Buckman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 1:26-cv-23595-RKA

JAMES BUCKMAN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,

Defendant.

______________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION DISMISSING NOTICE OF REMOVAL

THIS CAUSE is before the Court sua sponte upon review of pro se Plaintiffs Notice of

Removal and related filings. [ECF Nos. 1, 12, 19–24, 26–27, 30–32]. For the reasons expressed

below the Undersigned RECOMMENDS1 that Plaintiffs’ Notice of Removal [ECF Nos. 1, 12]

be DISMISSED and the case REMANDED to state court.

BACKGROUND

This is not the first time that a federal action has been filed in this Court to prevent the

foreclosure sale of the property that is the subject of this lawsuit. On February 25, 2026, United

States District Judge Jose Martinez described the case history in Wells et al. v. US Bank, National

Association, et al., as follows:

The instant suit is not Plaintiffs’ first attempt at seeking federal court review of a

state foreclosure action, … Plaintiffs’ claims arise from a decades-long dispute

concerning state foreclosure proceedings for the real property located at 15020

South River Drive, Miami, Florida 33167 (the “Property”). See U.S. Bank (na) v.

Williams, Case No. 2020-61928-CA-01 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct.). After prolonged

litigation where Plaintiffs and their compatriots repeatedly stymied the sale of the

Property by filing for bankruptcy on the eve of the scheduled sale, the Property

was finally sold on October 16, 2023. In their lengthy Corrected Amended

Complaint [ECF No. 16], Plaintiffs allege a conspiracy of bribery and corruption

among banks, financial institutions, Miami-Dade County officials, and members

1 This matter was originally assigned to the undersigned magistrate judge and was reassigned to

the Honorable Roy K. Altman on May 28, 2026, at Plaintiffs’ request. [ECF No. 11].

of the Florida judiciary to steal Plaintiffs’ Property. As best as the Court can

decipher, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that Defendants wrongfully foreclosed on

their Property, violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Real Estate

Settlement Procedures Act, committed fraud, took bribes, and discriminated

against Plaintiffs based on race, religion, and ability. (See generally Am. Compl.).

Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment, injunctive and equitable relief, and

compensatory, special, general, and punitive damages.

Wells et al. v. US Bank, National Association, et al., Case No. 23-cv-22640-JEM (S.D. Fla. Feb.

25, 2026), ECF No. 90 at 2, 3.

The Plaintiffs in that case were Mack Wells and Maurice Symonette. The case was initially

dismissed without prejudice. Among other reasons for dismissal, Judge Martinez found the claims

were “inextricably intertwined with the state court’s final judgment of foreclosure” because the

claims all stemmed from the contention that the state foreclosure judgment was improper. [Id. at

9]. The requested relief from the foreclosure judgment would run afoul of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, because it requested the Court overturn a state court final judgment of foreclosure. [Id.

at 8–9]. The Court expressed doubts that Wells and Symonette would be able to restate their

allegations in a manner that could remedy these flaws. [Id. at 20]

Undaunted, Wells and Symonette continued to amend their complaint without first

obtaining leave from the Court. After their third amended complaint failed to cure the deficiencies

in their prior attempts, and noting that Wells and Symonette had attempted to join a new plaintiff

for unknown reasons, Judge Martinez dismissed the case with prejudice for failure to comply with

court orders and repeated failure to cure pleading deficiencies and Wells and Symonette were

“restricted from filing anything further on the docket in [the] case without first obtaining leave of

Court.” Wells et al. v. US Bank, National Association, et al., Case No. 23-cv-22640-JEM (S.D.

Fla. May 19, 2026), ECF No. 93 at 2.

In the present case, on May 21, 2026, Plaintiffs James Buckman, Curtis McNeal, and

Micahiel Nichloson filed a Notice of Removal seeking a stay in eviction proceedings and a

temporary restraining order for the very same property. See [ECF No. 1] (emphasis added). In their

Notice of Removal, Plaintiffs take issue with an order signed by Miami-Dade County Circuit Judge

Spencer Eig directing that the occupants of the property located at 15020 South River Drive,

Miami, Florida 33167 be evicted on May 18, 2026. See [id. at 2]. They contend that the eviction

violates an automatic bankruptcy stay and is inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause Article VI

Clause 2 of the United States Constitution. See [id.].

On June 9, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a new Notice of Removal that was substantively the same

as the previous one. See [ECF No. 12]. However, in this Notice, Mack Wells and Maurice

Symonette were added as plaintiffs, and James Buckman and Micahiel Nicholson were removed.

See [id. at 1]. In addition, just as they have in prior cases, Wells and Symonette make accusations

concerning biases and conflicts of interest held by individuals involved in the state proceedings.

See [id. at 3, 6–7, 8, 11–12].

After reviewing the Notice of Removal and related attachments, the undersigned ordered

Plaintiffs to file a clear statement explaining this Court’s basis for exercising subject matter

jurisdiction over the claims asserted by the Notice of Removal. See [ECF No. 17]. On June 22,

2026, Mack Wells and Maurice Symonette filed a jurisdictional memorandum. See [ECF No. 22].

The following day, Plaintiffs filed an emergency motion to enforce a bankruptcy automatic stay

and seeking a temporary restraining order preventing an eviction, along with several notices of

filing exhibits. See [ECF Nos. 26, 27, 30, 31, 32].

LEGAL STANDARD

“A federal court not only has the power but also the obligation at any time to inquire into

jurisdiction whenever the possibility that jurisdiction does not exist arises.” Fitzgerald v. Seaboard

Sys. R.R., Inc., 760 F.2d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). It is, in fact, the Court’s

responsibility to “zealously ensure that jurisdiction exists over a case.” Smith v. GTE Corp., 236

F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001).

“Because removal is only permissible when [the] plaintiff’s claim could have been filed in

federal court originally, we must look to [the] plaintiff’s claim to determine whether removal was

appropriate.” Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994). To remove a case

to federal court under federal question jurisdiction, the plaintiff’s complaint must establish that the

case arises under federal law. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207–08 (2004) (emphasis

in original) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of the State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S.

Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983)). “[A] district court can remand a removed case back to state court

only if it determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, or if a party moves to remand the case

because of a defect in the removal process.” Ficus Villas Condo Assoc., Inc. v. Hardford Steam

Boiler Inspection and Ins. Co., 832 F. App’x 695, 695 (11th Cir. 2020).

Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se. A “pro se [filing], however inartfully pleaded, must be

held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erikson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Still, while we treat pro se litigants with some leniency, “this leniency does

not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient

pleading in order to sustain an action.” Schwarz v. Ga. Composite Med. Bd., 2021 WL 4519893,

at *2 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting GJR Inv., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th

Cir. 1998)).

DISCUSSION

Just as in Wells and Symonette’s prior case before Judge Martinez, the Court lacks subject-

matter jurisdiction to hear this case. “There are two bases of federal court subject matter

jurisdiction[:] One, diversity jurisdiction,” and “[t]he other, federal question jurisdiction[.]”

Blankenship v. Claus, 149 F. App’x 897, 898 (11th Cir. 2005). Federal-question jurisdiction—as

provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1331—doesn’t exist here because this is an eviction and foreclosure

action governed by Florida—not federal—law. See PMG-Greybrook Riverfront I, LLC v.

D'Amato, No. 23-CV-60866-RAR, 2023 WL 3369721, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 10, 2023) (“Federal

courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over state eviction proceedings, so this case was

improperly removed to this Court.”) (collecting cases).

To support their assertion of federal question jurisdiction, Plaintiffs reference the United

States Constitution, several federal statutes, bankruptcy authorities, and United States Supreme

Court authorities. [ECF No. 12 at 3–4, 7, 8–10, 12]. However, mere labels or general assertions

are insufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction. See, e.g., Crooked Creek Props., Inc. v.

Ensley, 660 F. App’x 719, 720 (11th Cir. 2016) (noting that “an allegation that the district court

had ‘jurisdiction and broad powers to remedy violations of the federal Constitution’ was

insufficient to invoke federal-question jurisdiction because the Complaint did not plead ‘a

colorable claim “arising under” the Constitution or laws of the United States.’” (quoting Arbaugh

v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006)); Verardi v. Mercedes-Benz Fin. Servs. USA, LLC, No.

24-CV-23391, 2024 WL 4554096, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 23, 2024) (“Though [the] [p]laintiff makes

conclusory statements that this Court has jurisdiction based on ‘equity principles’, this is not

sufficient to plead jurisdiction. Nor is it sufficient to simply state that [the] [d]efendant has violated

a federal statute or the constitution.”); Brown v. Girgenti, No. 24-CV-02061, 2024 WL 4520171,

at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4517800 (M.D.

Fla. Oct. 17, 2024) 2 (“Listing many statutes without explaining how they connect to [the

plaintiff]’s claims is conclusory and insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction.”).

Further, Plaintiffs’ jurisdictional memorandum fails to explain why this Court has

jurisdiction over the matter as it merely provides the Court with a summary of the foreclosure

proceedings. [ECF No. 22]. Interestingly, the jurisdictional memorandum Plaintiffs filed appears

to have come from another case. Plaintiffs Maurice Symonette and Mack Wells seem to be

responding to a court order dated August 3, 2023—but the undersigned requested Plaintiffs file a

jurisdictional memorandum on June 11, 2026. See [id.]. Similarly, the notices of exhibits

attempting to establish subject matter jurisdiction fail to do so. See [ECF No. 27] (showing several

court documents including recusal orders filed in other cases); see [ECF No. 30] (attaching several

websites involving U.S. Bank); see [ECF No. 31] (attaching several court documents filed in other

actions). From Plaintiffs own filings it appears that they are attempting to litigate other cases they

brought in this Court by filing documents in this action. For example, Plaintiffs filed a motion for

reconsideration, see [ECF No. 19], however they are asking the Court to reconsider a decision

made in Case No. 26-cv-23512. [Id. at 2].

In addition, to the extent Plaintiffs seek enforcement of a bankruptcy court stay, Plaintiffs

should seek such relief from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida. “While

district courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims for violation of the automatic stay, such

matters—like all proceedings arising under title 11—may be referred to the bankruptcy court for

that district. . . . Indeed, such referrals appear to be preferred.” Thompson v. Citimortgage, Inc.,

No. 1:14-CV-02528-AT-AJB, 2015 WL 11578454, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 12, 2015), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 1:14-CV-2528-AT, 2015 WL 11605498 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 10, 2015)

(internal citations omitted). Moreover, the Court notes that the notice of bankruptcy case filing is

dated October 15, 2023. [ECF No. 31 at 4]. This is the same notice Plaintiffs used in their previous

case in front of Judge Martinez. See Wells et al. v. US Bank, National Association, et al., Case No.

23-cv-22640-JEM, ECF No. 90 at 3; ECF No. 92-1 at 33. This case appears to be a repeat of their

prior attempt to interfere with the state’s final judgement of foreclosure and circumvent Judge

Martinez’s final ruling dismissing Plaintiffs’ case.

In sum, this is a straightforward state court action under Florida law relating to the

foreclosure and eviction proceedings concerning the property located at 15020 South River Drive,

Miami, Florida 33167. This Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this action.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffs’ Verified Notice of

Removal, Emergency Notice of Federal Stay Under 28 U.S.C. 1446(d), Emergency Motion to Stay

Eviction, Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, and Notice of Supremacy Clause Article VI

Clause 2 of the Constitution Violations [ECF Nos. 1, 12] be REMANDED and all other motions

DENIED.

Pursuant to Local Magistrate Rule 4(b), the parties have fourteen (14) days from the date

of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation within which to file written

objections, if any, with the assigned United States District Judge. Failure to timely file objections

shall bar the parties from a de novo determination by the District Judge of an issue covered in the

Report and shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal unobjected-to factual and legal

conclusions contained in this Report, except on grounds of plain error if necessary in the interest

of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson,

885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1.

SIGNED this 29th day of June 2026.

LISETTE M. REID

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ce: Plaintiffs, pro se.