Opinion

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

GS HOLISTIC, LLC,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 3:23-cv-317

V.

Judge Walter H. Rice

POR ENTER., INC., et a/.,

Defendants. :

a

ORDER SUSTAINING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANTS

POR ENTERPRISE, INC. AND MAHMOUD WAHDAN (DOC. #66), AND

OVERRULING AS MOOT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF

THE COURT'S MAY 26, 2026, ORDER (DOC. #62); JUDGMENT SHALL ENTER IN

FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS AND AGAINST PLAINTIFF GS HOLISTIC, LLC;

TERMINATION ENTRY

This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment of

Defendants POR Enterprise, Inc. (“POR”) and (“Wahdan”) (Summary Judgment

Motion, Doc. #66), and Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's May

26, 2026, Order. (Motion for Reconsideration, Doc. #62). In the Summary

Judgment Motion, Defendants argue that claims against Mahmoud should be

dismissed with prejudice, because the strict liability imposed for violations of the

Lanham Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. 8 1051 et seq., does not extend to officers of

corporations in their individual capacities absent a finding of willful or intentional

misconduct by those officers, which Plaintiff GS Holistic, LLC, has not been able to

show. (Doc. #66, PAGEID 467-68 (collecting cases)). Defendants claim that,

because Wahdan did not have any knowledge of infringement prior to receiving

notice of the lawsuit, Wahdan cannot be held liable individually simply because

they are owners of M&W. (/d. at PAGEID 478, citing M. Wahdan Decl., Doc. #66-

14, PAGEID 876-77, {| 17).

Defendants further argue that, were this Court to find liability and impose

damages upon M&W, those damages should be limited to the statutory minimum

of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), as Plaintiff's actual damages according to its

expert are $607.85. (Doc. #66, PAGEID 470-77, citing 15 U.S.C. 8 1117(c)(1); P.

Multani Expert Report, Doc. #66-13, PAGEID 820-73). However, Defendants aver

that, of the two waterpipes bearing a counterfeit Stundenglass mark that

Defendants purchased from a wholesaler, one was sold to Plaintiff's investigator,

and “[o]nce [Wahdan] learned about the lawsuit, [he] destroyed the remaining

waterpipe.” (M. Wahdan Decl., Doc. #66-14, PAGEID 875, 876, {| 7, 11). Thus,

Defendants argue, any harm suffered by Plaintiff is speculative. (Doc. #66,

PAGEID 476-77).

Moreover, Defendants note that Plaintiff, as a company, actually operated at

a loss in 2025 and has submitted no evidence that it earned any profit from the

sale of Stundenglass-branded waterpipes. Consequently, Defendants claim, an

award of even nominal damages is improper, since Plaintiff suffered no harm

from any negligent infringement by Defendants of Plaintiff's trademark. (Doc.

#66, PAGEID 477-878, citing Amerstate, /nc. v. Pace Mortg. Corp., No. C-3-89-281,

1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22742, *23 (S.D. Ohio Jun. 10, 1992) (Rice, J.); C. Folkerts.

Dep., Doc. #66-12, PAGEID 706-07)).

On February 6, 2026, the Court issued a Preliminary Pretrial Conference

Order. (Doc. #46). Therein, the Court set a deadline for filing motions for

summary judgment of July 1, 2026, (/a. at PAGEID 411), with which Defendants

complied. (Doc. #66). The Court set a deadline for filing any memorandum contra

such a motion of July 15, 2026. (Doc. #46, PAGEID 411). While a party in this

Court normally has twenty-one days to file a memorandum contra any motion for

summary judgment, S.D. OHIO Civ.R. 7.2(a)(2), the Court, as part of its inherent

authority to manage its docket, has significant discretion to shorten or lengthen

deadlines. See, e.g., Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 47 (2016), citing Landis v. North

Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (“district courts have the inherent authority to

manage their dockets and courtrooms with a view toward the efficient and

expedient resolution of cases.”); McLaurin v. Terminix Int'l Co., L.P., 13 F.4th 1232,

1241 (11th Cir. 2021) (district court’s implementation of scheduling order is

reviewed for abuse of discretion).

This case has been pending for almost three years, and Plaintiff has been

on notice of the expedited briefing schedule for more than five months.

Moreover, Plaintiff demonstrated its awareness of the case deadlines when

counsel for Plaintiff participated in a conference call with the undersigned on June

11, 2026, one day before the discovery cutoff (Doc. #46, PAGEID 411 ), to request to

extend that deadline, which the Court did. (Order, Doc. #65). Accordingly, the

Court’s enforcement of the July 15, 2026, cutoff for filing a memorandum contra is

proper.

“The Sixth Circuit has consistently explained that failure by a party to

respond to a motion for summary judgment constitutes a forfeiture of the claims

to which the motion is addressed.” Navarro v. Procter & Gamble Co., 515 F.

Supp. 3d 718, 775 (S.D. Ohio 2021) (Cole, J.) (alterations and internal quotation

marks omitted); quoting Rogers v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., No. 1:17-cv-383, 2019 WL

1388677, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 6, 2019); citing Notredan, L.L.C. v. Old Republic

Exch. Facilitator Co., 531 Fed. App'x 567, 569 (6th Cir. 2013); see a/so Brown v.

VHS of Mich., Inc., 545 F. App’x 368, 372 (6th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases) (“This

Court’s jurisprudence on abandonment of claims is clear: a plaintiff is deemed to

have abandoned a claim when a plaintiff fails to address it in response to a

motion for summary judgment.”); Humphrey v. United States Atty. Gen.’s Office,

279 F. App’x 328, 331 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted

(“if a plaintiff fails to respond or to otherwise oppose a defendant's motion, then

the district court may deem the plaintiff to have waived opposition to the

motion.”).

As Plaintiff failed to respond at all to Defendants’ Motion, which

encompasses all claims raised against them, Plaintiff has abandoned all claims

against Defendants and forfeited any arguments as to why judgment in favor of

Defendants and against Plaintiff is not appropriate. Moreover, the undisputed

evidence before the Court demonstrates that: Wahdan did not engage in any

intentional, willful, or even reckless infringement of Plaintiff's trademark, making

liability against him inappropriate; and Plaintiff's operational loss and failure to

delineate the portion of earnings attributable to the Stundenglass mark means

that even an award of any damages, even nominal statutory damages, is

inappropriate.

In sum, Defendants have met their prima facie burden to show no genuine

issue of material fact as to Wahdan’s liability and as to lack of damages suffered

by Plaintiff, FED.R.Civ.P. 56(a), while Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of

material fact otherwise. Thus, their Summary Judgment Motion (Doc. #66) is

SUSTAINED, and their Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. #62) is OVERRULED AS

MOOT. Judgment shall enter in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff.

The captioned cause is hereby ordered terminated upon the docket records

of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western

Division at Dayton.

IT IS SO ORDERED. □

LS egper pater,

July 22, 2026 WALTER H. RICE, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT