The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 7 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
N. M.; STACIE MILLER, Guardian ad No. 25-5890
Litem for minor child, N.M.; ESTATE OF D.C. No.
VINTON MILLER, 2:25-cv-01389-WBS-JDP
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
MEMORANDUM*
v.
CLAYTON GUILLEMIN, California
Highway Patrol Officer,
Defendant - Appellant,
and
COUNTY OF PLACER, a municipal
corporation, PLACER COUNTY SHERIFF,
a public entity, ERIC HINTZE, Placer
County Sheriff's Officer Deputy Coroner,
CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, a
public entity, CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND
RECREATION, MATTHEW
YARBROUGH, California State Parks
Officer, EVAN MATSHES, NAAG
FORENSIC, PC, an entity, BROOKE
RITZMAN,
Defendants.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
William B. Shubb, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 10, 2026
San Francisco, California
Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and McKEOWN and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
This § 1983 action arises from the death of Vinton Miller (“Miller”), who
was shot and killed by California State Parks Officer Matthew Yarbrough. In this
case, Miller’s wife, Stacie Miller (“Plaintiff”), alleges that California Highway
Patrol Officer Clayton Guillemin (“Guillemin”), who was also present at the scene
of the shooting, failed to provide reasonable medical care to Miller in violation of
the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff further alleges that Guillemin violated her
Fourteenth Amendment right to a familial relationship with her husband and
violated California’s Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (“Bane Act”).
Guillemin appeals the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on his
motion to dismiss the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims. He
also appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Bane Act
claim. We have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review a district
court’s denial of a qualified immunity defense at the motion to dismiss stage. 28
U.S.C. § 1291; Polanco v. Diaz, 76 F.4th 918, 925 (9th Cir. 2023). We review
such a denial de novo. Polanco, 76 F.4th at 925. We also have jurisdiction over
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Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim under the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction
because the rulings related to that claim and Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim are
inextricably intertwined. See Williamson v. City of National City, 23 F.4th 1146,
1151 (9th Cir. 2022). We reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity
and direct the district court to dismiss the remainder of Guillemin’s appeal.
1. We first address whether we may properly consider Guillemin’s dash
cam video footage and the video surveillance from the Olympic Valley Events
Center in reviewing the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. Plaintiff
makes repeated and specific references to what can be heard and seen in both
videos as a basis for her allegations regarding Guillemin and Miller’s conduct
throughout the complaint. Because Plaintiff “refers extensively” to both videos
such that the footage “forms [a] basis of” the Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth
Amendment, and Bane Act claims, the videos should be incorporated by reference
into the complaint. Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 1002 (9th
Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003)).
Plaintiff also does not dispute the authenticity of the videos or their relevance. See
Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010). Therefore, we
may properly consider the videos in determining whether Guillemin is entitled to
qualified immunity.
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2. With respect to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim, we conclude that
Guillemin is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate Miller’s
clearly established rights. For the unlawfulness of an officer’s conduct to be “clearly
established,” it must be the case that, “at the time of the officer’s conduct, the law
was ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand that what he
[wa]s doing’ [wa]s unlawful.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63
(2018) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).
We have previously held that “it is clearly established that officers must seek
to provide an injured detainee or arrestee with objectively reasonable medical care
in the face of medical necessity creating a substantial and obvious risk of serious
harm, including by summoning medical assistance.” D’Braunstein v. Cal. Highway
Patrol, 131 F.4th 764, 771 (9th Cir. 2025). Given the significance of Miller’s
injuries—namely, a gunshot wound to the back—Miller faced a “substantial risk of
serious harm” due to a “serious medical need,” such that a failure to summon the
necessary medical attention “could result in further significant injury.” Peralta v.
Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (quoting Jett v. Penner, 439
F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006).
However, Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that paramedics were summoned
“shortly after” the shooting, and the videos incorporated into the complaint confirm
that paramedics were summoned within two minutes. Taking Plaintiff’s allegations
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as true and construing them in the light most favorable to her, there was no clearly
established precedent that officers were constitutionally required to summon
additional medical assistance beyond paramedics or to otherwise transport an
injured arrestee to the hospital once paramedics arrived at the scene and began
providing care. See Tatum v. City & County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1098–
99 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that where “officers promptly requested medical
assistance . . . the Constitution required them to do no more”). Because the right
was not clearly established, Guillemin is entitled to qualified immunity.
3. Plaintiff expressly conceded her Fourteenth Amendment claim for loss of
familial association in her briefing before the district court. The district court abused
its discretion by not dismissing Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim on this
basis. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 393 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 2004) (confirming
that “[a] party . . . is bound by concessions made in its brief[ing]”). We therefore
reverse the district court’s decision denying dismissal of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth
Amendment loss of familial association claim.
4. Plaintiff alleged a Bane Act violation based upon the same facts as her
Fourteenth Amendment claim. A Bane Act claim “requires proof of an underlying
constitutional violation.” Williamson, 23 F.4th at 1155 (citing Reese v. County of
Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2018)). Because Plaintiff expressly
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withdrew her Fourteenth Amendment claim, we reverse the district court’s decision
denying dismissal of Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim.
5. For the above reasons, we conclude that the district court erred in denying
Guillemin qualified immunity. We also hold that the district court erred in failing
to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment and Bane Act claims. On remand, the
district court is directed to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth
Amendment, and Bane Act claims against Guillemin.
REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions.
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