Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

25-CV-5311(EK)(MMH)

-against-

NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

RELATIONS BOARD et al.,

Defendants,

-and-

AMAZON LABOR UNION NO. 1

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF

TEAMSTERS,

Defendant-Intervenor.

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ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:

Currently before the Court is Amazon’s motion for

summary judgment on Count I. The Court presumes familiarity

with the procedural and factual background of this case, as set

forth in our November 26, 2025 order granting Amazon’s motion

for a preliminary injunction. See generally ECF No. 49 (the

“Preliminary Injunction Order”).1

Amazon’s motion is granted for substantially the same

reasons articulated in the Preliminary Injunction Order: the

1 The Court also adopts all abbreviations used in the Preliminary

Injunction Order in this order.

SERA Amendment is squarely preempted by the NLRA as interpreted

in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236

(1959).2 We write further to address several new arguments

raised in the summary judgment briefing. None leads the Court

to “reconsider its conclusions in [the] Preliminary Injunction

Order.” Defs.’ Opp’n 3, ECF No. 70.

Discussion

A. This Court Does Not Have the Authority to Invent a New

Exception to Garmon Preemption

No matter how defendants frame their argument, they

are ultimately asking the Court to overrule — or invent a new

exception to — the preemption doctrine laid out by the Supreme

Court in Garmon. See, e.g., Defs.’ Opp’n 13 (asking the Court

to “decid[e] whether Garmon’s finding of implied preemption

continues to apply”). Defendants readily admit that the SERA

Amendment gives PERB and the NLRB “concurrent” jurisdiction,

see, e.g., id. at 1, 9, 23, which is precisely what Garmon

disallows. See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245 (“When an activity is

arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA], the States as well

as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of

the [NLRB].” (emphasis added)). Nonetheless, defendants ask us

to conduct an implied preemption analysis from scratch, as

2 Having determined that this case turns on pure questions of law, we

stayed discovery pending resolution of Amazon’s motion for summary judgment.

See docket order dated Jan. 16, 2026; minute entry dated Jan. 29, 2026.

though the NLRA’s preemptive effect were a matter of first

impression. See Defs.’ Opp’n 11-18. But, again, this Court is

bound by Garmon “[u]ntil and unless the Supreme Court itself

overrules or limits” it. Perez v. Greiner, 296 F.3d 123, 125

n.4 (2d Cir. 2002).

Defendants urge us to reconsider in light of the

Supreme Court’s recent decision overturning Humphrey’s Executor

v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), which had upheld for-

cause removal protections for members of “independent” executive

agencies like the NLRB. See Notice of Suppl. Authority, ECF No.

75 (citing Trump v. Slaughter, No. 25-332, 2026 WL 1855612 (U.S.

June 29, 2026)). But whether for-cause removal protections are

an essential underpinning of the NLRB’s exclusive jurisdiction,

as laid out in Garmon, is a question for the Supreme Court and /

or Congress. See Defs.’ Opp’n 1 (“These changes have erased

Congress and the Supreme Court’s basis for entrusting

administration of the labor policy for the Nation to the NLRB.”

(emphasis added)); see also Margolin v. Nat’l Ass’n of Immigr.

Judges, 146 S. Ct. 1285, 1290 (2026) (Thomas and Barrett, JJ.,

concurring) (“Statutes change only when Congress changes them,

not when judges decide that they no longer vindicate Congress’s

purposes.”).3

The 1959 amendments to the NLRA merely underscore this

point. Defendants argue that Congress passed those amendments

in “reaction to Supreme Court decisions that had permitted . . .

jurisdictional no-man’s lands” in American labor law. Defs.’

Opp’n 17. But just as Congress acted then, it could act now to

the extent it believes that changed political circumstances

warrant reconsideration of the scope of the NLRB’s exclusive

jurisdiction. So too, the purported inefficiencies and

obstruction at the NLRB that defendants describe, see, e.g.,

Defs.’ Opp’n 6-9, are a political issue more appropriately

addressed to Congress.

B. The Sears Exception Does Not Apply

To support its argument that Garmon does not apply now

that “ending quorums is . . . a tool of presidential control,”

3 Defendants had pointed to Nat’l Ass’n of Immigr. Judges v. Owen, 139

F.4th 293 (4th Cir. 2025), cert. granted, opinion rev’d sub nom. Margolin v.

Nat’l Ass’n of Immigr. Judges, 146 S. Ct. 1285 (2026), as “particularly

persuasive” support for their position in this case. See Defs.’ Opp’n 15

n.10; Defs.’ Opp’ to Mot. for Prelim. Inj. 14, ECF No. 30. That case “held

that an exception to exhaustion requirements for federal employee claims

regarding personnel actions covered by the Civil Service Reform Act might be

justified by the Special Counsel and Merit System Protection Board’s loss of

independence.” Defs.’ Opp’n 15 n.10. The Supreme Court has since summarily

reversed the Fourth Circuit for violating the principle of party

presentation. See Margolin, 146 S. Ct. at 1287. Justices Thomas and Barrett

wrote separately to criticize the Fourth Circuit’s decision on the merits for

reading an exception into a statutory exhaustion requirement on the basis of

changed political circumstances. Id. at 1290 (Thomas and Barrett, JJ.,

concurring).

ALU invokes the Supreme Court’s decision in Sears v. San Diego

County District Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978). See

ALU’s Opp’n 17-21, ECF No. 71; see also Defs.’ Opp’n 21 (relying

on Sears to argue that the SERA Amendment can be applied

constitutionally when the NLRB lacks a quorum). Specifically,

ALU contends that Sears “blessed an exception to Garmon

permitting state regulation when parties ‘lack[] a reasonable

opportunity to secure’” an NLRB decision — as they do now, in

ALU’s view, due to the NLRB’s dysfunction. ALU’s Opp’n 18

(quoting Glacier Nw., Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Loc. Union

No. 174, 598 U.S. 771, 777 n.1 (2023)).

That argument is simply incorrect. Sears held that a

state court could “entertain an action” that “arguably — but not

definitively” involved conduct prohibited or protected by the

NLRA when the plaintiff had no “reasonable opportunity either to

invoke the Board’s jurisdiction himself or else to induce his

adversary to do so.” 436 U.S. at 201 (emphasis added). Here,

by contrast, the SERA Amendment gives PERB the authority to

regulate matters clearly within the NLRB’s exclusive

jurisdiction. That is unconstitutional. Indeed, the Sears

Court reiterated that “unquestionably[,] . . . when the same

controversy may be presented to the state [body] or the NLRB, it

must be presented to the Board.” Id. at 202 (emphasis added).

C. Defendants’ Request for a “Tailored” Remedy Is Denied

Defendants also argue that, at the very least, the

Court should “reject [Amazon’s] facial challenge or . . .

provide a tailored remedy” because there are circumstances under

which the SERA Amendment’s application would be valid. Defs.’

Opp’n 18. Specifically, defendants ask the Court to hold that

“the 2025 Amendment can be constitutionally applied when the

NLRB is unable to exercise jurisdiction – either when Board

Member firings without cause eliminate a quorum or when courts

enjoin the NLRB from processing a case.” Id. at 20. We

disagree.

First, defendants argue that the SERA Amendment “is

constitutional when applied in circumstances like 2025 in which

the NLRB cannot function” due to its lack of quorum. Id. at 19.

But that is merely a variant on defendants’ argument for an

exception to Garmon. It does not merit further discussion,

except to note that the NLRB regained its quorum less than a

month after the issuance of the Preliminary Injunction Order.4

Second, defendants claim that the SERA Amendment’s

“grant of jurisdiction . . . could encompass specific labor

4 See Parker Purifoy, “NLRB Regains Quorum as Senate Confirms Trump

Labor Slate,” Bloomberg Law (Dec. 18, 2025), https://perma.cc/97BV-R7JX. ALU

also contends that it would be constitutional for PERB to exercise concurrent

jurisdiction with the NLRB during a federal government shutdown. ALU’s Opp’n

22. That argument fails for similar reasons.

disputes that fall under [recognized] Garmon exceptions.” Id.

at 19 (citing Glacier, 598 U.S. at 777 n.1). But defendants do

not explain how. We have already explained why the Sears

exception is inapplicable here. See supra Section I.B. The

other two recognized exceptions — for conduct that “is a merely

peripheral concern of the NLRA” and “conduct [that] touches

interests . . . deeply rooted in local feeling and

responsibility” — are also inapposite, largely for the reasons

articulated in Amazon’s reply brief. Glacier, 598 U.S. at 777

n.1; see Amazon’s Reply 11-13, ECF No. 74.

SERA, by defendants’ own admission, provides “parallel

rights” to the NLRB. See Defs.’ Opp’n 3. Indeed, New York

courts have repeatedly recognized that “The [NLRA], and the

[SERA] are not only alike in their provisions but are almost

identical in their language.” New York State Lab. Rels. Bd. v.

Holland Laundry, 294 N.Y. 480, 492 (N.Y. 1945). Clearly then,

SERA does not address conduct “peripheral” to the NLRA or rooted

in local concerns. Rather, it governs the very same conduct at

the heart of the NLRA.

Finally, defendants contend that the SERA Amendment

can be applied constitutionally “when the NLRB is enjoined from

processing a case.” Defs.’ Opp’n 22. But that would turn the

statute on its head. As written, the SERA Amendment applies

except when the NLRB “successfully asserts jurisdiction over any

employer, employees, trades, or industries” via a federal court

order. See SERA Amendment, ECF No. 1-1. “Statutes should be

construed to avoid constitutional questions, but this

interpretative canon is not a license for the judiciary to

rewrite language enacted by the legislature.” Salinas v. United

States, 522 U.S. 52, 59–60 (1997).

D. Amazon’s Claims Are Neither Moot, Nor Duplicative

Lastly, ALU argues that the case is now moot because

Amazon’s “particularized injury” — the PERB charge that ALU

filed on Brima Sylla’s behalf — “has been withdrawn.” ALU’s

Opp’n 9. This argument fails. For one thing, a plaintiff can

“bring[] a pre-enforcement facial challenge against a statute”

without “demonstrat[ing] to a certainty that it will be

prosecuted under the statute”; rather, it must prove “only that

it has an actual and well-founded fear that the law will be

enforced against it.” Pac. Cap. Bank, N.A. v. Connecticut, 542

F.3d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 2008). Amazon has clearly done so here.

Moreover, even if the Sylla charge was the only basis

for Amazon’s standing, “[a]n exception to the mootness doctrine

applies when a defendant ceases the challenged action

voluntarily.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Serio, No. 97-CV-23, 2003 WL

21418198, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2003). ALU argues this case is

different because it “didn’t do anything allegedly unlawful

[itself], and Amazon didn’t sue [ALU].” ALU’s Opp’n 10. But

that is a distinction without a difference: ALU sought to

intervene as a defendant in this case in part to defend the

Sylla charge. See Mot. to Intervene 14, ECF No. 26-1. And it

withdrew that charge in response to the Preliminary Injunction

Order, which led Sylla to conclude that his “case would be

decided more promptly” by the NLRB. ALU’s Jan. 26, 2026 Ltr.-

Mot. for a Pre-Mot. Conf., ECF No. 58. If that were to render

this case moot, the Court would vacate its injunction, and Sylla

(or a different member of ALU) could bring another charge to

PERB, which — by ALU’s own telling — is the preferable forum.

That is exactly what the voluntary cessation doctrine seeks to

prevent. See Connecticut Citizens Def. League, Inc. v. Lamont,

6 F.4th 439, 446 (2d Cir. 2021) (“The voluntary cessation rule

ensures that a party cannot evade judicial review . . . by

temporarily altering [its] behavior.”).

ALU also briefly argues, in the alternative, that the

Court should dismiss this litigation as duplicative of that

currently pending in the Northern District of New York. See

ALU’s Opp’n 9-10; see also NLRB v. New York, No. 25-CV-01283

(N.D.N.Y.). We have already twice rejected variants of this

argument and will not consider it anew. See Sept. 29, 2025

docket order denying motion for a stay; Preliminary Injunction

Order 13-14.

E. Amazon Has Met the Standards for Summary Judgment and

Permanent Injunctive Relief

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no

genuine dispute of material fact, such that the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Here, because we hold that the SERA Amendment is

unconstitutional as a matter of law, summary judgment is

warranted, and Amazon is entitled to declaratory relief.

Amazon has also fulfilled the requirements for

permanent injunctive relief:

(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;

(2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary

damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury;

(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between

the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is

warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not

be disserved by a permanent injunction.

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).

When the plaintiff seeks an injunction against the government,

the final two factors merge. Cf. New York v. United States

Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 969 F.3d 42, 58-59 (2d Cir. 2020)

(articulating the same rule in the context of a preliminary

injunction motion).

Each of these factors has been met here. As the Court

previously noted, “it is well-settled that an alleged

constitutional violation constitutes irreparable harm.”

Gallagher v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 477 F. Supp. 3d 19, 41

(S.D.N.Y. 2020) (collecting cases); see also Prelim. Inj. Order

12-13. And it is equally obvious that a constitutional

violation of the sort alleged here cannot be remedied with money

damages. Cf. Axon Enter., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 598 U.S.

175, 191 (2023) (“[An unconstitutional] proceeding that has

already happened cannot be undone.”). Finally, the state’s

“interest in administering its laws without interference by

federal equitable power . . . is diminished when the laws at

issue likely impinge a federal constitutional right. . . . [And]

the public interest is well served by the correction of this

constitutional harm.” A.H. by & through Hester v. French, 985

F.3d 165, 184 (2d Cir. 2021).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Amazon’s motion for summary

judgment on Count I is granted. It is hereby declared that the

SERA Amendment is unconstitutional, null, and void. And

defendants are permanently enjoined from enforcing the SERA

Amendment. Because that is the extent of the relief that Amazon

seeks, Counts II through IV are dismissed without prejudice.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment

for Amazon and to close this case.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Eric Komitee

ERIC KOMITEE

United State

s District Judge

D ated: July 20, 2026

Brooklyn, New York