Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

ESPADA HOLDING LLC, A

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,

AS ASSIGNEE OF CLAIMS;

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:26-cv-305-KCD-NPM

v.

WEEKS MARINE, INC., A

FOREIGN CORPORATION; LEE

COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY

COMMISSIONERS, A POLITICAL

SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF

FLORIDA; CITY OF BONITA

SPRINGS, FLORIDA, A FLORIDA

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION;

DAWN SERVICES, LLC, PATRIOT

MARINE SERVICES, LLC,

Defendants,

/

ORDER

Plaintiff Espada Holding LLC brings this negligence action as the

assignee of five local fishermen whose crab traps were destroyed during a

post-hurricane beach renourishment project. (See Doc. 20.)1 According to the

complaint, a fleet of tugs and barges—operated by Defendants Weeks

Marine, Dawn Services, and Patriot Marine Services—plowed through clearly

marked trap fields, severing lines and leaving the traps damaged.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and

alterations have been omitted in this and later citations.

Defendants the City of Bonita Springs and Lee County “participated in and

coordinated aspects of the Project within their respective jurisdictions.” (Id. ¶

14.) Espada alleges they failed to reasonably manage the project’s marine

operations with existing commercial fishing activity, directly resulting in the

alleged damage.

The City now moves to dismiss the single negligence claim brought

against it. (Doc. 45.) The City offers two arguments. First, it owed the

fisherman no duty because of an interlocal agreement with the County. (Id.

at 5.) Second, sovereign immunity shields its planning-level decisions and

bars much of the economic damages Espada seeks. (Id. at 12-17.) At this

stage of the litigation, the Court’s job is simply to ask whether the complaint

contains enough factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Because the City asks

the Court to look beyond the pleadings and resolve factual disputes

prematurely, the motion is DENIED.

I. Legal Standard

When a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6), our task is deliberately limited. The question at this stage is not

whether the plaintiff will ultimately win, but simply whether the complaint

states “a facially plausible claim for relief.” Galette v. Goodell, No. 23-10896,

2023 WL 7391697, at *3 (11th Cir. Nov. 8, 2023). Plausibility is not a

“probability requirement,” but it does demand more than a sheer possibility

that a defendant acted unlawfully. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. To cross the line

from conceivable to plausible, a plaintiff must plead enough “factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

At this starting gate, we must accept the complaint’s factual allegations

as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007). That benefit of the doubt,

however, has limits. The court is not bound to accept legal conclusions

dressed up as factual allegations. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007). A pleading that offers nothing more than “labels and conclusions”

or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not unlock

the courthouse doors. Id. In short, the plaintiff must tell a factual story that

makes the defendant’s liability plausible, not just point a finger and recite

the law. See, e.g., Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th

Cir. 2003).

II. Discussion

The City leads with a simple defense: it didn’t owe these fishermen a

duty of care. The City relies on an “interlocal agreement” with Lee County,

arguing that this contract shifted all operational responsibility for the project

elsewhere. (Doc. 45 at 6.) So the City is conclusively “not the entity

responsible for preparing the plans for the project, contracting with the entity

carrying out of the Project, or acting as the project manager for the Project.”

(Id. at 7.)

The problem for the City is a basic rule of civil procedure. A motion to

dismiss tests the complaint, not the evidence. Under Rule 12(b)(6), we are

strictly confined to analyzing the four corners of the pleadings. Wilchombe v.

TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009). “A court may consider

only the complaint itself and any documents referred to in the complaint

which are central to the claims.” Id. Here, the interlocal agreement fails that

test on every front. Espada did not attach the contract to its pleading, nor did

it mention the agreement anywhere in its allegations. Most importantly,

Espada’s negligence claim does not rely on this contract in any way. It is a

wholly outside document. We cannot skip ahead to the evidentiary phase just

because the defendant has a shiny exhibit, no matter how convenient that

might be. See, e.g., Sprengle v. Smith Mar. Inc., 660 F. Supp. 3d 1337, 1351

(M.D. Fla. 2023). So while the interlocal agreement may ultimately prove

dispositive like the City claims, that issue must be left for another day.

Next, the City invokes sovereign immunity. (Doc. 45 at 12.) To be sure,

Florida law protects local municipalities from tort liability when they make

discretionary, planning-level decisions. Com. Carrier Corp. v. Indian River

Cnty., 371 So. 2d 1010, 1021 (Fla. 1979). The government gets to make basic

policy choices—like deciding to fund a beach renourishment project in the

first place—without looking over its shoulder for a lawsuit. But that

immunity evaporates once a policy is made and the government shifts into

the operational phase of carrying it out. Trianon Park Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v.

City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912, 919 (Fla. 1985); see also Wynn v. City of

Lakeland, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1318 (M.D. Fla. 2010).

The City insists its involvement was strictly limited to high-level

planning. But that is not what the complaint says. Espada alleges that the

City served as a “local coordinating entity” that exercised “operational

involvement and control” over the day-to-day execution of the project in local

waters. (Doc. 20 ¶¶ 16, 21.) Specifically, Espada claims the City failed to

reasonably coordinate those ongoing marine operations with the active

commercial fishing season. (Id. ¶ 58.) At this stage, those allegations of

operational conduct must be accepted as true, and they are enough to survive

the City’s motion.

Finally, the City takes aim at Espada’s requested damages. (Doc. 45 at

17.) It argues that sovereign immunity bars any recovery for purely economic

harms, such as lost income and loss of use of the traps. (Id.) But these

granular issues are best left for another day. A motion to dismiss tests the

viability of a cause of action, not the precise contours of the claimant’s prayer

for relief. So long as some recoverable damage is demanded, the claim goes

forward. See Hutchings v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 6:08-CV-305-ORL-19KR, 2008

WL 4186994, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2008). Espada has alleged the physical

destruction of tangible property—more than 800 stone crab traps. That is a

cognizable property loss under Florida’s sovereign immunity statute. See Fla.

Stat. § 768.28(1).

Because Espada has alleged at least some recoverable injury, the Court

will not dismiss the complaint, even if it elsewhere seeks damages that may

ultimately prove impermissible. The City can challenge those specific

requests through more appropriate procedural vehicles down the road, such

as a motion in limine.

III. Conclusion

At this early juncture, Espada has pled enough to unlock the doors to

discovery. The Court’s role today is not to weigh the evidence, parse outside

contracts, or predict whether the City will be left holding the bag. The only

question is whether the complaint tells a plausible story of operational

negligence. It does.

To be sure, the City may well show that its involvement was confined to

protected, planning-level decisions. And it might be right that some of

Espada’s damages reach too far. But those are questions for summary

judgment. For now, the Court finds the factual allegations sufficient to move

forward.

A final word of caution. Based on the pleadings and the nature of the

project, Espada appears to face an uphill climb against the City. It should

carefully consider who the proper operational parties are in this dispute as

discovery unfolds. If it becomes clear that a party has been dragged into (or

kept in) this litigation simply to fish for deep pockets, the Court will not

hesitate to issue sanctions.

ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on July 13, 2026.

Kyle C. Dudek oo ot

United States District Judge