Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

Boards of Trustees of

the Ohio Laborers Benefits,

Plaintiffs, Case No. 2:22-cv-2631

V. Judge Michael H. Watson

LJServices, L.L.C., et al., Magistrate Judge Jolson

also known as

LJ Services LLC

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Boards of Trustees of the Ohio Laborers Benefits (“Plaintiffs”), sued

LJServices, L.L.C. (“LJ Services”) and LJ Traffic Control, LLC (“LJ Traffic

Control,” collectively “Defendants”) for violations of certain collective bargaining

agreements (“CBAs”) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.

Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs now move for summary judgment, ECF No. 69, but

the motion is DENIED without prejudice to renewal as to only LJ Services.

I. FACTS

Plaintiffs have presented evidence to support the following facts. Plaintiffs

are the fiduciaries of four employee benefit plans: (1) the Ohio Laborers’ District

Council—Ohio Contractors’ Association Insurance Fund; (2) the Laborers’ District

Council and Contractors’ Pension Fund of Ohio; (3) the Ohio Laborers’ Annuity

Fund; and (4) the Ohio Laborers’ Training and Apprenticeship Trust Fund.

Gaston Dec. J 3, ECF No. 69-1. They are also the fiduciaries of one labor-

management cooperative trust: Ohio Laborers’ District Council—Ohio

Contractors’ Association Cooperation and Education Trust (collectively, “Plans”).

Id. The Plans are multiemployer plans, and they collect contributions to the

LIUNA Tri-Funds, three national labor-management cooperative trusts. /d. J] 4—

5.

Defendants are limited liability companies that both provide traffic control

and flagging services in Ohio, Kentucky, and Indiana. /d. J 6. Defendants signed

various CBAs with Laborers’ International Union of North America and its

affiliated district councils and local unions, including the Local 265/534 Utility

Agreement, which appears to cover work performed from August 6, 2018,

through August 5, 2022 (through July 31, 2022, for wage deductions and through

August 5, 2022, for fringe benefits contributions), and the National Distribution

Agreement, which appears to cover work performed from June 1, 2022, through

May 31, 2027. /d. J 8, 10; L265-534 Utility Agmt., ECF No. 69-2 (LJ Services);

Utility Agmt. Signature Page, ECF No. 69-11 (LJ Traffic); Nat'l Distrib. Agmt., ECF

No. 69-6; Acknowledgment Nat’! Distrib. Agmt., ECF No. 69-10 (LJ Services);

Acknowledgement Nat’! Distrib. Agmt. (LJ Traffic), ECF No. 69-12. LJ Services

signed other CBAs with Laborers’ International Union of North America and its

affiliated district councils and local unions. Gaston Dec. ¥ 8, ECF No. 69-1; HHW

Agmt. (2019-2022), ECF No. 69-3; HHW Agmt. Signature Page (2019-2022),

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ECF No. 69-8 (LJ Services); Nat'l Pipeline Agmt., ECF No. 69-5: Acceptance of

Nat'l Pipeline Agmt., ECF No. 69-9 (LJ Services).

Signatories to those CBAs were bound to the CBAs and Declarations of

Trust establishing the Plans and the LIUNA Tri-Funds. /d. WM 9, 11. The CBAs,

the Declarations of Trust, and the Plans (“Governing Documents”) required

Defendants to file monthly contribution reports, permit audits of their financial

records, and make hourly contributions to the Plans and the LIUNA Tri-Funds on

behalf of persons defined in the CBAs. /d. 912. The Governing Documents also

permit Plaintiffs to conduct an audit of Defendants’ financial records, collect

delinquent contributions, and assess and collect liquidated damages when

signatory employers fail to make the required contributions and deductions. /d.

q 13.

Defendants employed laborers that performed work covered by the CBAs,

and the CBAs required Defendants to pay contributions at specified rates on

behalf of those employees for each hour worked in covered employment. /d.

{| 14. But Plaintiffs contend that Defendants are delinquent on contributions. /d.

{| 16. After filing this lawsuit, Megan Wilson (“Wilson”) performed an audit for

Plaintiffs. /d. 16. According to Wilson, the audit revealed that “Defendants”

failed to timely submit contributions for some months between May 2020 and

December 2023. Wilson Dec. J 3, ECF No. 69-13. In fact, according to Wilson,

the audit revealed that “Defendants” owed $77,064.54 in principle contributions,

Case No. 2:22-cv-2631 Page 3 of 7

$69,838.55 in liquidated damages, $87,659.87 and in interest, for a total of

$234,562.96. Id. J 4.

ll. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard governing summary judgment is set forth in Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 56(a): “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

The Court must grant summary judgment if the opposing party “fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to

that party’s case” and “on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). When reviewing a summary

judgment motion, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

nonmoving party, who must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine

dispute of material fact for trial, and the Court must refrain from making credibility

determinations or weighing the evidence. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted); Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 255 (1986). The Court disregards “all

evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury would not be required to

believe.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000)

(citation omitted). Summary judgment will “not lie if the dispute about a material

fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return

Case No. 2:22-cv-2631 Page 4 of 7

a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted).

The Court is not “obligated to wade through and search the entire record

for some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party’s claim.”

InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court

may rely on the parties to call attention to the specific portions of the record that

demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. LaSalle

Bank N.A., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1022 (S.D. Ohio 2009).

lll. ANALYSIS

LJ Services did not respond to Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, but

LJ Traffic opposes Plaintiffs’ motion. Resp., ECF No. 72. LJ Traffic argues that

liability and damages hinge on Wilson's declaration, but Wilson never audited LJ

Traffic and therefore could not have offered reliable testimony concerning LJ

Traffic’s delinquencies. Hayslip Dec. J] 3-5, ECF No. 73. Plaintiffs did not reply

in support of their motion.

Based on the evidence, summary judgment is not warranted against either

Defendant. First, summary judgment is not warranted against LJ Traffic, because

there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether any of the purported

delinquencies (let alone the amount thereof) are attributable to LJ Traffic. See

Hayslip Dec., ECF No. 73.

Moreover, although LJ Services did not oppose summary judgment,

Plaintiffs have not provided sufficient information from which the Court can

Case No. 2:22-cv-2631 Page 5 of 7

conclude that there is no genuine issue of fact as to LJ Services’ liability. For

example, Plaintiffs have not provided a signature page for the 2022—2025 Ohio

Highway-Heavy-Municipal-Utility State Construction Agreement. In addition, the

Wilson declaration fails to identify from which CBA each delinquency arose. It

therefore also fails to demonstrate which Defendant caused each delinquency.

Therefore, the Court cannot determine from the evidence provided that each

delinquency arose from a CBA to which LJ Services was a party for the covered

timeframe and cannot grant summary judgment against LJ Services.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE to renewal against only LU Services within TWENTY-ONE DAYS.

Any such renewed motion should be accompanied by evidence sufficient for the

Court to determine that each delinquent payment is attributable to LU Services,

under a CBA for which there is proof of LU Service’s participation, and that the

CBA covers the date of the delinquency.

Moreover, LJ Traffic has presented evidence that it is a separate company

from LJ Services and that the two companies do not employ the same workers or

work the same job sites. Hayslip Decl. J 10, ECF No. 73. As such, LJ Traffic

argues that it is not jointly and severally liable for LU Services’ delinquencies.

Resp. 1-2, ECF No. 72. Plaintiffs offered no contrary evidence with their motion

for summary judgment. Nonetheless, LJ Traffic did not move for summary

judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims against it, and the dispositive motion deadline has

passed. Plaintiffs and LJ Traffic are therefore ORDERED to confer and to

Case No. 2:22-cv-2631 Page 6 of 7

propose, within TEN DAYS, next steps regarding LJ Traffic’s involvement in this

litigation. If Plaintiffs wish to renew their motion for summary judgment against

LJ Traffic also, it shall including a brief argument within the proposal as to why

the Court should permit the same.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, ECF No.

69, is DENIED. The Clerk shall terminate ECF No. 69 as a pending motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED. . N □□□

ICHAEL H. WATSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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