Garbark

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

AUGUST GARBARK, :

:

Plaintiff, : Case No. 2:25-cv-1003

:

v. : Judge Algenon L. Marbley

:

BARR-NUNN TRANSPORTATION, LLC : Magistrate Judge S. Courter Shimeall

and HENRY HUMBLE, :

:

Defendants. :

:

OPINION & ORDER

This matter comes before this Court on Plaintiff August Garbark’s Motion to Remand to

State Court (ECF No. 11) and Defendant Barr-Nunn Transportation, LLC’s Motion for Leave to

File an Amended Notice of Removal (ECF No. 12). For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion

is GRANTED and this case is REMANDED.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from a traffic collision that occurred on Interstate 70 West in Columbus,

Ohio. (Compl., ECF No. 5 ¶ 4). Barr-Nunn is a transportation company engaged in shipping

materials in interstate commerce, and had employed Henry Humble as a driver. (See id. ¶¶ 7–10).

While operating a large tractor-trailer for Barr-Nunn on January 19, 2023, Humble allegedly failed

to recognize that traffic in front of him had slowed on the interstate, could not stop his tractor-

trailer in time, and collided with the vehicle in front of him, which then pushed that vehicle into

the back of Garbark’s vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 13–17). Garbark claims his vehicle suffered “catastrophic

damage,” and he was left with “serious and permanent injuries and other damages.” (Id. ¶¶ 18–

19).

Garbark filed suit against Barr-Nunn and Humble on January 2, 2025 in the Franklin

County Court of Common Pleas. (ECF No. 11 at 1). In detailing the propriety of the state court’s

jurisdiction and venue, he alleged that Barr-Nunn was an Iowa corporation with its principal place

of business in Granger, Iowa, while Humble was a resident of Columbus, Ohio. (Compl., ECF

No. 5 ¶¶ 2–3). Garbark also explained that he was a resident of Saint Clairsville, Ohio. (Id. ¶ 1).

On September 3, 2025, Defendant Barr-Nunn removed the case to this Court, asserting that

defense counsel had learned on August 29, 2025 that Humble, whose employment with Barr-Nunn

ceased shortly after the traffic collision, “was living in Greensboro, North Carolina with his sister.”

(Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1 ¶ 11). In removing, Barr-Nunn invoked the Court’s diversity

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441(a). (Id. ¶¶ 26–30).

On October 2, 2025, Plaintiff Garbark filed the instant motion to remand, arguing that Barr-

Nunn’s Notice of Removal was deficient because it only addressed Humble’s then-current

residence in North Carolina, rather than Humble’s citizenship at the time of filing. (ECF No. 11

at 2). In support, Garbark provided a 2023 traffic report of the collision completed by Columbus

police that provided a Columbus, Ohio address for Humble. (See id.). In response, Barr-Nunn

filed its motion seeking leave to amend its Notice of Removal, (ECF No. 12), and argued that the

amended Notice of Removal mooted Garbark’s remand motion because Barr-Nunn provided a

declaration by Humble attesting that, as of October 14, 2025, he was “not currently residing in the

State of Ohio,” “was not residing in the State of Ohio” on January 2, 2025, and “ha[d] not resided

in the State of Ohio” from January 2, 2025 through October 14, 2025. (ECF No. 13-1 ¶¶ 3–5).

Instead, Humble stated that he was “currently” residing in North Carolina. (Id. ¶ 5).

Replying in support of his remand motion, Garbark argued that assuming Humble’s

attestations are true, they could not demonstrate that Humble’s domicile was outside Ohio at the

time the case was initiated. (ECF No. 14 at 1). Garbark pointed out that residence is merely one

factor informing domicile and diversity of citizenship, and challenged the sufficiency of Humble’s

declaration in establishing his domicile. (Id. at 2–3). Thus, Garbark argued, Barr-Nunn had failed

to meet its burden to show that diversity jurisdiction was proper. (Id. at 3). Simultaneously,

Garbark opposed Defendant’s request to file its proposed amended Notice of Removal. Although

not disputing that Barr-Nunn had the right to amend, he claimed that the proposed amendment was

futile because it did not cure the defects in the original Notice of Removal or establish that Humble

was domiciled outside of Ohio when the action commenced. (ECF No. 15 at 1–2). He also pointed

out that Humble had listed an Ohio address as his residence as far back as December 2012,

suggesting Humble had lived and worked in Ohio for more than a decade before the traffic

collision. (Id. at 3).

In reply in support of its motion to submit the amended Notice of Removal, Barr-Nunn

points out that the documents establishing Humble’s former residence in Ohio are stale and predate

the state court complaint. (ECF No. 16 at 1). They argue that Humble’s declaration, along with

his current North Carolina driver’s license, both suffice to establish that he was a resident of North

Carolina for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When determining whether to remand a case, a court must “determine whether the action

was properly removed in the first place.” Roof v. Bel Brands USA, Inc., 641 F. App’x 492, 495

(6th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). A case “brought in a State court of which the district courts of

the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants,

to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where

such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Original jurisdiction includes federal-question

jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction. Clark v. Pollan, 2024 WL 4903806, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov.

27, 2024). Federal-question jurisdiction requires a cause of action arising under federal law. 28

U.S.C. § 1331. Diversity jurisdiction requires diversity of parties and a claim for at least one cent

more than $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

III. LAW & ANALYSIS

In seeking removal, Defendant Barr-Nunn invoked this Court’s diversity jurisdiction.

Thus, Barr-Nunn bears the initial burden of proving citizenship. Once Barr-Nunn has made such

a showing, the burden shifts to Garbark to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

domicile changed. Persinger v. Extendicare Health Servs., Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 995, 997 (S.D.

Ohio 2008) (Sargus, J.). The parties disagree on only one issue: whether Defendant Humble is a

citizen of Ohio or North Carolina for the purposes of this Court’s diversity jurisdiction. The Court

will consider, in evaluating whether removal could be proper in this case, both the original and

amended Notices of Removal. (ECF Nos. 1; 12-1).

Mr. Humble’s citizenship, for the purposes of this Court’s diversity jurisdiction, is equated

with his domicile. But domicile is not equated with or synonymous to residence. While Humble

can theoretically reside in several places, and although his residency is certainly relevant to his

citizenship for jurisdictional purposes, Humble “can only have one jurisdictional domicile.”

Scarlet Club, LLC v. Point on Lane Partners, LLC, 2025 WL 3004929, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 27,

2025) (Marbley, J.) (citing Persinger, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 996). Humble’s domicile is the state

where he is “physically present” with an intent to remain “indefinitely,” or absent an intent “to

make . . . home elsewhere.” Cardinal Health 110, LLC v. Talla, 2025 WL 1373316, at *2 (S.D.

Ohio Mar. 31, 2025) (Vascura, M.J.) (quoting Stifel v. Hopkins, 477 F.2d 1116, 1120 (6th Cir.

1973)).

A variety of factors inform the determination of domicile, including residence, location of

personal and real property, and place of business or employment; other factors include voting

registration, locations of bank accounts and brokerages, societal memberships and associations,

driver licenses, automobile registration, and payment of taxes. Scarlet Club, 2025 WL 3004929,

at *2; Persinger, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 997 (citing 13B Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice and

Procedure § 3612 (2d ed. 1984)).

Barr-Nunn offers two forms of evidence in support of its position that Humble is a citizen

of North Carolina, there is diversity between the parties, and therefore its removal is proper. First,

Barr-Nunn points to Humble’s declaration, where he states that he had not been residing in Ohio

at the time of the lawsuit’s filing or since. Second, Barr-Nunn provides Humble’s current North

Carolina driver license as further evidence that he is a North Carolina citizen.

The problem for Barr-Nunn, as Garbark correctly points out, is that an individual’s

residence and driver license are merely two of many factors that courts consider in determining

domicile and citizenship for diversity purposes. Barr-Nunn apparently accepts that Humble

resided in Ohio for nearly a decade before moving, and had Ohio driver licenses at that time. What

Barr-Nunn fails to provide, however, is a preponderance of evidence suggesting that Humble’s

domicile changed. The removal statute must be “strictly construed and all doubts resolved in favor

of remand,” as a “lack of jurisdiction would make any decree in the case void and the continuation

of the litigation in federal court futile.” Eastman v. Marine Mechanical Corp., 438 F.3d 544, 549–

50 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Brown v. Francis, 75 F.3d 860, 864–65 (3d Cir. 1996)); accord Am.

Gen. Fin. Servs. v. Griffin, 685 F. Supp. 2d 729, 733 (N.D. Ohio 2010). Even accepting Humble’s

declaration for its worth, Humble only states that he was not physically present in Ohio for a period

of time, and that he was “currently resid[ing]” in North Carolina. (ECF No. 13-1 ¶¶ 3–5). What

Humble’s declaration omits is any intent he might have had to remain in North Carolina or make

North Carolina (or some other state aside from Ohio) his permanent home. While Humble’s

present residence in North Carolina and his North Carolina license provide some evidence

suggesting he is domiciled in North Carolina, it is not a preponderance of evidence. See Kaiser v.

Loomis, 391 F.2d 1007, 1009 (6th Cir. 1968) (noting that citizenship for diversity purposes “is

synonymous not with ‘residence’ but with ‘domicile’”).

This 1s not to say that Humble is presently domiciled in Ohio. This Court need not make

that finding, and indeed, there 1s little record evidence as to his domicile either way. Instead, it is

sufficient to find that Barr-Nunn has failed to show a preponderance of evidence suggesting that

Humble’s domicile has changed to North Carolina, even if Humble presently resides with his sister

there and possesses a North Carolina driver’s license. Absent the required quantum of evidence,

this Court is not assured that it has jurisdiction over the matter.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Barr-Nunn has failed to carry its burden in removal, whether

removal is based on its original or amended Notice of Removal. This Court GRANTS Plaintiff

Garbark’s Motion to Remand. Defendant Barr-Nunn’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended

Notice of Removal is DENIED as MOOT.

The case is REMANDED back to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. The Clerk

of Court is DIRECTED to terminate this case for lack of jurisdiction, and send a copy of this

Order to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ALGENONL. MARB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: July 15, 2026