RORVIK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EINAR BRADFORD RORVIK, JR., :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-CV-1833

:

BUCKS COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA, :

et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

Pappert, J. July 15, 2026

Einar Bradford Rorvik, Jr. filed this pro se civil action claiming his constitutional

rights were violated in connection with his eviction from a rental property and

subsequent criminal prosecution. After filing his initial Complaint, he filed an

Amended Complaint1 (Dkt. No. 8) and paid the filing fee. For the following reasons, the

Court will deny his request to proceed in forma pauperis as moot because he has paid

the filing fee in full and dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915A.

1 An amended complaint, once submitted to the Court, serves as the governing

pleading in the case because an amended complaint supersedes the prior pleading. See

Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 82 (3d Cir. 2019) (“In general, an amended pleading

supersedes the original pleading and renders the original pleading a nullity. Thus, the

most recently filed amended complaint becomes the operative pleading.” (internal citations

omitted)), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1611 (2020); see also Argentina v. Gillette, 778 F. App’x

173, 175 n.3 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that “liberal construction of a pro se amended complaint

does not mean accumulating allegations from superseded pleadings”). In the caption of his

amended complaint, Rorvik wrote “Bucks County, Pennsylvania, et al., defendants” but he

did not include the names of any additional defendants. He refers to “Defendants”

throughout the Amended Complaint and mentions the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,

Judge Jordan Yaeger, Landlord Anthony Indelicato, his ex-wife, and her attorney, and

Perkasie and Pennridge Police Departments and unidentified police officers who work for

those departments. (Dkt. No. 8 at 8, 10-11, 15, 6.) Although he did not specifically name

these defendants in the caption, the Court will liberally construe his pro se Amended

Complaint and address the claims against them.

I2

Rorvik’s claims appears to stem from being evicted from his rental property,

located at 401 E. Callowhill Street in Perkasie, and court proceedings in Bucks County

related to his eviction and divorce. (Am. Compl. at 3-4, 7, 11-12). He asserts that on

June 9, 2024, his lease to the property, described as “his

residence/office/storage/parking was disregarded by police officers while performing a

Sunday morning eviction of the landlord, Anthony Indelicato.” (Id. at 3-4.) The police

were there to “secure the property.” (Id. at 10.) Because he was “[u]nder threat of mild

force” that he would be dragged out of the property, presumably by the police, he

“grabbed a front seats worth of clothes, leaving all other worldly possessions behind.”

(Id. at 4.) He claims “[u]nder threat of arrest, he was told not to return” to the property

and he complied with the “officer’s orders,” which resulted in him becoming homeless.

(Id. at 5.) He asserts his videos, records, and other property were destroyed and/or

seized when police entered the locked property. (Id. at 10-11.) He further alleges he

was not given a notice of the eviction as required in Pennsylvania, and he was

discriminated against because “they allowed the other tenant, Lynda Jones, to remain

despite her being issued a 10-day notice to quit” by the landlord. (Id. at 9.) At some

point, he went to the Pennridge police station to show proof of his lease to the property

and the title to his truck, but claims “Pennridge did not perform due diligence, the

2 Rorvik’s Amended Complaint consists of approximately sixteen handwritten pages.

(Dkt. No. 8.) The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from the

Amended Complaint. The Court considers the entirety of the submission to constitute the

Amended Complaint and adopts the sequential pagination assigned by the CM/ECF

docketing system. Where the Court quotes from the Amended Complaint, punctuation,

spelling, and capitalization errors will be cleaned up. The Court may also consider matters

of public record when conducting a screening under § 1915. Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch.

Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006).

eviction [was] done without due process under the law, [and] the writ of execution to

secure the property issued by [Judge] Jordan Yeager is evidence the police acted in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment” and deprived him of his personal property.

(Id. at 11-12.)

Rorvik “feels county agencies [and] municipal police officers acted under a

conspiracy to retaliate against” him, citing to 18 U.S.C. § 241. (Id. at 4-5.) He also

alleges a conspiracy, again citing to 18 U.S.C. § 241, “through a divorce,” mentioning

Judge Yaeger, “officers of Pennridge and Perkasie police departments [and] certain

individuals.” (Id. at 7.) Based on other conspiracy allegations made throughout his

Amended Complaint, he claims the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Bucks County,

and other state actors involved in the eviction conspired with his ex-wife, her attorney

identified as Amy Newman, and his landlord, referencing that state action occurs when

private actors “operate as a willing participant with the agents thereof.” (Id. at 8-9, 12.)

It appears he mentions the divorce and his ex-wife because the property was ordered by

Judge Yaeger to “be sold by divorce,” which ultimately led to the eviction. (Id. at 8-9,

12.)

Rorvik was humiliated and intimidated because of the eviction, and claims that

“he is the victim, not Mrs. Indelicato.” (Id.) He was subsequently arrested on

December 31, 20253 on arson and theft charges, among others, “using false information

where he now has been deprived of multiple rights stemming from the events beginning

3 A review of the public docket confirms that Rorvik was arrested on this date for a

state criminal case filed against him for arson with the intent to collect insurance and

related fraud, theft, and trespassing charges. See Commonwealth v. Rorvik, MJ-07303-CR-

0000390-2025 (M.J. Bucks). It appears he posted bail in April 2026 and is no longer

incarcerated at Bucks County Jail. (Id.)

in 2022.” (Id. at 7.) He asserts he is “stuck” on “fraudulent accusations,” presumably

referring to the pending criminal charges,4 because he “wouldn’t play the game.” (Id. at

16.)

As a result of these events, Rorvik appears to bring claims, inter alia, for a

violation of his due process rights, discrimination/equal protection, illegal search and

seizure, and conspiracy.5 (Id. at 3-4, 8-12.) As relief, he “is insisting [on] redress for his

lost property and the loss of his residence, for he became instantly homeless.” (Id. at 5.)

4 It is unclear if Rorvik intended to bring a malicious prosecution claim. See Holley

v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 1999) (“We apply the applicable law,

irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.”). An element of a

Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim is that the criminal proceeding ended in

the plaintiff’s favor. See Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 82 (3d Cir. 2007). A “favorable

termination” occurs when a prosecution ends “without a conviction.” Thompson v. Clark,

596 U.S. 36, 49 (2022) (“In sum, we hold that a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 for

malicious prosecution does not require the plaintiff to show that the criminal prosecution

ended with some affirmative indication of innocence. A plaintiff need only show that the

criminal prosecution ended without a conviction.”). To the extent Rorvik intended to bring

a malicious prosecution claim, it is not cognizable in a civil rights action at this time

because he has not alleged that the criminal proceedings have terminated in his favor.

Furthermore, the public docket reveals the criminal charges are still pending. See Rorvik,

MJ-07303-CR-0000390-2025.

5 Rorvik attempts to assert claims for conspiracy, citing to 18 U.S.C. § 241, and

potentially for claims under the Pennsylvania criminal code. (See Am. Compl. at 4-5, 7; see

also Dkt. No. 7.) However, criminal statutes generally do not give rise to a basis for civil

liability. See Brown v. City of Phila. Office of Human Res., 735 F. App’x 55, 56 (3d Cir.

2018) (per curiam) (“Brown alleges that the defendants violated various criminal statutes,

but most do not provide a private cause of action.”); see also, e.g., Williams v. Wetzel, 827 F.

App’x 158, 162 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (recognizing that plaintiff’s civil claims brought

pursuant to the Pennsylvania Crimes Code were properly rejected by the district court

because there was no private right of action available under the Code); Bey v. Patterson, No.

25-2081, 2025 WL 2233669, at *2 n.5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2025) (holding that civil rights

criminal statutes do not give rise to a civil cause of action); Grande v. Starbucks Corp., No.

18-4036, 2019 WL 1455445, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 2019) (finding that plaintiff’s “causes of

action . . . predicated on violations of Pennsylvania’s criminal and administrative codes”

could not “support or form the basis” of his claims because those “provisions do not include

a private cause of action”); Schwartz v. Steven Kramer & Assocs., No. 90–4943, 1995 WL

3673 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 1995) (finding no private causes of action for forgery or theft under

Pennsylvania law).

He also filed a separate motion requesting money damages, relief related to his pending

criminal case, including a dismissal of his criminal charges,6 and appears further to

want various other individuals and entities charged with several state and federal

crimes.7 (Dkt. No. 7.)

6 Any claims seeking dismissal of the pending state charges because of a

constitutional violation must be pursued in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus; such

claims are not cognizable in a civil rights action. See Jaffery v. Atl. Cty. Prosecutor’s Office,

695 F. App’x 38, 41-42 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“[T]o the extent Jaffery

seeks dismissal of the charges against him as a result of constitutional violations, such

relief is only available through a writ of habeas corpus.”); see also Duran v. Weeks, 399 F.

App’x 756, 759 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“[T]o the extent that Duran is seeking dismissal

of the charges against him as a result of constitutional violations, he is essentially asking

for relief only available through habeas corpus.”).

He also requests injunctive relief pursuant to “PA Rule 600,” Pennsylvania’s speedy

trial provision and to be released from custody, which is moot since he posted bail and was

released in April 2026 as mentioned above. (Dkt. No. 7 at 5-6.) The Court understands his

reference to Rule 600 to be a request to intervene in his state criminal case. However, as a

general matter, federal courts may not intervene in state criminal prosecutions. See

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971) (recognizing that the “longstanding public

policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings” generally requires

federal courts to abstain from addressing issues in state criminal proceedings absent

exceptional circumstances). Thus, to the extent Rorvik asks the Court to countermand

rulings made in his state criminal matter, such as when his criminal trial is scheduled, the

Court may not do so. See Borowski v. Kean Univ., 68 F.4th 844, 844 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting

Younger, 401 U.S. at 45) (“[T]he normal thing to do when federal courts are asked to enjoin

pending proceedings in state courts is not to issue such injunctions.”).

7 A “private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or

nonprosecution of another.” See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (finding

that a citizen lacks standing to contest prosecutorial policies “when he himself is neither

prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution”) (citations omitted); Lewis v. Jindal, 368 F.

App’x 613, 614 (5th Cir. 2010) (“It is well-settled that the decision whether to file criminal

charges against an individual lies within the prosecutor’s discretion, and private citizens do

not have a constitutional right to compel criminal prosecution.”) (citations omitted); Smith

v. Friel, No. 19-943, 2019 WL 3025239, at *4 (M.D. Pa. June 4, 2019), report and

recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3003380 (M.D. Pa. July 10, 2019) (collecting cases and

stating “courts have long held that a civil rights plaintiff may not seek relief in civil

litigation in the form of an order directing the criminal prosecution of some third parties”).

II

Although Rorvik paid the filing fee in full and was released from custody after

filing his case, the Court has the authority to screen his Amended Complaint pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A since he filed this case when he was a prisoner. See e.g., Shane v.

Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing that the district courts have

the authority to screen a prisoner complaint pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1) even if the

prisoner is not proceeding in forma pauperis); Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307,

314 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“[T]he need for the district court to screen a complaint in a

civil action filed by a prisoner, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, looks to the plaintiff's

status when the case is filed.”); In re Smith, 114 F.3d 1247, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“If a

litigant is a prisoner on the day he files a civil action, the PLRA applies.”). Section

1915A requires that the Court “review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as

soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental

entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In doing so, the Court must dismiss a complaint or any

portion thereof that “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted,” id. § 1915A(b)(1), or that “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who

is immune from such relief,” id. § 1915A(b)(2).

Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915A(b)(1) is governed by the

same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). See Neal v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. 96-7923, 1997 WL 338838, at *1

(E.D. Pa. June 19, 1997); see also Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir.

1999). Accordingly, the Court must determine whether the amended complaint

contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted);

Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). At this early stage of the

litigation, the Court will accept the facts alleged in the pro se amended complaint as

true, draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and ask only whether that

complaint, liberally construed, contains facts sufficient to state a plausible claim.

Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on other grounds

recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory

allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As Rorvik is proceeding pro se, the

Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F. 4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021)

(citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). An

unrepresented litigant “cannot flout procedural rules — they must abide by the same

rules that apply to all other litigants.” Id.; see also Doe v. Allegheny Cnty. Hous. Auth.,

No. 23-1105, 2024 WL 379959, at *3 (3d Cir. Feb. 1, 2024) (“While a court must liberally

construe the allegations and ‘apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro

se litigant mentioned it be name,’ Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002),

this does not require the court to act as an advocate to identify any possible claim that

the facts alleged could potentially support.”).

III

Rorvik asserts his federal constitutional claims pursuant to § 1983, the vehicle

by which such claims may be brought against state actors in federal court. “To state a

claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the

Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation

was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,

48 (1988). In a § 1983 action, the personal involvement of each defendant in the alleged

constitutional violation is a required element, and, therefore, a plaintiff must allege

how each defendant was involved in the events and occurrences giving rise to the

claims. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998).

A

States are not considered “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See Will v. Mich.

Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989). Furthermore, the Eleventh Amendment

bars suits against a state and its agencies in federal court that seek monetary damages.

See Pennhurst State Sch. And Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984); A.W. v.

Jersey City Public Schs., 341 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2003). The Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania has not waived that immunity. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b).

B

Following the decision in Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694

(1978), courts concluded that a police department is a sub-unit of the local government

and, as such, is merely a vehicle through which the municipality fulfills its policing

functions. See Johnson v. City of Erie, Pa., 834 F. Supp. 873, 878-79 (W.D. Pa. 1993).

Thus, while a municipality may be liable under § 1983, a police department, as a mere

sub-unit of the municipality, may not. Id.; see also, e.g., Martin v. Red Lion Police

Dept., 146 F. App’x. 558, 562 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (stating that police

department is not a proper defendant in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because

it is a sub-division of its municipality); Bonenberger v. Plymouth Township, 132 F.3d 20,

25 (3d Cir. 1997) (“As in past cases, we treat the municipality and its police department

as a single entity for purposes of section 1983 liability” (citing Colburn v. Upper Darby

Township, 838 F.2d 663, 671 n.7 (3d Cir.1988))); Hadesty v. Rush Twp. Police Dep’t, No.

14-2319, 2016 WL 1039063, at *9 n.4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2016). Therefore, the

Pennridge and Perkasie Police Departments are not proper defendants in this case

under Section 1983 and will be dismissed. In any event, Rorvik has not pled a basis for

municipal liability, as explained further below.

C

Rorvik’s claims against Judge Yaeger are also not plausible because judges are

entitled to absolute immunity from civil rights claims that are based on acts or

omissions taken in their judicial capacity, so long as they do not act in the complete

absence of all jurisdiction. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978);

Harvey v. Loftus, 505 F. App’x 87, 90 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Azubuko v. Royal, 443

F.3d 302, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). An act is taken in a judge’s judicial

capacity if it is “a function normally performed by a judge.” Gallas v. Supreme Ct. of

Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000). Moreover, “[g]enerally . . . ‘where a court has

some subject matter jurisdiction, there is sufficient jurisdiction for immunity

purposes.’” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443-44 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Barnes

v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1122 (6th Cir. 1997)). Because judges must feel free to act

without fear of incurring personal liability for their actions in court, judicial immunity

remains in force even if the actions are alleged to be legally incorrect, in bad faith,

malicious, or corrupt, Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991), or are taken as a result

of a conspiracy with others, Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). As Rorvik’s

claims against Judge Yaeger are based on acts he took in his judicial capacity while

presiding over an eviction matter and/or divorce proceedings over which he had

jurisdiction, Judge Yaegar is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from Rorvik’s

claims. See, e.g., Lee v. Gallina Mecca, No. 22-2871, 2023 WL 5814783, at *4 (3d Cir.

Sept. 8, 2023) (“But even accepting Lee’s allegations as true, judicial acts that appear to

be unfair, malicious, or ex parte are not stripped of their judicial immunity); Palmer v.

PHA, No. 21-2906, 2021 WL 3662401, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2021) (judges are entitled

to absolute judicial immunity based on acts they took in their official capacities while

presiding over eviction proceeding); Martin v. Bicking, 30 F. Supp. 2d 511, 513 (E.D. Pa.

1998) (District justice was judicially immune from liability for actions taken by justice

arising out of plaintiff’s trial and sentencing for summary offenses).

D

The gravamen of Rorvik’s Amended Complaint appears to be due process claims

against the police officers involved in evicting him from the property for the loss and

destruction of his personal property and a failure to provide notice. (Am. Compl. at 5,

10-12.) Under the Fourteenth Amendment, Rorvik is entitled to due process of law

before the government can deprive him of his “life, liberty, or property.” U.S. Const.

amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3. Nonetheless, an individual may not assert a claim under § 1983

for even an intentional deprivation of the individual’s property by a government

employee “if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986)

(negligent acts of officials causing unintentional loss of property do not violate due

process).

Pennsylvania law provides Rorvik with an adequate state remedy— the

Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act— for the loss and destruction of his property. See

Spencer v. Bush, 543 F. App’ x 209, 213 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); see also, e.g.,

Shakur v. Coelho, 421 F. App’x 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (explaining that the

Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act provides an adequate remedy for a willful deprivation of

property); Thompson v. Ferguson, No. 19-3455, 2019 WL 3573525, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug.

5, 2019) (dismissing Fourteenth Amendment claim based on the loss and destruction of

property during a search because the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act provides an

adequate remedy); Shiloh v. Does, No. 12-1086, 2013 WL 5297511, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Apr.

19, 2013), (dismissing Fourteenth Amendment deprivation of property claim based on

damage done to the plaintiff’s home and personal items during a search and seizure

because the plaintiff could have filed a tort claim under Pennsylvania law, thus

negating any due process violation), report and recommendation adopted sub nom.

Shiloh v. John Does, No. 12-1086, 2013 WL 4761124 (M.D. Pa. May 14, 2013).8

8 It is unclear if Rorvik intended to assert claims based on state law. In any event,

because the Court dismisses his federal claims, it will not exercise supplemental

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) over any state law claims. Accordingly, the only

independent basis for jurisdiction over any such claims is 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which grants

a district court jurisdiction over a case in which “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum

or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different

States.” Section 1332(a) requires “‘complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all

defendants,’ even though only minimal diversity is constitutionally required. This means

that, unless there is some other basis for jurisdiction, ‘no plaintiff [may] be a citizen of the

same state as any defendant.’” Lincoln, 800 F.3d at 104 (quoting Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche,

546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) and Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir.

2010) (internal footnotes omitted)). An individual is a citizen of the state where he is

domiciled, meaning the state where he is physically present and intends to remain. See

Washington v. Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2011). Rorvik lists a Pennsylvania

address for himself, and names Bucks County and other municipalities in Pennsylvania,

which suggests that he and some, if not all, of the Defendants may be Pennsylvania

citizens. Accordingly, he has not sufficiently alleged that the parties are diverse for

purposes of establishing the Court’s jurisdiction over any state law claims he intends to

pursue.

In addition to a deprivation of property claim, Rorvik alleges he was not given

notice of the eviction, and “the writ of execution to secure the property issued by

[Judge] Jordan Yeager is evidence the police acted in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment.” (Am. Compl. at 9, 11.) However, because it is apparent from Rorvik’s

allegations that the ejectment was ordered by the state court, the police officers who

carried out and assisted with the writ of eviction are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity

on his civil rights claims. See, e.g., Barel v. Off. of Clerk of Superior Ct. of N.J., 834 F.

App’x 763, 765 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (holding that a sheriff executing a court

order enjoys quasi-judicial immunity) (citing Russell v. Richardson, 905 F.3d 239, 250

(3d Cir. 2018) (quasi-judicial immunity covers acts authorized by court order)); Roland

v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 552, 556 (11th Cir. 1994) (quasi-judicial immunity protects law

enforcement officials executing facially valid court orders)). Even if the order was

unlawful, the police officers involved are entitled to rely on the facially valid state court

order.9

9 Rorvik also refers to an alleged violation of his equal protection rights and to

§§ 1981 and 1982. (Am. Compl. at 3.) A “‘passing reference’ to jurisprudential precepts

without more does not bring that issue before the Court in that it provides no basis for a

ruling one way or the other.” Campbell v. LVNV Finding, LLC and Resurgent Capital

Servs., No. 21-5388, 2022 WL 6172286, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2022) (citing Laborers’ Int’l

Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994)).

Even if the Court did entertain these claims, to state a claim under § 1981, Rorvik must

allege that “(1) [he] is a member of a racial minority; (2) an intent to discriminate on the

basis of race by the defendant; and (3) the discrimination concerned one or more of the

activities enumerated in [section 1981].” Bailey v. Harleysville Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., No.

04-1541, 2005 WL 2012024, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2005) (quotation omitted). To state a

claim under § 1982, a plaintiff must allege “1) the defendant’s racial animus; 2) intentional

discrimination; and 3) that the defendant deprived plaintiff of his rights because of race.”

Rose v. Rothrock, No. 08-3884, 2009 WL 1775614, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2009) (internal

quotation and citations omitted). Rorvik does not allege he is a member of a racial

minority. There are also no allegations in the Amended Complaint asserting that he was

treated differently than any other similarly situated individuals and, importantly, that

there was no rational basis for the treatment. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d

Further, to the extent Rorvik claims his injuries were caused by a defect in the

state court judgment—e.g., a lack of due process—and is seeking to invalidate the state

court’s decision on that basis, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars his claims. Rooker v.

Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462 (1983). Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “federal district courts

lack jurisdiction over suits that are essentially appeals from state-court judgments.”

Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir.

2010). As the Supreme Court recently reiterated, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

deprives a federal district court of jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-court losers

complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district

court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those

judgments.” T. M. v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 608 U.S. ---, --- S.Ct. ----, No. 25-197,

slip op. at 18 (U.S. June 18, 2026), 2026 WL 1751823, at *11 (quoting Exxon Mobil

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)); see also Great W.

Mining, 615 F.3d at 166 (same).

Since a portion of Rorvik’s Amended Complaint can be interpreted to challenge

the state court’s judgments in the divorce proceeding to sell the property and/or the writ

of execution for his eviction from the property, and to request invalidation of those

judgments, the Court lacks jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine over this

aspect of his case. See generally Stern v. Nix, 840 F.2d 208, 212 (3d Cir.

224, 243 (3d Cir. 2008) (to state an equal protection claim on a “class of one” theory, “a

plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant treated him differently from others similarly

situated, (2) the defendant did so intentionally, and (3) there was no rational basis for the

difference in treatment”). Based on his own allegations, he was evicted for a rational basis,

i.e., pursuant to a writ of execution issued by Judge Yaeger. (Am. Compl. at 11-12).

1988) (explaining that the complaint in question was merely a “skillful attempt to mask

the true purpose of the action, which essentially is to reverse the judicial decision [of

the state court]”).

E

Rorvik appears to assert constitutional claims against his ex-wife’s attorney, Amy

Newman, presumably for representing her in the divorce or other state court

proceedings. (Am. Compl. at 7, 12-13.) Private attorneys are not state actors. See, e.g.,

Gannaway v. Stroumbakis, 842 F. App’x 725, 730 (3d Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (noting

that “[a] privately retained attorney clearly does not act under color of state law, and . .

. that ‘no color of state law attache[s] to the functions of court-appointed counsel.’”);

Coulter v. Allegheny Cnty. Bar Ass’n, 496 F. App’x 167, 169 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam)

(none of the defendants named, including an attorney, his law firm, the Pennsylvania

Bar Association, the Allegheny County Bar Association or its three individual members,

were state actors for purposes of Section 1983).

Rorvik’s constitutional claims against his landlord and ex-wife are not plausible

because they too are not state actors for purposes of § 1983. See Groman v. Township of

Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining that state action is a “threshold

issue” for § 1983 claims). “Whether a defendant is acting under color of state law – i.e.,

whether the defendant is a state actor – depends on whether there is “such a close

nexus between the State and the challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior

may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d

Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). In assessing whether a private party’s action

constitutes state action the Court will consider: “(1) whether the private entity has

exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state; (2)

whether the private party has acted with the help of or in concert with state officials;

and (3) whether the state has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence

with the acting party that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged

activity.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and

alteration omitted). To support a finding of state action, “the government must be

‘responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.’” Borrell v.

Bloomsburg Univ., 870 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.

991, 1004 (1982)).

None of those criteria are met here. It appears the property was ordered to be

“sold by divorce” in state court, which subsequently resulted in “the writ of execution to

secure the property” issued by Judge Yeager. (Am. Compl. at 11-12.) His landlord and

ex-wife are private individuals, who were involved in state court proceedings against

Rorvik related to his eviction and divorce. Rorvik contends that his landlord and ex-

wife participated and conspired with the police or other state actors that ultimately led

to his eviction from the property. (Id.) However, to the extent they were involved with

the state actors because they filed a lawsuit for the eviction or the divorce, and/or gave

police officers information, even false information, that ultimately led to his eviction

does not transform them into state actors. “Merely giving information to police officers

is insufficient to convert a private party into a state actor.” Simmer v. Kehler, No. 15-

2285, 2015 WL 6737017, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 2, 2015) (collecting cases); see also, e.g.

Yoast v. Pottstown Borough, 437 F. Supp. 3d 403, 420 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (“Providing false

information to the police -- even deliberately -- does not transform a private party into a

state actor.”), aff’d, No. 22-1960, 2023 WL 4418213 (3d Cir. July 10, 2023); Gueson v.

Feldman, No. 00-1117, 2001 WL 34355662, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2001) (“Filing a

lawsuit in state court, is not for 1983 purposes ‘state action;’ nor does it turn a private

citizen into a state actor.”).

Nor can his landlord or ex-wife be considered state actors based on Rorvik’s

allegations of conspiratorial conduct because he has failed to state a conspiracy claim

under § 1983. Rorvik attempts to assert a widespread conspiracy between the non-

state actor and state actor Defendants to evict and/or deprive him of the property,

notably through a state court writ of execution, to nudge his claims from the possible to

the plausible. (Am. Compl. at 7-11.) As an initial matter, a “bare assertion of

conspiracy” does not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

556 (2007). Furthermore, “‘[a] conspiracy cannot be found from allegations of judicial

error, ex parte communications (the manner of occurrence and substance of which are

not alleged) or adverse rulings absent specific facts demonstrating an agreement to

commit the alleged improper actions.’” Capogrosso v. The Supreme Court of N.J., 588

F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (quoting Crabtree v. Muchmore, 904 F.2d

1475, 1480-81 (10th Cir. 1990)). Rather, “to properly plead an unconstitutional

conspiracy, a plaintiff must assert facts from which a conspiratorial agreement can be

inferred.” Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 178. Rorvik’s allegations of conspiracy are

essentially predicated on these Defendants’ actions related to his eviction, as ordered by

Judge Yaeger, and the judge’s order for the property to be sold in connection with the

divorce proceedings. (Am. Compl. at 11-12.) Rorvik has not alleged any facts that

plausibly suggest a meeting of the minds between his landlord, his ex-wife, and the

state actor defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S at 556 (holding that a plaintiff claiming

conspiracy must plead “enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will

reveal evidence of illegal agreement”). The Amended Complaint sets forth a

“conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point[, which] does not supply

facts adequate to show illegality.” Id. at 557. Specifically, he has failed to allege any

facts to support a conspiracy, such as the approximate time when the agreement was

made, the specific parties to the agreement, the period of the conspiracy, or the object of

the conspiracy. See Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162, 1166 (3d Cir.

1989) (“To plead conspiracy adequately, a plaintiff must set forth allegations that

address the period of the conspiracy, the object of the conspiracy, and the certain

actions of the alleged conspirators taken to achieve that purpose.”), abrogated on other

grounds by Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494 (2000). The fact that the state court

proceedings resulted in Rorvik’s eviction from the property, and that the other

defendants abided by such rulings, are not sufficient to plausibly allege the existence of

a conspiracy. See, e.g., Dennis, 449 U.S. at 28 (“[M]erely resorting to the courts and

being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make a party a co-conspirator or a joint

actor with the judge.”); Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 179 (holding that conspiracy claim

was not plausible where plaintiff “failed to allege except in general terms the

approximate time when the agreement was made, the specific parties to the agreement

. . . , the period of the conspiracy, or the object of the conspiracy”); Young v. Kann, 926

F.2d 1396, 1405 n.16 (3d Cir. 1991) (plaintiff cannot rely exclusively “upon his own

suspicion and speculation” to establish a conspiracy claim). Rorvik’s allegations merely

assume the existence of a conspiracy rather than alleging one. In sum, his allegations

of conspiracy are insufficient either as a basis for a conspiracy claim or as a basis for

finding that the private defendants may be considered state actors for purposes of §

1983. See generally Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Where a complaint pleads facts that are

merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between

possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.”) (internal quotations omitted); see

also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (“Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their

claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be

dismissed.”).

F

Rorvik names Bucks County as a defendant. As an initial matter, a municipality

is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of its employees. See Connick v.

Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (holding that local governments can be liable as

“persons” under § 1983, but this liability extends only to “their own illegal acts”

(emphasis in original) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986)).

Rather, to state a § 1983 claim against a municipality or municipal entity, a plaintiff

must allege that the municipality or municipal entity’s policy or custom caused the

violation of his constitutional rights. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. “To satisfy the

pleading standard, [the plaintiff] must . . . specify what exactly that custom or policy

was.” McTernan v. City of York, PA, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Phillips,

515 F.3d at 232). A plaintiff may also state a basis for municipal liability by

“alleging failure-to-supervise, train, or discipline . . . [and alleging facts showing] that

said failure amounts to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of those

affected.” Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 106 (3d Cir. 2019). “This consists of a showing

as to whether (1) municipal policymakers know that employees will confront a

particular situation, (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a history of

employees mishandling, and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will frequently cause

deprivation of constitutional rights.” Id. But “[i]t is well-settled that, if there is no

violation in the first place, there can be no derivative municipal claim.” Mulholland v.

Gov’t Cnty. of Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d 227, 238 n.15 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Los Angeles v.

Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (stating that if a municipal employee “inflicted no

constitutional injury . . ., it is inconceivable that [the municipality] could be liable”)).10

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss the Amended Complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and deny Rorvik’s motion (Dkt. No. 7). Any state law

claims and all claims barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine will be dismissed without

prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. All remaining claims will be dismissed

with prejudice. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108, 110 (3d Cir.

2002) (stating that complaints dismissed under the Prison Litigation Reform Act should

be with leave to amend “unless amendment would be inequitable or futile”). An

10 Even if Rorvik stated plausible constitutional violations, he failed to allege facts to

support any Monell claim against Bucks County. He does not identify any policy or custom,

or sufficiently allege that the conduct of which he complains was caused by a municipal

policy or custom, or municipal failures amounting to deliberate indifference. The only

mention of any Monell allegation was not alleged in his Amended Complaint, but in a

separately filed motion. (Dkt. No. 7.) He claims Bucks County “failed to adequately train

or supervise its employees.” (Id. at 11.) Although this allegation is improperly asserted

outside the operative pleading, even if the Court considered this conclusory allegation,

simply paraphrasing the standard for municipal liability does not support a plausible claim.

See Szerensci v. Shimshock, No. 20-1296, 2021 WL 4480172, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2021)

(“Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation, which generally paraphrases the relevant standard, is

insufficient to state a claim for § 1983 liability under Monell.” (citing cases)).

appropriate Order dismissing this case will be entered separately. See Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 58(a).

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gerald J. Pappert

Gerald J. Pappert, J.