The opinion
Case: 25-50714 Document: 109-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/06/2026
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
August 6, 2026
No. 25-50714 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Moctezuma Rivera Castelan, On Behalf of Himself and Others
Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Ronny Taylor,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 5:23-CV-1394
______________________________
Before Wiener, Haynes, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
James E. Graves, Jr., Circuit Judge:
As alleged, Moctezuma Rivera-Castelan was arrested in Kinney
County, Texas for criminal trespass in a disaster area. Rivera was among
many arrested during Operation Lone Star, a statewide initiative to increase
arrests of unlawful migrants in Texas border counties. After his arrest, Rivera
was brought to a makeshift detention facility: Val Verde Processing Center.
A paperwork error at Val Verde resulted in a nearly three-month delay for
Rivera to receive appointed counsel. Even then, his lawyer did no work on
his case for six months. When a new lawyer was appointed, she challenged
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Rivera’s detention. Within five days, the prosecutor dropped the case against
him, and he was released.
Rivera alleges that Ronny Taylor, the Val Verde facility administrator,
violated the Sixth Amendment by failing to timely transmit appointed
counsel paperwork to the public defenders’ office. We must resolve whether
Taylor enjoys qualified immunity.
Rivera seeks to evade the immunity framework by claiming that
Taylor assumed a magistrate’s nondiscretionary duty to transmit
appointed-counsel paperwork within 24 hours of an initial appearance. Yet
the Texas initial-appearance statute explicitly assigns that duty to the
magistrate—not to a detention facility administrator. And Rivera’s
delegation theory cannot overcome the statutory text and the longstanding
Texas-law principle that an officer may not delegate their official statutory
duties to another official. So as alleged, Taylor performed a discretionary
duty, and we reach the immunity framework.
Rivera cannot overcome qualified immunity. Even if the expiry of the
deadline for an arrestee’s bail to be reduced to an affordable amount is a
critical stage, Rivera cannot show a previous decision that clearly established
his right to counsel then. Taylor enjoys qualified immunity as a result.
I. Background
A. Under Texas law, a magistrate must transmit counsel-appointment
paperwork, or cause it to be transmitted, within 24 hours of an article
15.17 hearing.
Under Texas law, when someone is arrested, they must be brought
before a magistrate within 48 hours. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 15.17(a).
At this initial appearance—an article 15.17 hearing—the magistrate informs
the arrestee of the accusations against them and their rights, including that
they may request appointed counsel. See id.
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If an arrestee requests counsel and qualifies for it, the magistrate either
appoints counsel themselves, or they must “transmit, or cause to be
transmitted to the court or to the [managed assigned counsel provider], the
forms requesting the appointment of counsel.” See id.; Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 1.051(c). A managed assigned counsel program is “a
governmental entity, nonprofit corporation, or bar association under a
written agreement with a governmental entity,” that assumes the duty to
appoint counsel. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.047.
B. If the state is not ready for trial, an arrestee is entitled to an affordable
bond.
Texas law also restricts detention to prevent unnecessary delay before
trial. If the state is not ready for trial, article 17.151 requires an arrestee’s
release “either on personal bond or by reducing the amount of bail” within
“30 days” if the arrestee is “accused of a misdemeanor punishable
by . . . more than 180 days” in prison. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.151
§ 1. 1 Without an indictment, the state “cannot announce ready for trial.” Ex
parte Castellano, 321 S.W.3d 760, 763 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no
pet.). Nor can the state “declare itself . . . ready for trial” after the article
17.151 deadline has run. Id.
If the court reduces bail, it must set bond at “an amount that . . . [the]
accused can make.” Rowe v. State, 853 S.W.2d 581, 582 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App.
1993). Operation Lone Star suspended article 17.151’s automatic release
provision, but the other option remained: to reduce bail to an affordable
amount. Ex parte Lanclos, 624 S.W.3d 923, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).
_____________________
1
Article 17.151 prescribes different deadlines based on the maximum term of
imprisonment. Rivera’s crime of arrest—criminal trespass in a disaster area—carried a
maximum sentence of one year in prison, so the 30-day deadline applied to him See Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.151; Tex. Penal Code §§ 12.50, 30.05.
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C. In 2021, Texas launched Operation Lone Star, which aimed to
dramatically increase migrant arrests at the border.
These procedures governed when Rivera was arrested. He was among
the many migrants arrested under Operation Lone Star, which launched in
early 2021. 2 Under Lone Star, Texas declared a state of disaster in
participating border counties—including Kinney County. The state then
deployed its own law enforcement and military officials to those “counties to
help them arrest and jail migrants, mostly for misdemeanor trespass.”
Texas also helped the counties with arraignment and detention of
migrants. When a county arrested a migrant, they were transported to Val
Verde Processing Center, “a makeshift [tent] arraignment site” erected in
July 2021. The Texas Division of Emergency Management hired Taylor to
administer Val Verde, in concert with a government contractor, Recana
Solutions. At Val Verde, magistrates held arrestees’ article 15.17 hearings by
videoconference. If an arrestee could not make bail, the state would transfer
them to a repurposed state prison, such as the Dolph Briscoe Unit (Briscoe)
and the Manuel A. Segovia Unit (Segovia).
D. After Rivera’s arrest, he remained effectively without counsel for
eight months.
Rivera was arrested on October 6, 2021, on suspicion of criminal
trespass in a disaster area. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.50, 30.05. Soon
after, Rivera appeared for a remote article 15.17 hearing at Val Verde. At the
hearing, Rivera requested an appointed lawyer, and the magistrate found that
he qualified for one. Because Rivera could not afford bail, he was sent on to
Briscoe.
_____________________
2
Applying our motion to dismiss standard, we credit Rivera’s allegations as true,
except for “conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.”
McKay v. LaCroix, 117 F.4th 741, 746 (5th Cir. 2024).
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Kinney County used Lubbock Private Defenders Office as its managed
assigned counsel provider. So article 15.17 required the magistrate to send
Rivera’s paperwork to the Lubbock Defenders within 24 hours. See Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 15.17(a). But nobody at Val Verde sent the
paperwork until the Lubbock Defenders “specifically requested [it] from
Taylor, along with the missing paperwork of 50 other named [arrestees]” on
December 16, 2021. When Taylor received the request, he forwarded it to a
subordinate, who sent Rivera’s paperwork three days later.
Gary Villarreal was appointed the next day. But Villarreal never met
with Rivera or worked on his case. After six months, Villarreal was removed
as counsel. Meanwhile, Rivera was transferred to Segovia in January 2022.
Once Villarreal was removed, Rivera received a new lawyer on June 9,
2022. Her office swiftly informed the prosecutor that Rivera had never been
formally charged, so he “was being illegally held past the date that [article
17.151] required his release.” See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.151. On
June 14, the state dropped the case against Rivera. He was released and he
returned to Mexico. Rivera spent 252 days in custody; he was never charged.
E. Rivera sued Taylor and others in federal court, and the district court
denied Taylor qualified immunity.
In November 2023, Rivera sued Villarreal, Kinney County, Recana,
and Taylor in federal court. Rivera brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against
Taylor, Recana, and Kinney County, alleging Fourteenth and Sixth
Amendment violations. He brought these claims on behalf of a putative class
who allegedly suffered similar treatment during Lone Star. He also sued
Recana for negligence, and Villarreal for malpractice.
When Taylor moved to dismiss, the district court denied his motion.
Castelan v. Villarreal, No. 5:23-CV-1394, 2025 WL 2375406, at *1 (W.D.
Tex. Aug. 14, 2025). It held that Taylor had exceeded his discretionary
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authority, so he could not claim qualified immunity. Id. at *3–6. Taylor
appealed. Our court has stayed Rivera’s other claims until we resolve
Taylor’s appeal.
II. Our Review
Qualified immunity generally shields government officials so long “as
their conduct does not violate [a] clearly established [federal] right[].”
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The qualified immunity
analysis prescribes “a shifting burden of proof.” Cherry Knoll, L.L.C. v.
Jones, 922 F.3d 309, 318 (5th Cir. 2019). “The defendant official must first”
show “that the challenged conduct was within the scope of [their]
discretionary authority.” Id. If the official carries this burden, it shifts to the
plaintiff to overcome qualified immunity. Roy v. City of Monroe, 950 F.3d 245,
254 (5th Cir. 2020). The plaintiff must plead facts that show that the official
(1) violated their federal right, and (2) that the right was clearly established
at the time. Waller v. Hanlon, 922 F.3d 590, 599 (5th Cir. 2019).
We review de novo the denial of a motion to dismiss that rejects a
qualified immunity defense. Diaz v. Cantu, 123 F.4th 736, 747 (5th Cir.
2024). We have interlocutory jurisdiction to review such denials. McNeal v.
LeBlanc, 90 F.4th 425, 430 (5th Cir. 2024). But this jurisdiction “is sharply
limited” to resolving whether a defendant enjoys qualified immunity. Diaz,
123 F.4th at 750. If the official cannot show that they acted within their
discretionary authority, they never reach the immunity framework. Id. at
749–50.
Taylor urges us to resolve whether he acted within his discretionary
authority after we resolve whether Rivera states a constitutional claim. This
takes Iqbal’s collateral-order discussion too far. Of course, “whether
a particular complaint sufficiently alleges a clearly established violation of
law cannot be decided in isolation from the facts pleaded.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
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673. So the qualified immunity prongs are “inextricably intertwined,” and if
we have jurisdiction to consider the second prong, we have jurisdiction to
consider the first. See id. (citation omitted).
But unlike the clearly-established law inquiry, we may examine an
official’s authority separately from the facts pleaded—as a matter of an
official’s statutory authority. See Sweetin, 48 F.4th at 392. And we must do
so first, to confirm our jurisdiction to review the allegations. See Diaz, 123
F.4th at 749–50. Reversing this order would allow Taylor to escape his two
burdens: to establish our appellate jurisdiction, and to show that he
performed a discretionary function. See id.; Martin v. Halliburton, 618 F.3d
476, 481 (5th Cir. 2010). Consequently, we address Taylor’s authority first.
III. Discussion
A. Taylor acted within his discretionary authority.
1. To resolve the discretionary-authority inquiry, we examine an
official’s statutory authority.
“An official acts within [their] discretionary authority when [they]
perform[] nonministerial acts within the boundaries of [their] official
capacity.” Tamez v. City of San Marcos, 118 F.3d 1085, 1091–92 (5th Cir.
1997). State law defines these boundaries. Sweetin, 48 F.4th at 392.
Yet we eschew state-law labels. Taylor and Rivera often cite Texas
decisions that discuss what kinds of duties qualify as discretionary for
state-law immunity purposes. But our court has never relied on state-law
labels. In Cherry Knoll, a city manager filed certain land plats
“unlawfully . . . to drive down the cost of” a certain plat to force its owner to
sell. 922 F.3d at 318. Because the city code gave officials “no authority to file
plats affecting private property without the [landowner’s] consent” the
manager exceeded his discretionary authority. See id. at 319. Similarly, in
Sweetin, a city “permit officer” detained emergency medical technicians to
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determine whether their ambulance permits were valid. 48 F.4th at 392. But
“state law [did] not give a permit officer the authority to [ever] conduct
stops,” so the officer exceeded his discretionary authority. Id. And in Diaz,
because a state judge presiding over an administrative proceeding lacked
statutory authority to issue a contempt sanction outside of a judicial
proceeding, she exceeded her discretionary authority when she did so. 123
F.4th at 747–49.
These decisions never mention whether a Texas court would dub the
official’s authority discretionary for a state-law immunity analysis. We follow
their example, and examine how Texas statutes assign the duty to transmit
appointed-counsel paperwork. Only then do we resolve, as a matter of federal
law, whether that duty is discretionary.
2. A magistrate cannot delegate their statutory duty to transmit
appointed-counsel paperwork.
Rivera argues that Taylor had a nondiscretionary duty to send
appointment paperwork to the Lubbock Defenders within 24 hours. He relies
on article 15.17(a), which provides that if a magistrate finds appointed counsel
necessary, they have 24 hours to “transmit, or cause to be transmitted,” the
forms requesting appointed counsel. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
15.17(a). This text plainly assigns the duty to the magistrate. See id. Yet Rivera
argues that the magistrate delegated this duty to Taylor.
Rivera’s support for his delegation theory is weak. He chiefly relies on
Krug v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co., 245 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1957). Our
court acknowledged in Krug that an administrative body can delegate some
“administrative and ministerial duties” to its employees. Krug, 245 F.2d at
853. Hence the Texas board of insurance commissioners could delegate its
statutory duty to approve insurance contracts to its clerk employees. Id. at
850, 852–53. But delegation within a single office raises an entirely different
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issue than the transfer of a mandatory duty between a judicial officer and an
executive official. So Krug provides little guidance here.
And it is well-established under Texas law that “a public
officer . . . cannot delegate [their] official duties to another, other than [their]
duly appointed deputies.” See, e.g., Comm’rs Ct. v. Fullerton, 596 S.W.2d 572,
578–79 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980 writ ref’t n.r.e.); Wagner v.
Urban, 170 S.W.2d 270, 272–73 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1943, no writ). This
is why, for example, a judge’s statutory duty to explain the allegations against
the child in a delinquency proceeding “cannot be delegated to the
prosecutor,” since “the statue unequivocally” assigns the duty to the judge.
See In re K.L.C., 990 S.W.2d 242, 243–44 (Tex. 1999).
Likewise, a magistrate—another judicial officer—cannot delegate
their article 15.17 duty to transmit appointment paperwork to a detention
facility administrator—an executive official. And Article 15.17(a) is
unequivocal: If the magistrate does not transmit the paperwork themselves,
they must “cause [it] to be transmitted.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
15.17(a). Hence, the duty to ensure timely transmission of the paperwork
remains with the magistrate, even if someone else performs the task.
3. The discretionary-authority inquiry is not a fact question.
Rivera counters that the written agreement underlying the managed
assigned program or a description of Taylor’s duties would reveal that he
assumed the magistrate’s article 15.17(a) duty. Surely, Rivera reasons, this
means that Taylor’s authority is a fact question for a later stage. For two
reasons, not so.
First, Rivera muddles the written agreement’s role in an
assigned-counsel regime. When a county opts for an assigned-counsel
program, that county enters “a written agreement” with “a governmental
entity, nonprofit corporation, or bar association.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
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Ann. art. 26.047(a)(2)(A). Presumably, Kinney County would have had a
written agreement with the Lubbock Defenders. But that agreement would
be irrelevant to the important relationship here: between the magistrate and
the Val Verde facility administrator. We can examine this relationship as a
matter of Texas law, without resorting to a written agreement that speaks to
a different relationship.
Second, the complaint’s description of the facility administrator’s
duties belies Rivera’s claim that Taylor’s duties were ministerial. Although
Rivera conclusorily alleges that Taylor was “responsible under state law” for
transmitting the paperwork, he also alleges that Taylor was hired “to help
design, administer, and operate” Val Verde. He was “responsible for
formulating, implementing, and executing policies, customs, and practices
applicable to the” processing center. This included “the polices and customs
that led to the denial of [Rivera’s] . . . Sixth Amendment rights.” Assuredly,
executing these alleged duties required Taylor to exercise considerable
discretion. And if Rivera expects discovery to reveal the opposite, he should
have sought leave to amend the complaint. See Davis v. A.G. Edwards & Sons,
Inc., 823 F.2d 105, 108 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Factual assertions in pleadings are
judicial admissions conclusively binding on the party that made them.”
(citation modified)).
Nor does Brooks v. George County advance Rivera’s delegation theory.
84 F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 1996). In Brooks, a statute required a sheriff to keep and
timely transmit inmate work records. Id. at 164. Because this statute explicitly
assigned the sheriff this duty, he could not claim qualified immunity when an
inmate alleged that he failed to perform it. Id. at 164–65. But Taylor had no
analogous statutory duty; article 15.17 assigns the duty to transmit paperwork
to the magistrate—not the facility administrator. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
Ann. art. 15.17(a). Brooks offers no guidance on whether an official may
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delegate their nondiscretionary statutory duty to another official. 84 F.3d at
164–65.
Simply put, Taylor meets his burden to show that he acted within his
discretionary authority. Rivera’s conclusory claims otherwise contravene
Texas law, which generally holds that an officer may not delegate their official
statutory duties. See, e.g., In re K.L.C., 990 S.W.2d at 243–44. And article
15.17’s text confirms this, because the magistrate remains responsible to
cause the paperwork to be transmitted. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
15.17. Because Taylor shows that he acted within his discretionary authority,
he may assert qualified immunity.
B. Taylor enjoys qualified immunity.
The burden now shifts to Rivera to defeat qualified immunity. See Roy,
950 F.3d at 254. He alleges that Taylor violated the Sixth Amendment by
denying him counsel during a critical stage: when article 17.151 gave him the
right to an affordable bond. But we need not resolve whether this states a
constitutional violation because Rivera’s claim plainly fails at the second
immunity prong. 3
To satisfy this prong, Rivera must show that the allegedly violated
federal right was clearly established. Orr v. Copeland, 844 F.3d 484, 492 (5th
Cir. 2016). A right is clearly established if it is “beyond debate that the
defendant’s conduct was unlawful.” Roy, 950 F.3d at 254 (citation modified).
While Rivera need not offer a factually indistinguishable case, prior decisions
must have given Taylor “reasonable warning that [his] conduct . . . violated
constitutional rights.” Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 186.
_____________________
3
We “may consider either prong of the qualified immunity analysis first.” Gibson
v. Kilpatrick, 773 F.3d 661, 667 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
236 (2009)).
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Rivera claims that Jauch v. Choctaw County gave Taylor “fair warning
that a jailer cannot hold a person in jail without lawful authority and without
counsel or the ability to seek bail.” 874 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2017). The
distinctions between Jauch and this case are glaring. There, a police
department detained Jauch for nine months without probable cause, and
without an appearance before a judge. 874 F.3d at 428. Without a doubt, this
violated the Fourteenth Amendment because “prolonged detention
without . . . a court appearance violates the” Due Process Clause. Id. at 436.
But Rivera alleges a violation of a different right. He was also promptly
brought before a magistrate who presumably found probable cause for the
arrest. And the 46-day delay in appointing counsel falls well-short of the
9-month delay before Jauch was brought before a judge. With such
distinctions, Jauch cannot clearly establish the right at issue.
Nor can the cases showing that a critical stage can occur without a
formal proceeding clearly establish Taylor’s actions as unlawful. Cf. McAfee
v. Thaler, 630 F.3d 383, 390–93 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Pleitez, 876
F.3d 150, 157–61 (5th Cir. 2017). In McAfee, we held that the opportunity to
file a “motion for new trial, during the post-trial, pre-appeal period, is a
critical stage.” 630 F.3d at 393. And in Pleitez, we held that a final restitution
determination was a critical stage, even though the district court issued the
judgment without a hearing. 876 F.3d at 158–61. Because neither case
addressed whether the expiry of a deadline for reduced bail qualifies as a
critical stage, they offer Rivera no help.
The fact remains that Rivera presses a novel theory. Because our
circuit has never considered the issue, or even a closely related one, Taylor
would not have had reasonable warning that denying an arrestee counsel after
the article 17.151 deadline would violate the Sixth Amendment. Hence Rivera
cannot show that Taylor violated clearly established law, and his claim
against Taylor fails the second qualified immunity prong.
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* * *
For these reasons, we REVERSE. Rivera’s claim against Taylor is
DISMISSED, and we REMAND for further proceedings.
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