Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MARVIN ERNESTO LEON CERON,

Petitioner, 3:26-cv-1762

: (JUDGE MARIANI)

V.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF

THE US., et al., :

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner Marvin Ernesto Leon Ceron (“Petitioner”), a citizen of El Salvador, filed a

pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). Petitioner

is detained at FC] Lewisburg within the Middle District of Pennsylvania and names as

Respondents the Attorney General of the United States and Jessica Sage, Warden of FCI

Lewisburg.

Petitioner entered the United States without inspection at an unknown date and

location. (Doc. 7 at 4). On July 14, 2024, Petitioner was arrestecl in Maryland for Assault in

First Degree, Assault in the Second Degree, Disorderly Conduct, Disturbing the Peace, and

Failure to Obey a Reasonably Lawful Order. (/d. at 5). Petitioner was convicted of Assault

in the Second Degree and sentenced to three years imprisonment. (/d.).

Upon his release from state custody, ICE took Petitioner into custody on November

20, 2024. (Id.). He has remained detained without bond since. Petitioner was served with

Notice to Appear charging him as removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) for

being present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. On June 30, 2025, an

Immigration Judge (“lJ”) ordered Petitioner removed to El Salvador. (Doc. 7-4).

Petitioner timely appealed the |J’s removal order to the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”). (Doc. 7 at 6). On April 22, 2026, the BIA dismissed Petitioner's appeal.

(Doc. 7-5). Petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

and was granted a temporary stay of removal.' (Doc. 7-6).

Petitioner claims he is being unlawfully detained by Respondents without a bond

hearing under the mandatory detention provision of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), instead of

the discretionary detention provision of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). This distinction matters

because noncitizens detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) are not entitled to a bond

hearing, whereas noncitizens detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) are entitled to a bond

hearing before an Immigration Judge (“lJ”). Patel v. O'Neil, 2025 WL 3516865, at *2 (M.D.

1 Because the Third Circuit granted a temporary stay of removal, Petitioner's detention is governed by

the pre-removal order detention statutes, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 or 8 U.S.C. § 1226, not the post-removal order

detention statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231. See Olerewaju v. Lowe, 2026 WL 1045076, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 17,

2026) (“With the Third Circuit's temporary stay of removal and review of the BIA’s decision, [petitioner's] order

of removal is not yet final, and he remains in pre-order of removal detention.”). Put differently, Petitioner's

90-day removal period has yet to commence because the Third Circuit granted a temporary stay of removal.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii) (“The removal period begins on the latest of the following: (ii) If the removal

order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the court's final

order.”).

Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (citations omitted). Petitioner further claims that his detention without a

bond hearing violates his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United

States Constitution.

As directed by the Court, the Respondents filed a response to the Petition on July 2,

2026. (Doc. 7). The Respondents do not dispute the factual allegations contained in the

petition and recognizes that “this Court and other jurists in this District have rejected” their

arguments regarding mandatory detention without bond. (/d. at 2). Rather, the

Respondents set forth legal arguments as to why Petitioner’s detention is lawful under 8

U.S.C. § 1225(b). But, as discussed more fully below, Respondents’ interpretation of the

INA—the same one they advance here—has already been rejected by this Court and the

overwhelming majority of federal judges to address this issue. See Patel, 2025 WL

3516865, at “4 n.7 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025 (collecting cases). Indeed, the United States

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the same interpretation advanced by the

Respondents. See Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61, 69 (2d Cir. 2026) (“Today,

although we part ways with two other circuits that have addressed this question, we join the

overwhelming majority of federal judges across the Nation to consider it and conclude that

the government's novel interpretation of the immigration statutes defies their plain text. That

text makes clear that Section 1226(a) governs detention of noncitizens like Petitioner.

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to such noncitizens, who are present in the United

States after entering the country without inspection and admission, and who were not

apprehended while entering the country or shortly thereafter.”). The United States Court of

Appeals for the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have also rejected the Respondents’

interpretation of the statutory provision at issue here. See Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden

Fed, Det. Ctr. Miami, 175 F.4th 1258, 1262 (11 Cir. 2026) (“We are unpersuaded by the

Government's re-interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A).”); see also Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft,

175 F.Ath 713 (6th Cir. 2026) (similar); Santillian Quiroz v. Mullin, __F.4th __, 2026 WL

1876709 (10th Cir. June 30, 2026) (similar).

ll. | STANDARD OF REVIEW

Absent suspension, the Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas

corpus “to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.

507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a

federal district court may grant a habeas petition where a petitioner's immigration detention

is “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §

2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the

legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been

strongest.” /.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Claims brought by immigration

detainees seeking relief from their confinement “fall within the core of the writ of habeas

corpus.” Trump v. JiG.G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025). Itis well established that a federal

habeas corpus petitioner generally has the burden of proving facts entitling him to a

discharge from custody. Goins v. Brierley, 464 F.2d 947, 949 (3d Cir. 1972) (citations

omitted)

Ill. ANALYSIS

Although not raised by either party, the Court has jurisdiction to consider the

petition.2

Turning to the merits of the petition, the Court will first consider the two statutory

provisions of the INA at issue. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) is a statute entitled “Inspection by

immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.”

It provides, in relevant part:

(b) Inspection of applicants for admissions

(2) Inspection of other aliens

(A) In General

Subject to subparagraph (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an

applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines

that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt

entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding

under section 1229a [removal proceedings] of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). 8 U.S.C. § 1226, in contrast, is entitled “Apprehension and

detention of aliens.” It provides, in relevant part:

(a) Arrest, detention, and release

On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained

pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.

Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such) decision, the Attorney

General—

2 The Court incorporates by reference its prior analyses set forth in similar habeas petitions filed by

civil immigration detainees. See Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at *1-7; see also Richeme v. Warden, 2026 WL

937546, at *1-7 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2026). Furthermore, Petitioner is not required to exhaust his administrative

remedies. /d.

(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien, and

(2) may release the alien on—

(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing

conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or

(B) conditional parole; but

(3) may not provide the alien with work authorization (including an ‘employment

authorized’ endorsement or other appropriate work permit), unless the alien

is lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise would (without

regard to removal proceedings) be provided such authorization.

8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Respondents are detaining Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b}(2)(A).

As the Court previously found, “the overwhelming majority of federal district courts

that have addressed this issue have interpreted the INA to find that

persons similarly situated to Petitioner—noncitizens who previously entered the United

States and are currently residing in the United States—are not subject to the mandatory

detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) but instead are subject to the discretionary

detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and accordingly are entitled to a bond hearing.”

Patel, 2025 WL 3519895, at *4 (collecting cases). “These courts have further found that the

statutory provisions of the INA that Respondents’ claim divest this Court of jurisdiction do

not apply to persons similarly situated to Petitioner and that there is no need to exhaust

administrative remedies prior to filing a habeas petition.” /d.

As before, “the Court finds that the near universal rejection of Respondents’

interpretation of the INA by federal district courts to be highly persuasive and will adopt the

same approach.” /d. at*5. Petitioner's detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) is unlawful

under the INA because the plain language of this provision and the statutory framework of

the INA compels a finding that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to noncitizens who are

affirmatively seeking admission to the United States, not noncitizens like Petitioner who

have resided in the United States for years. See Bethancourt Soto v. Soto, 807 F. Supp.

3d. 397, 408 (D.N.J. 2025) (“For all these reasons, the Court concludes that § 1225(b)(2)(A)

applies only to noncitizens who are actively, i.e., affirmatively, ‘seeking admission’ to the

United States. Accordingly, it does not apply to individuals like Petitioner, who has been

residing in the United States ‘for over seven years.””); see also Patel, 2025 WL 3516865 at

*5 (same).

Like other Courts to address this issue, the Court finds that Respondents’

interpretation of the phrase “seeking admission” violates the rule against surplusage, would

negate the plain meaning of the text, and make redundant Section 1226(c) mandatory

detention of noncitizens who have committed or are charged with certain specified crimes.‘

3 The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that 8 U.S.C. § 1226 “generally governs the process of

arresting and detaining ... aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.”

Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288-89 (2018) (emphasis added); Id. at 303 ("As noted, § 1226 applies

to aliens already present in the United States.”). In addition, despite the Board of Immigration Appeals holding

in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 |. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to

noncitizens like Petitioner, “[t]his Court owes no deference to an agency’s interpretation that conflicts with

the statute’s unambiguous text.” Bethancourt Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 408 (citing Loper Bright Enters. v.

Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 400-01 (2024).

4 “If possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect (verba cum effectu sunt

accipienda). None should be ignored. None should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to

duplicate another provision or to have no consequence.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:

The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (Thomson/West eds., 1st Ed. 2012).

See Centeno Ibbara, 2025 WL 3294726, at *5-6 (“The government's interpretation of §

1225(b)(2) violates the rule against surplusage. If ‘an applicant seeking admission’ is the

same as ‘an applicant for admission,’ then ‘seeking admission’ is surplusage. Congress has

also recently adopted provisions in § 1226 that would be made superfluous under the

government's interpretation. If a noncitizen enters the country illegally and is subsequently

convicted or charged with certain crimes, these new provisions require that noncitizens be

detained without a bond hearing. Under the government's interpretation, § 1225 would

require such mandatory detention regardless of criminal charges or conviction. If this was

the case, Congress would have no need to create additional requirements for mandatory

detention.”).

Here, although Petitioner is an “applicant for admission,” he is not “seeking

admission” into the United States. Because Petitioner is not “seeking admission” into the

United States, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to him.5 See Barbosa da Cunha, 175

F.4th at 74 (“Here, although Petitioner is an applicant for admission under the statutory

definition because he is present in the country and has never been admitted, it simply

5 The Court acknowledges that Respondents cite to the Fifth Circuit's recent decision in Buenrosto-

Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 484 (5th Cir. 2026) , in which the Fifth Circuit—in a 2-1 decision—held that

noncitizens like Petitioner were “applicants for admission” to the United States who were “seeking admission”

and were thus subject to the INA’s mandatory detention provision. The Fifth Circuit’s ruling is not binding on

this Court. Similarly, the Court is aware of the Eighth Circuit's decision in Avila v. Bondi, holding that

noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention as an “applicant for admission” who was “seeking admission.”

Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026). The Eighth Circuit's holding is not binding on this Court.

cannot be said that he is ‘seeking admission,’ as he is not requesting lawful entry into the

United States.”). Accordingly, the Court will grant the petition in part.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's habeas petition will be granted in part

because his mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) without a bond hearing is

unlawful. Accordingly, Respondents will be directed to provide Petitioner with an

individualized bond hearing before an IJ within seven (7) days of the date of this Order. A

separate Order follows eens □□□

Ait

1 (Hta i

Robert D. Mari

United States District Judge

6 Petitioner also appears to bring claims under the 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Bivens, the Federal Tort Claims

Act, and the Administrative Procedures Act, among others. The Court has carefully reviewed the remaining

claims and finds many are not cognizable in habeas. See Broussard v. Ebbert, 2015 WL 6083541, at *2

(M.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2015) (FTCA and Bivens claims “are not cognizable in habeas since they do not challenge

the legality or duration of Petitioner's confinement, or the execution of his sentence.”) (citing Leamer v.

Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 547 (3d Cir. 2002)). To the extent Petitioner raises a conditions of confinement claim,

without more detailed factual allegations supporting this claim, the Court cannot conclude that his case

constitutes an “extreme case” that warrants habeas relief based on his alleged conditions of confinement at

FCI Lewisburg. Hope v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 324 (3d Cir. 2020). As for the remaining

claims, Petitioner has failed to satisfy his burden to demonstrate facts entitling him to any habeas relief other

than the bond hearing the Court is ordering.