Reyling

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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JACQUELINE REYLING, as natural guardian to

B.R., an infant, KEITH REYLING, as natural

guardian to B.R., an infant,

Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM

AND ORDER

-against- CV 23-0266 (RER) (AYS)

THREE VILLAGE CENTRAL SCHOOL

DISTRICT, THREE VILLAGE CENTRAL

SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION,

WILLIAM BERNHARD, and JOHN AND JANE

DOES,

Defendants.

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SHIELDS, United States Magistrate Judge:

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ application for an award of attorney’s fees and costs,

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, as part of a sanctions order issued by this Court.

Plaintiffs seek $183,393.61 in attorney’s fees and $704.00 in costs. Defendants oppose Plaintiffs’

motion and request that the fee application be either denied in its entirety or reduced by ninety

percent (90%). For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees and costs is

granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

Familiarity with the facts of this action is presumed. By Order dated June 10, 2025, this

Court rendered a decision on a discovery motion for sanctions brought by Plaintiffs (the

“Discovery Order”). The Discovery Order found that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 37, Plaintiffs were entitled to their reasonable attorney’s fees and costs with respect to

certain witness statements that were either belatedly produced by Defendants or not produced at

all. No attorney’s fees or costs were awarded with respect to the part of Plaintiffs’ motion for

sanctions that was withdrawn – i.e., the portion pertaining to alleged spoliation of video footage.

Plaintiffs were directed to submit their application for fees and costs by June 24, 2025. (Order of

Shields, M.J., dated June 10, 2025.)

Defendants appealed the Discovery Order to the District Court on July 8, 2025. (DE

[101].) In light of that appeal, the parties were afforded numerous extensions of time to file and

oppose Plaintiffs’ fee application. Ultimately, the fully-briefed motion for attorney’s fees and

costs was filed on November 19, 2025. (DE [111]. On April 17, 2026, the District Court denied

Defendants’ appeal of the Discovery Order. (Order of Reyes, J., dated Apr. 17, 2026.)

By the within motion, Plaintiffs seek $183,393.61 in attorney’s fees and $704.00 in costs

in accordance with the Discovery Order. Defendants oppose Plaintiffs’ application on several

grounds: (1) that the hourly rates requested are not reasonable; (2) that the hours expended by

Plaintiffs’ counsel are excessive; (3) that reimbursement is sought for hours unrelated to the

Discovery Order; (4) that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s billing entries are vague and duplicative; and, (5)

that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s use of quarter-hour billing is unreasonable and excessive. Defendants

request that the motion be denied in its entirety or that the fees sought be reduced by ninety

percent (90%). (DE [112].) The Court now turns to the merits of the motion.

DICUSSION

I. Legal Standard

In the Second Circuit, the “starting point” for calculating a “presumptively reasonable

fee,” is “the lodestar – the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of

hours required by the case.” Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011)

(“Both this Court and the Supreme Court have held that the lodestar – the product of a

reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of hours required by the case – creates a

‘presumptively reasonable fee.’”) (quoting Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Assoc.

v. County of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir. 2008)). The Supreme Court has held that “the

lodestar method produces an award that roughly approximates the fee that the prevailing attorney

would have received if he or she had been representing a paying client who was billed by the

hour in a comparable case.” Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 551 (2010) (emphasis in

original). “[T]he lodestar figure includes most, if not all, of the relevant factors constituting a

‘reasonable attorney’s fee.’” Id. at 553 (citation omitted); see also Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190-91

(holding that a court determines a “presumptively reasonable fee” by considering case specific

factors in order to establish a reasonable hourly rate that a “reasonable, paying client would be

willing to pay,” and then multiplying that rate by the number of reasonable hours). This

assessment is undertaken “bear[ing] in mind that a reasonable, paying client wishes to spend the

minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively.” Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190.

The reasonableness of hourly rates is guided by the market rate “[p]revailing in the

community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and

reputation,” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984), and the relevant community is

generally the “district in which the court sits.” Polk v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 722

F.2d 23, 25 (2d Cir. 1983). Moreover, “[t]he burden is on the party seeking attorney’s fees to

submit sufficient evidence to support the hours worked and the rates claimed,” Hugee v. Kimso

Apartments, LLC, 852 F. Supp. 2d 281, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), and this Circuit requires

contemporaneous billing records for each attorney who worked on the action. See Scott v. City

of New York, 643 F.3d 56, 57 (2d Cir. 2011). Finally, there is a “strong presumption” that the

lodestar represents the appropriate award, though “enhancements may be awarded in rare and

exceptional circumstances.” Perdue, 559 U.S. at 552.

II. Plaintiffs’ Application

Plaintiffs seek $183,393.61 in attorney’s fees. In support of their motion, Plaintiffs have

submitted the Declaration of Cheryl L. Berger (“Berger”), dated August 28, 2025 (“Berger

Decl.”), and the Supplemental Reply Declaration of Cheryl L. Berger, dated April 23, 2026,

(“Supplemental Berger Decl.”), as well as contemporaneous billing records. (DE [111-2], [111-

3], [119], [119-1].) Plaintiffs seek reimbursement for attorney services rendered at the following

rates: (1) $596.56 per hour for Berger, a partner, for services rendered prior to February 3, 2026,

and $650.00 per hour for services rendered after February 3, 2026; (2) $492.81 for Leah Johnson

(“Johnson”), an associate; (3) $492.81 per hour for Claudia Cannam (“Cannam”), an associate,

for services rendered prior to February 3, 2026, and $500.00 per hour for services rendered after

February 3, 2026; (4) $337.19 per hour for Joseph Abergail, a law clerk; (5) $337.19 per hour for

“law interns” Luke Lentini (“Lentini”) and Robert Traveso (“Traveso”); (6) $337.19 per hour for

Suzanne Damante (“Damante”), Lauren Rios (“Rios”), and Rachel Grossbard (“Grossbard”), all

paralegals, for services rendered prior to February 3, 2026, and $350.00 per hour for services

rendered after February 3, 2026; and, (7) $337.19 per hour for Amira Elmansoury

(“Elmansoury”), who is described as providing “law firm support to the attorneys and staff.”

(Berger Decl. 94; Supplemental Berger Decl. ¶ 12-13 and Ex. 1, annexed thereto.) Plaintiffs seek

reimbursement for costs in the amount of $704.00.

As to attorney time, Plaintiffs’ motion states that attorneys and staff expended the

following hours on this matter: (1) Berger = 259.55; (2) Johnson = 7.25; (3) Cannam = 14.5; (4)

Abergail = 1.75; (5) Lentini = 0.25; (6) Traveso = 0.25; (7) Damante = 20.25; (8) Rios = 20.45;

(9) Grossbard = 0.75; and, (10) Elmansoury = 5.75. (Berger Decl. ¶ 94; Supplemental Berger

Decl., Ex. 1.) The total attorney and staff time expended on this action by Plaintiffs’ counsel

amounts to 330.75 hours.

III. Disposition of the Motion

A. Hourly Rates

Presumptively reasonable hourly rates in this District are currently “$450-$650

for partners, $300-$450 for senior associates, $150-$300 for junior associates, and $100-$150 for

paralegals.” Rubin v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 763 F. Supp. 3d 233, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2025).

However, “[t]he determination of what constitutes a reasonable hourly rate also requires the

submission of information concerning the credentials or experience of counsel applying for

fees.” Fuchs v. Tara Gen. Contracting, Inc., No. CV 06-1282, 2009 WL 3756655, at *2

(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Where information

concerning the credentials or experience of counsel has not been provided, “a deduction of the

hourly rates is warranted.” RCB Equities No. 3, LLC v. Alma Bldg., LLC, No. 11 CV 1004,

2012 WL 832263, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2012) (citing Molefi v. Oppenheimer Trust, No. 03

CV 5631, 2007 WL 538547, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2007)), adopted as modified by, 2012 WL

832286 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2012); see also Fuchs, 2009 WL 3756655, at *2 (“Where such

information is lacking, the court may reduce the award of attorney’s fees accordingly.”); Night

Hawk Ltd. v. Briarpatch Ltd., No. 03 Civ. 1382, 2004 WL 1375558, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 17,

2004) (“[W]here no information is provided concerning the credentials or experience of counsel

applying for fees, it is appropriate to reduce the amount of a fee award sought.”).

Here, while Plaintiffs have submitted contemporaneous billing records in support of

their motion, they only provided credentials and background information for certain attorneys

and paralegals. Specifically, Plaintiffs only provided background information and credentials for

Berger and Cannam and limited information for Damante, Rios, Grossbard, and Elmansoury. No

information whatsoever was provided for Johnson, Abergail, or the “law interns” Lentini and

Traveso. While Plaintiffs did provide background information for Johnson in their reply

submission, after being advised of the omission by Defendants, such information should have

been included in their moving papers.1

In light of the failure to provide background information for numerous individuals who

billed time to this action, as well as the fact that the hourly rates sought by Plaintiffs are either at

the upper end or above the accepted range in this district, the Court awards Plaintiffs fees at the

following rates: (1) Berger (partner) = $450.00 per hour; (2) Johnson and Cannam (associates) =

$150.00 per hour; (3) Abergail (law clerk) = $100.00 per hour2; (4) Lentini and Traveso (“law

interns”) = $100 per hour3; (5) Damante, Rios and Grossbard (paralegals) = $100.00 per hour;

and (6) Elmounsary (support staff) = $100.00 per hour.

B. Reasonableness of Hours Sought

As stated above, “[a]n application for attorney’s fees must be supported ‘by

accurate, detailed, and contemporaneous time records.’” Datiz, 2020 WL 5899881, at *9

1 There is also much dispute among the parties about a timekeeper listed in the billing records

with the initials “NMD.” No background information was originally provided for this individual;

however, Berger’s Reply Declaration, (DE [115-1]), identifies her as Natalie Donaldson

(“Donaldson”), an associate. Donaldson, who appears to have only billed 0.5 hours to this

matter, is not included in the chart of timekeepers set forth in Plaintiffs’ memorandum of law and

was not originally identified by Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Court is disregarding her hours

altogether.

2 As no background information is provided for Abergail, the Court assumes he is a “law school

graduate who ha[s] not yet been admitted to the practice of law.” Gao v. Jian Song Shi, No. 18

CV 2708, 2021 WL 1949275, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2021) (citing Douyon v. NY Med.

Health Care, P.C., 49 F. Supp. 3d 328, 347 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). “In this district, fees for law clerks

are awarded at the same rates as legal assistants and support staff.” Gao, 2021 WL 1949275, at

*19 (collecting cases).

3 “Law students ‘are generally billed at rates similar to those of paralegals.’” Mary Jo C. v.

Dinapoli, No. 09-CV-5635, 2014 WL 7334863, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2014) (quoting Larsen

v. JBC Legal Group, P.C., 588 F. Supp. 2d 360, 364 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)).

(quoting LaBarbera v. ASTC Labs, Inc., 752 F. Supp. 2d 263, 277 (E.D.NY. 2010)) (additional

citation omitted). “Hours that are ‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary,’ are to be

excluded, and in dealing with such surplusage, the court has the discretion simply to deduct a

reasonable percentage of the number of hours claimed ‘as a practical means of trimming fat from

the fee application.’” Dagostino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 3d 404, 413 (E.D.N.Y.

2017) (quoting Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 173 (2d Cir. 1998)).

A review of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s billing records demonstrates that a large portion of the

hours for which reimbursement is sought pertain to work unrelated to the missing and belatedly

produced witness statements – the only issues for which sanctions were awarded. In addition,

fees are sought for hours expended on Plaintiffs’ spoliation motion, which was withdrawn by

Plaintiffs, (DE [91]), and for which the Court specifically stated that no attorney’s fees or costs

were awarded. (Discovery Order dated June 10, 2025.) Moreover, the Court finds a large portion

of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s billing records to be vague, duplicative, and overstaffed, warranting a

reduction. See Lochren v. County of Suffolk, 344 F. App’x 706, 709 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming

25% reduction in hours billed “because plaintiffs overstaffed the case, resulting in needless

duplication of work”); Serin v. N. Leasing Systems, Inc., No. 06-cv-1625, 2011 WL 147560, at

*6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2011), aff’d 501 F. App’x 39 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating that “unspecific or

vague records are generally removed” from a fee application and noting that “can be

accomplished through excision of the vague entries or reducing the total hours by a flat

percentage”).

For all these reasons, this Court is making an across-the-board deduction of fifty percent

(50%). See Smith v. City of New York, No. 19-cv-6198, 2022 WL 939711, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.

28, 2022) (“Where entries on a time sheet are vague or duplicative or otherwise insufficient, a

court need not itemize individual entries as excessive; rather, it may make an ‘across-the-board

reduction, or percentage cut, in the amount of hours.’”) (quoting Martinez v. City of New York,

330 F.R.D. 60, 72 (E.D.N.Y. 2019)); T.S. Haulers, Inc. v. Cardinale. No. 09 CV 0451, 2011 WL

344759, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2011) (“In reducing the ‘lodestar’ amount, the court may

exclude the excessive and unreasonable hours from its calculation by making an across-the-board

reduction, or percentage cut, in the amount of hours.”) (citing Green v. City of New York, 403

Fed. App’x 626, 630 (2d Cir. 2010)). Applying the foregoing reductions, the Court finds that

Plaintiffs are entitled to $62,509.00 in attorney’s fees as a sanction for Defendants’ conduct

herein, in accordance with the Discovery Order dated June 10, 2025.

C. Costs

Plaintiffs also seek reimbursement of their costs in the amount of $704.00.

However, documentation of such costs is only provided for mailing and postage expenses of

$245.51. (DE [111-3], [119-2].) No description or documentation of the remaining costs has

been submitted by Plaintiffs.

Reasonable and identifiable out-of-pocket disbursements ordinarily charged to clients are

recoverable. See LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 763 (2d Cir. 1998). However, the

party seeking to recover costs “bears the burden of adequately documenting and itemizing the

costs requested.” Ganci v. U.S. Limousine Serv. Ltd., No. 10-cv-3027, 2015 WL 1529772, at *8

(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2015) (citation omitted). “Courts have repeatedly . . . refused to award costs

absent supporting documentation.” Farrington v. Jewish Voice Inc., No. 21-CV-1575, 2022 WL

541645, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As

Plaintiffs only provided documentary proof of $241.45 in costs, that is all the Court will award.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs are awarded $62,509.00 in attorney’s fees and $241.45

in costs as a sanctions award for Defendants’ conduct herein, as set forth in the Discovery Order.

Defendants shall make payment to Plaintiffs’ counsel within two (2) weeks of the date of this

Order.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: Central Islip, New York

July 22, 2026

/s/ Anne Y. Shields

ANNE Y. SHIELDS

United States Magistrate Judge