Evans

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 25-CV-62656-DIMITROULEAS/STRAUSS

BRIAN EVANS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY NATIONAL BANK,

Defendant.

/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION1

THIS MATTER came before the Court upon Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss First

Amended Complaint (“Motion”) [DE 23]. I have reviewed the Motion, the briefing thereon [DE

24, 25], and all other pertinent portions of the record. For the reasons discussed herein, I

respectfully RECOMMEND that this action be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack

of personal jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

From around 1996 through 2000, Plaintiff (who is pro se)2 maintained a banking

relationship with Business Bank of Nevada (“Nevada Bank”). First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)

1 This case has been referred to me pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 for a ruling on all non-dispositive

matters and for a Report and Recommendation on any dispositive matter [DE 12].

2 Pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to “less stringent standards” than pleadings

drafted by attorneys. Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020). “Yet even in

the case of pro se litigants this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel

for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell

v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014). Moreover, pro se litigants are

required to comply with procedural rules. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993)

(“[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted

so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”); Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d

[DE 21] at 3. Defendant has since acquired Nevada Bank. Id. During the course of Plaintiff’s

relationship with Nevada Bank, John Guedry (“Guedry”), a Nevada Bank executive, instructed

Plaintiff to bring valuable portions of Plaintiff’s baseball card collection into a bank branch. Id.

Plaintiff subsequently delivered multiple boxes of Plaintiff’s baseball cards to Guedry inside the

bank during business hours, and Guedry took custody of the boxes of baseball cards. Id. Plaintiff

has made repeated written demands for the return of the baseball card collection over many years,

including in November 2025 (the month before Plaintiff filed this case). Id. However, Plaintiff’s

baseball card collection has not been returned, and no accounting or explanation has been provided

in response to Plaintiff’s demands. Id. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff asserts the following

claims against Defendant: (I) Conversion; (II) Fraudulent Misrepresentation; (III) Breach of

Fiduciary Duty; (IV) Negligent Supervision; and (V) Successor Liability.

DISCUSSION

In the Motion, Defendant contends that this action should be dismissed for multiple

independent reasons, including for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Because I agree with Defendant that dismissal (without prejudice) is

warranted for lack of personal jurisdiction, I do not reach Defendant’s other arguments for

dismissal.3

826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[A]lthough [courts] are to give liberal construction to the pleadings of

pro se litigants, ‘[courts] nevertheless have required them to conform to procedural rules.’” (citing

Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002))).

3 See Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1214 n.6 (11th Cir. 1999) (“A court without personal

jurisdiction is powerless to take further action.”); Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings

(Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 940 (11th Cir. 1997) (“As a general rule, courts should address

issues relating to personal jurisdiction before reaching the merits of a plaintiff’s claims.”); but see

Trump v. Clinton, 161 F.4th 671, 687 (11th Cir. 2025) (“Although we ordinarily address issues

relating to personal jurisdiction before reaching the merits, we can address the merits first when

jurisdiction turns on a merits question.” (cleaned up)).

I. LEGAL STANDARD – PERSONAL JURISDICTION

“Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their jurisdiction

over persons.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

4(k)(1)(A)). “A federal court sitting in diversity undertakes a two-step inquiry in determining

whether personal jurisdiction exists: the exercise of jurisdiction must (1) be appropriate under the

state long-arm statute and (2) not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to

the United States Constitution.” AcryliCon USA, LLC v. Silikal GmbH, 985 F.3d 1350, 1363-64

(11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Intern., Inc., 593 F.3d

1249,1257-58 (11th Cir. 2010)). “A plaintiff seeking the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a

nonresident defendant bears the initial burden of alleging in the complaint sufficient facts to make

out a prima facie case of jurisdiction.” United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th

Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). “A plaintiff defending against a facial attack on jurisdiction enjoys

safeguards similar to those retained when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim is raised, and both the district court and a reviewing court must consider the well-pleaded

allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true.” Watson v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 159 F.4th

1234, 1252 (11th Cir. 2025) (cleaned up). “[V]ague and conclusory allegations . . . are insufficient

to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction.” Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314,

1318 (11th Cir. 2006).

II. ANALYSIS

Under Florida’s long-arm statute, § 48.193, Fla. Stat., a defendant may be subject to

specific personal jurisdiction or general personal jurisdiction. Waite v. All Acquisition Corp., 901

F.3d 1307, 1312 (11th Cir. 2018). General jurisdiction – “jurisdiction over any claims against a

defendant, whether or not they involve the defendant’s activities in Florida” – exists where “the

defendant engages in ‘substantial and not isolated activity’ in Florida.” Id. (quoting Carmouche

v. Tamborlee Mgmt., Inc., 789 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2015)); see also § 48.193(2) (“A

defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such

activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of

this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity.”). On the other hand, specific

jurisdiction – “jurisdiction over suits that arise out of or relate to a defendant’s contacts with

Florida” – exists for conduct specifically enumerated in § 48.193(1)(a). Waite, 901 F.3d at 1312

(quoting Carmouche, 789 F.3d at 1204); see also SkyHop Techs., Inc. v. Narra, 58 F.4th 1211,

1223 (11th Cir. 2023) (“Florida’s long-arm statute subjects to the jurisdiction of Florida state

courts anyone ‘who personally or through an agent’ engages in any of nine enumerated acts, as

long as the cause of action arises from that act.”).

Relevant to the issue of personal jurisdiction, Plaintiff alleges: (1) Defendant is a national

banking association with its main office in California; (2) “Defendant conducts substantial,

continuous, and systematic business within the State of Florida, including maintaining branch

operations in Miami”; (3) “Defendant purposefully avails itself of conducting business in Florida,

employs personnel here, and derives revenue from Florida operations”; (4) Plaintiff resides in

Florida and sent written demands to Defendant from Florida; and (5) Defendant caused injury in

Florida due to its wrongful retention of Plaintiff’s property and its refusal to respond to the written

demands Plaintiff sent from Florida. FAC at 2. Thus, Plaintiff appears to allege the existence of

both general and specific jurisdiction.

In the Motion, Defendant raises a facial, not factual, personal jurisdiction challenge.

Defendant’s challenge is facial as it is based on the allegations of the FAC and does not rely on

affidavits or other evidence. See Del Valle v. Trivago GMBH, 56 F.4th 1265, 1271 (11th Cir.

2022) (“[T]hey did not submit any affidavits or other exhibits rebutting the jurisdictional

allegations in the complaint. The personal jurisdiction challenge, therefore, was facial and not

factual.”).4 In his response to the Motion, Plaintiff only appears to contend that specific

jurisdiction exists. He does not appear to press – and instead seemingly abandons – his allegation

of general jurisdiction. At any rate, as discussed herein, Plaintiff’s factual allegations are

insufficient to establish a prima facie case of general or specific personal jurisdiction.

A. GENERAL JURISDICTION

To the extent Plaintiff maintains that this Court can exercise general jurisdiction over

Defendant, he is incorrect. “Because Florida’s long-arm provision ‘extends to the limits on

personal jurisdiction imposed by the Due Process Clause,’ [the Court] ‘need only determine

whether [its] exercise of jurisdiction over [Defendant] would exceed constitutional bounds.’”

Waite, 901 F.3d at 1316 (quoting Carmouche, 789 F.3d at 1204). “A court may assert general

jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations, without offending due

process when their affiliations with the State are so continuous and systematic as to render them

essentially at home in the forum State.” Id. at 1317 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,

S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “‘only a

limited set of affiliations with a forum’ will render a defendant at home there.” Id. (quoting

4 Plaintiff includes an alternative request for jurisdictional discovery in his response to the Motion.

That request should be denied given that Defendant has only raised a facial challenge to personal

jurisdiction. See Diulus v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., Inc., 823 F. App’x 843, 849

(11th Cir. 2020) (“[A] district court does not abuse its discretion by denying jurisdictional

discovery if ‘the complaint was insufficient as a matter of law to establish a prima facie case that

the district court had jurisdiction.’” (quoting Butler v. Sukhoi Co., 579 F.3d 1307, 1314 (11th Cir.

2009))); Fleischman v. Forest Trail Acad., LLC, No. 24-CV-81457-RLR, 2025 WL 1330498, at

*2 (S.D. Fla. May 7, 2025) (“[J]urisdictional discovery may not be used to enable a plaintiff to

facially plead personal jurisdiction.” (citing In re Zantac, 706 F. Supp. 3d 1363, 1367-68 (S.D.

Fla. 2020)).

Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137). “The ‘paradigm all-purpose forums’ in which a corporation is at home

are the corporation’s place of incorporation and its principal place of business.” Id. (citing and

quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137). “‘[A] corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal

place of incorporation or principal place of business’ will be ‘so substantial and of such a nature

as to render the corporation at home in that State’ only in ‘exceptional’ cases.” Carmouche, 789

F.3d at 1204 (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19).

As indicated above, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s main office is in California – and

Plaintiff’s response to the Motion notes that Defendant’s headquarters are in California, see [DE

24] at 2 – but that Defendant maintains branch operations in Miami, Florida. The FAC also

includes conclusory allegations that Defendant employs personnel in Florida and derives revenue

from Florida operations. However, the FAC fails to include any factual allegations showing that

Defendant’s activities in Florida “closely approximate the activities that ordinarily characterize a

corporation’s place of incorporation or principal place of business.” Waite, 901 F.3d at 1318

(quoting Carmouche, 789 F.3d at 1205). Without such factual allegations, “the exercise of general

jurisdiction over [Defendant] in Florida would violate due process.” Id.5

5 See also Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 135 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding court could not

exercise general personal jurisdiction over bank that was incorporated and headquartered

elsewhere even though bank had branch offices in the forum); Legends Title, LLC v. Cap. One,

Nat’l Ass’n, 659 F. Supp. 3d 637, 649 (D. Md. 2023) (rejecting argument that “Capital One's

operation of branches in Maryland is sufficient to confer general personal jurisdiction”); Gen.

Agent Ctr. Inc. v. Donald Vanier LLP, 632 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1049 (D. Ariz. 2022) (“Plaintiffs

argue that BANA is subject to this Court’s general jurisdiction because BANA does business in

Arizona by operating ‘hundreds of branch banks’ which conduct wire transfers all over the world,

including transfers to other bank branches in Arizona. . . . Without more, operating bank branches

and conducting wire transfers is not enough to subject BANA to general jurisdiction in Arizona

where it is not domiciled.” (internal citations omitted)); Robey v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,

343 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1318-19 (S.D. Fla. 2018).

B. SPECIFIC JURISDICTION

The allegations of the FAC are likewise insufficient to establish that Defendant is subject

to specific jurisdiction. Plaintiff alleges that specific jurisdiction exists in this case under §

48.193(1)(a)(2), which provides as follows:

A person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or

through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits

himself or herself and, if he or she is a natural person, his or her personal

representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action

arising from any of the following acts:

. . .

2. Committing a tortious act within this state.

§ 48.193(1)(a)(2). “[A] nonresident defendant commits a tortious act in Florida by performing an

act outside the state that causes injury within Florida.” Del Valle, 56 F.4th at 1272 (citations

omitted). The “nonresident defendant need not be physically present in Florida to commit a

tortious act there.” Id. at 1273 (citations omitted).

In the Motion, Defendant contends that the allegations of the FAC are insufficient to

establish specific jurisdiction because the FAC does not contain factual allegations showing that

Plaintiff’s tort claims arise out of or relate to Defendant’s contacts with Florida. Plaintiff responds

that in 2024 and 2025, he sent written demands from Florida to Defendant’s headquarters in

California, and Plaintiff notes that under Florida law, “‘committing a tortious act’ in Florida under

[the long-arm statute] can occur through the nonresident defendant’s telephonic, electronic, or

written communications into Florida.” Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252, 1260 (Fla. 2002).

While Plaintiff acknowledges that the communications sent into Florida must form the basis of the

cause of action to establish the commission of a tortious act in Florida, see [DE 24] at 2, Plaintiff

has not included any factual allegations in the FAC showing that his claims arise out of any

communications that Defendant sent into Florida. In fact, Plaintiff does not even allege that

Defendant responded to the 2024 and 2025 written demands that Plaintiff sent from Florida or that

Defendant otherwise sent communications to Plaintiff in Florida.

Plaintiff instead seems to imply that his own written communications to Defendant, and

Defendant’s refusal to respond to those communications, somehow satisfies the long-arm statute’s

tortious act provision. Accepting Plaintiff’s implication would turn the long-arm statute on its

head. Even putting that aside, the fact remains that Plaintiff’s claims did not arise from his 2024

and 2025 written communications to Defendant or Defendant’s refusal to respond. Importantly,

although Wendt recognized that the commission of a tortious act can occur in Florida through a

nonresident defendant’s communication into Florida, Wendt made clear that the cause of action

must arise from the communication. 822 So. 2d at 1260. “This predicate finding is necessary

because of the connexity requirement contained in section 48.193(1).” Id. In this regard,

“[s]pecific jurisdiction under § 48.193(1) requires a connection or connexity between the

enumerated activity in Florida and the cause of action.” Knepfle v. J-Tech Corp., 48 F.4th 1282,

1292 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “It requires that there be a

‘nexus’ or ‘substantial connection’ between the cause of action and the defendant’s activities

within the state.” Samsung SDI Co. v. Fields, 346 So. 3d 102, 106 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (citing

Citicorp Ins. Brokers (Marine), Ltd. v. Charman, 635 So. 2d 79, 82 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)); see also

Harrison v. NC3 Sys., Inc., 395 So. 3d 657, 662 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024) (“As to personal jurisdiction

under section 48.193(1)(a)2, courts have looked to whether the nonresident defendant ‘committed

a substantial aspect of the alleged tort in Florida.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Here, the FAC does not contain any factual allegations establishing any nexus or

connection – substantial or otherwise – between Defendant’s activities in Florida and any of

Plaintiff’s causes of action. In fact, Plaintiff previously alleged that he maintained his Nevada

Bank account in Las Vegas. [DE 1] at 2. Although the FAC omits any reference to Las Vegas,

what is important is that it contains no allegation that Plaintiff maintained any account with Nevada

Bank (or Defendant) in Florida or that Plaintiff delivered the property at issue (his baseball card

collection) to any Florida location.

While Plaintiff does appear to posit that the written communications Plaintiff sent to

Defendant from Florida somehow supply the requisite connexity between Plaintiff’s causes of

action (or at least his conversion claim) and Florida, the mere fact that Plaintiff sent his

communications from Florida has nothing to do with Defendant’s activities in Florida. And it is a

defendant’s activities in Florida that matter. See Samsung SDI, 346 So. 3d at 106 (recognizing

“that there be a ‘nexus’ or ‘substantial connection’ between the cause of action and the defendant’s

activities within the state” (emphasis added)). Regardless, even if Defendant had responded to

Plaintiff’s written communications and sent written communications to Plaintiff in Florida, such

communications could only lead to a finding of specific jurisdiction if the communications

themselves were tortious. See Reiss v. Ocean World, S.A., 11 So. 3d 404, 406 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)

(“Cases interpreting Wendt have held that the communication into Florida must be tortious in and

of itself, such as defamatory statements or negligent legal advice to a client.” (citations omitted));

see also Harrison, 395 So. 3d at 662-63 (“[T]he Wendt rule is applied when the tort ‘involves some

sort of communication directed into Florida for purpose of fraud, slander, or other intentional

tort.’” (quoting Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Gangapersaud, 346 So. 3d 134, 140 (Fla. 2d DCA

2022))).6

6 Plaintiff recently filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority [DE 37] directing this Court to a

decision that the Eleventh Circuit issued on April 17, 2026 (i.e., after briefing on the Motion was

completed). Although Plaintiff does not identify the name or citation for that decision, he is clearly

referring to Frida Kahlo Corp. v. Pinedo, 172 F.4th 1316 (11th Cir. 2026). In his notice, Plaintiff

asserts, inter alia, that the Eleventh Circuit “reaffirm[ed] the principles governing personal

Additionally, as Defendant correctly notes in the Motion, the fact that Plaintiff sent some

of his written demands from Florida does not mean that Defendant’s alleged conversion of

Plaintiff’s property occurred in Florida. Notably, Florida case law has made clear that “the relevant

act for personal jurisdiction purposes with regard to the tort of conversion is the initial wrongful

deprivation.” Russo v. Fink, 87 So. 3d 815, 818 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); see also Merkin v. PCA

Health Plans of Fla., Inc., 855 So. 2d 137, 140-41 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). And none of the facts

alleged in the FAC indicate that the alleged initial wrongful deprivation occurred in Florida. Cf.

Schrier v. Qatar Islamic Bank, 632 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2022) (“The wrongful

deprivation occurred wherever Schrier’s bank accounts—whose monies were depleted—happened

to be. And, while we don’t know exactly where those accounts were, we do know that they were

not in Florida because the SAC . . . never alleges that these accounts were held in Florida.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the factual allegations in the FAC fail to establish a prima facie

case of specific jurisdiction under the tortious act provision of Florida’s long-arm statute.7

jurisdiction where intentional conduct is directed toward a forum resident and causes injury within

the forum.” [DE 37] ¶ 2. However, Frida Khalo does not support the existence of long-arm

jurisdiction in this case for the reasons discussed above. In Frida Khalo, the plaintiffs “brought a

lawsuit claiming Defendants had violated Florida tort law and the Lanham Act by sending

threatening and false cease-and-desist letters to Plaintiffs’ business partners in Florida.” 172 F.4th

at 1319. Thus, the lawsuit arose out of or directly related to communications the defendants sent

into Florida. On the contrary, in this case, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant sent tortious

communications (or any communications) to Plaintiff in Florida.

7 Because Plaintiff’s allegation of specific jurisdiction fails under the less restrictive first step

(Florida’s long-arm statute), I do not reach the more restrictive Due Process Clause step. See

Reger v. Barefoot, No. 9:24-CV-80396-WPD, 2024 WL 6978055, at *7 (S.D. Fla. July 26, 2024)

(“[T]he Due Process Clause imposes a more restrictive requirement than does Florida’s Long–

Arm Statute. Consequently, a finding that jurisdiction is not available under Florida’s general or

specific jurisdiction necessitates the conclusion that jurisdiction is not appropriate under the Due

Process clause.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, I respectfully RECOMMEND that the Motion [DE 23]

be GRANTED to the extent that this action be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack

of personal jurisdiction. Additionally, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply [DE 29]

should be DENIED AS MOOT.*

The parties will have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of this

Report and Recommendation within which to file written objections, if any, with the Honorable

William P. Dimitrouleas, United States District Judge. Failure to timely file objections shall bar

the parties from a de novo determination by the District Judge of an issue covered in the Report

and shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions

contained in this Report except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interest of justice.

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d

790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1.

DONE AND SUBMITTED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida this 22nd day of June 2026.

United States Magistrate Judge

8 Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply only briefly addresses personal jurisdiction, and

none of the arguments Plaintiff makes therein regarding personal jurisdiction impact the analysis

in this Report.

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