The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 1:25-CV-25395-ELFENBEIN
JOSE RAMON PAEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND
COSTS UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff Jose Ramon Paez’s (“Paez”) Unopposed
Motion for Attorney’s Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (the “Motion”). See ECF
No. [13]. In the Motion, Paez argues that the Commissioner of Social Security’s (“the
Commissioner”) position was not “substantially justified” and that Paez is the “prevailing party.”
Id. at 1. Paez asks the Court to award $3,122.20 in attorney’s fees, representing 11.9 hours of
attorney time in 2025 and 2026 and $405.00 in costs. See id. at 2. The Commissioner does not
oppose the Motion and does not object to the number of attorney hours, counsel’s hourly rate, or
the total amount of fees and costs requested. See ECF No. [14]. For the reasons explained below,
the Motion, ECF No. [13], is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Paez brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for review of the Commissioner’s final
decision denying his application for Social Security benefits. See ECF No. [1] at 1. After Paez
moved for summary judgment, the Commissioner filed an unopposed motion to remand the matter
for further administrative proceedings. See ECF Nos. [8], [10]. On March 27, 2026, the Court
granted that motion, reversed the Commissioner’s decision under sentence four of § 405(g),
remanded the matter, and entered final judgment in Paez’s favor. See ECF Nos. [11], [12]. Paez
filed the Motion for attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (the “EAJA”) on June
25, 2026, and the Commissioner does not oppose it. See ECF Nos. [13], [14].
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Entitlement to Costs and Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act
Under the EAJA, the Court may award “a judgment for costs” to “the prevailing party in
any civil action brought” against “any agency or any official of the United States acting in his or
her official capacity.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1). Those costs are the ones enumerated in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920, which include the “fees of the clerk.” 28 U.S.C. § 1920(1). The Court may also award
“reasonable fees and expenses of attorneys, in addition to the costs which may be awarded pursuant
to subsection (a),” to a prevailing party in such an action. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b). The applicable
statute provides that “a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees
and other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that
party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial
review of agency action, brought … against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of
that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified
or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
To receive fees and costs, a party “shall, within 30 days of final judgment in the action,
submit to the court an application for fees and other expenses which shows that the party is a
prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award under this subsection, and the amount sought,
including an itemized statement from any attorney or expert witness representing or appearing in
behalf of the party, stating the actual time expended at the rate at which fees and other expenses
were computed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). “The party shall also allege that the position of the
United States was not substantially justified.” Id.
A party is “prevailing” in a Social Security appeal if he wins “a remand order pursuant to
sentence four of [42 U.S.C.] § 405(g).” Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300 (1993). A party is
“eligible to receive an award” if his “net worth” does “not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil
action was filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B). The “position of the United States” means, in
addition to the position taken by the United States in the civil action, the action or omission by the
agency upon which the civil action is based. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D).
EAJA’s attorney’s fee awards are payable not to the lawyer but “to the litigant,” which
means that any such award is subject to “a federal administrative offset if the litigant has
outstanding federal debts.” Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 593 (2010). The litigant may, however,
assign his “rights in the fees award to the attorney.” Id. at 597. Such an assignment is valid if it
either complies with the Anti-Assignment Act or is excused by the government’s waiver of that
Act’s requirements. See 31 U.S.C. § 3727(b); Arthur Pew Construction Co. v. Lipscomb, 965 F.2d
1559, 1576 (11th Cir. 1992). If the litigant “does not owe a debt to the government and assigns
the right to receive the fees to the attorney,” the government will pay the award to the attorney
directly. Astrue, 560 U.S. at 597.
While those principles govern who receives an award, a different set of provisions governs
the source of the funds used to pay it. Attorney’s fees awarded under subsection (d) “shall be paid
by any agency over which the party prevails from any funds made available to the agency by
appropriation or otherwise.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(4). Costs awarded under subsection (a), by
contrast, “shall be paid as provided in sections 2414 and 2517 of this title,” that is, from the
Judgment Fund. 28 U.S.C § 2412(c)(1); 31 U.S.C. § 1304.
B. Calculating Attorney’s Fee Awards Generally
To calculate attorney’s fee awards, courts generally use the “lodestar” method. See
Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988); Inj.
Treatment Ctr., 2022 WL 17325834, at *2. “The most useful starting point for determining the
amount of a reasonable fee” using the lodestar method “is the number of hours reasonably
expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate . . . [which] provides an objective
basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer’s services.” Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); ACLU of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 427 (11th Cir. 1999)
(noting that the lodestar is “properly calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably
expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate” (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,
888 (1984))). “[T]here is a ‘strong presumption’ that the lodestar is the reasonable sum the
attorneys deserve.” Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565–66 (1986)).
“The first step in the computation of the lodestar is determining the reasonable hourly rate.”
Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994). “The next step in the computation of
the lodestar is the ascertainment of reasonable hours.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301. “Counsel for
the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are
excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is
obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. “In other
words, the Supreme Court requires fee applicants to exercise ‘billing judgment.’” Norman, 836
F.2d at 1301 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437). “This must necessarily mean that the hours
excluded are those that would be unreasonable to bill to a client and therefore to one’s adversary
irrespective of the skill, reputation or experience of counsel. If it were otherwise, an inexperienced
or unskillful attorney would face a double penalty. First, his hourly rate would be lowered and
second, his time reduced.” Id. (emphasis and citation omitted).
The “district court is charged with deducting for redundant hours. Redundant hours
generally occur where more than one attorney represents a client. There is nothing inherently
unreasonable about a client having multiple attorneys, and they may all be compensated if they are
not unreasonably doing the same work and are being compensated for the distinct contribution of
each lawyer.” Id. at 1301–02. The “district court must deduct time spent on discrete and
unsuccessful claims.” Id. at 1302. “When a district court finds the number of hours claimed is
unreasonably high, the court has two choices: it may conduct an hour-by-hour analysis or it may
reduce the requested hours with an across-the-board cut.” Bivins, 548 F.3d at 1350; see
also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436–37 (“There is no precise rule or formula for making these
determinations. The district court may attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated,
or it may simply reduce the award to account for the limited success.”).
As noted above, the “product” of the reasonable hourly rate and the number of hours
reasonably expended on the litigation “is the lodestar.” Bivins, 548 F.3d at 1350. After
determining the lodestar amount, courts can “adjust the fee upward or downward, including [by
considering] the important factor of the results obtained.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (quotation
marks omitted). “If the result was excellent, then the court should compensate for all hours
reasonably expended.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302. “If the result was partial or limited success,
then the lodestar must be reduced to an amount that is not excessive.” Id.; see also Bivins, 548
F.3d at 1350–51 (“When the number of compensable hours and the hourly rate are reasonable, a
downward adjustment to the lodestar is merited only if the prevailing party was partially successful
in its efforts.”). “A reduction is appropriate if the relief, however significant, is limited in
comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302. “Where all
theories derive from a common core of operative facts, the focus should be on the significance of
overall results as a function of total reasonable hours. It is improper to make the reduction based
on a simple ratio of successful issues to issues raised.” Id. (citation omitted).
C. Calculating Attorney’s Fee Awards in Equal Access to Justice Act cases
When calculating an award of attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the
“amount of fees . . . shall be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the
services furnished.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). “[A]ttorney[’s] fees shall not be awarded in
excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special
factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies
a higher fee.” Id.
The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that the Equal Access to Justice Act “establishes a
two-step analysis for determining the appropriate hourly rate to be applied in calculating attorney’s
fees under the Act.” Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029, 1033 (11th Cir. 1992). “The first step in
the analysis” is “to determine the market rate for similar services provided by lawyers of
reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation,” id. (alterations adopted, quotation
marks omitted), which is the same first step used in the traditional lodestar analysis. See Loranger,
10 F.3d at 781; Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. “The second step, which is needed only if the market
rate is greater than $75 per hour, is to determine whether the court should adjust the hourly fee
upward from $75 to take into account an increase in the cost of living, or a special factor.” Meyer,
958 F.2d at 1033–34; see 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A).
When performing this rate adjustment, courts in this District have found proposed hourly
rates reasonable when they have relied on cost-of-living increases in the Consumer Price Index.
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Kijakazi, No. 21-CV-22170, 2023 WL 3852275, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May 26,
2023), report & recommendations adopted, No. 21-CV-22170, 2023 WL 3845131 (S.D. Fla. June
6, 2023) (Williams, J.); Romero v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-CV-22246, 2022 WL 2289222, at
*3 & n.3 (S.D. Fla. June 14, 2022), report & recommendations adopted, No. 21-CV-22246, 2022
WL 2290578 (S.D. Fla. June 24, 2022).
III. DISCUSSION
As noted above, the Court must award costs and attorney’s fees to a party who prevailed
and is eligible, unless the United States’ position in the case was substantially justified or special
circumstances make an award unjust. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)–(B). The Supreme Court
has recognized that a party is “prevailing” in a Social Security appeal if he or she wins “a remand
order pursuant to sentence four of [42 U.S.C.] § 405(g).” Shalala, 509 U.S. at 300. And, by
definition, a party is “eligible to receive an award,” if his “net worth” does “not exceed $2,000,000
at the time the civil action was filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B). Moving to the final requirement,
a plaintiff must show that “the position of the United States was not substantially justified,” as the
statute mandates. Id. § 2412(d)(1)(B). The Court’s analysis of whether the United States’ position
was substantially justified is based on “the record (including the record with respect to the action
or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based) which is made in the civil
action for which fees and other expenses are sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B); id. §
2412(d)(2)(D) (noting that the United States’ position is both “the position taken by the United
States in the civil action” and “the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action
is based”).
Here, the Court agrees that Paez is the prevailing party because Defendant filed an
unopposed Motion to Remand, which the Court granted pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §
405(g), and it thereafter entered Final Judgment in Paez’s favor. See ECF Nos. [10], [11], [12].
Paez also meets the financial-eligibility requirement because his application represents that his net
worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time this action was filed. See ECF No. [13] at 2. The
record further supports the conclusion that Defendant’s position was not substantially justified, as
Defendant itself requested the remand pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g). See ECF No. [10].
Additionally, Defendant did not oppose the Motion or argue that its position was substantially
justified, see ECF No. [14], and the record does not reveal any special circumstances that would
make an award unjust. See id. As a result, the Court finds that Paez has met all the requirements
for an award of costs and attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. See 28 U.S.C. §
2412.
The only remaining step is for the Court to calculate the appropriate amount of attorney’s
fees. Fee awards under the Equal Access to Justice Act must be “based upon prevailing market
rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished,” and the hourly rate cannot exceed “$125
per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor …
justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). Paez seeks attorney’s fees for time billed by
his counsel, Richard A. Culbertson (“Culbertson”), at a rate of $258.46 per hour for work
performed in 2025 and $262.85 per hour for work performed in 2026. See ECF No. [13] at 2.
After reviewing hourly rates that courts in this District have found reasonable in recent
similar cases, see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3, and in view of the Court’s own knowledge and
experience in this District for almost twenty years, see Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303, the Court finds
that the market rate for Social Security matters is greater than $125 per hour. In a 2023 decision,
for example, Magistrate Judge Sanchez found reasonable an hourly rate of “$217.54 for 2021 and
$234.95 for 2022 and 2023,” Rodriguez, 2023 WL 3852275, at *2, and that finding was later
adopted by District Judge Williams, see Rodriguez, 2023 WL 384513, at *1. Similarly, in a 2022
decision, then-Magistrate Judge Becerra found reasonable an hourly rate of “$217.54 for 2021
and $225.71 for 2022,” Romero, 2022 WL 2289222, at *3 & n.3, and that finding was later
adopted by District Judge Martinez, see Romero, 2022 WL 2290578, at *1. Those findings support
a conclusion that the market rate for Social Security matters is greater than $125 per hour.
As a result, the Court moves to the second step of the rate analysis: determining whether
to adjust the hourly fee upward to account for a cost-of-living increase or another special factor.
See Meyer, 958 F.2d at 1033–34; 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). In evaluating adjustments of hourly
rates, courts in this District have found that using data from the Consumer Price Index is
appropriate. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 2023 WL 3852275, at *2; Romero, 2022 WL 2289222, at *3 &
n.3. Following that lead, the Court finds Culbertson’s proposed hourly rates of $258.46 for 2025
and $262.85 for 2026 reasonable because each accurately reflects a factually warranted adjustment
of the $125 statutory rate for the increase in the cost of living based on the Consumer Price Index.
Moving to the second step in the lodestar analysis, which this Circuit uses to determine
attorney’s fee awards both generally, see Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299, and in the Equal Access to
Justice Act context, see Rodriguez, 2023 WL 3852275, at *3; Romero, 2022 WL 2289222, at *3
& n.3, the Court must determine the number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation, see Barnes, 168 F.3d at 427. Paez notes that Culbertson spent 11.9 hours on this case
and includes a detailed breakdown of the tasks performed, when he performed those tasks, and
how long each task took. See ECF No. [13] at 9. The Court has reviewed Culbertson’s time
entries, and based on its own knowledge and expertise, finds that the 11.9 hours Culbertson spent
prosecuting this action are reasonable. See Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303; Rodriguez, 2023 WL
3852275, at *3; Romero, 2022 WL 2289222, at *3.
The final step in the lodestar analysis is simply to multiply the number of hours Culbertson
reasonably expended on the litigation by his reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433;
Barnes, 168 F.3d at 427. Because Culbertson billed at a different rate in each year, the Court
performs that calculation separately for each. Multiplying the 1.3 hours Culbertson expended in
2025 by his 2025 rate of $258.46 per hour equals $335.99, and multiplying the 10.6 hours he
expended in 2026 by his 2026 rate of $262.85 per hour equals $2,786.21. Added together, those
amounts equal $3,122.20, which is the lodestar. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; Bivins, 548 F.3d at
1350; Barnes, 168 F.3d at 427. It is also the amount of attorney’s fees Paez requests. See ECF
No. [13] at 1-2. Although the Court can adjust the lodestar amount upward or downward, see
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, the Court finds that $3,122.20 is the reasonable sum Culbertson deserves.
See Bivins, 548 F.3d at 1350 (noting that there is a strong presumption that the lodestar is the
reasonable sum the attorneys deserve).
Paez asks the Court to direct payment to Culbertson, see ECF No. [13] at 2, which he is
permitted to do, see Astrue, 560 U.S. at 596–97. Because Defendant does not object to Paez’s
assignment or request, the Court finds that Defendant has waived the requirements of the Anti-
Assignment Act. See Rodriguez, 2023 WL 3852275, at *4; Lipscomb, 965 F.2d at 1576.
Paez also seeks $405.00 in costs, representing the filing fee for this action. See ECF No.
[13] at 1. Because Paez is the prevailing party and Defendant does not object to the amount
requested, the Court finds that Paez is entitled to recover $405.00 in costs. See 28 U.S.C. §
2412(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1920(1). Given that the attorney’s fees and the costs are payable from
separate sources, the Court awards them separately. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(c)(1), (d)(4).
Case No. 25-CV-25395-ELFENBEIN
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Paez’s Motion, ECF No. [13], is GRANTED. Paez is AWARDED
$3,122.20 in attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act to be paid to Culbertson, subject
to offset against any pre-existing debt that Paez may owe to the United States. Paez is further
AWARDED $405.00 in costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1) to be paid from the Judgment Fund,
31 US.C. § 1304.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Miami, Florida on July 31, 2026.
———Ty 7 = /, _ _
MARTY FULGUEIRA ELFENBEIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
ce: All Counsel of Record
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