The opinion
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-2129
BRIAN PFALZGRAF,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
RUSK COUNTY, WISCONSIN and BEN REISNER,
Defendants-Appellants.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin.
No. 3:23-cv-00877 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.
____________________
ARGUED FEBRUARY 19, 2026 — DECIDED AUGUST 12, 2026
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, PRYOR, and KOLAR, Circuit Judges.
KOLAR, Circuit Judge. A deputy of the Rusk County, Wis-
consin Police Department began following Plaintiff Brian
Pfalzgraf, supposedly on a hunch. When the deputy saw
Pfalzgraf’s license plate covered in snow—a traffic viola-
tion—the deputy took the opportunity to pull Pfalzgraf over.
The deputy, Ben Reisner, questioned Pfalzgraf about his
travel plans and began to suspect drugs were at play. Deputy
2 No. 25-2129
Reisner claimed to observe Pfalzgraf with dilated pupils and
speaking with a “dry mouth.” He also considered Pfalzgraf’s
explanations “odd.” Deputy Reisner then called for back-up,
frisked Pfalzgraf, searched his car, conducted a dog sniff, and
eventually searched Pfalzgraf’s person, revealing a bag of
methamphetamine in Pfalzgraf’s pocket.
After Pfalzgraf’s state charges were dismissed, he sued
Deputy Reisner and Rusk County, claiming that the traffic
stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Specifically, he
claimed that (1) the initial protective frisk was unlawful, (2)
the stop was unlawfully extended, and (3) the search of his
person was unsupported by probable cause.
The district court granted partial summary judgment for
Pfalzgraf on his frisk and extended-search claims. In its view,
no reasonable jury could find either that Deputy Reisner had
reasonable suspicion that Pfalzgraf was armed and danger-
ous, as necessary to justify the frisk, or that he was involved
in a distinct drug offense to justify extending the stop. Deputy
Reisner now appeals, claiming that genuine disputes of fact
precluded summary judgment for Pfalzgraf.
We affirm in part and reverse in part. We agree with the
district court that nothing suggested Pfalzgraf was armed or
dangerous during the stop. But we find genuine disputes over
facts that, if taken in Deputy Reisner’s favor, could support
reasonable suspicion of a drug offense that would provide a
constitutional justification for extending the stop. Perhaps the
district court’s skepticism of the reasons for the extended stop
is well-founded, but that is a question for the jury.
No. 25-2129 3
I. Background
Deputy Reisner was on patrol in the early hours of the
morning when he found himself behind Pfalzgraf’s truck
driving south on Highway 27 in Ladysmith, Wisconsin. He
saw Pfalzgraf signal to turn into a Kwik Trip gas station,
where several police vehicles were parked, before turning the
signal off and continuing south. After a short distance, he ob-
served Pfalzgraf exit the highway and start driving the oppo-
site way on a side-street. Finding it “odd” that Pfalzgraf
would drive south on the highway only to turn off and head
north, Deputy Reisner followed Pfalzgraf. Pfalzgraf then
turned back onto the highway and continued heading north.
While following Pfalzgraf, Deputy Reisner observed that
Pfalzgraf’s license plate was obscured with snow, a traffic vi-
olation. See Wis. Stat. § 341.15. As they approached the next
intersection, Deputy Reisner flashed his lights and initiated a
traffic stop.
The entire interaction between Deputy Reisner and
Pfalzgraf was captured on Reisner’s body-worn camera. As
Deputy Reisner approached Pfalzgraf’s vehicle, he explained
to Pfalzgraf that he had pulled him over because of the ob-
structed license plate and had observed Pfalzgraf’s change of
direction on Highway 27. When asked about his travel plans,
Pfalzgraf explained that he had left his house to buy ciga-
rettes. But he changed his mind when he saw the squad cars
at the Kwik Trip and “turned around to go back to [his]
house.” Remarking that Pfalzgraf’s story “seem[ed] a little
odd,” Deputy Reisner took Pfalzgraf’s license and insurance
information back to his squad car, scraping the snow from
Pfalzgraf’s license plate on the way.
4 No. 25-2129
In his police report and deposition, Deputy Reisner ex-
plained that he found Pfalzgraf to be “irritable” and “ani-
mated” during this initial interaction, and that Pfalzgraf ap-
peared to have pulled the brim of his hat lower to shield his
eyes. Deputy Reisner further claimed that Pfalzgraf’s mouth
seemed dry and his pupils dilated, which Reisner considered
signs of intoxication given his training and experience. Ad-
mitting that he had never interacted with Pfalzgraf before,
Deputy Reisner said he had seen Pfalzgraf’s truck parked out-
side a residence known for drug trafficking on several occa-
sions. The camera footage does not definitively confirm or
deny any of these assertions.
Once Pfalzgraf’s license plate was clear of snow, Deputy
Reisner radioed dispatch, asking to run Pfalzgraf’s name and
license plate in the system. A second officer then arrived, and
Reisner told her that he suspected Pfalzgraf of a drug crime,
stating “961, something going on here”—a reference to Wis-
consin’s statutory chapter on drug offenses. Returning to
Pfalzgraf’s vehicle, Deputy Reisner asked Pfalzgraf to step
out of his truck and asked if he had any weapons on his per-
son (to which Pfalzgraf replied “no”). Deputy Reisner frisked
the outside of Pfalzgraf’s clothing despite Pfalzgraf’s protests
that he “didn’t do nothing.” He then continued to question
Pfalzgraf for several minutes about his “agitated” demeanor,
avoiding the gas station, and whether Pfalzgraf had taken any
controlled substances. Pfalzgraf denied taking drugs, and
when further probed by Reisner, declared that he could pass
a field sobriety test and a blood test.
Unconvinced, Deputy Reisner obtained Pfalzgraf’s verbal
consent to conduct a K-9 sniff of his vehicle. Deputy Reisner
walked his K-9, Boone, around the exterior of the vehicle, and
No. 25-2129 5
according to Reisner (but disputed by Pfalzgraf), Boone
changed his behavior consistent with the presence of con-
trolled substances. Now about fifteen minutes into the stop,
Deputy Reisner told Pfalzgraf that Boone had detected drugs
and received his permission to manually search the truck.
Deputy Reisner searched the truck’s cab, engine bay, and un-
dercarriage, but found no contraband or drug paraphernalia.
Finally, almost thirty minutes into the stop, Deputy Reis-
ner asked Pfalzgraf whether he had anything in his pockets,
which Pfalzgraf denied. Deputy Reisner then stated his inten-
tion to search Pfalzgraf, and instructed Pfalzgraf to remove
his hands from his pockets. Seeing Pfalzgraf gripping some-
thing, he told Pfalzgraf to open his fist, revealing a bag that
Deputy Reisner identified as, and was later confirmed to be,
methamphetamine. Pfalzgraf admitted to using methamphet-
amine earlier in the day and acknowledged that his blood was
likely to test positive for that substance. Deputy Reisner
placed Pfalzgraf under arrest for possession of methamphet-
amine and operating a vehicle while under the influence of a
controlled substance.
Pfalzgraf was later charged in state court, but all charges
were dismissed after the State agreed with Pfalzgraf that the
traffic stop had been unlawfully extended and that any evi-
dence obtained from it should be suppressed. Pfalzgraf then
sued Deputy Reisner and his employer, Rusk County, in fed-
eral court under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging three Fourth
Amendment violations. Count I alleged that Deputy Reisner
patted him down early in the traffic stop without reasonable
suspicion that Pfalzgraf was armed or dangerous. Count II as-
serted that Deputy Reisner deviated from the initial mission
of the stop—the obstructed license plate—and extended the
6 No. 25-2129
stop beyond what was necessary for resolving the traffic vio-
lation. Count III maintained that Reisner searched Pfalzgraf’s
pockets without probable cause or consent.
After the parties cross-moved for summary judgment, the
district court denied Defendants’ motion and granted
Pfalzgraf’s motion in part. The court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of Pfalzgraf as to liability, but not damages, for
his unlawful-frisk (Count I) and extended-search (Count II)
claims.
As to the extended-search claim, the district court held
that no reasonable jury could find Deputy Reisner had rea-
sonable suspicion to extend the stop beyond what was neces-
sary for the obstructed-license-plate violation; i.e. clearing the
obstruction and issuing a citation. It deemed the body-worn
camera footage inconsistent with Deputy Reisner’s testimony
that Pfalzgraf was acting in an agitated, suspicious manner
suggesting drug use. And it discounted Deputy Reisner’s al-
legation that Pfalzgraf had a dry mouth, noting that Reisner
had never interacted with Pfalzgraf before and thus did not
know what Pfalzgraf’s voice normally sounded like. The
court denied qualified immunity on this claim as well, read-
ing State v. Hogan—a Wisconsin Supreme Court case with
analogous facts—to establish that dilated pupils and nervous
demeanor do not create reasonable suspicion of a drug of-
fense. See 2015 WI 76, ¶ 50, 364 Wis. 2d 167.
As to the frisk claim, the district court held that Deputy
Reisner lacked any articulable suspicion that Pfalzgraf was
armed or dangerous. It rejected Reisner’s arguments that sus-
picion of a drug crime and the context of the stop occurring
late at night in a rural area could create reasonable suspicion
that Pfalzgraf was armed. These circumstances, it reasoned,
No. 25-2129 7
did not give rise to a suspicion particularized to Pfalzgraf. The
court also denied qualified immunity as to this claim, point-
ing to United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2013), for
clearly establishing that a lawful frisk requires an individual-
ized suspicion of danger.
Finally, the district court denied both summary-judgment
motions with respect to the unreasonable-search claim (Count
III) based on Deputy Reisner’s search of Pfalzgraf’s pockets,
which revealed the methamphetamine. It found a genuine
dispute of material fact over whether Boone’s changed behav-
ior after circling the exterior of Pfalzgraf’s truck was an alert
that drugs were present. If Boone’s behavior did constitute
such an alert, the court concluded that Deputy Reisner was at
least entitled to qualified immunity as to the subsequent
search. If it did not, Reisner would not have had probable
cause to conduct the personal search based on suspected
drugs. The court, therefore, reserved for the jury the factual
question of whether Boone had alerted Deputy Reisner to the
presence of drugs.
Following the district court’s order granting partial
summary judgment, Pfalzgraf voluntarily dismissed his
unreasonable-search claim under Count III, and a jury trial
proceeded to determine damages for his unlawful-frisk and
extended-stop claims. The jury ultimately awarded Pfalzgraf
$500 in compensatory damages and $3,500 in punitive
damages. Its verdict form did not specify what portion of
these damages was attributable to each of Pfalzgraf’s two
claims. Defendants appealed, seeking to vacate the jury
award because “[t]he District Court’s order granting
Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment was in error
due to the court resolving genuine issues of material fact.”
8 No. 25-2129
II. Discussion
“Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no
genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Hess v. Board of Trustees, 839
F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). We
review the district court’s partial grant of summary judgment
de novo, and we construe the facts in the light most favorable
to Defendants as the nonmoving parties. Ontiveros v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., 148 F.4th 521, 527 (7th Cir. 2025). In this case, Dep-
uty Reisner’s body-worn camera captured the relevant inter-
action between him and Pfalzgraf. We have reviewed that
footage. Still, only “when video footage clearly contradicts the
nonmovant’s claims” may we “consider that video footage
without favoring the nonmovant.” Horton v. Pobjecky, 883 F.3d
941, 944 (7th Cir. 2018).
Defendants argue that genuine disputes of fact precluded
summary judgment as to liability on Pfalzgraf’s frisk and
extended-search claims. At the outset, Pfalzgraf suggests that
Defendants waived any argument that genuine disputes of
fact exist in this case because, in cross-moving for summary
judgment themselves, Defendants affirmatively argued the
absence of genuine disputes of fact.
But that is not how cross-motions for summary judgment
work. A party’s assertion that no facts are in genuine dispute
for its own motion for summary judgment is not a concession
on appeal. See Market Street Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Frey,
941 F.2d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Moving for summary judg-
ment is not a waiver of the right to a trial if the motion is de-
nied.”). Rather, we treat each cross-motion for summary judg-
ment independently, and “the legal theories the movant ad-
vances in support of a Rule 56 motion and the assertion that
No. 25-2129 9
there is no issue of material fact may not be used against the
movant when the court rules on the opponent’s motion.” 10A
Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720 (4th
ed. Apr. 2026 update).
With waiver aside, we turn to the merits.
A. Extended-Search Claim
“A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic vio-
lation … [violates the Fourth Amendment] if it is prolonged
beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission
of issuing a ticket for the violation.” Rodriguez v. United States,
575 U.S. 348, 350–51 (2015) (cleaned up). But a stop may be
lawfully extended if “the officer has reasonable suspicion of
other criminal activity.” United States v. Cole, 21 F.4th 421, 428
(7th Cir. 2021) (en banc).
Here, Deputy Reisner lawfully stopped Pfalzgraf for an
obstructed license plate. But there is no dispute that the stop
extended beyond what was necessary for clearing the license
plate, issuing a citation, and “ordinary inquiries incident to
[the traffic] stop.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355 (citation omitted).
Instead, Deputy Reisner continued to question Pfalzgraf,
search the truck, and eventually search Pfalzgraf’s person be-
cause he suspected Pfalzgraf had taken drugs. The question,
then, is whether Reisner had reasonable suspicion of a sepa-
rate drug offense justifying his extension of the stop. Cole, 21
F.4th at 428. The district court ruled that Deputy Reisner
lacked reasonable suspicion of a drug offense as a matter of
law, but Defendants urge that genuine disputes of fact pre-
cluded summary judgment on this score. We agree and re-
verse summary judgment as to this claim.
10 No. 25-2129
“Reasonable suspicion is an objective standard, consider-
ing the totality of the circumstances” known to the officer at
the time of the stop. United States v. Lewis, 920 F.3d 483, 493
(7th Cir. 2019). It requires “‘specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts,’ suggest criminal activity.” United States v. Ruiz, 785 F.3d
1134, 1141 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21
(1968)).
Defendants point to several factors supporting Deputy
Reisner’s suspicion that Pfalzgraf may have been under the
influence or in possession of drugs: (1) the observed driving
pattern that Reisner considered “odd”; (2) Pfalzgraf’s height-
ened emotional state and visible agitation; (3) his dilated pu-
pils; (4) his apparent dry mouth; (5) his inconsistent explana-
tions for his driving pattern; (6) his admission that he avoided
the Kwik Trip parking lot to avoid the officers parked there;
and (7) Deputy Reisner’s previous sightings of Pfalzgraf’s
truck at a residence known for drug trafficking.
The district court discounted many of Deputy Reisner’s
assertions about Pfalzgraf’s behavior because it found them
inconsistent with the body-worn camera footage. After re-
viewing the footage, the court found Pfalzgraf’s behavior con-
sistent with “benign reasons [why] a person who has been fol-
lowed and then pulled over by an officer could be agitated by
the interaction.” It also concluded that Reisner’s observations
of dry mouth and dilated pupils were unsupported by the
footage. And Deputy Reisner lacked experience interacting
with Pfalzgraf to substantiate his claims.
But at summary judgment, video footage must “clearly
contradict[]” a nonmovant’s claim for us not to take the facts
in its favor. Horton, 883 F.3d at 944. Here, while the district
No. 25-2129 11
court’s view of the video footage was reasonable, the footage
does not clearly contradict Deputy Reisner’s claims. Pfalzgraf
does avoid the flashlight and speaks in an agitated manner in
the footage, among other behaviors. And a jury could con-
clude that this behavior supported the inference that he was
under the influence of drugs. Thus, drawing all possible in-
ferences in Defendants’ favor, there remain genuine disputes
as to whether Pfalzgraf’s behavior seen in the camera footage
supported Deputy Reisner’s independent reasonable suspi-
cion.
For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s grant of
summary judgment on Pfalzgraf’s extended-search claim.
And we remand for a jury to resolve whether Deputy Reisner
gained reasonable suspicion of a drug offense during the traf-
fic stop.
B. Unlawful-Frisk Claim
Defendants also argue that there are genuine disputes of
fact with respect to Pfalzgraf’s unlawful-frisk claim. We disa-
gree and affirm summary judgment as to liability on this
claim.
“[A]n officer performing a Terry stop may not automati-
cally frisk the individual subject to the stop.” Williams, 731
F.3d at 686. “[T]he officer must also be able to point to specific
and articulable facts indicating that the individual may be
armed and present a risk of harm to the officer or to others.”
United States v. Brown, 188 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir. 1999).
Here, Defendants identify no articulable facts that would
suggest Pfalzgraf was armed or posed a threat to Deputy Reis-
ner during the traffic stop. Deputy Reisner’s observations, by
his own admissions, established only the suspicion that
12 No. 25-2129
Pfalzgraf was “under the influence.” Defendants cite cases
suggesting that because “guns often accompany drugs,” Dep-
uty Reisner’s suspicion also supports an inference that
Pfalzgraf was armed and dangerous. See United States v. Jones,
289 F. App’x 593, 597 (4th Cir. 2008). But those cases involve
suspected drug trafficking, not drug impairment. See id.; Mar-
tin v. Forest County, 677 F. Supp. 3d 853, 865–66 (E.D. Wis.
2023); Cary v. City of Fond Du Lac, 2021 WL 1381190, at *7 (E.D.
Wis. Apr. 12, 2021). Even accepting that drug trafficking is
correlated with the possession of weapons, Defendants iden-
tify nothing in the record that suggests mere suspicion of drug
use gives rise to such a broad inference.
Defendants also argue that the surrounding context of the
stop—at night and in a rural area—supported an inference
that Pfalzgraf might be armed. But “[e]ven in high crime ar-
eas, where the possibility that any given individual is armed
is significant, Terry requires reasonable, individualized suspi-
cion before a frisk for weapons can be conducted.” Doornbos
v. City of Chicago, 868 F.3d 572, 582 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 n.2 (1990)). Here, the stop’s
remote context cannot save Defendants from the absence of
individualized suspicion.
Defendants also fault the district court for discounting that
Pfalzgraf was a larger man (6’2” and 265 pounds), kept his
hands in his pockets during the stop, and appeared agitated.
But we have made clear that “the simple fact that one’s hands
are in one’s pockets” is “of little value” for establishing that
an individual is armed and dangerous. Williams, 731 F.3d at
689. That is especially true on these facts, where Pfalzgraf was
asked to stand outside on a frigid January morning for a pro-
longed period. And Defendants cite no authority for the
No. 25-2129 13
dubious proposition that an individual’s size gives an officer
reasonable suspicion that he is armed. Finally, while agitated
behavior may be an additional factor in determining that an
individual is dangerous, it provides no individualized basis
for concluding that Pfalzgraf was dangerous and armed. Cf.
Brown, 188 F.3d at 865 (“Nervousness or refusal to make eye
contact alone will not justify a Terry stop and pat-down, but
such behavior may be considered as a factor in the totality of
circumstances.” (citation omitted)).
Nor can Defendants establish a genuine dispute of fact as
to qualified immunity on this claim, as they suggest late in
their brief. 1 Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that
shields state officials from liability so long as their conduct
“does not violate clearly established statutory or constitu-
tional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Russell v. Comstock, 167 F.4th 984, 988 (7th Cir. 2026)
(citation omitted). A plaintiff can defeat qualified immunity
by pointing to “a general constitutional rule already identi-
fied in the decisional law [that] applies with obvious clarity to
the specific conduct in question.” Davis v. City of Elgin, 180
F.4th 1023, 1028 (7th Cir. 2026) (quoting Cibulka v. City of Mad-
ison, 992 F.3d 633, 640 (7th Cir. 2021)).
Pfalzgraf meets that burden here. Our precedents clearly
establish the principle that a lawful protective frisk requires
individualized suspicion that a suspect is armed and
1 Because Defendants have only appealed the district court’s grant of
Pfalzgraf’s motion for summary judgment, we only consider whether
there is a genuine dispute of fact as to qualified immunity. Defendants do
not argue that Deputy Reisner was entitled to qualified immunity as a
matter of law, as they are not appealing the denial of their own motion for
summary judgment.
14 No. 25-2129
dangerous. E.g., Brown, 188 F.3d at 864; Williams, 731 F.3d at
686; Doornbos, 868 F.3d at 582; United States v. Adair, 925 F.3d
931, 937 (7th Cir. 2019). To date, Defendants have not identi-
fied a single individualized fact suggesting that Pfalzgraf was
armed, much less identified a dispute for a jury to resolve on
this question. Deputy Reisner’s conduct—performing an in-
trusive frisk without reasonable suspicion of danger—vio-
lated a “clearly established” principle that applies with “ob-
vious clarity” to this case. Davis, 180 F.4th at 1028.
III. Conclusion
We REVERSE the district court’s partial grant of summary
judgment as to Pfalzgraf’s extended-search claim. We
AFFIRM the district court’s partial grant of summary judg-
ment as to Pfalzgraf’s unlawful-frisk claim. Because neither
party has offered any basis for apportioning the jury’s dam-
ages award between the two claims, we VACATE the jury
award and REMAND for further proceedings.