Kuchler

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SETH KUCHLER, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

v. NO: 25-2064

JOE LEE, ET AL. SECTION: C (5)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Equitable Tolling (R. Doc. 12) filed

on December 22, 2025. The motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 2, 2025, Seth Kuchler filed a collective action for himself and

those similarly situated alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),

the Louisiana Wage Payment Act, and for retaliation under the FLSA as applied to

Kuchler. 1 Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the initial complaint.2 On December

2, 2025, Kuchler filed his first amended complaint (FAC), asserting the same claims

as his initial complaint.3 That resulted in defendants’ motion to dismiss the original

complaint being denied as moot.4 Defendants then answered the FAC.5

1 R. Doc. 1.

2 R. Doc. 6.

3 R. Doc. 8.

4 R. Doc. 13.

5 R. Doc. 11.

On December 22, 2025, Kuchler filed the instant motion seeking equitable

tolling for potential class members in the FLSA action.6 Kuchler, a former officer

with the Pearl River Police Department, alleged that defendants employed a policy

of failing to compensate employees for hours worked in excess of forty hours per

week in violation of the FLSA.7 On March 23, 2026, plaintiff’s counsel submitted

a Notice of Additional Named Plaintiffs bearing the written consents of Sean Dancer,

Jayson Germann, and Destini Navarro to adopt the earlier allegations made by

Kuchler.8

II. ANALYSIS

A cause of action under the FLSA “may be commenced within two years after

the cause of action accrued, and every such action shall be forever barred unless

commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, except that a cause

of action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three years

after the cause of action accrued.” 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). A FLSA cause of action

accrues on each regular payday immediately following the work period for which

overtime compensation is claimed. Mata v. Caring For You Home Health, Inc., 94

F. Supp. 3d 867, 878 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (citing Halferty v. Pulse Drug Co., 821 F.2d

261, 271 (5th Cir.1987)). Generally, an action starts when the complaint is filed. Id.

6 R. Doc. 12.

7 Id. at 1–2.

8 R. Doc. 21.

§ 256(a).9 However, in a collective action this holds true only for named plaintiffs

who file a written consent to be a plaintiff on that date. Id. In the absence of a

written consent, and for unnamed opt-in plaintiffs, a FLSA action starts on the date

written consent is filed. Id. § 256(b).10

Equitable tolling preserves a claim when enforcement of the statute of

limitations would be unjust. Lambert v. United States, 44 F.3d 296, 298 (5th Cir.

1995). Federal statutes of limitations are generally presumed subject to equitable

tolling unless Congressional policy dictates otherwise. Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez,

572 U.S. 1, 10–11 (2014). Equitable tolling may allow the action to be considered

started at an earlier date for unnamed opt-in plaintiffs, permitting an otherwise

expired claim to survive.

The Fifth Circuit strictly construes the FLSA statute of limitations provision.

Atkins v. General Motors Corp., 701 F.2d 1124, 1130 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1983); see also

Granger v. Aaron’s, Inc., 636 F.3d 708, 712 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Equitable tolling is to

be applied sparingly.”) (internal quotations omitted). Courts apply equitable tolling

most frequently where “the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about the

cause of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights.”

9 Because Kuchler’s complaint was filed October 2, 2025, the look back period for his FLSA claims extends

to October 2, 2023 for non-willful violations and October 2, 2022 for willful violations.

10 For Dancer, Germann, and Navarro, because their written consents were filed March 23, 2026, the look

back period for their FLSA claims extends to March 23, 2024 for non-willful violations and March 23, 2023

for willful violations.

Teemac v. Henderson, 298 F.3d 452, 457 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). The

Supreme Court has outlined reasons for equitable tolling, including inadequate

notice of claimants, pending appointment of counsel beyond the plaintiff’s control,

misleading or incorrect information from the court, and affirmative misconduct by

the defendant. Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984).

The litigant seeking equitable tolling must show: “(1) that he has been pursuing his

rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).

Kuchler argues he has acted with reasonable diligence prosecuting this case,

including attempting to secure a tolling agreement with defendants, commencing

this lawsuit, filing an amended complaint, and filing the instant equitable tolling

motion. He also argues that Swales v. KLLM Transp. Servs., LLC, 985 F.3d 430 (5th

Cir. 2021) implemented a new legal framework for certification of a collective action

under FLSA that imposes a procedural hardship on claimants, which should

potentially give courts a reason to grant equitable tolling.11

11 In Swales, the Fifth Circuit rejected the previously used two-step conditional certification method for

FLSA collective actions which afforded leniency to plaintiff employees’ requests to issue notice to

prospective parties and strictly scrutinized decertification motions typically filed by employers. 985 F.3d

at 443.

Post-Swales, courts within the Fifth Circuit must “identify, at the outset of the case, what facts and legal

considerations will be material to determining whether a group of ‘employees’ is ‘similarly situated’ and

conduct preliminary discovery accordingly. In other words, the district court, not the standards

from Lusardi [v. Xerox Corp., 118 F.R.D. 351 (D.N.J. 1987)], should dictate the amount of discovery needed

to determine if and when to send notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs.” Id. at 441.

This litigation has now proceeded for over ten months in a regular and orderly

fashion. No activity by either party suggests delay tactics or a lack of diligence.

Likewise, nothing before the court reflects extraordinary circumstances preventing

Kuchler or any prospective party from prosecuting a case. See Sandoz v. Cingular

Wireless, L.L.C., 700 F. App’x 317, 321 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e will not transform

routine litigation into an extraordinary circumstance.”). And there is no legal support

for the argument that complying with the post-Swales mandates warrants the

application of equitable tolling.

The subject claims relate to an alleged policy denying overtime pay. Kuchler

correctly notes that the nature of the accrual of prescription means that each day a

plaintiff can lose part of his or her claim. But, that is the nature of prescription; one

day the claim exists, and the next day it may not. See, e.g., Mosley v. Bristow U.S.,

LLC, No. CV 23-2674, 2023 WL 6976891, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 23, 2023). The

statutory prescriptive period is at least two years from the end of the pay period

during which the employee was allegedly denied overtime pay. That is a substantial

period allowing for suit to be filed to collect payments which an employee knows or

should know are not paid at the moment he or she is not paid. Also, Kuchler’s

complaint is replete with references to communications between him and his fellow

Pearl River police officers about the compensation issue. Nothing suggests

extraordinary circumstances that justify extending the prescriptive period by

equitable tolling. This argument is without merit. See Lee v. Metrocare Servs., 980

F. Supp. 2d 754, 770 (N.D. Tex. 2013); Escobedo v. Dynasty Insulation, Inc., 694 F.

Supp. 2d 638, 655 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (rejecting equitable tolling for FLSA claim on

the grounds that opt-in plaintiffs were not “excusably unaware” of their claims if

they worked more than forty hours per week and knew they were entitled to overtime

compensation).

Kuchler alleges a retaliatory environment at the Pearl River Police

Department that could prevent unnamed opt-in plaintiffs from joining this lawsuit.

But, three plaintiffs have joined the case in the last five months, suggesting potential

opt-in plaintiffs are likely aware of their rights.

Plaintiff fails to establish the extraordinary circumstances required for

equitable tolling. The motion is denied.

III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Motion for Equitable Tolling (R. Doc. 12) filed on December 22,

2025 is DENIED.

New Orleans, Louisiana this 5th day of August 2026

__________________________________

WILLIAM J. CRAIN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE