GRIER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DAVID VAUGHN GRIER, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-CV-2515

:

GLOBAL TEL LINK/VIA PATH :

TECHNOLOGIES, CORPORATION, et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

YOUNGE, J. JULY 13, 2026

Plaintiff David Vaughn Grier, who is currently confined at SCI Phoenix, brings this pro

se action against Global Tel Link Corporation (“GTL”) and several of its employees, asserting

claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) as well as

various state law claims because he allegedly purchased a defective tablet and received a

refurbished replacement that was also defective. He asserts, inter alia, a breach of warranty

claim because he had to pay for a replacement battery while his tablet was still under warranty.

The Court will grant Grier’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and will screen his

Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As explained below, the Court will dismiss

the Complaint.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1

Grier alleges that he was sold a defective tablet, and while that tablet was replaced with a

refurbished tablet, the refurbished tablet stopped working a few months later. He also claims

that he had to pay for a replacement battery even though his tablet was still under warranty.

Grier names GTL as a Defendant as well as the following GTL employees: Deb Alderson

(identified in the Complaint as a “chief executive officer”); Eve Doe2 (identified as a “chief

executive officer”); Jeffery Haidinger (identified as the “president and Chief Operating

Officer”); and John Does I-III (identified as the “Manager,” “Tech Support 2,” and “Tech

Support 16,” respectively). (See ECF No. 2 (“Compl.”) at 2-4.) Grier avers that GTL, a

corporation out of Falls Church, Virginia, supplies the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

(“DOC”) with “telecommunications and . . . media products including physical devices such as

tablets.” (Id. at 2.)

Grier purchased a tablet from GTL for $80 in June 2024. (Id. at 4.) He avers that on July

25, 2024, the tablet “became defective, failing to properly run its software.” (Id.) Grier sent an

electronic message to “GTL Support” on July 27, 2024, indicating that the music player on his

tablet would stop working whenever he pressed pause. (Id. at 13.) He received a response with

instructions to correct the issue with his tablet. (Id.) However, in August 2024, Grier sent

additional messages indicating that despite the information received, the radio on his tablet

1 The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Grier’s Complaint, which

consists of eleven typewritten pages (ECF No. 2 at 1-11), and twenty-seven pages of attached

exhibits (id. at 12-38). The Court deems the entire submission to constitute the Complaint and

adopts the sequential pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system. Where the Court

quotes from pro se pleadings, punctuation, spelling, and capitalization errors will be cleaned up

as needed for clarity.

2 Although Grier initially identifies this Defendant as Eve Doe, he later refers to this individual

as “Eve.” (Compl. at 3.) It appears that Grier is not aware of this individual’s surname.

would not work, and he requested a new device, averring that he was sold a “defective product.”

(Id. at 4, 13.) On or about August 19, 2024, GTL arranged for the tablet to be shipped out “for

testing and repairs.” (Id. at 14.) On October 10, 2024, Grier was informed that following an

evaluation, his tablet would be “replaced under warranty.” (Id. at 4, 14.) Grier avers that he

received a refurbished tablet. (Id. at 4.)

On January 21, 2025, Grier “informed GTL that the replacement tablet did not turn on

and had no ability to function.” (Id. at 5.) He sent multiple messages to GTL Support in January

2025 indicating that his tablet would randomly shut off and not turn back on. (Id. at 15.)

GTL Support responded to Grier on January 31, 2025, advising him that the “original 90-day

warranty period on [his] battery has expired.” (Id.) Grier was informed via message from “GTL

Inmate Support 2” that if he wanted to purchase a new battery, Grier should “request a check for

$47.00 to be paid to ViaPath,” and the check and tablet would be sent to ViaPath for replacement

“with a brand-new battery, which comes with a new 90-day warranty period,” effective from the

date of install. (Id.)

Grier contends that because his tablet would not power on, it was a “software issue” that

was “separate from ‘battery issues,’” and he maintains that his tablet was covered by GTL’s

supplemental warranty. (Id. at 5-6.) On February 1, 2025, Grier sent a message to GLT Support,

indicating that GTL was “in error” because he reported that the replacement tablet was defective

89 days after he received it, and, as such, he maintained that the tablet was still covered by

warranty. (Id. at 16.) In response, Grier was told that when a tablet is “replaced under warranty

at [their] facility, any remaining warranty time from the previous device rolls over to the

replacement device” and the “replacement device does NOT come with a new warranty.” (Id.)

Grier was also informed that his “battery warranty expired on 09/16/2024.” (Id.)

Grier sent another message on February 3, 2025, again disputing coverage under the

warranty, asserting that because his tablet “has a defect,” GTL did not complete its original

obligation under the warranty. (Id.) On February 4, 2025, Grier sent another message asserting

that the “software is not functioning as the device will not shut on” and that “civil litigation”

would ensue if GTL did not comply. (Id.) GTL Inmate Support 2 responded that “[i]f the device

will not turn on it is not a software issue” and that “[l]egal matters will not be discussed through

support link.” (Id.) On April 20, 2025, Grier completed an inmate request form requesting that a

check be sent to the business office so he could obtain “a new tablet battery.” (Id. at 6, 27.) On

April 21, 2025, Grier was informed that his request to have his tablet shipped “for a battery

replacement” was set up. (Id. at 17.) Grier claims, without further explanation, that his tablet

was returned to him “without work being done.” (Id. at 6.) It is unclear whether the battery in

Grier’s tablet was replaced.

Based on these allegations, Grier avers that Defendants John Does I-III “breached

warranty/breached contract with a blanketed denial of repair.” (Id. at 6.) He also asserts that

Defendants Eve, Alderson, and Haidinger affirmed the “policy and practice of charging patrons

while under warranty.” (Id.) He alleges that GLT and its employees deprived him of property

without redress, and that GTL committed theft by receiving his stolen property and also

“attempted extortion by submitting the request to deprive [him] of funds.” (Id. at 8.) Grier

contends that these acts demonstrate “racketeering activity,” and he further avers that GTL

committed mail fraud by using the “mail and the United States Postal Service to further its

scheme to defraud [him] of his property through artiface [sic], false promotion, and promises.”

(Id. at 8-9, 10.)

Grier contends that the “joined actions” of GTL and its employees “in procuring [his]

tablet through falsity” constitutes fraud, unjust enrichment, theft by unlawful taking, theft by

deception, theft by extortion, receiving stolen property, civil conspiracy, evading prosecution,

breach of contract and warranty, the creation of false documents, negligence, interference with

contractual relations, misrepresentation, false advertisement, violation of unfair trade practices

and consumer protection laws, corrupt organization, federal mail fraud, and a RICO violation.

(Id. at 1, 9.) He seeks declaratory relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages in excess

of one million dollars. (Id. at 10-11.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court will grant Grier leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that he

is incapable of prepaying the fees to commence this civil action.3 Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B) requires the Court to screen and dismiss the Complaint if it is frivolous, malicious,

fails to state a claim, or seeks relief from an immune defendant. Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)

requires the Court to dismiss Complaint if it is frivolous, and § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires

dismissal if a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A complaint is

frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Brown v. City of Philadelphia,

750 F. App’x 171, 173 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)).

The use of the term “frivolous” in § 1915 “embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion,

but also the fanciful factual allegation.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. Section 1915 accords judges

“the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those

claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless[,]” including claims that describe “fantastic

3 However, since Grier is a prisoner, he will be obligated to pay the filing fee in installments in

accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).

or delusional scenarios[.]” Id. at 327-28; see also Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir.

2003). “[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level

of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts

available to contradict them.” Smith v. N. Cambria Police, No. 25-1273, 2025 WL 1324070, at

*1 (3d Cir. May 7, 2025) (per curiam) (quoting Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).

A claim is legally baseless if it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Deutsch v.

United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1085 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison

officials took an inmate’s pen and refused to give it back).

Whether the Complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the

same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to

determine whether the Complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 560 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). At the screening stage, the

Court will accept the facts alleged in a pro se complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in

the plaintiff’s favor, and ask only whether that complaint contains facts sufficient to state a

plausible claim. Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on other

grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024). Additionally, the

Court must review the Complaint and dismiss the matter if it determines that subject matter

jurisdiction is lacking. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Grp. Against Smog and Pollution, Inc. v.

Shenango, Inc., 810 F.3d 116, 122 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “an objection to subject

matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time [and] a court may raise jurisdictional issues sua

sponte”).

As Grier is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v.

Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239,

244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). However, conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;

see also Martinez v. UPMC Susquehanna, 986 F.3d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 2021) (“A plaintiff cannot

survive dismissal just by alleging the conclusion to an ultimate legal issue.”). “[P]ro se litigants

still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Vogt, 8 F.4th at 185

(quoting Mala, 704 F.3d at 245). An unrepresented litigant “cannot flout procedural rules —

they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F.3d

at 245); see also Doe v. Allegheny Cnty. Hous. Auth., No. 23-1105, 2024 WL 379959, at *3 (3d

Cir. Feb. 1, 2024) (“While a court must liberally construe the allegations and ‘apply the

applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant mentioned it b[y] name,’ Higgins v.

Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002), this does not require the court to act as an advocate to

identify any possible claim that the facts alleged could potentially support.”).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Federal Law Claims

Grier’s RICO claims are legally baseless. RICO “makes it unlawful ‘for any person

employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,

interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of

such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern racketeering activity.’” In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust

Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 362 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)). To state a civil RICO

claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege the following elements: “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise

(3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). When a

plaintiff presents a fraud-based RICO claim, he “must plead with particularity the circumstances

of the alleged fraud.” Mierzwa v. Safe & Secure Self Storage, LLC, 493 F. App’x 273, 276 (3d

Cir. 2012) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)). An “enterprise” is defined as “any individual,

partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity” or a “group of individuals associated

in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). “‘Racketeering activity’ is defined in

the RICO statute to comprise the state law offenses of murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson,

robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, and dealing in a controlled substance or

listed chemical, as well as several federal offenses such as mail and wire fraud.” Talley v.

Halpern ex rel. Est. of Winderman, No. 05-4184, 2005 WL 2002611, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16,

2005) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)). “According to the RICO statute, a ‘pattern of racketeering

activity’ requires at least two acts of racketeering activity within a ten-year period.” In re Ins.

Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d at 363 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5)). Additionally, a

plaintiff must have sustained “injury to business or property” caused by the alleged RICO

violation in order to bring a RICO claim. Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 482-83 (3d Cir.

2000).

Grier’s claims that Defendants engaged in a RICO conspiracy and committed acts of

theft, extortion, and mail fraud in connection with the refurbishment and battery replacement of

his electronic tablet lacks any arguable basis in law and will be dismissed as frivolous. See

Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter, 185 F.3d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The claim that the defendants [including

numerous judges, staff attorneys, and an assistant united states attorney] engaged in a RICO

conspiracy by failing to properly address issues on appeal and ‘bribing’ witnesses to testify

pursuant to plea agreements lacks any arguable basis in law and was properly dismissed as

frivolous.”); Mierzwa v. Safe & Secure Self Storage, LLC, 493 F. App’x 273, 276 (3d Cir. 2012)

(“[C]onclusory allegations that defendants conspired for the purpose of defrauding [Mierzwa]

are simply inadequate to plead a valid RICO claim.”)

Grier alleges in conclusory fashion that Defendants committed, inter alia, fraud, theft by

unlawful taking, deception, and extortion, a breach of contract and warranty, as well as acts of

misrepresentation and false advertisement. (Compl. at 1, 9.) The claims he alleges under state

law for, inter alia, breach of contract, breach of warranty, and fraud, are not enumerated in

Section 1961, nor does he specify any factual allegation that supports a plausible inference of

“racketeering activity” that poses a threat of criminal activity under the federal criminal

provisions relating to enumerated frauds. See Annulli v. Panikkar, 200 F.3d 189, 199-200 (3rd

Cir. 1999) (“Racketeering” does not include things like “garden-variety state law crimes, torts

and contract breaches.”), overruled on other grounds by Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549 (2000);

see also Kolar v. Preferred Real Est. Invs., Inc., 361 F. App’x 354, 364 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting

that court should not permit contract claims nor simple fraud disputes to be transformed into

RICO claims).

The Complaint also fails to satisfy the requirements for a RICO conspiracy claim because

Grier cannot allege an agreement to commit predicate acts when the Complaint fails to allege

predicate acts in the first place, nor can he allege requisite knowledge of participants that they

were part of a pattern of racketeering activity because he fails to describe such a pattern. See

Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 366 (3d Cir. 1989) (citation omitted) (to state a RICO conspiracy

claim, the plaintiff “must allege (1) agreement to commit the predicate acts of fraud, and (2)

knowledge that those acts were part of a pattern of racketeering activity conducted in such a way

as to violate [§ 1962].”’). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Grier’s RICO claims as legally

baseless, without leave to amend.4

B. State Law Claims

The remaining claims alleged in Grier’s Complaint are state law claims that sound in

contract or tort, and are, in some instances, based on violations of Pennsylvania criminal laws.5

However, the Complaint is most aptly interpreted as asserting breach of warranty claims. See

Holley v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 1999) (“We apply the applicable

law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.”). Because the Court has

dismissed his federal claims, the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c) over any state law claims. Accordingly, the only independent basis for

jurisdiction over any such claims is 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which grants a district court jurisdiction

over a case in which “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive

of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.”

4 Since Grier has failed to allege a legal basis for a substantive RICO claim, it follows that he

lacks a legal basis for a conspiracy claim under RICO. See Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp.,

4 F.3d 1153, 1191 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Any claim under section 1962(d) based on a conspiracy to

violate the other subsections of section 1962 necessarily must fail if the substantive claims are

themselves deficient.”).

5 Courts, including the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, routinely dismiss

claims seeking to impose civil liability under various sections of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code,

finding that the “Code gives no authority for a private cause of action and none has been

implied.” Youst v. Roth, No. 23-0848, 2023 WL 3821813, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 2023) (quoting

Martrano v. Quizno’s Franchise Co., No. 08-0932, 2009 WL 1704469, at *12 (W.D. Pa. June

15, 2009)); see also Williams v. Wetzel, 827 F. App’x 158, 162 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam)

(recognizing that plaintiff’s civil claims brought pursuant to the Pennsylvania Crimes Code were

properly rejected by the district court because there was no private right of action available under

the Code); Abouloh v. Lehigh Cnty. Prison, No. 25-3377, 2025 WL 2654904, at *8 (E.D. Pa.

Sept. 15, 2025).

Section 1332(a) requires “‘complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants,’”

which “means that, unless there is some other basis for jurisdiction, no plaintiff may be a citizen

of the same state as any defendant.”6 Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 104

(3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) and Zambelli

Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal footnotes omitted)). It

is the plaintiff’s burden to establish diversity of citizenship. Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 72

(1939); see also Quaker State Dyeing & Finishing Co., Inc. v. ITT Terryphone Corp., 461 F.2d

1140, 1143 (3d Cir. 1972) (stating that, in diversity cases, the plaintiff must demonstrate

complete diversity between the parties and that the amount in controversy requirement has been

met).

Even assuming that the parties are diverse, Grier has failed to demonstrate that the

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (specifying that the sum or value

of the matter in controversy must exceed $75,000 for diversity jurisdiction, exclusive of interest

and costs). A plaintiff’s good faith allegations govern whether the amount in controversy is

satisfied unless it is clear to a legal certainty that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed.

See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938) (“The rule

governing dismissal for want of jurisdiction in cases brought in the federal court is that, unless

6 An individual is a citizen of the state where he is domiciled, meaning the state where he is

physically present and intends to remain. See Washington v. Hovensa, LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344

(3d Cir. 2011). “[T]he domicile of a prisoner before his imprisonment presumptively remains his

domicile during his imprisonment.” Pierro v. Kugel, 386 F. App’x 308, 309 (3d Cir. 2010). To

determine the citizenship of a corporation for purposes of diversity under § 1332, courts use the

test announced by the United States Supreme Court in Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77

(2010). Under Hertz, a corporation is a citizen of its state of incorporation and its principal place

of business, i.e., its “nerve center.” Id. at 80-81. A nerve center is “the place where the

corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities,”

which is typically “found at a corporation’s headquarters.” Id.

the law gives a different rule, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently

made in good faith.” (footnotes omitted)); Spectacor Mgmt. Grp. v. Brown, 131 F.3d 120, 122

(3d Cir. 1997) (“As a general rule, [the amount in controversy] is determined from the good faith

allegations appearing on the face of the complaint.”).

Grier’s Complaint alleges two concrete dollar amounts—the cost of the tablet, $80, and

the cost of the replacement battery, $47. (Compl. at 4, 6.) “Under Pennsylvania law the measure

of damages for breach of warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code ‘is the difference at the

time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would

have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages

of a different amount.’” Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 402 (3d Cir.

2004) (quoting 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2714(b)); see also Marino v. Sports Auth., 940 F. Supp. 792,

795 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (“[A] useful objective measure of the difference in the value of the goods as

is and as warranted is the cost of repair or replacement of the goods.”) (citing Cober v. Corle,

610 A.2d 1036, 1041 (1992)). The dollar amounts claimed by Grier are far below the

jurisdictional threshold, even considering any incidental or consequential damages that may be

recoverable for a breach of warranty claim. Id. (citing 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 2714(c), 2715,

2A519(d)).

To the extent that Grier asserts a plausible claim under the state consumer protection

laws, he could potentially recover treble damages. See Samuel-Bassett, 357 F.3d at 399-400

(including potential damages under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer

Protection Law to calculate amount in controversy for diversity jurisdiction); Suber v. Chrysler

Corp.104 F.3d 578, 587-88 (3d Cir. 1997) (considering potential trebled damages under the New

Jersey Consumer Fraud Act for amount in controversy). On the face of this Complaint, using the

purchase price as the actual damages amount and assuming Grier would be successful on a

consumer protection claim, trebled damages could result in a recovery of at most $240.

Although Grier requests the extraordinary sum of $1,300,000 in his Complaint, the

measure of damages available under either a breach of warranty or violation of state consumer

protection laws claim demonstrates to a legal certainty that he is unable to satisfy the $75,000

amount in controversy requirement.7 See Gibson v. Tip Towing & Recovery LLC, No. 23-2919,

2024 WL 658977, at *1 n.3 (3d Cir. Feb. 16, 2024) (per curiam) (“Gibson alleged that the value

of her roughly decade-old vehicle was $100,000, and she demanded that the defendants pay her

$10,000 per day for holding it. But the District Court “ha[d] no trouble finding that such

monetary demands are not made in good faith.”); Douglas v. Joseph, 656 F. App’x 602, 605 (3d

Cir. 2016) (noting that it must appear “to a legal certainty that the plaintiff’s claim is really for

less than the jurisdictional amount to justify a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction”);

see also Kalick v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 372 F. App’x 317, 322 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam)

(affirming the district court’s ruling that diversity jurisdiction was lacking because plaintiff’s

plausible damages were well below $75,000). The dismissal will be without prejudice to Grier

refiling his state law claims in state court, where federal jurisdiction will not be an issue.8 See

N.J. Physicians, Inc. v. President of U.S., 653 F.3d 234, 241 n.8 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that

dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are “by definition without prejudice” (citation

omitted)).

7 Grier seeks punitive damages. (Compl. at 11.) Although punitive damages “must [also] be

considered in determining the amount in controversy,” see Coulter v. Paul Laurence Dunbar

Cmty. Ctr., 685 F. App’x 161, 165 (3d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted), punitive damages are not

recoverable for breach of contract or warranty claims, see Greenwald Caterers Inc. v. Lancaster

Host, LLC, 599 F. Supp. 3d 235, 249-250 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (citations omitted).

8 The Court expresses no opinion on the merits of any state law claims.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Grier leave to proceed in forma pauperis

dismiss his Complaint. The federal RICO claims will be dismissed with prejudice as legally

baseless pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). All state law claims will be dismissed without

prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Under the circumstances of this case, leave to

amend will not be given, as amendment would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.,

293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). An appropriate Order regarding dismissal follows, which shall

be entered separately. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a).

BY THE COURT:

/s/ John Milton Younge

JOHN MILTON YOUNGE, J.