VALDIVIA

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ROSA VALDIVIA,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 25-3901 (GC) (JBD)

v.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

GLADIBEL MEDINA, et al.,

Defendants.

CASTNER, District Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon pro se Plaintiff Rosa Valdivia’s revised

Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (IFP). (ECF No. 16.) For the reasons set forth below,

and other good cause shown, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 4) is DISMISSED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint and IFP Application on May 6, 2025.

(ECF Nos. 1, 2.) On May 18, 2025, Plaintiff submitted an Amended Complaint, which is the

operative pleading before the Court.1 (ECF No. 4.) The Court denied Plaintiff’s initial IFP

Application as incomplete on August 28, 2025, (ECF No. 14), and Plaintiff submitted an amended

IFP Application on September 12, 2025, (ECF No. 16).

1 The Court notes that Plaintiff has filed several additional documents on the docket. (See,

e.g., ECF Nos. 9-13, 15.) However, Plaintiff does not state how these filings relate to the claims

asserted in the Amended Complaint or if they are intended to supplement the Amended Complaint.

Construing them liberally, they do not appear to clarify the factual basis of Plaintiff’s asserted

claims.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint includes seven paragraphs of facts purporting to assert

various claims against Defendants Dr. Gladibel Medina, Saint Peter’s University Hospital, the

Dorothy B. Hersh Child Protection Center, the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and

Permanency (DCPP), DCPP official Annemarie Mueller, prosecutor Dana Morton, Elizabeth

Gutierrez, and John Does 1-10. (ECF No. 4 at 4-5.) Plaintiff states that, on or about August 25,

2020, Dr. Medina conducted a “forensic child abuse evaluation” of Plaintiff’s minor child without

obtaining lawful joint parental consent and prepared a report accordingly. (Id. at 3-4.) Plaintiff

alleges that Dr. Medina’s report relied solely on “partial” information provided by DCPP and failed

to include exculpatory family history, domestic violence orders, and certain differential diagnoses.

(Id.) Plaintiff also contends that she was “denied [Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)]

accommodations during these proceedings despite prior documentation and repeated requests.”

(Id.) She further alleges that her “pro se rights were systematically denied or obstructed by State

actors” and that prior records from DCPP investigations conducted in 2017 were “reopened and

weaponized” against her. (Id. at 4-5.) Because of these events, Plaintiff purportedly suffered

reputational harm, emotional distress, family separation, and economic hardship. (Id. at 4.)

Plaintiff asserts claims under the Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, First

Amendment, Title II of the ADA, Article I of the New Jersey Constitution, and the New Jersey

Civil Rights Act. (Id. at 5.) She seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, declaratory

relief, injunctive relief, costs, interest, and other relief the Court deems just and proper. (Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. In Forma Pauperis

To avoid paying the filing fee for a civil case in this district, a litigant may apply to proceed

in forma pauperis. In considering applications to proceed IFP, the Court engages in a two-step

analysis. Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990). A court need not complete each

step, nor must a court complete these steps in a specific order. See Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 655,

660 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[A] court has the authority to dismiss a case ‘at any time,’ 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2), regardless of the status of a filing fee; that is, a court has the discretion to consider the

merits of a case and evaluate an IFP application in either order or even simultaneously.”).

First, the Court determines whether the plaintiff is eligible to proceed under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a). Id. Under section 1915(a), a plaintiff’s application must “state the facts concerning his

or her poverty with some degree of particularity, definiteness or certainty.” Simon v. Mercer Cnty.

Comm. Coll., Civ. No. 10-5505, 2011 WL 551196, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb 9, 2011) (citing United States

ex rel. Roberts v. Pennsylvania, 312 F. Supp. 1, 2 (E.D. Pa. 1969)).

Second, the Court determines whether the Complaint should be dismissed as frivolous or

for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); Green v. Izod Corp. Office & Head-Quarters,

Civ. No. 22-06380, 2024 WL 1809859, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2024) (citing Deutsch v. United

States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1084 (3d Cir. 1995)) (“To guard against potential ‘abuse’ of ‘cost-free access

to the federal courts,’ 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) empowers district courts to dismiss an IFP complaint

if, among other things, the action is frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to comply with the proper

pleading standards.”). “The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure [(‘Rule’)] 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120,

122 (3d Cir. 2012).

“[A] court may dismiss an in forma pauperis claim as frivolous if, after considering the

contending equities, the court determines that the claim is: (1) of little or no weight, value, or

importance; (2) not worthy of serious attention; or (3) trivial.” Deutsch, 67 F.3d at 1082.

B. Rule 12(b)(6) – Failure to State a Claim

Although courts construe pro se pleadings less stringently than formal pleadings drafted by

attorneys, pro se litigants are still required to “allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support

a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind

Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “[A] pleading

that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

C. Rule 8 – Pleading Requirements

Rule 8 sets forth general rules of pleading requirements and requires (1) “a short and plain

statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,” (2) “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and (3) allegations that are “simple, concise, and

direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (a)(2), (d)(1). The allegations in the complaint must not be “so

undeveloped that [they do] not provide a defendant the type of notice of claim which is

contemplated by Rule 8.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). Even

pro se litigants must “comply with the basic pleading requirements of Rule 8(a).” Purisima v. City

of Philadelphia, 738 F. App’x 106, 107 (3d Cir. 2018).

III. DISCUSSION

The Court exercises its discretion to review the merits of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

before it decides whether to grant the IFP application. Brown, 941 F.3d at 660; see also Schwager

v. Norristown State Hosp., Civ. No. 23-3866, 2023 WL 8458236, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2023)

(screening the complaint before addressing the IFP application).

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted. First, Plaintiff engages in impermissible group pleading. A group pleading “is a

complaint that ‘fails to specify which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions,

or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.’” Foulke v. Twp. of Chery Hill, Civ. No.

23-02543, 2024 WL 3568841, at *7 (D.N.J. July 29, 2024) (quoting Morales v. New Jersey, Civ.

No. 21-11548, 2023 WL 5003891, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2023)); see also Innovative Cosm.

Concepts, LLC v. Brown Packaging, Inc., Civ. No. 18-5939, 2020 WL 7048577, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr.

28, 2020) (describing group pleadings as those in which “it is ‘virtually impossible to know which

allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief’”).

Here, Plaintiff asserts claims against “Defendants” broadly but does not attribute specific

conduct to any Defendant except for Dr. Medina. (See ECF No. 4 at 4-5.) As a result, the Court

cannot determine which of Plaintiff’s factual allegations support which claims for relief against

which Defendants. This fails to satisfy Rule 8, and therefore Plaintiff fails to state a claim against

Saint Peter’s University Hospital, Dorothy B. Hersh Child Protection Center, DCPP, Annemarie

Mueller, Dana Morton, and Elizabeth Gutierrez. See Shine v. County of Montgomery, Civ. No. 23-

1952, 2023 WL 7190480, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2023) (“[A] pro se complaint must conform with

the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which ‘demands more than

an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation’ or ‘naked assertions’ that are

devoid of ‘factual enhancement’”).

Second, Plaintiff’s factual allegations as to Dr. Medina fail to state a claim. The extent of

Plaintiff’s allegations about Dr. Medina are as follows:

On or about August 25, 2020, Dr. Medina conducted a forensic

evaluation of Plaintiff’s minor child without obtaining lawful, joint

parental consent, in violation of N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 and related

standards. Dr. Medina’s report failed to include relevant differential

diagnoses, including BECC/BESS findings. She relied solely on

partial DCPP submissions and omitted exculpatory family history

and DV orders.

(ECF No. 4 at 4.)2 Even drawing all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor as the Court must, the Court

cannot discern a viable claim against Dr. Medina from these allegations. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“provides private citizens with a means to redress violations of federal law” committed by state

actors. Woodyard v. County of Essex, 514 F. App’x 177, 180 (3d Cir. 2013). “[T]he basic cause

of action requires that a § 1983 plaintiff prove two essential elements: (1) that the conduct

complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct

deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States.” Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2011).

2 The Court also notes that Plaintiff alleges the forensic evaluation underlying her

constitutional claims occurred on or about August 25, 2020. (ECF No. 4 at 4.) Claims brought

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act are subject to New Jersey’s two-year

statute of limitations on personal injury actions and thus may be time-barred. See Dique v. N.J.

State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010).

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that Dr. Medina was acting under color of state law, and

therefore any claim against Dr. Medina pursuant to section 1983 must fail.3 See Am. Mfrs. Mut.

Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (“[The] under-color-of-state-law element of Section

1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.”

(citation modified)); Amig v. County of Juniata, 432 F. Supp. 3d 481, 486 (M.D. Pa. 2020)

(“Generally, § 1983 mandates that claims may only be brought against state actors, not private

entities.”). Moreover, Plaintiff does not state how Dr. Medina purportedly deprived Plaintiff of

her constitutional rights.4 (See ECF No. 4 at 4-5.) The Court infers that Plaintiff alleges that Dr.

Medina violated her Fourth Amendment rights by “orchestrating an unauthorized medical seizure

of her child.” (Id. at 4.) But even assuming Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to support this claim,

a Fourth Amendment child-seizure claim “belongs only to the child, not to the parent, although a

parent has standing to assert it on the child’s behalf.” Voorhis v. Digangi, Civ. No. 23-66, 2024

WL 4479831, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2024) (citation modified). There is no indication here that

Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of any child, and even if Plaintiff did purport to do so, a non-

attorney parent “must be represented by counsel in bringing an action on behalf of his or her child.”

Osei-Afriyie ex rel. Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1991). Because

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, she cannot pursue a Fourth Amendment child-seizure claim on behalf

of her minor child against Dr. Medina.

3 Similarly, Title II of the ADA authorizes suits only against public entities, not individuals.

See Matthews v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 613 F. App’x 163, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2015).

4 Although Plaintiff also asserts First Amendment and Title II ADA claims against

Defendants broadly, the Amended Complaint alleges no facts from which the Court could

reasonably infer either claim as to Dr. Medina.

The Court further infers from Plaintiff’s assertions that Plaintiff brings a Fourteenth

Amendment claim against Dr. Medina because Dr. Medina allegedly used “biased expert reports”

and “suppress[ed] exculpatory evidence” in the preparation of her forensic evaluation report. (ECF

No. 4 at 5.) But to state a claim for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that (1) she was deprived of an individual interest included within the Fourteenth

Amendment’s protection of “life, liberty, or property,” and (2) the procedures available to her did

not provide “due process of law.” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir.

2006) (quoting Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)). Plaintiff alleges only that Dr.

Medina’s purportedly biased report deprived Plaintiff of “life, liberty, and property” without due

process. (ECF No. 4 at 5.) This is a mere recitation of the elements of a procedural due process

claim and is insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Battle v. Marchese, Civ. No. 23-666,

2025 WL 1710538, at *7 (M.D. Pa. May 27, 2025) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (stating that a

procedural due process claim requires “a specific identification of the interest [the p]laintiff was

deprived of,” rather than “just a generic statement that [she] was deprived of an interest”).

Because Plaintiff fails to state a federal claim over which this Court has original

jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction at this early stage over

Plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims. See Obuskovic v. Wood, 761 F. App’x 144, 148-49 (3d Cir.

2019) (“[The Court] has discretion to ‘decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim

. . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.’”

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3))); Francisco v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., Civ. No. 23-22775, 2024 WL

4117394, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2024) (“[T]he district court must decline to decide the pendent

state law claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties

provide an affirmative justification for doing so.”).

IV. ORDER

For the reasons a above, and other good cause shown,

IT IS on this day of July, 2026 ORDERED as follows:

1. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (ECF No. 4) is DISMISSED without prejudice,

2. The Clerk’s Office is directed to mail Plaintiff a copy of this Memorandum Order

and CLOSE this case.

3. Plaintiff may have this case reopened if, within thirty (30) days of the date of the

entry of this Memorandum Order, Plaintiff files an amended complaint that cures

the deficiencies set forth herein. Failure to file an amended complaint within that

time will render the dismissal with prejudice or final. See Hoffman v. Nordic Nats.,

Ine,, 837 F.3d 272, 279 (3d Cir, 2016) (When that 30-day period expired, the

District Court’s decision became final.”),

U UF kp States DISTRICT JUDGE