The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
)
BENJAMIN STEWART, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
)
v. ) No. 2:22-cv-02431-SHM/atc
)
FARNHAM FIBER OPTICS, LLC, )
AND STEVEN C. FARNHAM, )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Before the Court is Plaintiff Benjamin Stewart’s Motion
for Default Judgment (the "Motion”). (ECF No. 51). For the
reasons that follow, the Motion is GRANTED.
I. Background
On July 1, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against
Defendant Farnham Fiber Optics, LLC (“Farnham Fiber Optics”)
and Defendant Steven Farnham (“Farnham”) alleging unpaid wages
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq.
(the “FLSA”). (ECF No. 1.)
Defendants were properly served on July 19, 2022, and July
22, 2022. (ECF Nos. 7-8.) Defendants were initially represented
and filed a joint Answer and Counterclaim on March 3, 2023.
(ECF No. 24.) Counsel for Defendants withdrew on May 8, 2023.
(ECF Nos. 30, 31.) Defendant Steven Farnham elected to proceed
pro se. (ECF No. 34.) Defendant Farnham Fiber Optics, LLC has
not retained new counsel. (Id.)
On July 14, 2023, Plaintiff served discovery requests on
Defendants. (ECF No. 40.) On February 5, 2024, after Defendants
had failed to respond, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel,
which was referred to the Magistrate Judge. (ECF Nos. 41-42.)
On March 6, 2024, the Magistrate Judge entered an Order to Show
Cause, ordering Defendants to respond to Plaintiff’s discovery
requests and the Motion to Compel by March 30, 2024. (ECF No.
44.) Defendants did not respond. On May 7, 2024, the Magistrate
Judge granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, requiring
Defendants to respond to Plaintiff’s discovery requests by May
21, 2024. (ECF No. 45.) Defendants again failed to respond. On
May 29, 2024, the Court held a status conference. (ECF No. 47.)
Only Plaintiff’s counsel appeared. (Id.)
On June 12, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Entry of
Default against Defendants. (ECF No. 48.) On August 14, 2025,
the Court granted the Motion and entered default against
Defendants for failure to “otherwise defend” the case. (ECF No.
49.)
On September 29, 2025, the Court entered an order
administratively closing the case, without prejudice to any
party to move to reopen. (ECF No. 50.)
On October 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for
Default Judgment. (ECF No. 51.) In his Motion, Plaintiff seeks
an entry of default judgment against Defendants and an award of
unpaid wages, liquidated damages, and attorney’s fees and
costs. (ECF No. 51 at 16.) The Motion is unopposed.
II. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 governs default and
default judgments. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. After the Clerk of Court
enters default against a defendant pursuant to Federal Rule
55(a), a plaintiff may seek default judgment against that
defendant pursuant to Federal Rule 55(b). Fed. R. Civ. P.
55(b). On entry of default by the Clerk, the defendant is
deemed to have admitted all well-pleaded factual allegations in
the complaint addressing liability. Long v. Morgan, 451 F.
Supp. 3d 830, 832–33 (M.D. Tenn. 2020) (citing In re Family
Resorts of America, Inc., 1992 WL 174539, 972 F.2d 347, at *4
(6th Cir. July 24, 1992) (table)). Allegations about damages or
stating legal conclusions are not deemed admitted. HICA Educ.
Loan Corp. v. Lackie, No. 11–2894, 2013 WL 633216, at *2 (W.D.
Tenn. Feb. 20, 2013) (citations omitted).
A plaintiff seeking a default judgment must meet several
procedural obligations. Hames v. SunTrust Bank, No. 2:18-cv-
02121-SHM-cgc, 2019 WL 4248892, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 6,
2019) (citing Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Marler, No. 1:09-cv-193,
2009 WL 3785878, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 12, 2009)). The
plaintiff must: (1) properly serve the defendant with process;
(2) seek entry of default by demonstrating that the defendant
has failed to answer the complaint or otherwise defend the
action; (3) submit an affidavit stating that the defendant is
not a minor or an incompetent person; (4) submit an affidavit
stating whether the defendant is in military service, or that
plaintiff is unable to determine whether the defendant is in
military service;1 and (5) serve the defendant with notice of
the motion for default judgment if the defendant has entered an
appearance. Hames, 2019 WL 4248892, at *2 (citing Marler, 2009
WL 3785878, at *4).
A defendant’s default and a plaintiff’s satisfaction of
the procedural requirements do not automatically entitle a
plaintiff to a default judgment. See Kwik–Sew Pattern Co. v.
Gendron, No. 1:08-cv-309, 2008 WL 4960159, at *1 (W.D. Mich.
Nov. 19, 2008) (citations omitted). “In order to rule upon
plaintiff’s motion, the Court must determine whether the
factual allegations in the complaint deemed admitted by
defendant’s default . . . are sufficient to satisfy the
elements of [plaintiff’s] legal claims for which [plaintiff]
seek[s] default judgment.” Harbold v. Smash Restro & Bar, LLC,
1 The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (the “SCRA”), 50 U.S.C. §
3931(b)(1).
No. 5:22-cv-1583, 2023 WL 4085309, at *2 (N.D. Ohio June 20,
2023) (citing Zinganything, LLC v. Imp. Store, 158 F. Supp. 3d
668, 672 (N.D. Ohio 2016)). “[A] court may not enter default
judgment upon a legally insufficient claim.” Kwik–Sew, 2008 WL
4960159, at *1 (citations omitted).
If a plaintiff satisfies the procedural requirements for
default judgment and the complaint states a claim for relief, a
court may, at its discretion, enter default judgment. See
Sream, Inc. v. Kanku Express #21, No. 1:20-cv-00209-DCLC-SKL,
2022 WL 989406, at **1-2 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 16, 2022). After
entering default judgment on liability, the court conducts an
inquiry to determine damages. Lackie, 2013 WL 633216, at *2
(citing Coach, Inc. v. Cellular Planet, No. 2:09–cv–00241, 2010
WL 1853424, at *3 (S.D. Ohio May 7, 2010)). Because allegations
about damages are not accepted as true, “the party moving for a
default judgment must present some evidence of its damages.”
Mill's Pride, L.P. v. W.D. Miller Enters., LLC, No. 2:07–cv–
990, 2010 WL 987167, at * 1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 12, 2010) (citation
omitted). Rule 55(b)(2) permits the court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of damages at its
discretion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). However,“[a] court may
reach a reasonable certainty on the correct amount of damages
from the record without conducting a hearing.” Spring Sols.,
Inc. v. LaFayette, No. 2:15-cv-2595-SHM-cgc, 2018 WL 3097027,
at *5 (W.D. Tenn. June 22, 2018) (citing Vesligaj v. Peterson,
331 F. App’x. 351, 355 (6th Cir. 2009)).
III. Analysis
A. Procedural Requirements
Plaintiff has met the procedural requirements for a
default judgment against Defendant Farnham Fiber Optics and
Defendant Farnham.
Plaintiff properly served Defendants with process. (ECF
Nos. 7-8.) Plaintiff also served the instant Motion on
Defendants as required by Rule 55(b)(2) given that both
Defendants have made an appearance in the case. (ECF No. 51 at
18.) See Simpson v. VSP North America, LLC, No., 1:16-cv-00912,
2019 WL 1239802, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Jan 25, 2019).
Before moving for default judgment, Plaintiff obtained an
entry of default against both Defendants, demonstrating that
Defendants had “failed to . . . otherwise defend” this action
by failing to respond to discovery requests, comply with court
orders, and retain counsel for Defendant corporation, Farnham
Fiber Optics. (ECF Nos. 48-49.)
Plaintiff has not submitted an affidavit stating that
Defendants are not minors, incompetent persons, or in military
service. However, that deficiency is not fatal to Plaintiff’s
motion for default judgment against either Defendant.
“As a business entity, [Farnham Fiber Optics, LLC] is not
a minor, incompetent person, or subject to the Soldiers and
Sailors Relief Act of 1940.” See Tr. of Bricklayers and Masons’
Local Union No. 5, Ohio Pension Fund v. United Masonry
Construction, Co., LLC, No. 5:22-cv-406, 2022 WL 4119811, at *2
(N.D. Ohio Sept. 9, 2022) (citing Zinganything, 2016 WL 362359,
at *2); Sream, 2022 WL 989406, at *2 (“[E]ach of the Defendants
is either an incorporated entity or an LLC . . . and therefore
none of the Defendants is an infant, incompetent person, or a
member of the armed forces.”)
Because Defendant Farnham is a natural person, “entry of
default against him requires some evidence that [Defendant] is
not a minor or incompetent, or otherwise protected from the
entry of default judgment against him.” See Zinganything, 2016
WL 362359, at *2. Here, based on Defendant Farnham’s appearance
in this matter and the admitted factual allegations in the
Complaint, there is evidence that Defendant, as owner and
general manager of Farnham Fiber Optics, is a competent adult.
See Harbold, 2023 WL 4085309, at *3 (“[T]here is nothing in the
record to support a finding that [Defendant] is incompetent,
subject to the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Relief Act of 1940, or
otherwise incapable of being sued in federal court.”); United
States v. Owens, No. 13-02984-SHM, 2017 WL 1058391, at *7 n.7
(W.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2017) (“There is no evidence that
[Defendant] is a minor or an incompetent person. The Court need
not consider that aspect of Rule 55(b)(2).”). Also, because
Defendant has appeared in this matter, the SCRA does not apply.
See 50 U.S.C. § 3931(a) (“This section applies to any civil
action or proceeding . . . in which the defendant does not make
an appearance.”)
Plaintiff has satisfied the procedural requirements for
default judgment against Defendant Farnham Fiber Optics and
Defendant Farnham.
B. Liability
Because default has been entered against Defendant Farnham
Fiber Optics and Defendant Farnham, Defendants are deemed to
have admitted the factual allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint.
The admitted allegations are sufficient to satisfy the elements
of Plaintiff's claim of an FLSA overtime violation. Harbold,
2023 WL 4085309, at *2 (citation omitted).
The FLSA requires employers who are subject to its
provisions to pay non-exempt employees overtime pay at a rate
of one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate for all
hours worked in excess of forty in a work week.2 29 U.S.C. §
207(a)(1).
2 “The employer has the burden of proving that an employee satisfies
any exemptions under the FLSA [29 U.S.C. § 213], and exemptions
under the FLSA are narrowly construed against the employer.” Elwell
An entity that “has employees engaged in commerce” and has
an annual gross volume of sales of not less than $500,000 is
defined as an “enterprise engaged in commerce” and is subject
to the FLSA’s overtime provisions. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Under
the FLSA, an “employee” is “any individual employed by an
employer” and an “employer” is “any person acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee” 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d)-(e)(1). The Sixth Circuit employs
an “economic reality” test to determine whether an individual
is an “employee” and a person or entity is an “employer” within
the meaning of the FLSA. See Keller v. Miri Microsystems, LLC,
781 F.3d 799, 807 (6th Cir. 2015) (“‘[E]mployees are those who
as a matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business
to which they render service.’”)3(quoting Donovan v. Brandel,
736 F.2d 1114, 1116 (6th Cir. 1984)); Becker v. Sam
Gildersleeve & Son Plumbing, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-2359, 2021 WL
4348260, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 24, 2021) (holding that, as a
v. Univ. Hosps. Home Care Servs., 276 F.3d 832, 837 (6th Cir. 2002)
(citation omitted).
3 In applying the economic reality test to determine whether an
individual is an employee, courts consider six factors: “1) the
permanency of the relationship between the parties; 2) the degree of
skill required for the rendering of the services; 3) the worker's
investment in equipment or materials for the task; 4) the worker's
opportunity for profit or loss, depending upon his skill; . . . 5)
the degree of the alleged employer's right to control the manner in
which the work is performed; and 6) whether the service rendered is
an integral part of the alleged employer's business.” Keller, 781
F.3d at 807 (citation and internal brackets omitted).
matter of “economic reality,” one who “controls significant
functions of the business, and determines salaries and makes
hiring decisions . . . qualifies as an ‘employer’ for the
purposes of FLSA”) (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants hired him to work
as a fiber splicer, responsible for joining together fiber
optic cables to expand Farnham Fiber Optics’ telecommunications
networks into new areas or to replace existing lines. (ECF No.
1 ¶¶ 13, 20, 22.) Plaintiff alleges that, while he was employed
by Defendants, from January 2022 to March 2022, he regularly
worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week but was always
paid the same flat weekly salary regardless of the number of
hours he worked. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21, 31-32.)
Plaintiff also alleges that, during the relevant period,
Farnham Fiber Optics had employees engaged in commerce and had
an annual gross volume of sales in excess of $500,000. (Id. ¶¶
6-7.) Plaintiff alleges that Farnham Fiber Optics, through its
owner, general manager, and/or primary decision maker Defendant
Farnham, determined Plaintiff’s wages, created Plaintiff’s
schedules, and approved Plaintiff’s hours and days off. (Id. ¶
17.) Plaintiff alleges that he did not exercise discretion or
independent judgment in performing his job duties and that he
was required to use equipment owned and supplied by Defendants.
(Id. ¶¶ 26, 28.)
Based on the allegations in the Complaint, that the Court
accepts as true by virtue of Defendants’ default, the Court
finds that Defendant Farnham Fiber Optics is, or was in the
relevant period, an enterprise engaged in commerce subject to
the FLSA’s overtime provisions for non-exempt employees. See,
e.g., Sanders v. SQU Mahadev, LLC, No. 2:23-cv-2165-SHL-cgc,
2024 WL 3554883, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. July 26, 2024). The Court
also finds that Plaintiff was a non-exempt employee of
Defendants and that Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff overtime
pay. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 22-27.) The allegations in Plaintiff’s
Complaint are sufficient to establish Defendants’ liability for
an overtime violation of the FLSA.4
Because Plaintiff has stated a valid cause of action under
the FLSA, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Default
Judgment against Defendant Farnham Fiber Optics and Defendant
Farnham.
C. Damages
Plaintiff seeks to recover unpaid wages and liquidated
damages on his FLSA claim for unpaid overtime. Under the FLSA,
4 Plaintiff sues both Defendants as joint employers for the same FLSA
overtime claim. Under the FLSA, liability between multiple employers
is joint and several. See, e.g., Fegley v. Higgins, 19 F.3d 1126,
1131 (6th Cir. 1994) (“‘The overwhelming weight of authority is that
a corporate officer with operational control of a corporation's
covered enterprise is an employer along with the corporation,
jointly and severally liable under the FLSA for unpaid wages.’”)
(quoting Dole v. Elliott Travel & Tours, Inc., 942 F.2d 962, 965
(6th Cir. 1991)).
an employer “shall be liable to the employee or employees
affected in the amount of . . . their unpaid overtime
compensation . . . and in an additional equal amount as
liquidated damages.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
Plaintiff cannot rely on the allegations in his Complaint
to establish damages, but must provide evidence. Mill's Pride,
2010 WL 987167, at * 1. In support of his claim for damages,
Plaintiff provides two sworn declarations: his own and that of
Plaintiff’s counsel, Gordon Van Remmen. (ECF Nos. 51-1, 51-2.)
1. Unpaid Wages
Plaintiff seeks to recover $5,500 in unpaid overtime
wages. In his Declaration, Plaintiff attests that in the
twenty-two (22) weeks he was employed by Defendant, between
January 2022 and May 2022, he worked an average of 50 hours per
week. (ECF No. 51-2 at 3.) Plaintiff attests that he was paid
a flat weekly salary of $2,500 regardless of hours worked, for
a realized regular rate of $50.00 per hour and an overtime rate
of $75.00 per hour.5 (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff further attests
that he was only paid his regular rate of $50.00 per hour for
ten (10) hours per week for twenty-two (22) weeks. (Id. at 3-
4.) Plaintiff’s counsel computes that Plaintiff suffered wage
5 The realized regular rate is calculated by dividing the weekly
salary, here $2,500, by the hours worked per week, here 50 hours.
damages of $250.00 per week in unpaid overtime wages for
twenty-two (22) weeks for a total of $5,500 in unpaid wages.
(ECF No. 51-1 at 2.)
Plaintiff provides no other evidence to substantiate his
hours worked and rate of pay, but he need not, and, in this
instance, could not. “The most common method of proof of
undercompensation is discovery and analysis of the employer’s
records.” Keller, 781 F.3d at 816 (citation omitted); see
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946)
(“[I]t is the employer who has the duty under § 11(c) of the
[FLSA] to keep proper records of wages [and] hours[.]”). Where
employer records are inadequate or not forthcoming, a
plaintiff’s testimony is sufficient to establish FLSA damages.
See Long, 451 F. Supp. 3d at 833–34 (plaintiffs’ declarations
and damage calculations sufficient to determine amount of
damages for unpaid wages in default judgment); D.W. by Brown v.
Bay Water, LLC, No. 1:24-cv-82-TAV-CHS, 2025 WL 1713561, at
**2-3 (E.D. Tenn. June 18, 2025) (plaintiff’s declaration
attesting to hours worked and rate of pay sufficient to
establish damages for unpaid wages in default judgment).
Here, Defendants have not cooperated with discovery
seeking production of wage records. (ECF No. 41.) Absent those
records, Plaintiff’s declaration is sufficient to establish his
entitlement to overtime compensation in the amount of $5,500
without an evidentiary hearing. See Hames, 2019 WL 4248892, at
*3 (“A sworn, uncontested affidavit may serve as sufficient
evidence of damages for default judgment.”) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff is entitled to $5,500 in unpaid overtime wages.
2. Liquidated Damages
Plaintiff also seeks liquidated damages in the amount of
$5,500, an amount equal to his claim for unpaid overtime
compensation. Unless an employer demonstrates “to the
satisfaction of the court” that the act or omission resulting
in the FLSA violation was in good faith, a court “has no power
or discretion to reduce an employer’s liability for the
equivalent of double unpaid wages” in liquidated damages.
Harbold, 2023 WL 4085309, at *4 (quoting Elwell, 276 F.3d at
840). The burden on the employer to demonstrate good faith “is
substantial.” Elwell, 276 F.3d at 840.
Here, Defendants have merely asserted as one of the many
boilerplate affirmative defenses in their Answer to the
Complaint6 that they “acted in good faith in the operation of
its business and had reasonable grounds to believe it did not
6 For example, among affirmative defenses asserted in Defendants’
Answer is a statute of limitations defense that does not apply to
this case. (ECF No. 24 at 12.) The FLSA requires that claims for
unpaid overtime be filed within two years from the date the
violation occurred. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Plaintiff alleges that he
was not paid for overtime during the period of January 2022 to March
2022. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff filed his Complaint for this
overtime violation on July 1, 2022, well within the statutory
period. (ECF No. 1.)
violate the FLSA in such operations.” (ECF No. 24 at 13.) That
blanket assertion is insufficient to carry Defendants’
substantial burden of demonstrating they acted in good faith.
See Dole, 942 F.2d at 968 (“The only proof of good faith and
reasonableness offered by defendants is the bare assertion in
[an] affidavit that at all times they have ‘acted in good faith
in an effort to comply with the Act.’”) Plaintiff is entitled
to $5,500 in liquidated damages, equal to the amount of unpaid
overtime he is owed under the FLSA.
D. Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Plaintiff also seeks an award of attorney’s fees and
costs. The FLSA provides that “[t]he court . . . shall . . .
allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant,
and costs of the action.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). “As the Sixth
Circuit has noted, the award of a reasonable attorney's fee to
a prevailing plaintiff is mandatory under the Act.” Jackson v.
True Install, LLC, No. 1:20-cv-02256-STA-jay, 2021 WL 6751886,
at *2 (W.D. Tenn. June 1, 2021) (citing Rembert v. A Plus Home
Health Care Agency, LLC, 986 F.3d 613, 616 (6th Cir. 2021)).
To determine reasonable attorney’s fees, a court
calculates “the fee applicant’s lodestar, which is the proven
number of hours reasonably expended on the case by an attorney,
multiplied by [the] court-ascertained reasonable hourly rate.”7
Hubbell v. FedEx SmartPost, Inc., 933 F.3d 558, 575 (6th Cir.
2019) (quoting Waldo v. Consumers Energy Co., 726 F.3d 802, 821
(6th Cir. 2013)).
The party seeking attorney’s fees bears the burden of
substantiating the hours worked and the rates sought. See Ne.
Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 831 F.3d 686, 702 (6th
Cir. 2016). “In this district, the Local Rules require parties
to submit an affidavit or declaration of counsel detailing the
number of hours spent on each aspect of the case and an
affidavit or declaration from another attorney in the
community, who is not otherwise involved in the case, setting
out the prevailing rate in the community for similar services.”
Mid-America Apartment Cmty.’s v. Philipson, No. 2:23-cv-02186-
SHL-cgc, 2024 WL 4654452, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 1, 2024)
(citing Local Rule 54.1(b)(1)-(2)).
To support his request for attorney’s fees and costs,
Plaintiff provides the declaration of his counsel, Gordon Van
Remmen, and contemporaneous billable time records detailing the
number of hours spent on the case by the two attorneys on the
7 A court may enhance or decrease the lodestar amount based on the
factors in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express in “rare” and
“exceptional” circumstances. Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559
U.S. 542, 543 (2010); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Exp., Inc., 488
F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974)).
case, Van Remmen and Andrew Lampros. (ECF No. 51-1.) According
to Van Remmen’s Declaration, Plaintiff seeks a lodestar figure
of $30,330.00. (Id. at 4.) That figure is based on an hourly
rate of $525 for Andrew Lampros for 5.2 hours, and $400 an hour
for Gordon Van Remmen for sixty-nine (69) hours. (Id. at 6, 9,
11.) Van Remmen attests that the hourly rates charged are
“consistent with the rates in the local market.” (Id. at 6.)
Van Remmen further attests that his firm incurred $651.00 in
litigation expenses. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff requests a total
award of $30,981 for attorney’s fees and costs.
Plaintiff’s fee request is reasonable. On review of the
billing records of Plaintiff’s counsel, the Court finds that
the hours spent on each aspect of the case were reasonable. See
Rembert, 986 F.3d at 618.
The rates sought are also reasonable. Although Plaintiff
has not provided the affidavit of another attorney in the
community attesting to the prevailing rate in the community for
similar services, a second affidavit is not required in this
instance. See Van Horn v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 436
F. App'x 496, 499 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted) (“When
determining a reasonable hourly rate . . . [a] district court
may rely on . . . awards in analogous cases . . . and its own
knowledge and experience in handling similar fee requests.”)
The Court is familiar with the prevailing hourly rates in this
district from other cases before this Court and other District
Judges in the Western District of Tennessee. See Pristex Med.,
LLC v. Luxurypak Prods., LLC, No. 2:21-cv-2140-MSN-cgc, 2025 WL
390551, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 31, 2025). Based on other awards
and the Court's own knowledge and experience handling similar
fee requests, the Court finds that the stated hourly rates of
$525 for Lampros and $400 for Van Remmen are reasonable. See,
e.g., Mosby v. Reaves Law Firm, PLLC, No. 2:23-cv-02009-SHM-
tmp, 2025 WL 2988466 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 23, 2025) ($500);
Pristex, 2025 WL 390551, at *2 ($450); Harper v. Shelby Cnty,
No. 2:21-cv-2300-MSN-tmp, ECF No. 85 (W.D. Tenn. July 1, 2025)
($400); Edwards v. Shelby Cnty., No. No. 22-cv-2682-TMP, 2026
WL 823308, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 25, 2026) (“[T]his court has
approved hourly rates ranging from $300 to $500 per hour in
employment cases” brought under the FLSA.).
IV. Conclusion
The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment.
The Court AWARDS Plaintiff $11,000 in unpaid overtime
compensation and liquidated damages and $30,981 for attorney's
fees and costs.
SO ORDERED this 6th day of August, 2026.
/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.Saays, Jr.
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE