Eaton

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

THERON E.,1 Case No. 6:25-cv-01092-SB

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

BECKERMAN, U.S. Magistrate Judge.

Theron E. (“Plaintiff”) filed this appeal challenging the Commissioner of the Social

Security Administration’s (“Commissioner”) denial of his applications for Child’s Insurance

Benefits (“CIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the

Social Security Act. The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). For the reasons explained below, the Court reverses the Commissioner’s decision

because it is based on harmful legal error and not supported by substantial evidence in the

record.

1 In the interest of privacy, this opinion uses only the first name and the initial of the last

name of the non-governmental party.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“As with other agency decisions, federal court review of social security determinations is

limited.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014). A federal

court’s review is limited because “[f]or highly fact-intensive individualized determinations like a

claimant’s entitlement to disability benefits, Congress places a premium upon agency expertise,

and, for the sake of uniformity, it is usually better to minimize the opportunity for reviewing

courts to substitute their discretion for that of the agency.” Id. (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar.

Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 621 (1966)). Adhering to this principle, courts “follow three important

rules” in reviewing social security determinations. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492

(9th Cir. 2015).

First, courts “leave it to the [agency] to determine credibility, resolve conflicts in the

testimony, and resolve ambiguities in the record.” Id. (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1098).

Second, courts “will ‘disturb the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits only if it is not

supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.’” Id. (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at

1098). Third, if the agency “‘commits legal error, [courts] uphold the decision where that error is

harmless,’ meaning that ‘it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination,’ or that,

despite the legal error, ‘the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned, even if the agency

explains its decision with less than ideal clarity.’” Id. (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1098); see

also Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2021) (“And even where this modest

[substantial evidence] burden is not met, [courts] will not reverse an [agency] decision where the

error was harmless.” (citing Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded on

other grounds by regulation as recognized in Farlow v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 485, 487 (9th Cir.

2022))).

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BACKGROUND

I. PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATIONS

Plaintiff was born in May 1994, making him twenty-one years old on April 30, 2016, his

alleged disability onset date. (Tr. 15, 17, 24, 64, 72, 81, 90.) Plaintiff is a high school graduate

who has no past work experience. (Id. at 24, 48, 280.) In his applications, Plaintiff alleges

disability due to paranoia, anxiety, depression, learning disability, attention deficit hyperactivity

disorder (“ADHD”), sleep apnea, and “[s]ociopathic [t]endencies.” (Id. at 64, 72, 81, 90) (bold

omitted).

The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s applications initially and upon reconsideration, and

on September 28, 2022, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”). (Id. at 15.) Plaintiff appeared and testified at an administrative hearing before the ALJ

on November 15, 2023, and an impartial vocational expert (“VE”) testified at a supplemental

hearing held on July 10, 2024. (Id. at 15, 34-40, 43-60.) On July 18, 2024, the ALJ issued a

written decision denying Plaintiff’s applications. (Id. at 15-25.) On April 24, 2025, the Appeals

Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s written decision the final

decision of the Commissioner. (Id. at 1-6.) Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ’s

decision.

II. THE SEQUENTIAL PROCESS

A claimant is considered disabled if he or she is unable to “engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment

which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than [twelve]

months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). “Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential

process for determining whether an applicant is disabled within the meaning of the Social

Security Act.” Keyser v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation

omitted). Those five steps are: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity;

(2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals a

listed impairment; (4) whether the claimant can return to any past relevant work; and (5) whether

the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.

Id. at 724-25.

To establish a “prima facie case of a disability,” a claimant must demonstrate “at steps

one through four of the sequential evaluation process that she suffers from a severe impairment

that prevents her from doing any work she has done in the past, or that she has a severe

impairment and has no relevant past work[.]” White v. Kijakazi, 44 F.4th 828, 833 (9th Cir. 2022)

(citing Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999)). If the claimant does so, “[t]he

burden then shifts to the Commissioner at step five to establish that the claimant can perform a

‘significant number[]’ of jobs in the national economy given the claimant’s physical and mental

limitations, age, education, and work experience.” Id. (first quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(c)(2);

and then citing Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 955 (9th Cir. 2002)). “If the Commissioner

meets [his] burden, the claimant has failed to establish disability.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 955

(simplified).

III. THE ALJ’S DECISION

The ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation process to determine if Plaintiff is

disabled. (Tr. 15-25.) At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial

gainful activity since April 30, 2016, his alleged disability onset date. (Id. at 17.) At step two, the

ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from three severe impairments: “[O]besity; obstructive sleep

apnea; major depressive disorder; generalized anxiety disorder; and [ADHD.]” (Id.) At step

three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does not suffer from an impairment that meets or equals a

listing. (Id.)

The ALJ then found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform

“light work,” subject to the following limitations: (1) Plaintiff can stand and walk up to two

hours in an eight-hour workday, (2) Plaintiff can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch,

crawl, and climb ramps and stairs but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, (3) Plaintiff can

make “simple work-related decisions” and “understand, remember, and carry out simple

instructions,” (4) Plaintiff can “perform tasks that do not involve a specific production rate

pace,” such as “assembly-line work or an hourly production quota,” (5) Plaintiff can “adjust to

occasional changes in the work setting,” and (6) Plaintiff can engage in “occasional interaction

with the public, co-workers, and supervisors.” (Id. at 19.) At step four, the ALJ concluded that

Plaintiff has no past work experience. (Id. at 24.) At step five, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff

was not disabled because a significant number of jobs existed in the national economy that he

could perform, such as a small products assembler II, marker, and electronics worker. (Id. at 24-

25.)

DISCUSSION

In this appeal, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed reversible error because he found

persuasive the opinion of the consultative psychiatric examiner, Dayna Stierley, Psy.D.

(“Dr. Stierley”), yet formulated an RFC (and VE hypothetical) that failed to capture the marked

limitation that she identified. (See Pl.’s Reply Br. at 3 n.1, ECF No. 17, providing a succinct

summary of the issue; cf. Pl.’s Opening Br. at 2, ECF No. 11, identifying the “dispositive”

records; Def.’s Br. at 2, ECF No. 14, framing the “main issue” on appeal). Emphasizing that the

ALJ effectively rejected Dr. Stierley’s opinion without providing any explanation for doing so

and that the VE’s testimony reflects that Dr. Stierley’s opinion supports finding him disabled,

Plaintiff argues that the Court should reverse and remand this case for an award of benefits. (See

Pl.’s Opening Br. at 6, arguing that the “improperly rejected opinion should be fully credited as

true”).

The Court agrees that the ALJ’s decision is based on harmful legal error and not

supported by substantial evidence but finds that unresolved issues preclude an award of benefits.

The Court therefore reverses the Commissioner’s decision and remands this case for further

proceedings.

I. MEDICAL OPINION EVIDENCE

A. Applicable Law

“In January 2017, the Social Security Administration issued revised regulations for

evaluating medical opinions relating to claims filed on or after March 27, 2017.”2 Cross v.

O’Malley, 89 F.4th 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing Revisions to Rules Regarding the

Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01 (Jan. 18, 2017) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pts.

404 & 416)). The revised “regulations provide that ALJs will no longer ‘defer or give any

specific evidentiary weight’ to any medical opinion.” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a)).

Instead, “ALJ[s] must assess the persuasiveness of each medical opinion after considering

specified factors.” Stiffler v. O’Malley, 102 F.4th 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2024) (first citing Woods v.

Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2022); and then citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a)-(c),

416.920c(a)-(b)).

Specifically, the revised “regulations require an ALJ to discuss the supportability and

consistency of medical evidence—the factors the agency has historically found to be the most

2 Given that Plaintiff filed his applications on August 25, 2021 (Tr. 15), the parties agree

that the revised regulations apply here. (See Pl.’s Opening Br. at 2, 5, emphasizing the ALJ’s

reliance on the supportability and consistency factors in evaluating Dr. Stierley’s opinion; Def.’s

Br. at 1-10, relying on the ALJ’s findings regarding the persuasiveness of medical opinion

evidence).

important in evaluating medical opinions—while allowing for discussion of other factors listed

in paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(5), as appropriate.” Cross, 89 F.4th at 1215 (citing 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.920c(a)); see also Woods, 32 F.4th at 791 (“‘The most important factors’ that the agency

considers when evaluating the persuasiveness of medical opinions are ‘supportability’ and

‘consistency.’” (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a))). “Supportability focuses on whether ‘a

medical source supports a medical opinion by explaining the relevant objective medical

evidence.’” Stiffler, 102 F.4th at 1106 (quoting Woods, 32 F.4th at 791-92); see also Kitchen v.

Kijakazi, 82 F.4th 732, 740 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Supportability concerns how ‘a medical source

supports a medical opinion’ with relevant evidence[.]” (quoting Woods, 32 F.4th at 791-92)).

“Consistency means the extent to which a medical opinion is consistent with the evidence from

other medical sources and nonmedical sources[.]” Stiffler, 102 F.4th at 1106 (quoting Woods, 32

F.4th at 792).

In addition to supportability and consistency, “[a]n ALJ may discuss other factors [listed

in paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(5)], such as the medical source’s ‘relationship with the claimant’

or ‘specialization,’ but generally has no obligation to do so.” Cross, 89 F.4th at 1214 (citing 20

C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2)). If, however, an ALJ concludes that “two or more contradictory medical

opinions ‘both equally well-supported . . . and consistent with the record[,]’ . . . the regulations

mandate discussion of these other factors.” Id. at 1214-15 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(3),

(c)(3)-(5)).

Where, as here, the new regulations apply, a district court reviews the ALJ’s evaluation of

a medical opinion for substantial evidence. See Woods, 32 F.4th at 787 (“For claims subject to

the new regulations, . . . an ALJ’s decision, including the decision to discredit any medical

opinion, must simply be supported by substantial evidence.”); id. at 792 (“Even under the new

regulations, an ALJ cannot reject an examining or treating doctor’s opinion as unsupported or

inconsistent without providing an explanation supported by substantial evidence.”); Metcalf v.

Kijakazi, No. 22-35201, 2022 WL 17592194, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 13, 2022) (observing that

“under the revised regulations . . . , the ALJ’s evaluation of a medical opinion is reviewed for

substantial evidence” (citing Woods, 32 F.4th at 789)); see also Stiffler, 102 F.4th at 1108 (“In

sum, the ALJ’s evaluation of [the physician’s] medical opinion is supported by substantial

evidence.”).

B. Analysis

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ effectively rejected Dr. Stierley’s opinion because he found

her opinion persuasive but formulated an RFC and VE hypothetical that failed to account for the

marked limitations that she identified. (Pl.’s Reply at 3 n.1; Pl.’s Opening Br. at 2-4.) The Court

agrees.

1. Dr. Stierley’s Opinion

On February 24, 2024, Oregon’s Disability Determination Services (“DDS”) referred

Plaintiff to Dr. Stierley for a consultative psychiatric evaluation. (Tr. 1187-97; see also id. at

1183-86, 1198, setting forth the remaining pages of Exhibit 19F at 1-16; cf. Ct. Tr. Index at 5,

ECF No. 8-1.)

Dr. Stierley’s “functional assessment” and “diagnostic impressions” were based on her

clinical observations and interview, review of Plaintiff’s “record,” and administration of the

Wechsler Adult Intelligence Test–Fourth Edition (“WAIS-IV”), the Wechsler Memory Scale–

Fourth Edition (“WMS-IV”), and the Trail Marking Test (“TMT”). (Tr. 1187, 1192-94) (all caps

omitted). Notably, DDS provided Dr. Stierley with a form that (1) addressed an individual’s

ability to perform various work-related mental activities, (2) defined a “[m]arked” limitation as a

“serious[] limit[]” on one’s ability to “[f]unction[] . . . independently, appropriately, effectively,

and on a sustained basis,” and (3) defined “[s]ustained basis” as the “ability to perform [the

mental activity] eight hours a day for five days a week, or an equivalent work schedule.” (Id. at

1183.)

Dr. Stierley prepared an eleven-page report and addressed questions on DDS’s three-page

form, using its “rating terms” like “[m]ild,” “[m]oderate,” and “[m]arked.” (See id. at 1183,

1192.) Dr. Stierley opined that Plaintiff was “[m]arked[ly] impair[ed]” in his “[t]olerance to

stress associated with [activities of daily living] and work activity.” (Id. at 1192.) Furthermore,

Dr. Stierley opined that Plaintiff was “[m]oderate[ly] impair[ed]” in his “[i]nterpersonal

capabilities” with supervisors, coworkers, and the general public, “[m]oderate[ly] impair[ed]” in

his ability to “sustain attention and perform simple repetitive tasks or persist in [a] competitive

work environment,” and “[m]ild[ly] impair[ed]” in his ability to “retain and follow instructions.”

(Id.)

In terms of diagnostic impressions, Dr. Stierley recounted that Plaintiff “endorsed

symptoms of social communication disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and [ADHD.]”

(Id. at 1193) (simplified). Dr. Stierley also explained that “[a]dditional diagnostic considerations

include[d] major depressive disorder, and autism spectrum disorder [(‘ASD’)], as [Plaintiff]

endorsed many social problems aligned with an ASD diagnosis and reported a historical

diagnosis.” (Id.) Dr. Stierley also explained that she believed that Plaintiff’s “social limitations”

reflected more than “just low average to average” intelligence quotient (“IQ”) scores. (Id.)

(simplified).

2. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ found Dr. Stierley’s opinion “persuasive” and did not provide any explanation

for discounting it. (Tr. 23.) As relevant here, the ALJ noted that Dr. Stierley opined that Plaintiff

suffers from “[m]arked limitations” in his ability to tolerate stress “associated with limited

judgment and insight, and preoccupation with self-stress tolerance” and “mak[e] complex work-

related decisions and responding appropriately to usual work situations and changes in a routine

work setting.” (Id.) The ALJ explained that he found Dr. Stierley’s opinions persuasive because

they were “consistent with the other medical evidence” in the record and “well-supported” by her

“explanations, observations [that she] made during the examination,” and her “objective

testing[.]” (Id.)

Immediately thereafter, the ALJ noted that “[c]onsistent with [Dr. Stierley’s] opinion,” his

RFC assessment limited Plaintiff to “understand[ing], remember[ing], and carry[ing] out simple

instructions,” performing “tasks that do not involve a specific production rate pace” like

“assembly-line work or an hourly production quota,” making “simple work-related decisions,”

“adjust[ing] to occasional changes in the work setting,” and “occasional[ly] interact[ing] with the

public, co-workers, and supervisors.” (Id.) The ALJ stated that by limiting Plaintiff to “simple

work performed without significant contact with others, frequent changes, or decision making,”

he “avoids aggravation of mood issues or distractibility that could lead to excessive off-task

behavior.” (Id.)

3. Disposition

The Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is based on harmful legal error and not supported

by substantial evidence in the record. For that reason, the Court reverses the Commissioner’s

decision.

Plaintiff’s principal argument concerns Dr. Stierley’s opinion that Plaintiff suffers from

“marked limitations in tolerance to stress and responding appropriately to usual work situations

on a sustained basis.” (Pl.’s Opening Br. at 4.) Emphasizing that the ALJ found Dr. Stierley’s

opinion persuasive and offered no explanation for discounting any portion of it, Plaintiff argues

that the ALJ’s RFC assessment and VE hypothetical failed to account for the foregoing marked

limitations, which are based on Paragraph B’s fourth criteria (i.e., “B4” or “adapt or manage

oneself”). (See id.; Pl.’s Reply Br. at 3-4 & n.3, arguing that the RFC “does not address ‘B4’”);

cf. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (“Paragraph B of [nearly every] listing . . . provides the

functional criteria [the agency] assess[es], in conjunction with a rating scale . . . , to evaluate how

[a claimant’s] mental disorder limits [his] functioning. These criteria represent the areas of

mental functioning a person uses in a work setting. They are[ u]nderstand, remember, or apply

information; interact with others; concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and adapt or manage

oneself.”).

“[A]n ALJ evaluates Paragraph B criteria to determine if the severity of the claimant’s

mental impairment meets or is medically equal to the criteria of a listed impairment.” Kimberly

A. v. Kijakazi, No. 2:20-cv-01802-SB, 2022 WL 19203, at *5 (D. Or. Jan. 3, 2022) (citing 20

C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1). In other words, “[t]he limitations identified in the Paragraph B

criteria are not an RFC assessment but are used to rate the severity of mental impairment(s) at

steps [two] and [three] of the sequential evaluation process.” Id. (simplified); (cf. Tr. 19, stating

the same). By contrast, in formulating a claimant’s “mental RFC assessment” at subsequent steps

of the sequential process, an “ALJ is required to perform a more detailed assessment by

itemizing various functions contained in the broad categories found in [P]aragraphs B and C of

the adult mental disorders listings in 12.00 of the Listing of Impairments, and summarized on the

[agency’s] PRTF (Psychiatric Review Technique Form).” Kimberly A., 2022 WL 19203, at *5

(simplified).

Given this understanding, courts have recognized that “[w]hile similar evidence may be

used in both assessments of [a claimant’s] mental impairments, they are distinct, and limitations

assessed in the context of the [P]aragraph B assessment are not necessarily transferable to the

more detailed assessment required when formulating the RFC.” Id. (quoting JW U.C. v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., No. 2:19-cv-00090, 2019 WL 3451515, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 31, 2019)). Thus,

“the question is not whether the ALJ’s [P]aragraph B findings are consistent with the RFC, but

whether the ALJ has provided an adequate explanation for the mental limitations contained in the

RFC.” Id.

As relevant here, an ALJ’s “finding that an individual has ‘moderate’ limitations in the

[P]aragraph B criteria domains does not require the ALJ to assess a specific degree of functional

limitation in the RFC.” JW U.C., 2019 WL 3451515, at *3 (first citing Collingswood-Bonse v.

Colvin, No. 6:13-01646-AA, 2015 WL 853063, at *5-6 (D. Or. Feb. 24, 2015); and then citing

Phillips v. Colvin, 61 F. Supp. 3d 925, 940 (N.D. Cal. 2014)); see also Kimberley A., 2022 WL

19203, at *6 (reflecting that this Court previously quoted the same passage from the JW U.C.

decision).

Further, “[a]n ‘ALJ is responsible for translating and incorporating clinical findings into a

succinct RFC.’” Martinez v. Bisignano, No. 24-4520, 2025 WL 2364595, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 14,

2025) (quoting Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015)); see

also Floe v. O’Malley, No. 23-35589, 2024 WL 4601594, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 29, 2024) (“The

ALJ found each medical opinion persuasive and appropriately translated the assessments of [the

claimant’s] moderate mental impairments into the [RFC.]” (citing Rounds, 807 F.3d at 1006)).

An ALJ does not commit harmful error in formulating an RFC that is consistent with (or more

restrictive than) the medical opinion evidence that he found persuasive. See Martinez, 2025 WL

2364595, at *1 (“[The claimant] contends that the ALJ [assigned some weight to but] failed

[adequately] to incorporate [a provider’s] assessed limitations into his [RFC.] . . . [This]

argument fails because [the provider’s] medical opinions . . . are entirely consistent with the non-

exertional limitations identified in the ALJ’s RFC. An RFC that articulates a capacity ‘to perform

simple, routine, repetitive tasks’ adequately reflects medical opinions identifying mild and

moderate mental limitations.” (quoting Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir.

2008))).

By contrast, if the ALJ formulates an RFC that is inconsistent with (or less restrictive

than) a medical opinion that he found persuasive, then the ALJ has committed a harmful error.

See Jeffrey G. v. Kijakazi, No. 6:23-cv-00283-MK, 2024 WL 414422, at *5 (D. Or. Feb. 5, 2024)

(explaining that the Commissioner’s cases were “distinguishable” because they “only applie[d] if

the [ALJ’s RFC] determination is consistent with the restrictions identified in the medical

evidence,” which was “not the case [t]here”) (simplified); see also Timothy N. v. Comm’r Soc.

Sec. Admin., No. 3:25-cv-00994-SB, 2026 WL 1724684, at *4 (D. Or. June 15, 2026) (noting the

same).

The Commissioner does not dispute that the ALJ “found Dr. Stierley’s opinion persuasive

in its entirety[.]” (Def.’s Br. at 5.) Unlike Plaintiff, however, the Commissioner argues that the

RFC “accounted” for Dr. Stierley’s opinion. (See id., asserting that the ALJ “accounted for” and

“reasonably translated and incorporated Dr. Stierley’s opinion of marked limitation tolerating

‘stress with work activity’ into the [RFC]”; but cf. Tr. 1192, opining that Plaintiff is markedly

impaired in his ability to “tolerate stress associated with [activities of daily living] and work

activity”) (simplified).

The Court finds the Commissioner’s argument unpersuasive. The ALJ failed to provide

an adequate explanation for the mental limitations contained in the RFC. See JW U.C., 2019 WL

3451515, at *3 (“[T]he question is not whether the ALJ’s [P]aragraph B findings are consistent

with the RFC, but whether the ALJ has provided an adequate explanation for the mental

limitations contained in the RFC.”). The ALJ recognized that the Paragraph B criteria are “used

to rate the severity of mental impairments” at steps two and three of the sequential evaluation

process and are “not a[n RFC] assessment,” which “requires a more detailed” evaluation of the

“areas of mental functioning.” (Tr. 19.) The ALJ then explained that the RFC “reflect[ed] the

degree of limitation [that he had] found in the ‘[P]aragraph B’ mental functional analysis.” (See

id. at 19, so stating and finding “marked limitation” in “adapting or managing oneself,” in part

because it was “consistent with” Dr. Stierley’s functional assessment (citing Ex. 19F at 10, i.e.,

Tr. 1192)).

The Commissioner argues that the ALJ reasonably explained that his RFC aligned with

Dr. Stierley’s opinion because it limited Plaintiff to simple instructions, simple work-related

decisions, tasks that do not involve a specific production rate pace like assembly-line work or an

hourly production quota, and only occasional interactions with the public, co-workers, and

supervisors and changes in work setting. (Def.’s Br. at 5-6, citing Tr. 19, 23.) The Commissioner

in turn argues that the ALJ appropriately translated Dr Stierley’s assessment of marked mental

impairments into the RFC and that to the extent that Plaintiff advances a reasonable alternative

interpretation, the Court must defer to and affirm the ALJ’s decision. (Id. at 6-7, arguing that

even if Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s interpretation of Dr. Stierley’s opinion or the ALJ could

have interpreted Dr. Stierley’s opinion differently, “it is the ALJ’s rational findings that should be

affirmed”).

The Commissioner fails adequately to address the definitions upon which Dr. Stierley

based her (fully accepted) opinion. The relevant forms defined a “[m]arked” limitation as a

“serious[] limit[]” on an individual’s ability to “[f]unction[] . . . independently, appropriately,

effectively, and on a sustained basis” and defined “[s]ustained basis” as the “ability to perform

[the mental activity] eight hours a day for five days a week, or an equivalent work schedule.”

(Tr. 1183.) Thus, Dr. Stierley, relying on her clinical interview and observations, record review,

and administration of tests, opined that Plaintiff suffers from a “seriously limited” “[t]olerance to

stress associated with [full-time activities of daily living] and work activity” given his “limited

judgment and insight” and general “preoccupation with using violence to defend himself if he

was attacked.” (Id. at 1192, providing an example of Plaintiff’s general worries). Dr. Stierley

added that Plaintiff was limited in his “mental ability to meet [his] own basic needs[.]” (Id. at

1193.)

The ALJ’s explanation is insufficient because the Court is unable to discern how the ALJ

decided that the RFC’s limitations accounted for Plaintiff’s seriously limited ability to tolerate

stress associated with his full-time activities of daily living or work activity, or his impaired

ability to meet his own basic needs, let alone an employer’s. (See id. at 1183, 1193; see also id. at

19, finding that marked limitations in adapting or managing oneself aligned with Dr. Stierley’s

opinion and Plaintiff’s “limited daily activities outside of gaming or watching videos or

movies”); cf. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (“How do we use the [P]aragraph B criteria to

evaluate your mental disorder? . . . Marked limitation [means that y]our functioning in this area

independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is seriously limited. . . . If you

have difficulty using an area . . . day-to-day at home . . . , you may also have difficulty using that

area to function in a work setting. . . . [Y]ou must be able to . . . adapt and manage yourself in the

workplace. Limitation in any one of these parts (understand or remember or apply; concentrate

or persist or maintain pace; adapt or manage oneself) may prevent you from completing a work-

related task.”).

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The Court finds that the Commissioner has failed meaningfully to explain how the ALJ

arrived at the RFC despite fully accepting Dr. Stierley’s opinion. See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at

492 (holding that “the agency [must] set forth the reasoning behind its decisions in a way that

allows for meaningful review” because without it, “a reviewing court [is] . . . unable to review

[the ALJ’s] reasons meaningfully without improperly ‘substituting [its] conclusions for the

ALJ’s, or speculating as to the grounds for the ALJ’s conclusions’”) (simplified) (quoting

Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1103); see also Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2020)

(explaining that ALJs “must provide sufficient reasoning that allows [federal courts] to perform

[their] own review, because ‘the grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged are

those upon which the record discloses that its action was based’” (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at

1102)). As a result, the Court is unable to conclude that substantial evidence supports the denial

of Plaintiff’s applications.

On this record, the Court finds that a remand for further proceedings, not an award of

benefits, is warranted because the credit-as-true criteria are not satisfied. See Jeffrey G., 2024

WL 414422, at *5 (standard). On remand, the ALJ must explain how he translated Dr. Stierley’s

assessment of marked limitations into the RFC and address any related conflicts and ambiguities.

Cf. Floe, 2024 WL 4601594, at *1 (“The ALJ found each medical opinion persuasive and

appropriately translated the assessments of [the claimant’s] moderate mental impairments into

the [RFC.]” (citing Rounds, 807 F.3d at 1006)); Diedrich v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 634, 638 (9th Cir.

2017) (explaining that an “ALJ is responsible for studying the record and resolving any conflicts

or ambiguities in it”).

///

///

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court REVERSES the Commissioner’s decision and

REMANDS this case to the agency for further administrative proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 31st day of July, 2026.

HON. STACIE F. BECKERMAN

United States Magistrate Judge

PAGE 17 — OPINION AND ORDER