Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

EMERALD CONSULTING

PARTNERS, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 8:25-cv-1915-CEH-AEP

MESSNER REEVES LLP,

Defendant.

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Messner Reeves, LLP’s

Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Doc.

10). In the motion, Defendant seeks dismissal of the amended complaint for lack of

personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff Emerald Consulting Partners, LLC filed a response in

opposition (Doc. 11), to which Defendant replied (Doc. 15). Upon careful

consideration of the Defendant’s motion and being fully advised in the premises, the

Court will grant the motion and dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant for lack

of personal jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND1

1 The following statement of facts is derived from the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 8), the

allegations of which the Court must accept as true in ruling on the instant motion to dismiss.

See Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332, 334 (11th Cir. 1992); Quality Foods de Centro Am., S.A.

v. Latin Am. Agribusiness Dev. Corp. S.A., 711 F.2d 989, 994 (11th Cir. 1983).

Plaintiff Emerald Consulting Partners, LLC is a financial advisory and

consulting firm. Doc. 8 ¶ 13. Emerald is a Florida limited liability company with its

principal place of business in Florida. Id.

Defendant Messner Reeves, LLP is a law firm. Id. ¶ 14. Messner Reeves is a

Colorado limited liability partnership with its principal office in Denver, Colorado. Id.

Emerald brings this action against Messner Reeves under Florida defamation

law. Pursuant to a contract between the parties, Messner Reeves collected $700,000 in

escrow funds from Emerald and was to serve as an escrow agent in a purported loan

transaction. Id. ¶ 1. The escrow funds were to remain in Messner Reeves’ possession

pending the funding of the loan. Id. ¶ 2. The loan never occurred. Id. Emerald claims

that the escrow funds should have been returned to it within ninety days under the

contract. Id. ¶ 2. Messner Reeves informed Emerald that the funds were being held

securely in a trust account. Id. Messner Reeves claimed it could not return the funds

back to Emerald yet due to banking logistics. Id. ¶ 10.

On February 22, 2024, Messner Reeves published statements on its website

regarding its obligations under the contract. Id. ¶¶ 42, 47. Messner Reeves stated:

Messner Reeves LLP deeply values its reputation for excellence and,

therefore, issues this statement in response to the Emerald Consulting

Partners LLC lawsuit. At no time have the funds at issue in the lawsuit

disappeared or become lost. The legal requirements regarding the return

of the funds have not been satisfied, and the firm is legally prohibited

from releasing the money at issue. The Plaintiff is aware of these

circumstances, yet has falsely alleged otherwise.

Id. ¶ 48. The statement was titled “Messner Reeves LLP Issues Statement Regarding

Emerald Consulting Partners LLC Lawsuit.” Id. Emerald alleges that the February 24,

2024, website post falsely portrays Emerald as “dishonest and untrustworthy, causing

reputational injury.” Id. ¶ 11.

Emerald claims that the website post was “accessed by numerous people within

Florida.” Id. ¶ 68. Emerald’s clients and business contacts in Florida accessed and read

the defamatory statement. Id. ¶ 74. Emerald also alleges that Messner Reeves designed

its website to target Florida residents. Messner Reeves’ website is hosted on WordPress

and configured with a specialized search engine optimization (“SEO”) plugin to target

Florida. Id. ¶ 70. Emerald claims that Messner Reeves used this SEO to enhance the

likelihood that the statement would be discoverable by Florida users. Id. Emerald

further alleges that Messner Reeves designed its website to target Florida residents by

using a source code which contains “Florida” as a key word appearing four times. Id.

¶ 71.

In a two-count complaint, Emerald sues Messner Reeves for defamation per se

and defamation per quod (Doc. 8). Messner Reeves filed its Motion to Dismiss First

Amended Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Doc. 10). Emerald then filed

a response in opposition (Doc. 11) and Defendant filed a reply (Doc. 15).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction are governed by Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). A court must dismiss an action against a defendant

over which it lacks personal jurisdiction. Smith v. Trans–Siberian Orchestra, 689 F. Supp.

2d 1310, 1312 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (citing Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1214 n.6

(11th Cir. 1999)). To withstand a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead sufficient

facts to establish a prima facie case of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. See

id. at 1313; Virgin Health Corp. v. Virgin Enters. Ltd., 393 F. App’x 623, 625 (11th Cir.

2010). The district court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, to the

extent they are uncontroverted by the defendant’s affidavits. Consol. Dev. Corp. v.

Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2000). If the defendant can refute personal

jurisdiction by sustaining its burden of challenging the plaintiff’s allegations through

affidavits or other competent evidence, the plaintiff must substantiate its jurisdictional

allegations through affidavits, testimony, or other evidence of its own. Future Tech.

Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000). The district

court must construe all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff

when confronted with conflicting evidence. PVC Windoors, Inc. v. Babbitbay Beach

Constr., N.V., 598 F.3d 802, 810 (11th Cir. 2010); Consol. Dev. Corp., 216 F.3d at 1291.

To determine whether personal jurisdiction exists over an out-of-state

defendant, courts undertake a two-step analysis. Cable/Home Commc’n Corp. v. Network

Prod., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 855 (11th Cir. 1990). First, the court must determine whether

the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to subject the defendant to the forum state’s

long-arm statute. See Future Tech. Today, 218 F.3d at 1249. Second, if the court

determines that the forum state’s long-arm statute has been satisfied, the court must

then decide whether exercising jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. In determining

whether jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause, the court must ask “(1)

whether [the] defendant has established sufficient ‘minimum contacts’ with the [forum

state]; and (2) whether the exercise of this jurisdiction over [the] defendant would

offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe

Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Only if both prongs of the Due Process

analysis are satisfied may this Court exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident

defendant. Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253, 256 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing

Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990); Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).

Personal jurisdiction “concern[s] the extent of a court’s power over the parties

and the fairness of requiring a party to defend itself in a foreign forum.” Delong Equip.

Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 840 F.2d 843, 857 (11th Cir. 1988). It “represents

a restriction on judicial power . . . as a matter of individual liberty.” Ruhrgas AG v.

Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) (quoting Insurance Corp. of Ireland v.

Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)). Thus, the court must

dismiss an action against a defendant over which it lacks personal jurisdiction. Trans–

Siberian Orchestra, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 1312 (citing Posner, 178 F.3d at 1214 n.6).

III. DISCUSSION

Messner Reeves moves to dismiss Emerald’s First Amended Complaint for lack

of personal jurisdiction. It argues that the Court lacks specific personal jurisdiction

over it because neither Florida’s long-arm statute nor Due Process are satisfied. First,

Messner Reeves argues that Florida’s long-arm statute is not satisfied because the First

Amended Complaint does not allege sufficient facts to establish that Messner Reeves

engaged in activity to subject itself to specific personal jurisdiction. Second, it argues

that its contacts with Florida are insufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause.

A. Florida’s Long-Arm Statute

The Court will first address whether Florida’s long-arm statute has been

satisfied. Under Florida’s long arm-statute, a defendant may be subject to personal

jurisdiction by either: (1) engaging in one of the enumerated acts listed under Florida

Statutes § 48.193(1)(a), thereby subjecting itself to specific personal jurisdiction; or (2)

engaging in substantial and not isolated activity within Florida, as required for general

personal jurisdiction under § 48.193(2).2 Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt., Inc., 789 F.3d

1201, 1203–04 (11th Cir. 2015).

Emerald’s First Amended Complaint alleges the existence of specific

jurisdiction based on two enumerated acts listed under Florida’s long arm statute. Doc.

8 ¶ 66. First, the First Amended Complaint asserts jurisdiction based on tortious acts

Messner Reeves committed in Florida under Florida Statutes § 48.193(1)(a)(2). Id.

2 In its motion to dismiss, Messner Reeves also argues that the First Amended Complaint

fails to allege facts supporting general personal jurisdiction. Emerald does not cite the

general jurisdiction provision of Florida’s long arm statute in its complaint or respond to

Defendant’s argument that general jurisdiction is lacking. As such, general personal

jurisdiction need not be addressed by the Court.

¶¶ 67–76. Next, it asserts jurisdiction based on solicitation activities that Messner

Reeves committed in Florida under Florida Statutes § 48.193(1)(a)(6)(a). Id. ¶¶ 77–90.

1. Tortious Acts

The First Amended Complaint asserts that specific personal jurisdiction over

Messner Reeves exists under Florida Statutes § 48.193(1)(a)(2). Under

§ 48.193(1)(a)(2), specific jurisdiction exists when a cause of action arises out of a

defendant “committing a tortious act” in Florida.

A nonresident defendant commits the tortious act of defamation in Florida for

purposes of § 48.193(1)(a)(2) when he makes “defamatory statements about a Florida

resident . . . on a website,” provided that the website containing the statements is

“accessible and accessed” in Florida.” Jastrjembskaia v. inCruises, LLC, No. 23-12601,

2024 WL 5244786, at *6 (11th Cir. Dec. 30, 2024) (citing Internet Sols. Corp. v. Marshall,

39 So. 3d 1201, 1203, 1206 (Fla. 2010); Dean v. Easterling, No. 3:19-CV-566, 2020 WL

1665482, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2020)); see Catalyst Pharms., Inc. v. Fullerton, 748 F.

App'x 944, 947 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Internet Sols., 39 So. 3d at 1215) (“A party

asserting jurisdiction in Florida over a nonresident defendant for a defamation claim

must make a prima facie showing that the purported defamatory statements were not

merely accessible to, but also ‘accessed by a third party in Florida.’”).

In its motion to dismiss, Messner Reeves argues that the First Amended

Complaint, alleges, in a conclusory manner, that Messner committed tortious acts

affecting Florida residents by publishing false and defamatory statements about a

Florida-based company. Doc. 10 at 5. Messner Reeves further argues that conclusory

allegations that its website was “actually accessed” in Florida are insufficient to

support jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(a)(2). Id.

Emerald responds that the First Amended Complaint alleges that Messner

Reeves’ website was accessible in Florida and actually accessed in Florida by multiple

Florida residents. Doc. 11 at 5. Emerald submits a declaration in support of its

response to the motion to dismiss, in which Jonathan Fodera, President and Chief

Executive Officer of Emerald, states that the defamatory post was accessed by

“numerous individuals within the state of Florida” and he is aware of “multiple people

in Florida who have accessed” the post. Doc. 11-1 ¶ 48.

In its reply, Messner Reeves concedes that Emerald has presented evidence that

Messner Reeves’ website was accessed in Florida. Doc. 15 at 2.

Even though Messner Reeves concedes that Emerald’s allegations that the

website post was accessed in Florida are not conclusory, courts in the Middle District

of Florida have required more specificity than Emerald provided. See Arpaio v. Biden,

No. 8:24-CV-2647, 2025 WL 2591828, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2025) (finding

conclusory the complaint’s allegations that the purported defamatory statements were

“published, opened, read and viewed by third parties in this judicial circuit”); Dean v.

Easterling, No. 3:19-CV-566, 2020 WL 1665482, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2020) (finding

conclusory the complaint’s allegations that “members of the public in the state of

Florida viewed” the purported defamatory statements); Bonczyk v. Levene, No. 6:20-

CV-192, 2020 WL 5803174, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2020) (holding plaintiff must

allege that a specific “person or group in Florida viewed the allegedly defamatory

material, resulting in harm to [it] . . . to give rise to jurisdiction under section

48.193(1)(a)(2)”); Asbury v. Stout, No. 8:25-CV-141, 2025 WL 1906707, at *4 (M.D.

Fla. July 10, 2025) (finding Florida’s long arm statute was not satisfied where plaintiff

failed to allege that a third-party accessed the defamatory communications in

Florida.); see also Catalyst Pharms., Inc. v. Fullerton, No. 16-25365-CIV, 2017 WL

6558397, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2017) (finding conclusory the complaint’s allegations

that the purported defamatory statements “were accessed by [plaintiff] and others in

Florida”), aff'd 748 F. App'x 944, 947 (11th Cir. 2018).

Emerald also argues that Messner Reeves committed a tortious act in Florida

by directing false communications into Florida. Doc. 11 at 5–6. In support of this

argument, Emerald describes an email from January 25, 2024, to Plaintiff’s Florida

counsel—stating that Emerald’s funds remained in its control, which was sent into

Florida and which Emerald argues is a false statement. Id. Plaintiff cites Wendt v.

Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252, 1260 (Fla. 2002).

In Wendt, the Florida Supreme Court states that a defendant does not need to

be physically present in Florida to commit a tortious act for purposes of specific

jurisdiction, rather a tortious act “can occur through the nonresident defendant's

telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida.” However, the Florida

Supreme Court further notes that “the cause of action must arise from the

communications.” Florida courts refer to this connection between the act and the

forum state as “connexity.” Wiggins v. Tigrent, Inc., 147 So. 3d 76, 87 (Fla. 2d DCA

2014). The connexity analysis for defamation actions requires a court to analyze where

the publication occurs. See Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1515 (11th Cir. 1990) (“The

tort of libel is generally held to occur wherever the offending material is circulated.”).

Under Florida law, the tort of defamation is committed in the place where it is

published. Rautenberg v. Falz, 193 So. 3d 924, 929 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016); Casita, L.P. v.

Maplewood Equity Partners L.P., 960 So. 2d 854, 857 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Wiggins, 147

So. 3d at 86 (“Cases involving torts such as defamation, libel, and slander are

especially amenable to [the connexity analysis] because such torts are generally

considered to occur in the state where the tortious statements are published or

directed.”).

Here, the causes of action for defamation in the First Amended Complaint do

not arise from the email Messner Reeves sent to Emerald’s counsel. The January 25,

2024, email concerns an allegedly false statement of similar subject matter as the

purported defamatory website post from February 22, 2024. However, the website

post—not the email—is the tortious conduct at issue. Thus, any connection between

the January 25, 2024, email and the forum state is irrelevant for the connexity analysis.

Thus, Florida’s long-arm statute has not been satisfied under § 48.193(1)(a)(2).

2. Solicitation Activities

The First Amended Complaint also alleges that the Court has personal

jurisdiction over Messner Reeves under Florida Statutes § 48.193(1)(a)(6)(a). Section

48.193(1)(a)(6)(a) confers personal jurisdiction over a defendant that causes “injury to

persons or property within [Florida] arising out of an act or omission by the defendant

outside [Florida], if, at or about the time of the injury,” the defendant “engaged in

solicitation or service activities within [Florida].” The First Amended Complaint

alleges that Defendant solicited money from multiple Florida victims in 2023 pursuant

to a fraudulent scheme.

The Florida Supreme Court held that § 48.193(1)(a)(6) (previously codified as

§ 48.193(1)(f)) applies only when a defendant's out-of-state actions cause personal

injury or damage to physical property in Florida. Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Therm-O-Disc,

Inc., 511 So. 2d 992, 994 (Fla. 1987) (“We hold that the provisions of section

48.193(1)(f) contemplate personal injury or physical property damage.”); Snow v.

DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1318 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The Florida Supreme Court has

held that § 48.193(1)(f) applies only when a defendant's out of state actions cause

personal injury or damage to physical property in the State of Florida.”). Section

48.193(1)(a)(6) does not apply to economic injuries. Williams v. 3RD Home Ltd., No.

-

8:20-CV-1647, 2021 WL 825047, at *7 n.5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2021) (“[M]ere

economic injury without accompanying personal injury or property injury does not

confer personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants under . . .

§ 48.193(1)(a)(6)(a)”).

Here, the First Amended Complaint does not “point to any personal injury or

property damage stemming from” Messner Reeves’ purported solicitation or service

activities in Florida. The First Amended Complaint only alleges economic damages

in the form of reputational harm. Thus, § 48.193(1)(a)(6)(a) does not apply.

Florida’s long-arm statute has not been satisfied.

B. Due Process

Even if Emerald satisfied Florida’s long arm statute, personal jurisdiction over

Messner Reeves does not comport with the Due Process Clause. In specific jurisdiction

cases, courts apply a three-part due process test: (1) the plaintiff's claims “arise out of

or relate to” at least one of the defendant's contacts with the forum; (2) the nonresident

defendant “purposefully availed” itself of the privilege of conducting activities within

the forum state, thus invoking the benefit of the forum state's laws; and (3) the exercise

of personal jurisdiction comports with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice.” Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1355 (11th Cir.

2013). “The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the first two prongs, and if the

plaintiff does so, a defendant must make a compelling case that the exercise of

jurisdiction would violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id.

(citation modified).

The First Amended Complaint alleges that Due Process is satisfied because

Messner Reeves configured its website and SEO to enhance the likelihood that its

defamatory post would be discoverable in Florida. Doc. 8 ¶¶ 69–70. It further alleges

that Messner Reeves’ website targeted Florida residents because the source code of its

website contains “Florida” as a keyword appearing four times. Id. ¶ 71.

Messner Reeves argues that the use of an SEO is a standard in the web design

industry and it did not use its website or SEO to target the statement directly into

Florida. Doc. 10 at 11. Messner Reeves attaches a declaration from its website

developer, Adam Wolf, in support. Doc. 10-5.

Emerald responds that Messner Reeves directed its conduct at Florida by

soliciting money from Florida LLCs, employing Florida residents as intermediaries,

sending false emails and messages into Florida, and publishing a statement about a

Florida business intending to cause reputational harm in Florida. Doc. 11 at 7.

1. Arise Out of or Relate to

The first inquiry is whether the claims “arise out of or relate to” Messner

Reeves’ contacts with Florida. SkyHop Techs., Inc. v. Narra, 58 F.4th 1211, 1229 (11th

Cir. 2023); see Asbury v. Stout, No. 8:25-CV-141, 2025 WL 1906707, at *4 (M.D. Fla.

July 10, 2025). In Asbury, the relevant contacts for a defamation claim under this

inquiry were the defamatory communications—namely emails and an ethics

complaint. Id

Here, the relevant contact for purposes of the defamation claim is the website

post. Emerald’s jurisdictional allegations that Messner Reeves targeted Florida

because it solicited money from Florida LLCs, employed Florida residents as

intermediaries, and sent false messages into Florida are irrelevant. Emerald’s

defamation claims do not arise out of these contacts. The First Amended Complaint

has failed to allege that Messner Reeves’ “[Florida]-based conduct relates to the

claims” in this case. See Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351,

365 (2021).

2. Purposeful Availment

Emerald’s argument that Messner Reeves’ purposefully availed itself to the

jurisdiction of Florida courts is also without merit. To determine whether purposeful

availment has occurred in an intentional tort3 case, there are two applicable tests: “the

effects test and the traditional minimum-contacts test.” SkyHop Techs., Inc., 58 F.4th at

1230.

a. Effects Test

The effects test4 requires a showing that the defendant “(1) committed an

intentional tort (2) that was directly aimed at the forum, (3) causing an injury within

the forum that the defendant should have reasonably anticipated.” Moore v. Cecil, 109

F.4th 1352, 1362 (11th Cir. 2024) (citation modified). The Supreme Court has made

clear that a defendant’s actions do not create sufficient contacts with the forum state

“simply because [it] directed [its] conduct at [a] plaintiff[] whom [it] knew had [forum

state] connections.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 289 (2014). “The fact that [the

plaintiff]—the subject of the out-of-forum speech—resides in Florida is not sufficient

on its own to satisfy the Due Process Clause.” Asbury, 2025 WL 1906707, at *4.

“[W]here there is no evidence that the defendant posted the allegedly defamatory

information hoping to reach the forum state or an audience in the forum state

specifically, then the Calder effects test is not satisfied.” Moore, 109 F.4th at 1364. “[A]

plaintiff must show that the forum state is the ‘focal point’ of the communications in

question by way of evidence that the publication was directed at the state . . . as

opposed to [its] followers or a national audience generally.” Wood v. Netflix, Inc., No.

3 Under Florida law, defamation is an intentional tort. Fla. Dep't of Corr. v. Abril, 969 So. 2d

201, 207 (Fla. 2007).

4 The Supreme Court set forth the “effects test” in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).

8:22-CV-2431, 2025 WL 918078, at *19 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2025); see Delphi

Connection, LLC v. Parisot-Potter, No. 2:24-CV-789, 2025 WL 2652856, at *1 (M.D. Fla.

Sept. 16, 2025).

In Delphi, the court considered whether a series of social media posts targeted

Plaintiff or Florida. Delphi, 2025 WL 2652856, at *5. In that case, the defendant posted

a series of essays on LinkedIn deriding the training program of the plaintiff—a

consulting firm. Id. The Court found that the defendant’s posts targeted the plaintiff

because it derided its training program and the posts were directed at an audience

specifically in Florida when the defendant linked her posts to the personal social media

pages of plaintiff’s principals and published an unredacted invoice containing the

plaintiff’s Florida address. Id.

In order to satisfy the effects test, Emerald must allege that Messner Reeves

posted on its website “hoping to reach the forum state or an audience in the forum

state specifically.” See Moore, 109 F.4th at 1364. The First Amended Complaint alleges

that Messner Reeves targeted Florida through its SEO and source code, which

contains the word Florida four times. However, in its motion to dismiss, Messner

Reeves provided an affidavit5 from its web developer, Adam Wolf, attesting that

Messner Reeves does not use its SEO to specifically target Florida. Doc. 10-5 ¶ 3.

Additionally, Wolf states that although Florida appears in the source code for the web

5 "Because the standard for considering declarations and affidavits is the same, the terms are

used interchangeably throughout this Order." Mulloney v. Polk Cnty. Board of Cnty.

Commissioners, 8:17-CV-2573-CEH-TGW, 2019 WL 13271780, at *5, n.8 (M.D. Fla. 2019).

page four times, so does every other state. Id. ¶ 5. Emerald provided a declaration from

its CEO and President in response, however none of his statements rebut or conflict

with those of Wolf’s to create a “genuine dispute of material jurisdictional fact.” Hinkle

v. Cont'l Motors, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 3d 1312, 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2017) (denying

jurisdictional discovery where the plaintiff did not submit evidence that rebutted

defendant’s affidavits), aff'd sub nom. Hinkle v. Cirrus Design Corp., 775 F. App'x 545

(11th Cir. 2019).

The only evidence supporting purposeful availment is Messner Reeves naming

Emerald in its alleged defamatory website post: “Messner Reeves LLP deeply values

its reputation for excellence and, therefore, issues this statement in response to the

Emerald Consulting Partners LLC lawsuit.” Unlike the defamatory post in Delphi,

nothing indicates that the post targeted Emerald or Florida. The post does not contain

mention of Florida and discusses Emerald in the context of a lawsuit between the

parties. Additionally, the lawsuit was filed in California state court. Doc. 10, Exhibit

A. Messner Reeves’ post is only connected to the forum because it mentions Emerald

who is a citizen of the forum. Since the “plaintiff cannot be the only link between the

defendant and the forum,” Walden, 571 U.S. at 289, Emerald has not satisfied the

effects test.

b. Minimum Contacts Test

Emerald’s arguments similarly fail under the minimum contacts test. Under the

minimum contacts test for purposeful availment, the court looks at a nonresident

defendant's contacts with the forum state and asks whether those contacts: “(1) are

related to the plaintiff's cause of action; (2) involve some act by which the defendant

purposefully availed himself of the privileges of doing business within the forum; and

(3) are such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in

the forum.” Louis Vuitton, 736 F.3d at 1357. In Louis Vuitton, the Eleventh Circuit

analyzed whether a defendant’s website purposefully availed defendant to jurisdiction

in Florida where the website was used to sell alleged counterfeit goods. The court

found purposeful availment under the minimum contacts test because the defendant

operated a fully interactive website accessible in Florida, sold and distributed infringed

goods through this website to Florida consumers, and the cause of action derived

directly from those contacts.

Other courts have also looked at whether a website is active or passive in order

to determine the issue of purposeful availment where the website is the only

connection the defendant has to a forum. See e.g., Miller v. Berman, 289 F. Supp. 2d

1327, 1335 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (“[C]ase law on this subject suggests that a Court must

look at the nature of a website and the commercial activity actually being conducted

over a website in order to determine whether personal jurisdiction can be

constitutionally exercised.”); Internet Sols. Corp, 2010 WL 11617855, at *3 (“The

constitutionality of basing personal jurisdiction on Internet activity has been analyzed

in light of the interaction between the host and the user and the commercial nature of

the Web site.”). At one end of the spectrum are active websites that conduct business

over the internet with individuals from foreign jurisdictions. See Hartoy Inc. v.

Thompson, No. 02-80454-CIV, 2003 WL 21468079, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2003). At

the other end of the spectrum are passive websites which simply provide information

which can be accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. See id. “[P]assive websites . . .

are not grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.” Einmo v. Aecom Gov't Servs.,

Inc., No. 8:06-CV-1371, 2007 WL 2409816, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2007). While

this test is not binding in this jurisdiction, it is a factor this Court may take into account.

See Phazzer Elecs., Inc. v. Protective Sols., Inc., No. 6:15-CV-348, 2016 WL 3543638, at

*5 n.9 (M.D. Fla. June 29, 2016).

Turning to the analysis of the commercial nature of the website, Emerald does

not allege that there is any commercial activity associated with the website. The

website only provides information to users in foreign jurisdictions. It does not allow

consumers “to purchase items or enter into a contract online.” See Full Sail, Inc. v.

Spevack, No. 6:03-CV-887, 2003 WL 25277185, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 21, 2003). The

website post only mentions Emerald in the context of a lawsuit between the parties

which occurred outside of Florida. Under the minimum contacts test, Defendant has

not purposefully directed its activities towards Florida in such a way that it could

reasonably anticipate being haled into Florida court.

Thus, Emerald has failed to allege sufficient facts to show Messner Reeves

purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Florida through

either the effects or minimum contacts test.

3. Fair Play and Substantial Justice

In determining whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident

defendant comports with fair play and substantial justice, a court considers “(1) the

burden on the defendant; (2) the forum's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the

plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; and (4) the judicial

system's interest in resolving the dispute.” Louis Vuitton, 736 F.3d at 1358 (citation

modified).

Messner Reeves argues that defending this lawsuit in Florida imposes an undue

burden on it because it is headquartered in Colorado and has no offices or attorneys in

Florida. Doc. 10 at 13. It also argues that the underlying lawsuit at issue in this

defamation action was filed in California, thus Florida has little interest in adjudicating

this dispute beyond the fact that Plaintiff is a Florida company. Id.

Emerald argues that litigating in Florida imposes no undue burden because

Messner Reeves is a national law firm with more than 140 attorneys and multiple

offices across the world. Doc. 11 at 8. Additionally, Emerald argues that personal

jurisdiction over Messner Reeves does not impose an undue burden because Messner

Reeves reached into Florida to solicit money, used Florida agents to do so, and

defamed a Florida company. Id. Emerald further argues that Florida has an interest in

protecting its residents from out-of-state fraud and defamation. Id.

Since Emerald has failed to meet its burden of showing the first two prongs of

the Due Process test, the Court need not address whether Messner Reeves made a

“compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would violate traditional notions of

fair play and substantial justice.” Louis Vuitton, 736 F.3d at 1355.

Emerald has failed to allege facts satisfying Due Process for purposes of

personal jurisdiction. Defendant is not subject to the jurisdiction of a Florida court on

the claims alleged tn this case.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. Defendant Messner Reeves, LLP’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended

Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Doc. 10) is GRANTED. Plaintiff

Emerald Consulting Partners, LLC’s action is dismissed without prejudice for lack of

personal jurisdiction.

DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on July 14, 2026.

Chak era andas Mong A gl yell □□

Charlene Edwards Honeywell

United States District Judge

Copies to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Parties, if any

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