Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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DR. CHRISTOPHER JOHNSON,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

No. 24-CV-8791-JRC

-against-

THE BROOKDALE HOSPITAL MEDICAL

CENTER, DR. RAVI KOTHURU, DR. NARENDRA

KUMTHEKHAR, GARY STEPHENS, and DR.

ANTHONY TORTOLANI,

Defendants.

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JAMES R. CHO, United States Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Dr. Christopher Johnson (“plaintiff” or “Dr. Johnson”) commenced this action

against defendant the Brookdale Hospital Medical Center (“Brookdale” or “the hospital”), Dr.

Ravi Kothuru (Dr. Kothuru”), Dr. Narendra Kumthekhar (“Dr. Kumthekhar”), Gary Stephens

(“Stephens”), and Dr. Anthony Tortolani (“Dr. Tortolani”) (collectively, “defendants”), for

violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“§ 1981”), the New York State Human Rights Law

(“NYSHRL”), the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), and tortious interference

with an advantageous relationship. See generally Compl., Dkt. 1. Now pending before this

Court is defendants’ motion to dismiss this action in its entirety pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and

(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. 42.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Background

I. Factual Background

The Court accepts as true the following factual allegations, taken primarily from the

Complaint, and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Commerzbank AG v. U.S.

Bank, N.A., 100 F.4th 362, 374 (2d Cir. 2024).

Defendant Brookdale is a not-for-profit corporation organized under the laws of the State

of New York with business operations at 1 Brookdale Plaza in Brooklyn, New York. Compl. ¶

7. Defendants Dr. Kothuru, Dr. Kumthekhar, and Dr. Tortolani are individuals residing in New

York and who work at Brookdale in Brooklyn. Id. ¶¶ 8–10. Defendant Stephens is the Chief

Marketing Officer of One Brooklyn Health and an individual residing in New York, working in

the Brooklyn location of Brookdale. Id. ¶ 11.

Plaintiff Dr. Johnson is a Board-Certified plastic surgeon licensed in California and New

York. Id. ¶ 13. In January 2016, plaintiff received privileges to practice at Kingsbrook Jewish

Hospital, the predecessor of Brookdale, under Chairman Dr. William Lois. Id. ¶ 14. One

Brooklyn Health “bought out” Kingsbrook Jewish Hospital in 2020. Id. ¶ 20. Dr. Kumthekhar

then became Chairman. Id. Defendants explain that Brookdale is a hospital comprised of three

campuses that merged with Interfaith Medical Center and Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center as

of January 1, 2021, to operate as an integrated hospital network. Defendants’ Mem. of Law in

Supp. of their Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mem.”), Dkt. 43, at 1. In December 2021, after the

Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center campus ceased allowing inpatient surgical procedures at its

facilities, plaintiff applied for and received privileges to admit his patients for inpatient surgical

procedures at the Brookdale campus, pursuant to Brookdale’s Medical Staff Bylaws. Id.

Plaintiff “experienced race and sexual orientation discrimination” while working at the

hospital. Compl. ¶ 16. Plaintiff points to a series of instances of discrimination, as detailed

below. Around August 1, 2017, plaintiff was not permitted into the hospital and asked to show

identification. Id. No white doctors were treated similarly, and plaintiff complained in an email

to Assistant Director Griffin. Id. Dr. Kumthekhar, who became plaintiff’s supervisor around

June 2018, never referred patients to plaintiff, never “scrubbed with him,” and never had a

meeting with plaintiff by himself. Id. ¶ 17. In July 2019, a white ophthalmologist, Dr. Berg,

assaulted a “clerk for OR” and plaintiff. Id. ¶ 18. The hospital did not accept payment for

cosmetic surgeries that plaintiff brought in. Id. ¶ 19.

On May 20, 2020, Dr. Kumthekhar examined a patient and claimed he did not have a

hernia. Id. ¶ 21. When “scrubbing,” a hernia was discovered and Dr. Kumthekhar “hated

[p]laintiff for finding this.” Id. Dr. Kumthekhar then “caused [p]laintiff to be investigated for

insurance fraud and reviewed 10 hernia patients for which he was fully exonerated.” Id. ¶ 22.

Dr. Kumthekhar also ensured the gender affirming surgery plaintiff brought in was denied when

a Black transgender male patient was denied the opportunity to pay out of pocket for pectoralis

implants. Id. ¶ 23.

Plaintiff was forced to purchase and transport daily liposuction equipment, tattoo

machines, and fat transfer cannula equipment, while other doctors were given better

accommodations and equipment on site. Id. ¶ 26.

In October 2020, defendant Dr. Tortolani “intervened” and claimed Asian employees

were making accusations against plaintiff. Id. ¶ 27. Dr. Kumthekhar solicited these accusations.

Id. Dr. Kumthekhar and Dr. Kothuru were made uncomfortable by Dr. Johnson saying that his

child is half ethnically Indian and raised by gay parents. Id. ¶ 28. On February 8, 2021, plaintiff

asked Dr. Kumthekhar, copying Dr. Tortolani and others, “to treat him fairly like other surgeons

and noted specific instances of liposuction where reimbursement is an issue.” Id. ¶ 29.

Defendants “made sure anesthesia turnover time for [p]laintiff was much higher to reduce his

number of surgeries.” Id. ¶ 30.

In October 2021, Dr. Kumthekhar accused plaintiff of performing fraudulent hernia

surgeries. Id. ¶ 31. Dr. Tortolani said Dr. Kumthekhar was mistaken but still discussed

transferring plaintiff. Id. Before plaintiff “integrated” in January 2022, plaintiff received a letter

from Dr. Tortolani notifying him of an “outside investigation.” Id. ¶ 32.

On March 11, 2022, Dr. Kumthekhar spoke negatively about plaintiff to Dr. Kothuru at a

holiday party. Id. ¶ 33.

On April 19, 2022, plaintiff met with Julie Schwartz, allegedly conducting a neutral

investigation, and mentioned “the discrimination case” regarding the Black transgender male

patient who was denied the opportunity to pay out of pocket for pectoralis implants. Id. ¶ 34.

Plaintiff was not shown an investigation report, and no instruction of non-retaliation was given to

the witnesses who participated in the investigation. Id. ¶ 35.

On April 22, 2023, plaintiff made a submission to the New York State Division of

Human Rights concerning Brookdale’s treatment of the transgender patient and other racial and

sexual orientation discrimination. Id. ¶ 36.

On May 19, 2022, plaintiff “reported” that Dr. Kothuru threatened that two people would

lose their job if they refused to make false allegations against plaintiff. Id. ¶ 37.

On May 31, 2022, plaintiff wrote to LaRay Brown, Chief Executive Officer of One

Brooklyn Health, reporting a nurse had “attacked him for being Black and gay, he suffered false

complaints, and allegations of fraudulent billing for repair of hernias in women undergoing

abdominoplasty.” Id. ¶¶ 38–39.

On June 6, 2022, Brookdale’s outside counsel, Leonard Rosenberg, “engaged in a

settlement that Dr. Johnson and [Brookdale] would withdraw complaints against each other.” Id.

¶ 41.

On August 11, 2022, plaintiff reported to LaRay Brown that on July 22, 2022, Dr.

Kothuru “became aggressive and threw an instrument at the only other Black gay person in the

OR.” Id. ¶ 42. On August 24, 2022, plaintiff was not invited to mandatory departmental

meetings. Id. ¶ 43.

On October 26, 2022, plaintiff “reported homophobia” to Dr. Sandra Scott, the interim

Chief Executive Officer of Brookdale. Id. ¶ 44. Plaintiff mentioned that Bonita Hardwick, Dr.

Kumthekhar, Dr. Jenneelyn Johnson, Leonard Rosenberg, Reginald Bullock, and Dr. Kothuru all

discriminated against him. Id. ¶ 45.

On November 3, 2022, plaintiff met with Dr. Kothuru. Id. ¶ 46. LaRay Brown and Dr.

Sandra Scott had promised that Dr. Kothuru would apologize to plaintiff for his “insulting false

scheme that [Dr. Kothuru] helped promote accusing [p]laintiff of insurance fraud due to

discrimination.” Id. On December 15, 2022, Dr. Sandra Scott and LaRay Brown asked plaintiff

to help with “LGBTQI issues” in the hospital. Id. ¶ 48. LaRay Brown was later fired on January

10, 2024. Id. ¶ 60.

On April 17, 2023, plaintiff was “reappointed to medical staff.” Id. ¶ 49. On April 26,

2023, Dr. Guny Gabriel, a Black surgeon, was terminated. Id. ¶ 50.

In Spring 2023, defendant Gary Stephens called plaintiff into an office and said, “When I

say jump, you say how high?” Id. ¶ 51.

On June 25, 2023 and July 10, 2023, the Chief Executive Officer asked plaintiff,

plaintiff’s child, and plaintiff’s husband to walk in the hospital’s Gay Pride parade. Id. ¶ 52.

Plaintiff’s husband was to carry the banner with Dr. Sandra Scott. Id. Dr. Kothuru “was forced

to march and angry.” Id.

On July 17, 2023, Gary Stephens initiated a peer review investigation about “wrong side

surgery.” Id. ¶ 53. Stephens “had people on payroll for no show jobs and was receiving $10–

30k per patient with his charity in Guyana, Caribbean Heart Institute,” and took “male Indian

and Middle Eastern physicians,” and went “to Guyana while on paid leave from One Brooklyn

Health.” Id. ¶ 54.

Plaintiff fell ill in August 2023. Id. ¶ 55. On August 22, 2023, plaintiff’s husband sent a

text message to Dr. Sandra Scott, informing her that plaintiff had a liver biopsy that revealed

cancer cells. Id. ¶ 56.

On September 20, 2023, plaintiff was notified of the suspension of his privileges pending

investigation. Id. ¶ 57. On September 22, 2023, plaintiff was called into a meeting “for

suspension” while he was “suffering from enterococcal line sepsis and admitted to Brookdale.”

Id. ¶ 58. Plaintiff was told of three “complaints—one being he had to lie down in OR bed, and

that he exposed [his] torso to [an] Islamic female resident.” Id. At the end of October 2023,

plaintiff underwent liver embolization for stage IV carcinoid cancer. Id. ¶ 59.

In April 2024, plaintiff was notified of false charges against him relating to failure to

diagnose, abusive conduct toward staff, and unprofessional conduct. Id. ¶ 61. These allegations

took place after plaintiff reported his own internal complaints and “outside agency filings.” Id.

Plaintiff “lost Heal[]ogics opportunity” in May 2024 “due to [] false allegations and has not been

able to perform surgeries without privileges at a hospital.” Id. ¶ 62. Plaintiff is “suffering from

deep depression, cancer, post-traumatic stress and sleep deprivation.” Id. ¶ 63.

II. Procedural History

On December 24, 2024, plaintiff commenced this action alleging violations of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981, the NYSHRL, the NYCHRL, and tortious interference with an advantageous

relationship. See Compl. On April 28, 2025, defendants filed a pre-motion letter expressing

their intent to file a motion to dismiss. Dkt. 16. On April 29, 2025, the Honorable Natasha C.

Merle was assigned as the presiding judge. On April 30, 2025, plaintiff responded to defendants’

pre-motion letter. Dkt. 17. On May 2, 2025, defendants filed a motion for a pre-motion

conference before Judge Merle. Dkt. 18. On May 9, 2025, plaintiff responded to defendants’

motion for pre-motion conference. Dkt. 19. On May 19, 2025, Judge Merle granted in part and

denied in part defendants’ motion for pre-motion conference. See Order dated May 19, 2025.

The Court set a briefing schedule on defendants’ anticipated motion to dismiss. Id. The Court

entered a modified briefing schedule several times at the request of the parties while they

discussed settlement. See Orders dated June 25, 2025; Aug. 8, 2025; Oct. 1, 2025; Oct. 28, 2025.

The parties consented to the undersigned’s jurisdiction in this case on November 20,

2025. Dkt. 39. The undersigned was reassigned as the presiding judge on November 24, 2025.

On December 18, 2025, the parties filed their fully-briefed motion to dismiss. See Dkt. 42.

Discussion

I. Standard of Review

“In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, the Court construes the complaint liberally, ‘accepting all factual allegations in

the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.’” Zhong v.

Aug. Aug. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 2d 625, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Chambers v. Time Warner,

Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002)). However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rather, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint “must

contain sufficient factual matter,” which if “accepted as true, . . . state[s] a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In other words, “[t]he Court should not dismiss a complaint for failure to

state a claim if the factual allegations sufficiently ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.’” Zhong, 498 F. Supp. at 628 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 5).

II. Analysis

A. Section 1981

Plaintiff alleges that (1) defendants discriminated against him by subjecting him to

hostile, discriminatory treatment and offensive, racially motivated comments and conduct; and

(2) defendants retaliated against him by subjecting him to further discrimination and harassment,

refusing to reprimand the discriminatory behavior, and ultimately terminating his privileges at

Brookdale, all in violation of § 1981. Compl. ¶¶ 66, 72.

1. Statute of Limitations

Plaintiff’s § 1981 discrimination claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations.

See Burgis v. Dep’t of Sanitation City of N.Y., No. 13-CV-1011, 2014 WL 1303447, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014) (“Although § 1981 does not contain a statute of limitations, the

Supreme Court has held that the four-year federal ‘catch-all’ statute of limitations applies.”

(citing Jones v. R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382 (2004)).

Defendants claim that each of the incidents allegedly occurring prior to December 24,

2020, are time-barred under the four-year statute of limitations period for § 1981 claims. Defs.’

Mem. at 18; see Compl. ¶¶ 16–28. Plaintiff argues that otherwise time-barred acts should be

considered an ongoing course of discrimination that constitute a “continuing violation,” for the

purpose of the timeliness of his claims. Pl.’s Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp.”), Dkt.

46, at 19–20; see Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 359 (2d Cir. 2001) (continuing

violation doctrine allows plaintiffs to challenge an ongoing practice of discrimination if at least

one episode falls within the statute of limitations). Plaintiff also notes that courts have been

hesitant to make determinations of where a course of conduct constitutes a continuing violation

pre-discovery. Pl.’s Opp. at 20–22.

Even assuming the continuing violation doctrine applies to plaintiff’s § 1981 claims, his

claims must fail because he fails to state a claim under § 1981, as explained below.

2. Contractual Relationship Under § 1981

“To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that

(1) the plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) defendant’s intent to discriminate on the

basis of race; and (3) discrimination concerning one of the statute’s enumerated activities,” such

as the making and enforcement of contracts. Felder v. United States Tennis Ass’n, 27 F.4th 834,

848 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal quotations omitted). “Section 1981 offers relief when racial

discrimination blocks the creation of a contractual relationship, as well as when racial

discrimination impairs an existing contractual relationship, so long as the plaintiff has or would

have rights under the existing or proposed contractual relationship.” Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v.

McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006).

Plaintiff’s Complaint satisfies the first requirement for a § 1981 claim. See Compl. ¶¶ 39,

42. As to the second requirement, that plaintiff must allege defendants’ intent to discriminate on

the basis of race, plaintiff’s allegations that defendants targeted him, and not non-Black doctors

he asserts were similarly situated, is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See Littlejohn v.

City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 312 (2d Cir. 2015) (“An inference of discrimination can arise

from . . . the more favorable treatment of employees not in the protected group.” (internal

quotations omitted)); see also Buon v. Spindler, 65 F.4th 64, 83 (2d Cir. 2023) (“[W]e have

cautioned courts to be mindful of the elusive nature of intentional discrimination when making a

plausibility determination at the motion-to-dismiss phase because discrimination claims

implicate an employer’s usually unstated intent and state of mind and therefore rarely is there

direct, smoking gun, evidence of discrimination.” (internal quotations omitted)). Plaintiff’s §

1981 claims therefore depend on whether he has adequately alleged that the discrimination

related to the making and enforcement of a contract under which he has rights. See Patterson v.

County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 224 (2d Cir. 2004) (Section 1981 “outlaws discrimination with

respect to . . . a contractual relationship”).

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not provide a detailed description of the employment

relationship between himself and Brookdale. Plaintiff asserts that he “received privileges at

Kingsbrook Jewish Hospital (predecessor of Brookdale)” in January 2016. Compl. ¶ 14. Then,

“[o]n September 20, 2023, [p]laintiff was notified of suspension of privileges pending

investigation.” Id. ¶ 57. Plaintiff alleges that the individual defendants knew of plaintiff’s

“contract and advantageous privileges relationship” with Brookdale. Id. ¶ 95.

Defendants assert that the granting of hospital privileges at Brookdale is governed by

Brookdale’s bylaws and not a separate written agreement. Defs.’ Mem. at 11. Defendants also

submit Brookdale’s bylaws, under which plaintiff’s privileges are determined. See Decl. of Gary

McCollin (“McCollin Decl.”), Ex. 1 (“Bylaws”), Dkt. 45-1.1

Plaintiff alleges that he need not plead a contractual relationship because § 1981 offers

relief when racial discrimination blocks the creation of a contractual relationship. Pl.’s Opp. at 8

(citing Domino’s Pizza, 546 U.S. at 470). Plaintiff does not allege that the creation of any

additional contractual relationship was blocked, only that plaintiff’s pre-existing privileges to

practice at Brookdale (created under the hospital bylaws) were suspended after the alleged

discrimination. Compl. ¶ 57. The Court, therefore, evaluates whether these privileges create a

sufficient contractual relationship for plaintiff’s § 1981 claims.

As explained by this Court in the recent decision of Hutchinson v. Northwell Health, Inc.,

No. 23-CV-2116, 2024 WL 1308691 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2024), courts in New York have found

that hospital bylaws only rarely create contractual rights. See Hutchinson v. Northwell Health,

Inc., No. 23-CV-2116, 2024 WL 1308691, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2024) (collecting cases).

Defendants rely on this Court’s holding in Hutchinson for their argument that plaintiff’s § 1981

claims must be dismissed for his failure to plead the necessary contractual relationship. Defs.’

Mem. at 10–12.

Plaintiff does not respond to recent case law holding that a plaintiff may not state a claim

under § 1981 where the contractual relationship alleged is a doctor’s privileges awarded by a

1 Defendants contend that it is appropriate for the Court to consider the bylaws as they are integral to plaintiff’s

claims and plaintiff had notice of the bylaws. Defs.’ Mem. at 4 n.1; see Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949

F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991) (courts may consider documents of which a plaintiff had notice and are integral to a

plaintiff’s claim in deciding a motion to dismiss). The Court agrees, as plaintiff’s privileges to practice at

Brookdale, granted pursuant to the bylaws, are relied on extensively in the Complaint. See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 14–15, 57,

62, 72, 95; see also Pucilowski v. Spotify USA, Inc., No. 21-CV-1653, 2022 WL 836797, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21,

2022) (“For a document to be integral to a complaint, the plaintiff must have [i] actual notice of the extraneous

information and [ii] relied upon the document in framing the complaint.” (internal quotations omitted)). Plaintiff

does not dispute defendants’ reliance on or submission of the bylaws. See Faulkner v. Beer, 463 F.3d 130, 134 (2d

Cir. 2006) (“[I]t must be clear on the record that no dispute exists regarding the authenticity or accuracy of the

document” and that “there exist no material disputed issues of fact regarding the relevance of the document.”).

hospital’s bylaws. Instead, plaintiff cites to Mahmud v. Kaufmann, 454 F. Supp. 2d 150

(S.D.N.Y. 2006), and Hamad v. Nassau County Med. Ctr., 191 F. Supp. 2d 286 (E.D.N.Y. 2000),

for his argument that a doctor may adequately plead a contractual relationship under § 1981 by

alleging the termination of hospital privileges. Pl.’s Opp. at 8–9; see Mahmud, 454 F. Supp. 2d

at 158 (“At this stage, alleging the denial of hospital privileges is a sufficient contractual

relationship to maintain a § 1981 claim.”); Hamad, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 301 (finding that plaintiff

doctor “adequately plead the essential elements of a § 1981 cause of action” by alleging that “his

termination and denial of privileges were predicated upon a racially discriminatory animus”).

The Court finds the recent reasoning in Hutchinson, rather than Mahmud or Hamad,

persuasive and controlling. Like the plaintiff in Hutchinson, here, Dr. Johnson had no

employment contract with the hospital at which he exercised his privileges. Instead, the hospital

bylaws allowed the hospital to offer “privileges,” allowing physicians to practice there. See

McCollin Decl. at ¶ 4. Like the plaintiff in Hutchinson, Dr. Johnson alleges that the hospital at

which he practiced, motivated by discrimination and in violation of § 1981, wrongly terminated

previously provided privileges. Hutchinson, 2024 WL 1308691 at *2. In determining whether

privileges formed under hospital bylaws create a contractual right, this Court in Hutchinson

examined New York State case law, which governs the formation of contracts. See Specht v.

Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 27 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[A] court should generally apply

state-law principles to the issue of contract formation.”). After determining “hospital bylaws

will only rarely create contractual rights” under New York law, this Court in Hutchinson held

that since “the bylaws would be unable to support a breach of contract claim, they also cannot

give rise to § 1981 claims.” Hutchinson, 2024 WL 1308691, at *4.

Here, as in Hutchinson, Brookdale’s bylaws do not fall under any exception to the

general rule that hospital bylaws do not create a contractual right. Brookdale’s bylaws do not

contain “clear language” that create a right to “relief to restore wrongfully revoked practicing

privileges.” Id. at *3. Like the bylaws at issue in Hutchinson, Brookdale’s bylaws only contain

a procedural process by which a decision adverse to a practitioner or applicant’s clinical

privileges may be reviewed. See Bylaws Art. XIII (“Hearing and Appellate Review”); see also

Hutchinson, 2024 WL 1308691, at *3 (a hospital’s hearing procedures are “unlikely [to have

been] intended by anyone to create a monetary claim”). Further, when applying for appointment

to the “Medical Staff,” or “Adjunct Staff,” a process that must precede the awarding of clinical

privileges, applicants must “[r]elease[] from any liability the Hospital and its representatives for

their permissible acts performed in connection with evaluation of the Applicant and his/her

credentials.” Bylaws Art. V, § 3(B)(1)(d). Thus, as in Hutchinson, it is implausible that bylaws

containing an explicit clause releasing the hospital from liability were intended to permit civil

liability. See Hutchinson, 2024 WL 1308691, at *3 (“[N]othing in [the hospital] bylaws

suggest[] they are the rare variety intended to create an enforceable contract; instead, these

bylaws are analogous to those found insufficient to establish a right to damages [by the New

York Court of Appeals].”).

Moreover, this Court noted in Hutchinson that “no court applying New York law has

faced this exact issue.” Id. The Court finds unavailing plaintiff’s citation to Johnson v. Nyack

Hospital, 954 F. Supp. 717, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), a decades-old case which denied a motion to

dismiss a § 1981 claim and said in dicta, without explanation, that a physician plaintiff may rely

on “the contract implicit in the medical staff relationship with [the] Hospital” in making a § 1981

claim.

Plaintiff cites to no recent cases, and the Court finds none, that rely on either Mahmud or

Hamad for the proposition that privileges to practice at a hospital formed under a hospital’s

bylaws constitute the contractual relationship necessary to state a claim under § 1981. Mahmud

relies on Hamad for its holding that plaintiff sufficiently plead a § 1981 claim, yet Hamad

predates the New York State Court of Appeals decisions relied on in examining the existence of

a contractual relationship in hospital bylaws in Hutchinson. See Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of their

Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Reply”), Dkt. 47, at 4. Plaintiff does not allege that any contractual

relationship exists other than the allegation that “the denial of hospital privileges is a sufficient

contractual relationship to maintain a § 1981 claim,” which was directly dispelled in Hutchinson.

Plaintiff also attempts to rely on Bhanusali v. Orange Reg’l Med. Ctr., 572 F. App’x 62

(2d Cir. 2014), yet the Second Circuit in Bhanusali did not address whether plaintiff’s hospital

privileges formed under a hospital’s bylaws are sufficient to plead a contractual relationship

under § 1981. Instead, the Court in Bhanusali held that the district court erred in dismissing

plaintiff’s claims because plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to support an inference of

discrimination. Bhanusali v. Orange Reg’l Med. Ctr., 572 F. App’x 62, 63 (2d Cir. 2014).

As such, plaintiff’s § 1981 claims must be dismissed.

B. NYSHRL, NYCHRL, and Tortious Interference

Having dismissed plaintiff’s only claim under federal law, the Court “declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction” over plaintiff’s state and city law claims. Cummings v. City of New

York, No. 19-CV-7723, 2021 WL 1664421, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2021); 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3) (a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over state law

claims “if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”). No

“clearly articulated federal interest” remains, and “[t]he Court has not invested the judicial

resources necessary to resolve [the] non-federal claims or even determined whether the

Complaint adequately pleads them.” Goszczynska v. Arcadia Earth LLC, 805 F. Supp. 3d 551,

561 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (internal quotations omitted); see also TRB Acquisitions LLC v. Yedid, No.

20-CV-552, 2021 WL 293122, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2021) (after dismissal of federal claim,

“the traditional values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity that the Court

must consider [did] not counsel in favor of exercising jurisdiction” (internal quotations omitted)).

Accordingly, the Court “dismisses [the state and city law claims] without prejudice to the claims

being refiled in a court of competent jurisdiction.” Cummings, 2021 WL 1664421, at *3; see

Jusino v. Fed. of Catholic Teachers, Inc., 54 F.4th 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2022) (“dismissals for lack of

subject[-]matter jurisdiction must be without prejudice” (internal quotations omitted)).

III. Plaintiff’s Request to Amend the Complaint

Plaintiff requests, in a single sentence at the end of his opposition papers, that “Dr.

Johnson should be granted the first opportunity to amend his Complaint.” Pl.’s Opp. at 22.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 governs a party’s request to amend its pleadings. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15. Under Rule 15(a)(1), a party may amend its pleadings once as a matter of course

under certain circumstances. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Because plaintiff’s request comes

after the deadlines specified in both Rule 15(a)(1)(A) and Rule 15(a)(1)(B), the proposed

Amended Complaint may be filed only through Rule 15(a)(2), with either the Court’s leave or

the other party’s written consent. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

Here, plaintiff’s boilerplate request for leave to amend his Complaint does not comply

with this district’s Local Rules. See E.D.N.Y. Loc. Civ. R. 15.1 (“All motions made by a

represented party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) . . . must also include as an exhibit (1) a clean

copy of the proposed amended or supplemental pleading; and (2) a version of the proposed

pleading that shows . . . all differences from the pleading that it is intended to amend or

supplement.”). The Court therefore exercises its discretion to deny this “cursory or boilerplate

request[ ] . . . made solely in a memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss.” Malin v. XL

Capital, Ltd., 312 F. App’x 400, 402 (2d Cir. 2009). However, the Court dismisses plaintiff’s

claims without prejudice, and, as set forth below, plaintiff may file a properly supported motion

for leave to amend within 30 days of entry of this Memorandum & Order.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss seeking

dismissal of this case in its entirety. Plaintiff may file a motion for leave to amend within 30

days of the date of this Memorandum & Order. In the event such a motion is filed, the Court will

enter a briefing schedule thereon. If no such motion is filed, the Complaint shall be dismissed.

SO ORDERED

Dated: Brooklyn, New York

July 21, 2026

s/ James R. Cho

James R. Cho

United States Magistrate Judge