Powell

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ROSALIND POWELL * CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS * NO. 26-681

WALMART INC., ET AL. * SECTION “T” (2)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before me is Plaintiff Rosalind Powell’s second Motion for Leave to File Supplemental

and Amended Complaint. ECF No. 17. Defendants Walmart Inc. and Wal-Mart Real Estate

Business Trust filed a timely Opposition Memorandum. ECF No. 19. The Court heard oral

argument on the motion on July 8, 2026, ordered the parties supplement the record with the

relevant video footage and photos, and took the motion under submission. ECF No. 23.

Defendants produced same. ECF Nos. 24-25.

Having considered the record, the arguments and submissions of counsel, and the

applicable law, Plaintiff’s second Motion for Leave to File Supplemental and Amended Complaint

Motion is DENIED for the reasons herein.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Rosalind Powell filed suit in state court against Defendants Walmart Inc., Wal-

Mart Real Estate Trust (collectively, “Walmart”), and Melissa Doe on August 12, 2025, alleging

that she slipped on a “fresh wax/liquid” and fell at a Walmart store in Slidell, Louisiana. ECF No.

1-1 ¶¶ 1-6. She alleged that an unidentified Walmart employee (Doe) was responsible for ensuring

the floors were safe and that Walmart is jointly, severally, solidarily and vicariously liable for Doe’s

negligence. Id. ¶¶ 7-11.

Walmart removed the case, asserting that the citizenship of fictitious Defendant Melissa

Doe could not be determined and recent discovery responses demonstrated the claim exceeds the

jurisdictional minimum. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 3, 6-8.

After removal, on the same day, Plaintiff filed two motions: (1) Motion to Remand and

(2) Motion for Leave to File Supplemental and Amending Petition for Damages. ECF Nos. 12-

13. Applying the factors articulated in Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 833 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987), I

denied Plaintiff’s first motion for leave, finding that there were not strong equities in favor of

amendment, particularly given the timing of the request, the absence of any allegations necessary

to state a valid claim under Canter v. Koehring Co.1 against the two new proposed defendants, and

the availability of full relief without the presence of the non-diverse employees. ECF No. 16.

Plaintiff now moves to amend to name a different Walmart employee, Patricia Thornton.

ECF Nos. 17, 17-2.2 She alleges general duties and responsibilities in ¶¶7-10 of her proposed

amended complaint, which for the same reasons as before, fail to state a claim under Canter. ECF

No. 17-2; see ECF No. 16 at 6-7. But in ¶ 8, Plaintiff also alleges that Thornton was personally

cleaning the area where Plaintiff fell immediately before the incident, and her cleaning, the method

of her cleaning, the dirty brush she was using to clean, her failure to remove that dust/substance/dirt

from her brush while cleaning, and her then applying the dust/substance/dirt to the floor and area

at issue was/were the direct cause(s) of Plaintiff’s fall. ECF No. 17-2. Plaintiff contends that these

allegations, coupled with the fact that she is not amending to defeat jurisdiction, was not dilatory

and will be significantly injured if amendment is denied, justifies amendment. ECF 17-1 at 2-3.

In Opposition, Walmart asserts the amendment is for the purpose of destroying diversity

jurisdiction as evidenced by the close timing of the filings of the motion to remand and the initial

1 283 So. 2d 716 (La. 1973).

2 Although employees Reynolds and Holley, whom Plaintiff previously sought to add, are listed in the caption, they

are not identified as defendants in the body of the new proposed amended complaint though there are allegations

against them. ECF No. 17-2 ¶¶ 13, 20. Plaintiff’s inartful pleading aside, during oral argument, Plaintiff confirmed

their inclusion was in error and she does not seek to add them. See U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556

U.S. 928, 935 (2009) (“A person or entity can be named in the caption of a complaint without necessarily becoming

a party to the action.”); Abraugh v. Altimus, 26 F.4th 298, 303 (5th Cir. 2022) (noting the caption of the complaint

may not be determinative as to the identity of the parties to the action); Jones v. Louisiana, 764 F.2d 1183, 1185 &

n.1 (5th Cir. 1985) (determining party status based on caption as well allegations throughout body of the complaint).

motion for leave to amend coupled with her knowledge of the circumstances since Walmart’s

December 15, 2025, discovery responses. ECF No. 19 at 5-8. Further, Walmart asserts piercing

Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint and conducting a summary inquiry reveals that she lacks

a viable claim against Thorton under Canter. Id. at 8-12. Walmart asserts that Plaintiff will not

be significantly injured if amendment is denied as Walmart is her employer, and thus vicariously

liable. Id. at 12-14.

II. APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS

Section 1447(e) provides: “If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants

whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit

joinder and remand the action to the State court.” Thus, this request for leave is assessed under 28

U.S.C. § 1447(e), not Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Courts scrutinize

proposed amendments naming non-diverse defendants in removed cases more closely than they

would for ordinary proposed amendments.3 “If [the court] permits the amendment of the

nondiverse defendant, it then must remand to the state court. If the amendment is not allowed, the

federal court maintains jurisdiction.”4

In analyzing whether to allow the addition of a non-diverse defendant in a removed case,

the court evaluates the competing interests of avoiding parallel federal/state proceedings with the

inherent dangers of inconsistent results and the waste of judicial resources versus a diverse

defendant's statutorily granted choice of a state or federal forum.5 Balancing these competing

3 Moore v. Manns, 732 F.3d 454, 456 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting Hensgens, 833 F.2d at 1182); Dillard v.

Albertson's, Inc., 226 F.3d 642, 2000 WL 1029031, at *1 (5th Cir. July 7, 2000) (“28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) specifically

confers on the district court the responsibility to scrutinize attempted joinder of non-diverse parties in cases previously

removed to federal court.”).

4 Hensgens, 833 F.2d at 1182.

5 Id. at 1182 & n.2; G & C Land v. Farmland Mgmt. Servs., 587 F. App’x 99, 103 (5th Cir. 2014) (“In Hensgens v.

Deere & Co., this court directed district courts to exercise discretion when deciding whether to join a non-diverse

party. . . .”). Hensgens referred to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), which was amended and is now codified at § 1447(e).

interests is not served by a “rigid distinction of whether the proposed added party is an

indispensable or permissive party” under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6 Rather, the court

should consider the Hensgens factors: (1) whether the purpose of the amendment is to defeat

federal jurisdiction, (2) whether the plaintiff was dilatory in requesting the amendment,

(3) whether the plaintiff will be significantly injured if the amendment is not allowed, and

(4) whether any other factors bear on the equities.7 “[W]hen an amendment would destroy

jurisdiction, ‘most authorities agree that leave should be denied in the absence of strong equities

in favor of amendment.’”8

This Court previously addressed the Hensgens factors in its earlier ruling. ECF No. 16.

For those same reasons, factors (2) and (4) remain neutral, and factor (3) weighs against granting

the amendment. See ECF No. 16 at 7-9. Assessing the first factor, the Court again finds that the

close timing of the remand motion and request for leave to amend suggests the amendment is

sought to destroy diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 4-6. But this factor also requires consideration of

whether the plaintiff states a valid claim against the proposed nondiverse defendant.9

In determining whether a plaintiff states a valid claim, courts employ the same standard

used when considering whether a non-diverse defendant was fraudulently joined,10 looking to

6 Hensgens, 833 F.2d at 1182.

7 Id.

8 Delgado v. Ocean Harbor Cas. Ins. Co., No. 22-1987, 2022 WL 17092125, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 2022) (Morgan,

J.) (citing Neely v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. 14-48, 2014 WL 1572441, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 17, 2014)).

9 See, e.g., Fontenot v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 10-162, 2012 WL 2064722, at *4 (W.D. La. Apr. 13, 2012) (citing

Tillman v. CSX Transp., Co., 929 F.2d 1023, 1029 (5th Cir. 1991); Kling Realty Co. v. Texaco, No. 06-1492, 2007

WL 4553611 (W.D. La. 2007)), R.&R. adopted, 2012 WL 2064848 (W.D. La. June 5, 2012); Richardson v. Wal-Mart

Stores Tex., LLC, 192 F. Supp. 3d 719, 726 (S.D. Tex. 2016).

10 Wells v. Medtronic, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 3d 493, 506 (E.D. La. 2016) (Brown, J.) (relying on Cobb v. Delta Exps.,

Inc., 186 F.3d 675 (5th Cir. 1999) to hold that the “fraudulent joinder” test is used when determining whether to allow

a pleading amendment that would join a non-diverse defendant and destroy the court’s diversity jurisdiction); Noble

v. Norfolk S. Corp., No. 02-3233, 2003 WL 1618590, at *3-4 (E.D. La. Mar. 26, 2003) (using the “fraudulent joinder”

standard to determine whether the plaintiff’s primary purpose in joining a non-diverse defendant was to defeat the

court’s diversity jurisdiction); see Cobb, 186 F.3d at 677-78 (explaining in dicta that “[a] request to join a party against

whom recovery is not really possible and whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction (i.e., a request

fraudulently to join a party) would never be granted.”).

“whether the defendant has demonstrated that there is no possibility of recovery by the plaintiff

against [the proposed] defendant.”11 Courts address fraudulent joinder in two ways.12 Typically,

the court conducts an inquiry similar to a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis of the allegations in a complaint.13

When the plaintiff states a valid claim against a proposed defendant, it is unlikely that the primary

purpose of the amendment is to defeat diversity jurisdiction.14 But in rare cases, if a plaintiff has

stated a claim, but has misstated or omitted discrete facts that would determine the propriety of

joinder, the court may, in its discretion, pierce the pleadings and conduct a summary inquiry.15

The first question is whether Plaintiff states a valid claim against Thorton under Canter.16

“A merchant owes a duty to persons who use his premises to exercise reasonable care to keep his

aisles, passageways, and floors in a reasonably safe condition. This duty includes a reasonable

effort to keep the premises free of any hazardous conditions which reasonably might give rise to

damage.”17 And generally, the owner or operator of a facility has the duty of exercising reasonable

care for the safety of persons on his premises and the duty of not exposing such persons to

unreasonable risks of injury or harm.18

In Canter, the Louisiana Supreme Court explained the circumstances in which an employee

can be held personally liable for injuries to third persons.19 Personal liability may be imposed on

11 Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).

12 Id.

13 Wells, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 506 (citing Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573).

14 Schindler v. Charles Schwab & Co., No. 05-0082, 2005 WL 1155862, at *3 (E.D. La. May 12, 2005) (Africk, J.)

(“[C]ourts have . . . recognized that when a plaintiff states a valid claim against a defendant, it is unlikely that the

primary purpose of bringing those defendants into a litigation is to destroy diversity jurisdiction.” (emphasis in

original) (citations omitted)); Noble, 2003 WL 1618590, at *3 (“As long as the plaintiff states a valid claim against

the new defendants, the principal purpose is not to destroy diversity jurisdiction.” (citing cases)); see also Tillman,

929 F.2d at 1029; Allen v. Walmart Stores, L.L.C., 907 F.3d 170, 186 (5th Cir. 2018) (noting plaintiff’s failure to state

plausible claim against proposed defendants gives an apparent reason for denying motion to amend).

15 Wells, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 506 (quoting Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573).

16 Brown v. PAC Housing Grp., LLC, No. 24-923, 2024 WL 3925156, at *4 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2024) (Ashe, J.).

17 LA. REV. STAT. § 2800.6(A).

18 Mundy v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 620 So. 2d 811, 814 (La. 1993).

19 Ford v. Elsbury, 32 F.3d 931, 935-36 (5th Cir. 1994).

an employee where the duty breached arises solely because of the employment relationship if four

criteria are met:

1. The employer owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and the breach of that duty

caused plaintiff's injury;

2. The duty is delegated by the employer to the defendant employee;

3. The defendant employee has breached this duty through personal (as contrasted

with technical or vicarious) fault, including the failure to remedy a risk the

employee knew or should have known about; and

4. Personal liability cannot be imposed upon the employee simply because of her

general administrative responsibility for performance of some function of

employment; rather, she must have a personal responsibility creating a duty to the

plaintiff that was not delegated to some other employee. If that responsibility was

delegated to another employee, the defendant is not liable for the breach unless

she knows or should know of the non-performance or mal-performance and still

fails to remedy the risk of harm.20

As Judge Ashe recently explained in applying Canter, evidence of personal fault, as opposed to a

general responsibility to oversee safety, is required to trigger personal liability.21 Personal fault is

demonstrated by an employee’s personal involvement in causing or contributing to the alleged

injury22 or “knowledge of the dangers present” and subsequent failure to cure the risk of harm.23

20 Canter, 283 So. 2d at 721; Ford, 32 F.3d at 936.

21 Brown, 2024 WL 3925156, at *5 (quoting McIntosh v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2019 WL 3306532, at *3 (E.D. La.

July 23, 2019) (quoting Moore, 732 F.3d at 456)).

22 Smith v. L’Auberge Casino & Hotel Baton Rouge, No. 22-825, 2024 WL 36008, at *4 (M.D. La. Jan. 3, 2024) (citing

cases); see, e.g., Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 958, 960 (M.D. La. 1995) (finding fraudulent joinder

established because plaintiffs failed to allege nor provide evidence that employee “personally caused the accident” at

issue as required by Canter); Lounsbury v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. 95-2544, 1995 WL 626211, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct.

20, 1995) (Vance, J.) (finding plaintiff alleged employee’s personal fault by alleging the employee obstructed his

“passage and negligently tripping him”); George–McGee v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., No. 90-2788, 1991 WL 2701, at

*2 (E.D. La. Jan. 9, 1991) (allegation of employee’s “personal negligence”—i.e., employee was “operating the steel

dolly which allegedly struck the plaintiff from behind”—was “sufficient to state a claim . . . with ample possibility of

recovery”).

23 Ford, 32 F.3d at 936; accord. Hayden v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 788 F. Supp. 285, 287 (E.D. La. 1992) (finding an

employee’s alleged personal knowledge of a dangerous pipeline could give rise to personal duty under Canter);

Creppel v. Apache Corp., No. 04-865, 2004 WL 1920932, at *4 (E.D. La. Aug. 25, 2004) (Vance, J.) (plaintiffs stated

a cause of action against non-diverse employee where “plaintiffs allege that [employee] had personal knowledge of

the dangerous well and that he failed to remedy the danger.”).

In her proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges Walmart had a duty to ensure “the

premises and floors in the area in which [her] injuries occurred were in a safe condition for all

shoppers, customers, and business invitees shopping at said location” and that it “tasked” its

employee, Thorton, “with making sure [its] aisles and passageways were free from unreasonable

risks of harm and ensuring that the same remained in an orderly fashion and free of any hazards,

vices, defects, such as unmarked fresh wax/liquid substances.” ECF No. 17-2 ¶¶ 7-9. Plaintiff

further alleges Thorton “personally cleaned the area” immediately before she fell, and Thorton’s

“cleaning, the method of her cleaning, the dirty brush she was using to clean, her failure to get the

dust/substance/dirt her brush while cleaning, and her then applying the dust/substance/dirt to the

floor and area at issue was/were the direct cause(s) of Plaintiff’s fall.” Id. ¶ 8. These allegations

are sufficient to state a claim against Walmart, as it conceded at oral argument.

However, Walmart contends that Plaintiff’s allegations are fictional and have been altered

to survive the Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry on a motion for leave to amend, and thus, they should be

pierced when conducting a summary inquiry. ECF No. 19 at 9. The summary inquiry is aimed at

determining whether the plaintiff “truly has a reasonable possibility of recovery”24 based solely on

“discrete and undisputed facts” (i.e., facts easily disprovable if not true) that would preclude

plaintiff’s recovery against the in-state defendant.25 Once the court pierces the pleadings and

embarks on a summary inquiry, it does not turn back to the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.26

Notably, the fraudulent joinder summary inquiry does not employ the standard used for a

24 Ticer v. Imperium Ins. Co., 20 F.4th 1040, 1047 (5th Cir. 2021) (emphasis added) (quoting Gray ex rel. Rudd v.

Beverly Enters.-Miss., Inc., 390 F.3d 400, 405 (5th Cir. 2004)).

25 Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573-74, 574 n.12.

26 Jack v. Evonik Corp., 79 F.4th 547, 559 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Int'l Energy Ventures Mgmt., LLC v. United Energy

Grp., Ltd., 818 F.3d 193, 207 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Certainly a court may choose to use either one of these two analyses,

but it must use one and only one of them, not neither or both”)).

Rule 56 summary judgment.27 Rather, under the fraudulent joinder standard,28 the court considers

“summary judgment-type evidence in the record,” but also “take[s] into account all unchallenged

factual allegations, including those alleged in the complaint, in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff” and “the status of discovery,” considering what opportunity the plaintiff has had to

develop her claims against the non-diverse defendant.29 Unlike a summary judgment motion, a

plaintiff’s absence of evidence is not fatal;30 rather, the defendant bears a heavy burden to establish

that there is no possibility of recovery.31 The burden then shift to the plaintiff to put forth

contradictory summary judgment-type evidence,32 not merely allegations.33 Any genuine dispute

of fact must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.34

Whether an employee is personally at fault under Canter can be a discrete fact that a court

27 See McKee v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 358 F.3d 329, 334 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 648-49

(5th Cir. 2003)).

28 See Travis, 326 F.3d at 648-49 (describing the differences between the “fraudulent joinder and Rule 12(b)(6)

standards”).

29 McKee, 358 F.3d at 334 (citing Travis, 326 F.3d at 649).

30 Davidson v. Georgia-Pacific, L.L.C., 819 F.3d 758, 768 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Travis, 326 F.3d at 650 n. 3 (noting

that “[o]n a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff’s lack of evidence in support of her claims, after a sufficient

period of discovery, could have a different effect” than at the motion to remand stage, where such lack of evidence is

not dispositive)); Cumpian v. Alcoa World Alumina, L.L.C., 910 F.3d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 2018) (“On a question of

improper joinder at the early stage of a case, it is error to use the no-evidence summary judgment standard because

the determination is being made before discovery has been allowed.” (citing Davidson, 819 F.3d at 766)).

31 Jack, 79 F.4th at 555 (quoting Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 753)); Davidson, 819 F.3d at 767 (quoting Travis, 326 F.3d

at 650).

32 See Jack, 79 F.4th at 560 (Canter case); Anderson v. Ga. Gulf Lake Charles, LLC, 342 F. App’x 911, 917-18 (5th

Cir. 2009) (Canter case); Guillory v. PPG Indus., Inc., 434 F.3d 303, 312-13 (5th Cir. 2005) (Canter case); cf. Ford,

32 F.3d at 936-938 (Canter case) (finding plaintiffs’ expert affidavits that “squarely contradicted” employee-

defendant’s affidavit established “plaintiffs have at least a ‘possibility’ of establishing a state court cause of action”

against the defendant); Garrett v. AEP River Operations, LLC, No. 15-5562, 2016 WL 945056, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar.

14, 2016) (Vance, J.) (Canter case) (finding “genuine factual dispute” on whether shipyard supervisor owed a duty to

plaintiffs based on emails they submitted that contradicted supervisor’s declaration), cited with approval in Jack, 79

F.4th at 559.

33 See Jack, 79 F.4th at 559 (“Jack next contends that we cannot consider the affidavits [submitted by defendants]

because he disputes the allegations. Specifically, he claims that we should ignore . . . [their] statements that they were

never delegated the duties that Jack claims they were because Jack has said the opposite. We disagree.”); Anderson,

324 F. App’x at 918 (“Attempting to contradict [sworn] testimony, the . . . Plaintiffs repeat allegations from their

complaints in an effort to prove that these Employee–Defendants were personally delegated duties by Georgia Gulf. .

. . These general and unsupported allegations are similar to those we disqualified in Guillory.”).

34 McKee, 358 F.3d at 334 (citing Travis, 326 F.3d at 649); accord. Garrett, 2016 WL 945056, at *3.

may properly pierce the pleadings to examine.35 Plaintiff alleges that Thorton swept with a “dirty”

broom that left a substance that caused her to slip and fall, Thorton owed Plaintiff a personal duty,

and Thornton is personally responsible for Plaintiff’s injuries. ECF No. 17-2 ¶ 8. To show Plaintiff

has no possibility of recovery against Thorton, Walmart relies on Thorton’s affidavit stating she

“did not have any knowledge of any hazardous condition on the premises.” ECF No. 14-8 ¶ 3.

Thornton also states that she swept with a dry broom as part of a “general sweep,” rather than in

response to “any spill or other condition on the floor,” and the area was “free of any liquid

substance or other debris.” Id. ¶¶ 4-5, 7-8, 11. This affidavit36 is sufficient to demonstrate that

Plaintiff’s Canter claim against Thorton would fail because Thornton is not personally responsible

for Plaintiff’s injuries.37

After Walmart carried its burden to produce evidence for the summary inquiry, the burden

shifts to Plaintiff to submit her own evidence, not merely allegations, that contradicts Thorton’s

affidavit. Plaintiff, however, submits no evidence despite the opportunity to do so. Plaintiff leaves

the affidavit uncontradicted for purposes of this motion. The discrete and undisputed facts then

are that Thorton had no knowledge of any substance that could have caused Plaintiff’s injuries and

that she did not personally contribute to those injuries because she did not cause there to be a

substance on the floor from her sweeping.

The surveillance video footage of the moments before Plaintiff’s fall supports Walmart’s

35 See, e.g., Rolls ex rel. A.R. v. Packaging Corp. of Am. Inc., 34 F.4th 431, 438 (5th Cir. 2022) (affirming district

court finding of fraudulent joinder after summary inquiry regarding Canter’s personal fault element); cf. Jack, 79

F.4th at 558-59 (holding courts may properly pierce the pleadings to examine Canter’s delegated duty element

considering the plethora of cases doing so).

36 Ford, 32 F.3d at 935 (noting “affidavits” as an example of summary judgment-type evidence (citing Carriere v.

Sears, Roebuck & Co., 893 F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 817 (1990)).

37 Cf. Rolls, 34 F.4th at 438 (affirming district court’s summary inquiry finding that defendant employee was not

personally responsible, and thus plaintiff’s Canter claim fails, based on employee’s uncontradicted declaration that he

had no personal knowledge of or involvement in the cause of the injury).

assertion. See ECF No. 24-2 (Clip 1).°* The footage reveals (1) people traversed the floor where

Plaintiff fell without incident before the sweep, (2) there was no substance on the floor where

Plaintiff fell before Thorton conducted her general sweep of the entire checkout area, (3) there was

no substance on any locations of the floor after Thorton swept the entire area, (4) Thorton swept

the particular location only once, and (5) multiple people traversed the checkout area, including

the particular spot where Plaintiff fell, without incident after the sweep.

Walmart has demonstrated that Plaintiff has no possibility of recovery against Thorton, and

Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence to the contrary despite having the obligation to do so.*

Thus, the Court finds the first Hensgens factor weighs against granting the proposed amendment.

With two Hensgens factors weighing against amendment and the other two neutral, denial of

Plaintiff’s second Motion for Leave to File Supplemental and Amended Complaint is appropriate.

I. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s second Motion for Leave to File Supplemental and

Amended Complaint (ECF No. 17) is DENIED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 27th day of July, 2026.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

38 Video footage is summary judgment-type evidence. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007); Aguirre

v. City of San Antonio, 995 F.3d 395, 410-411 (Sth Cir. 2021).

3° Jack, 79 F.4th at 559-60.

10