Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

ROLANDO ROMIRO

MONTEAGUDO,

Petitioner,

v. Case No.: 2:26-cv-01785-SPC-KRH

MATTHEW MORDANT et al.,

Respondents,

/

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are petitioner Rolando Romiro Monteagudo’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) and the government’s response (Doc. 5).

Monteagudo is a native of Cuba who entered the United States on

December 24, 1970, and later became a lawful permanent resident. On March

9, 2010, the Department of Homeland Security charged him as removable due

to multiple drug convictions. An immigration judge ordered him removed to

Cuba on September 10, 2012. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)

released Monteagudo under an order of supervision in August 2013.

On August 13, 2025, ICE arrested Monteagudo in a targeted operation.

In March 2026, ICE unsuccessfully attempted to remove Monteagudo to

Mexico. The government claims Monteagudo failed to comply but does not

explain how. In any event, ICE returned Monteagudo to Florida. He is

currently detained at Glades County Detention Center.

“Once a noncitizen’s order of removal becomes administratively final, the

Government ‘shall’ remove the person within 90 days.” Singh v. U.S. Attorney

Gen., 945 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)).

The government must detain the noncitizen during the 90-day removal period,

which begins when the removal order becomes administratively final. Id.

Detention may continue after the removal period, but not indefinitely.

In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held, “if removal is not

reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention

unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.” 533 U.S. 678, 700-01

(2001). If removal is not practically attainable, detention no longer serves its

statutory purpose of “assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.”

Id. at 699. The Court found it unlikely Congress “believed that all reasonably

foreseeably removals could be accomplished in [90 days].” Id at 701. So, “for

the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts,” it established a

“presumptively reasonable period of detention” of six months—the 90-day

removal period plus an additional 90 days. Id. Courts use a burden-shifting

framework to judge the constitutionality of additional post-removal detention:

After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe

that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence

sufficient to rebut the showing.

Id.

Because the six-month period for presumptively reasonable detention

has expired, Zadvydas’s burden-shifting framework applies. Monteagudo has

carried his initial burden by showing a good reason to believe there is no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. ICE

cannot remove him to Cuba, and there is no indication any other country has

agreed to accept him.

The burden thus shifts to the government. ICE points to its March 2026

attempt to send Monteagudo to Mexico. But the evidence before the Court

suggests that was an informal effort to compel voluntary departure, not an

above-board removal attempt that complied with statutory and constitutional

requirements. See Andriasian v. Immigr. and Naturalization Servs., 180 F.3d

1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Failing to notify individuals who are subject to

deportation that they have the right to apply for asylum in the United States

and for withholding of deportation to the country to which they will be deported

violates both INS regulations and the constitutional right to due process.”); see

also D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2026 WL

521557 (D. Mass. Feb. 25, 2026) (setting aside DHS’s current third-country

removal policy because it violates noncitizens’ right to seek fear-based relief

under the Convention Against Torture). ICE makes no attempt to show it can

lawfully remove Monteagudo in the reasonably foreseeable future.

The Court finds no significant likelihood Monteagudo will be removed in

the reasonably foreseeable future. He is entitled to release from detention

under Zadvydas. If removal becomes likely in the reasonably foreseeable

future, ICE can detain Monteagudo to “assur[e] [his] presence at the moment

of removal.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 680.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:

Rolando Romiro Monteagudo’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc.

1) is GRANTED.

1. The respondent shall release Monteagudo within 24 hours of this

Order and provide him telephone access so he can arrange his

transportation from the facility.

2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate any pending motions and

deadlines, enter judgment, and close this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on July 14, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SA: FTMP-1

Copies: All Parties of Record