

Complaint. ECF No. 41. They argue that the second Amended Complaint, like the

original Complaint and first Amended Complaint, fails to state a claim under any

theory of liability against either Defendant. ECF No. 42. The Court agrees and will

therefore dismiss the second Amended Complaint. Furthermore, because any further

attempt by Swafford to amend would be futile, the Court will dismiss this action with

prejudice.

II]. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests

the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir.

1993). As with the prior motions to dismiss, in deciding the instant motion, the Court

accepts as true the Amended Complaint’s factual allegations and examines them in

a light most favorable to Swafford. See id.; U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281

F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). But the Court is “not compelled to accept unsupported

conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal

quotations and citations omitted); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Cal.

Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (8d Cir. 2004); McTernan v.

City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (8d Cir. 2009). In making its determination under

Rule 12(b)(6), the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on

the merits; the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007) (citing 5C Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice &

Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, a

complaint should only be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

Finally, because Swafford is proceeding pro se, his second Amended Complaint

must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). If the Court can reasonably read his

Amended Complaint to state a valid claim upon which relief can be granted, it will

do so despite his failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor

syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. See

Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982); U.S. ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley,

414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969).

III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

To support a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege facts to

support that each defendant, while acting under color of state law, deprived the

plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See

Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (38d Cir. 1995); Shuman v. Penn

Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). Section 1983 “does not confer any

substantive rights, but merely ‘provides a method for vindicating federal rights

elsewhere conferred.” Williams v. Pennsylvania Hum. Relations Comm’n, 870 F.3d

294, 297 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (8d

Cir. 2014)).

Swafford alleges that an unnamed staff member at CCCF (not Greenfield or

Fair) gave his apartment keys to an unauthorized third party. ECF No. 38, §1.

Without explanation, he further alleges that this action left him homeless and living

ina homeless shelter. Jd., 42. As a threshold matter, these allegations fail to support

the deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution or other federal law. See

Spencer v. Bush, 543 Fed. Appx. 209, 213 (8d Cir. 2013) (“[A]n unauthorized

intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation

of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.”

(quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984))); Shakur v. Coelho, 421 Fed.

Appx. 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (explaining that the Pennsylvania Tort

Claims Act provides an adequate remedy for a willful deprivation of property).

Because Swafford has a state law remedy for his lost property under state conversion

or replevin law or the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act, any Fourteenth Amendment

due process claim is foreclosed.?

Furthermore, Swafford’s allegations at best support an inference that an

unnamed prison staff member negligently or intentionally released his apartment

keys. Such conduct does not support a violation of the Constitution under any

substantive theory. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (negligence of

federal agents resulting in property loss to plaintiff not constitutional deprivation).

Any potential constitutional claim also fails because the causal connection between

the alleged unauthorized release of Swafford’s keys and his later homelessness 1s too

attenuated to support a viable claim under any federal theory of liability. See e.g.,

Bad. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (plaintiff

must show that the defendant “through its deliberate conduct... was ‘moving force’

behind injury alleged”); Woods v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., No. CV 24-0058, 2026

WL 883810, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2026) (“Allegations fail the ‘fairly direct’ element

if they are ‘too attenuated’ to show a ‘direct causal connection’ between the action and

the harm.”).

In addition to failing to support a deprivation of a right secured under federal

law, the second Amended Complaint also fails to support the personal involvement of

Greenfield or Fair. Under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts to demonstrate the

2 To the extent Swafford may have a claim under Pennsylvania state law, the Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over such claim.

personal involvement of each named defendant in the alleged constitutional

deprivation. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988); see also

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). The facts alleged must show that each

defendant's own conduct—not the conduct of others—caused or contributed to the

constitutional harm. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. A supervisor’s liability under § 1983

cannot be based on his title or position alone. S.A. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., No.

1:24-CV-00343-SPB-RAL, 2025 WL 4303808, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 2025), report

and recommendation adopted, No. CV 24-348, 2026 WL 465743 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 18,

2026). Although a supervisor's liability may arise from his adoption of a policy that

caused the plaintiffs constitutional harm or his knowledge of and acquiescence in a

subordinate’s misconduct, id., Swafford has alleged no facts to support either theory

of liability against Greenfield or Fair. In fact, his second Amended Complaint

specifically alleges that the unnamed CCCF staff member who released his keys did

so contrary to prison policy and rules.

IV. CONCLUSION

Because Swafford’s second Amended Complaint fails to allege facts to support

a violation of the Constitution or other federal law or the personal involvement of

either Defendant, the Court will grant Defendants Greenfield and Fair’s motion to

dismiss (ECF No. 41). Furthermore, based on his repeated failure to allege a viable

claim against Greenfield and Fair, his acknowledgment that neither participated in

the unauthorized release of his apartment keys, and because the facts alleged and his

submissions demonstrate that any further attempt to amend his pleading to state a

claim would be futile, the Court will dismiss this action with prejudice. A separate

order will follow.

Dated this 4th day of August, 2026.

BY THE COURT:

RICHARD A. LANZILLO C

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE