The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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WELLS FARGO BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
AS TRUSTEE FOR THE HOLDERS OF COMM 2014-
UBS6 MORTGAGE TRUST COMMERCIAL
MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, BY
AND THROUGH ITS SPECIAL SERVICER, LNR REPORT AND
PARTNERS LLC, RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, 17-CV-3570
(Matsumoto, J.)
v. (Marutollo, M.J.)
366 REALTY LLC; JOSHUA MIZRAHI; CRIMINAL
COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK; NYC
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL BOARD; NEW
YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE; and
KASSIN SABBAGH REALTY LLC,
Defendants.
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JOSEPH A. MARUTOLLO, United States Magistrate Judge:
On June 13, 2017, Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank National Association, as Trustee for the
Holders of COMM 2014-UBS6 Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
by and through its special servicer, LNR Partners LLC, filed this foreclosure action against
Defendants 366 Realty LLC (“366 Realty”); Joshua Mizrahi (“Mizrahi”); the Criminal Court of
the City of New York (the “Criminal Court”); NYC Environmental Control Board (“ECB”); New
York City Department of Finance (“DOF”); and Kassin Sabbagh Realty LLC (“Kassin”); as well
as several other defendants who were thought to possess or claim an interest in or a lien upon the
real property located at 366 Knickerbocker Avenue, Brooklyn, New York 11237 (the “Property”).
See Dkt. No. 1. Extensive litigation followed. On March 16, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment against 366 Realty, finding that Plaintiff was entitled to foreclosure.
Dkt. No. 58. On October 15, 2025, the Court granted in part Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment against Defendants 366 Realty and Mizrahi1 as to Mizrahi’s interest in the Property. See
Dkt. No. 162. On November 19, 2025, the Court appointed a receiver for the Property. See Dkt.
No. 169.
Currently pending before this Court, on a referral from the Honorable Kiyo A. Matsumoto,
United States District Judge, is Plaintiff’s motion seeking judgment of foreclosure, sale, and other
relief. See Dkt. No. 177; Text Order, dated Feb. 2, 2026. Specifically, Plaintiff’s motion seeks
foreclosure and sale to satisfy all sums due to Plaintiff, namely, “(i) $3,603,179.68, plus interest
accruing at a daily rate of $622.58 . . . from July 31, 2023 through the entry of Judgment [o]f
Foreclosure and Sale [a]nd Other Relief, (ii) advances by Plaintiff subsequent to July 31, 2023 in
the amount of $140,769.34, and (iii) attorney fees and disbursements in the amount of
$567,054.08, with post judgment interest to accrue thereon,” as well as “such other and further
relief as the Court may deem just and proper.” Dkt. No. 177-3 at 14.2
For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiff’s
motion be granted in part and denied in part.
I. Relevant Background
The Court presumes the parties’ familiarity with this matter. The Court recites only the
relevant facts and procedural history below.
On November 6, 2014, 366 Realty executed a loan agreement (the “Loan Agreement”)
obtaining a loan (the “Loan”) for $2,200,000 from Cantor Commercial Real Estate Lending, L.P.
1 Defendants 366 Realty and Mizrahi are the only active defendants remaining in this action. On February
20, 2025, the Court entered default judgment as to Kassin. See Dkt. No. 118. On October 17, 2025, the
Court entered default judgment against the Criminal Court and ECB, but denied, without prejudice, default
judgment as to the DOF. See Dkt. No. 163. On June 5, 2026, Plaintiff filed a notice of discontinuance
against the DOF, without prejudice. See Dkt. No. 186.
2 Page citations are to the ECF-stamped pages unless otherwise noted.
(the “Original Lender”). Dkt. No. 38 ¶ 6; Dkt. No. 121 ¶¶ 13-14; Dkt. No. 121-3; see also Dkt.
No. 87-4. Next, 366 Realty signed and delivered an Amended, Restated, and Consolidated
Promissory Note (the “Note”). Dkt. No. 38 ¶ 7; Dkt. No. 121 ¶¶ 14-15; Dkt. No. 121-4. The
indebtedness owed under the Note is secured by the Property, as outlined in the Mortgage Security
Agreement and Assignment of Leases and Rents (“Original Mortgage”). Dkt. No. 38 ¶ 9; Dkt.
No. 121 ¶ 16; Dkt. No. 121-5.
After numerous assignments, the indebtedness owed under the Note was further secured
by the Property, as evidenced by the Amended, Restated, and Consolidated Mortgage, Assignment
of Leases and Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing, dated November 6, 2014 (the
“Amended Mortgage”). Dkt. No. 38 ¶¶ 10-12; Dkt. No. 121 ¶¶ 17-22; see also Dkt. No. 87-6.
The Amended Mortgage granted the Original Lender a first-priority lien on the Property. Dkt. No.
38 ¶¶ 13-14; Dkt. No. 121 ¶¶ 23-25; Dkt. No. 121-8.
As a further source of repayment for the obligations owed by 366 Realty, including its
obligations under the Note, 366 Realty executed an Assignment of Leases and Rents (the “ALR”).
Dkt. No. 38 ¶ 15; Dkt. No. 121 ¶¶ 26-27; Dkt. No. 121-9. Mizrahi also allegedly guaranteed
repayment of the Loan pursuant to a Guaranty of Recourse Obligations, dated November 6, 2014
(the “Guaranty”). Dkt. No. 38 ¶ 16; Dkt. No. 121 ¶ 28; Dkt. No. 121-10.
In December 2014, the Original Lender assigned and transferred all rights, title, and interest
in the Loan Agreement, Note, ALR, Guaranty, and Amended Mortgage (collectively, the “Loan
Documents”) to Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 38 ¶¶ 17-18; Dkt. No. 121 ¶¶ 29-30; Dkt. No. 121-11. The
Amended Mortgage provided for appointment of a receiver. See Dkt. No. 142-15 § 7.1(g) (stating
that, upon 366 Realty’s default, Plaintiff may “apply for the appointment of a receiver . . . of the
Property, without notice and without regard for the adequacy of the security for the Debt and
without regard for the solvency of [366 Realty], any guarantor or indemnitor with respect to the
Loan or any Person otherwise liable for the payment of the Debt or any part thereof”). It is
undisputed that 366 Realty has been in default under the Loan Documents since 2017. See Dkt.
No. 38 § 31; Dkt. No. 121 § 36. Plaintiff thereafter accelerated the Note on April 3, 2017. See
Dkt. No. 58 at 7; Dkt. No. 121 §] 42-43; Dkt. No. 121-18; Dkt. No. 150 at 5.
Plaintiff commenced this foreclosure action on June 13, 2017. Dkt. No. 1. On March 16,
2021, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment against 366 Realty, finding that
Plaintiff was entitled to foreclosure. Dkt. No. 58; Wells Fargo Bank Nat’l Ass'n v. 366 Realty
LLC, No. 17-CV-3570 (SJ) (RER), 2021 WL 9494173 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2021).
Litigation then continued, which included Plaintiff's filing of its First Amended Complaint
on April 19, 2023. See Dkt. No. 70. On January 15, 2024, the undersigned issued a Report and
Recommendation, which recommended that Plaintiff's motion to fix indebtedness be granted in
part and denied in part. Dkt. No. 95. Specifically, the undersigned recommended that Plaintiff be
awarded $3,603,179.68 plus interest accruing at a daily rate of $622.58 from July 31, 2023 through
the entry of Judgment of Foreclosure, as set forth in more detail below:
$2,071,999.91
Contract Interest $528,315.34
Default Interest $741,227.18
$109,595.84
$117,756.86
Interest on Advances
Financial Statement
Fees $35,000.00
-$715.45
$3,603,179.68
Id. at 20. On March 26, 2024, Judge Matsumoto adopted in full the undersigned’s January 15,
2024 Report and Recommendation, thereby granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff’s motion
to fix indebtedness. Dkt. No. 101.
On February 20, 2025, the Court granted default judgment as to Defendant Kassin but
denied Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment as to Defendants Mizrahi, the Criminal Court, ECB,
and DOF. See Dkt. No. 118. The Court directed Plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint to
address pleading deficiencies. Id. at 24.
On February 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 121.
Defendants 366 Realty and Mizrahi answered the Second Amended Complaint on March 10, 2025.
Dkt. No. 128.
On September 27, 2025, the undersigned entered a Report and Recommendation
recommending that the Court grant in part and deny in part Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment
regarding Defendants the Criminal Court, ECB, and DOF, which the Court adopted on October
17, 2025. See Dkt. Nos. 159, 163. The Court granted default judgment as to the Criminal Court
and ECB, and denied, without prejudice, default judgment as to the DOF. See Dkt. No. 163. The
Clerk of the Court entered default judgment in Plaintiff’s favor against the Criminal Court and
ECB. See Dkt. No. 165.
On October 15, 2025, the Court denied Defendant Mizrahi’s motion for summary judgment
and granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.3 See Dkt. No.
162. Specifically, the Court denied Defendant Mizrahi’s motion for summary judgment and
dismissal of claims against him under the Guaranty. Id. at 16-17. The Court also granted
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to Defendant Mizrahi’s liability under the Guaranty.
3 Plaintiff and Defendants 366 Realty and Mizrahi consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned to
adjudicate those motions. Dkt. No. 147.
Id. Additionally, the Court found that appointment of a receiver was warranted. Id. at 17-27. The
Court, however, did not grant Plaintiff’s motion insofar as it sought to appoint Mr. Sanjay Gandhi
as a receiver, for the reasons set forth in its Memorandum and Opinion. See id. at 26-27. The
Court directed Plaintiff and Defendants to meet and confer in good faith and file a letter by October
29, 2025, proposing a sensible and expedient transition of management of the Property from
Defendants to such receiver as the Court shall duly appoint. See id. at 27.
Following additional submissions, on November 19, 2025, the Court appointed Mr. Gandhi
as receiver of all rents and profits from the Property as outlined in the Court’s Order Appointing a
Rent Receiver. Dkt. No. 169. Plaintiff has provided the Court with status updates regarding the
receivership thereafter. See Dkt. Nos. 173, 175, 180, 181, 182, 183.
The Court subsequently set a briefing schedule for Plaintiff’s motion for final judgment of
foreclosure and sale. See Text Order, dated Dec. 9, 2025. The Court ordered Plaintiff to serve on
Defendants (and not file) its motion by December 18, 2025; Defendants to serve any opposition
thereto no later than January 19, 2026; and Plaintiff to serve its reply by February 2, 2026. Id. For
the convenience of the Court, the parties were ordered to file all motion papers on the docket on
February 2, 2026, in the manner of a bundled filing. Id.
On February 2, 2026, Plaintiff filed its motion, as well as a proposed order of judgment.
See Dkt. Nos. 177, 178-1.4 As Plaintiff noted in a February 2, 2026 letter, Defendants did not
oppose or otherwise respond to Plaintiff’s motion. Dkt. No. 179. The Court subsequently ordered
Defendants to show cause as to why they failed to respond to Plaintiff’s motion. See Text Order,
4 Also on February 2, 2026, Plaintiff filed a letter noting that, since serving its motion on December 18,
2025, Plaintiff “identified certain administrative provisions in the previously served proposed Order that
required amending to ensure compliance with federal law and the internal procedures of the U.S. Marshals
Service . . . for the Eastern District of New York.” Dkt. No. 178 at 1. Plaintiff described such changes and
filed a clean copy and red-lined copy of an amended proposed order of final judgment. Id. at 1-2; Dkt. Nos.
178-1, 178-2.
dated May 17, 2026. On May 19, 2026, Defendants 366 Realty and Mizrahi filed their response.
Dkt. No. 184. Defendants, “having reconciled themselves with the inability to redeem their sole
asset, and seeking to minimize any potential deficiency claim, had elected not to oppose the
application.” Id. at 1. Defendants 366 Realty and Mizrahi also stated that “[i]t is not disputed that
had the initial complaint been proper, Plaintiff would be entitled to the unpaid principal and
advances for taxes, less the sums collected by the referee, interest for a reasonable period, and such
legal fees as this Court deems reasonable under the circumstances,” but argue that the attorneys’
fees sought against Defendants are not reasonable. Id. at 2. Defendants cite Yagui v. Republic Bar
& Lounge Inc., No. 25-CV-2674 (MKB), 2026 WL 1296762 (E.D.N.Y. May 12, 2026), in
opposition to Plaintiff’s application. See Dkt. No. 184 at 2.
On June 5, 2026, the Court held a status conference. See Minute Entry, dated June 5, 2026.
The Court ordered Plaintiff and Defendants 366 Realty and Mizrahi to confer regarding a proposed
referee for the sale of the Property and file a joint letter addressing a single proposed referee,
including the proposed referee’s qualifications, and the additional advances requested by Plaintiff.
Id. The Court also ordered Plaintiff to file an amended proposed order of foreclosure and sale and
other relief and a notice of discontinuance as to the DOF. See id. Plaintiff filed the notice of
discontinuance as to the DOF the same day. See Dkt. No. 186. The DOF was terminated from
this action on the same day. Text Order, dated June 5, 2026.
On June 8, 2026, Plaintiff filed a letter indicating that the parties agreed to name Domenick
Napoletano, Esq., as a referee for the sale of the Property. See Dkt. No. 187. Plaintiff also filed
an amended proposed order of judgment of foreclosure and sale and other relief. See Dkt. No.
189.5 The Court will consider the amended proposed order of final judgment at Dkt. No. 189 as
Plaintiff’s operative proposed order.
II. Discussion
A. Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale
As Plaintiff notes, the Court has already awarded Plaintiff $3,603,179.68 plus interest
accruing at a daily rate of $622.58 from July 31, 2023, through the entry of Judgment of
Foreclosure. See Dkt. No. 95 at 20; Dkt. No. 101 at 4; Dkt. No. 177-3 at 14. Defendants concede
this point, as they have not opposed that portion of Plaintiff’s motion. See Dkt. No. 184. The
undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiff is therefore entitled to $3,603,179.68 plus
interest accruing at a daily rate of $622.58 from July 31, 2023 through the entry of Judgment of
Foreclosure.
Additionally, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiff is entitled to
advances made by Plaintiff subsequent to July 31, 2023 in the amount of $140,769.34. Dkt. No.
177-3 at 14. As detailed in an affidavit from Edward Birsic (an asset manager at LNR Partners
LLC, the special servicer of the loan held by Plaintiff), Plaintiff advanced funds for insurance and
real estate taxes for the Property on behalf of 366 Realty, which failed to stratify those obligations.
See Dkt. No. 177-1. According to Plaintiff, 366 Realty “continued to fail to pay real estate taxes
and insurance for the” Property after July 31, 2023; those payments are: $50,008.83 in insurance
and $90,760.51 in real estate taxes. See id. ¶ 7; Dkt. No. 177-2 (detailing the insurance and real
estate taxes paid on the Property between August 1, 2023 and December 1, 2025). Again,
Defendants do not oppose this argument. See Dkt. No. 184. Plaintiff confirmed that those
5 Plaintiff initially incorrectly filed the proposed order as a “Consent to Magistrate Judge Disposition on
Motion” on the docket on June 8, 2026. See Dkt. No. 188. Per the Court’s directive, see Text Order, dated
June 11, 2026, Plaintiff re-filed the corrected document on June 11, 2026. See Dkt. No. 189.
$140,769.34 in advances “were incurred well before the Receiver’s appointment” and “[t]hey bear
no relation to any amounts paid or to be paid during the receivership period and were not funded
from receivership proceeds.” Dkt. No. 187 at 2. “To date, no moneys have been disbursed to
Plaintiff from the receivership funds, and the receivership is not generating any surplus or excess
revenue.” Id. “Courts in this Circuit allow plaintiffs in foreclosure actions to recover such
protective advances where the plaintiff submits sufficient documentation to prove the accuracy of
its claims.” Wells Fargo Bank v. 5615 N. LLC, No. 20-CV-2048 (VSB) (KHP), 2023 WL
7394340, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2023) (citation omitted) (collecting cases), report and
recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 1778788 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2023). Accordingly, the
undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiff is entitled to $140,769.34 in advances.
Next, the undersigned respectfully recommends the appointment of Mr. Napoletano as
referee for the sale of the Property. “[C]ourts regularly appoint referees in cases of mortgage
foreclosures and sales.” Windward Bora, LLC v. Brown, No. 21-CV-3147 (KAM) (RER), 2022
WL 875100, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2022) (citation omitted). As Plaintiff describes, Mr.
Napoletano is “a widely respected and highly decorated member of the New York legal
community.” Dkt. No. 187 at 1. Mr. Napoletano has “served in numerous distinguished leadership
positions within the bar, including as Treasurer of the New York State Bar Association (2018–
2022), Past President of the Brooklyn Bar Association and the Brooklyn Bar Foundation, Co-Chair
of the NYSBA Civil Practice Law & Rules Section, and Past Member of the Grievance Committee
for the 2nd, 11th, and 13th Judicial Districts, among many other roles.” Id. He received the 2019
St. Thomas More award and various other accolades. See Domenick Napoletano Esq, Napoletano
Law, https://www.napoletanolaw.com/#biography (last visited June 15, 2026). Mr. Napoletano
appears to be well-qualified to serve as referee here. The undersigned respectfully recommends
that Mr. Napoletano be appointed as the referee to sell the Property and compensated for his
appointment in compliance with New York Civil Practice Law and Rule (“CPLR”) § 8003. The
auction of the Property shall occur in compliance with N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law §§ 231, 1351.
Plaintiff also requests post-judgment interest from the date judgment is entered until the
date the judgment is satisfied. See Dkt. No. 177-3 at 14; Dkt. No. 189 at 2. Courts have held that
post-judgment interest at the statutory rate under 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) is mandatory. See Windward
Bora LLC v. Ingber, No. 21-CV-3308, 2023 WL 6385815, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2023)
(Matsumoto, J.) (“In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), Plaintiff shall also be awarded post-
judgement interest, which is calculated based on the weekly average one-year constant maturity
Treasury yield for the week preceding the date on which judgment is entered.” (citing Schipani v.
McLeod, 541 F.3d 158, 165 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that “postjudgment interest is governed by
federal statute,” 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), and that “we have consistently held that an award of
postjudgment interest is mandatory”))). The undersigned therefore respectfully recommends that
Plaintiff be awarded post-judgment interest at the statutory rate set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1961,
“running from the date judgment is entered until the judgment is satisfied, presumably by the
foreclosure sale.” Brown, 2022 WL 875100, at *5 (citation omitted).
Accordingly, in light of the above, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court
enter a Judgement of Foreclosure and Sale in a form substantially similar to that proposed by
Plaintiff at Dkt. No. 189.
B. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
Plaintiff seeks attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $567,054.08. Dkt. No. 177-3 at
12. Plaintiff argues that “[p]ursuant to Section 5.1.14 of the Loan Agreement and Sections 1.3 and
7.3 of the Mortgage, in the event the Lender commences an action to enforce its rights under the
Loan Documents, the Borrower [(366 Realty)] is required to pay the Lender’s attorneys’ fees,
expenses, and court costs.” Id. at 10; see also Dkt. No. 87-4 at 58 (Section 5.1.14 of the Loan
Agreement); Dkt. No. 87-6 at 9-10, 18-19 (Amended, Restated, and Consolidated Mortgage); Dkt.
No. 95 at 19 (noting that “[a]s a preliminary matter, the Loan Agreement and the Mortgage provide
Plaintiff with the right to seek an award of attorneys’ fees and costs.” (citations omitted)). The
Court will address Plaintiff’s specific requests for attorneys’ fees and costs, in turn, below.
1. Legal Standard
“New York state law governs the substantive right to attorneys’ fees in a foreclosure
action.” Ingber, 2023 WL 6385815, at *5 (quoting Mid-Hudson Catskill Rural Migrant Ministry,
Inc. v. Fine Host Corp., 418 F.3d 168, 177 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[s]tate law creates the substantive right
to attorney’s fees”)). “Since there is no statute in New York authorizing the recovery of an
attorney’s fee in a mortgage foreclosure action, such a fee may only be recovered if it is
contractually authorized.” PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Khan, No. 25-CV-2925 (DLI) (LGD), 2026 WL
41169, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2026) (quoting Vigo v. 501 Second St. Holding Corp., 994 N.Y.S.2d
354, 356 (2d Dep’t 2014)), report and recommendation adopted, Text Order, dated Mar. 31, 2026;
see also Ingber, 2023 WL 6385815, at *5 (“Under New York law, attorneys’ fees may only be
awarded ‘under a valid contractual authorization.’” (quoting Mid-Hudson Catskill Rural Migrant
Ministry, 418 F.3d at 177)); CIT Bank N.A. v. Gordon, No. 17-CV-3972 (ADS) (SIL), 2020 WL
4587446, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 10, 2020) (“Under New York law, attorneys’ fees in mortgage
foreclosure actions may only be recovered if they are contractually authorized, as there is no statute
in New York providing for the recovery of attorneys’ fees in such actions.” (citation omitted)),
report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 2711420 (E.D.N.Y. May 26, 2020). Indeed, “[a]
plaintiff in a foreclosure action may recover attorneys’ fees and costs against a mortgagor if the
note or mortgage allows for such an award.” Freedom Mortg. Corp. v. Ervin, No. 18-CV-1082
(ENV) (SMG), 2019 WL 2436298, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2019) (citation omitted), report and
recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 2511873 (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2019).
Even where fees and costs are authorized, “[a]n award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to a
contractual provision may only be enforced to the extent that the amount is reasonable and
warranted for the services actually rendered.” Axos Bank v. 64-03 Realty LLC, No. 20-CV-3549
(RPK) (CYP), 2026 WL 764476, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2026) (quoting Lupo v. Anna’s Lullaby
Cafe, LLC, 138 N.Y.S.3d 103, 106 (2d Dep’t 2020)); see also Exec. Risk Indem., Inc. v.
Fieldbridge Assocs., LLC, 642 F. App’x 25, 25 (2d Cir. 2016) (same) (citations omitted). “In
determining a fee award, the typical starting point is the so-called lodestar amount, that is ‘the
number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.’”
Healey v. Leavitt, 485 F.3d 63, 71 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); see also Hennessy ex rel.
Hennessy v. 194 Bedford Ave. Rest. Corp., No. 21-CV-5434 (FB) (RML), 2022 WL 4134502, at
*6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2022) (“The starting point for determining the presumptively reasonable fee
award is the ‘lodestar’ amount, which is ‘the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable
number of hours required by the case.’” (citation omitted)), report and recommendation adopted,
2022 WL 4134437 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 12, 2022).
“The attorney bears the burden of establishing the reasonable value of the services
rendered, based upon a showing of the hours reasonably expended and the prevailing hourly rate
for similar legal work in the community.” Axos Bank, 2026 WL 764476, at *7 (quoting Loughlin
v. Meghji, 240 N.Y.S.3d 132, 135 (2d Dep’t 2025)); see also Sadowski v. Yeshiva World News,
LLC, No. 21-CV-7207 (AMD) (MMH), 2023 WL 2707096, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2023) (“The
applicant bears the burden to demonstrate reasonableness.” (citation omitted)), report and
recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2742157 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2023). Attorneys must support
“the application with contemporaneous time records and ‘specify, for each attorney, the date, the
hours expended, and the nature of the work done.’” Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Nickle, No.
24-CV-7889 (NCM) (PCG), 2026 WL 788108, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2026) (quoting Cruz v.
Loc. Union No. 3 of the Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 34 F.3d 1148, 1160-61 (2d Cir. 1994)), report
and recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 788011 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2026).
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has explained, to guide the
Court’s inquiry into what constitutes a reasonable hourly rate, courts should examine the following
factors:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3)
the level of skill required to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion
of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the attorney’s
customary hourly rate; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved in
the case and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the
attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cnty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 186 n.3 (2d
Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see also Axos Bank, 2026 WL 764476, at *7 (stating that courts must
consider “such factors as the time, effort, and skill required; the difficulty of the questions
presented; counsel’s experience, ability, and reputation; the fee customarily charged in the locality;
and the contingency or certainty of compensation” (quoting Vigo, 994 N.Y.S.2d at 356)).
“The Court can assess the number of hours billed to determine if the number is reasonable,”
and the number of hours will be determined to be unreasonable “if it is found to be excessive,
duplicative, or unnecessary.” 5316 Church Ave., LLC v. Yhun, No. 14-CV-7376 (FB) (RER), 2018
WL 6204615, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted),
report and recommendation adopted as modified, 2018 WL 6201709 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2018).
“If the Court finds that some of the time [the attorney billed] was not reasonably necessary[,] it
should reduce the time for which compensation is awarded accordingly.” Perry v. High Level Dev.
Contracting & Sec. LLC, No. 20-CV-2180 (AMD) (PK), 2022 WL 1018791, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
16, 2022) (citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 1017753 (E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 5, 2022). “Where time entries are vague, duplicative, or otherwise inadequate, a court may
make an across-the-board reduction or percentage cut, in the amount of hours.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Studio Six Prods., Ltd. v. Sargsyan, No. 19-CV-
2685 (WFK) (MMH), 2024 WL 4309622, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 26, 2024) (noting that district
courts are authorized to make “across-the-board percentage cuts in hours ‘as a practical means of
trimming fat from a fee application’” (quoting Green v. City of New York, 403 F. App’x 626, 630
(2d Cir. 2010))), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4574142 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23,
2024). Indeed, courts have applied percentage reductions of up to fifty percent. See Gonzalez v.
Fresh Start Painting Corp., No. 18-CV-11124 (PMH), 2022 WL 3701096, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
26, 2022) (collecting cases). “Inadequate documentation is another ground[] for reduction of a fee
award.” Perry, 2022 WL 1018791, at *14 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
When a party is awarded attorneys’ fees, the party is also entitled to compensation for
“those reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by attorneys and ordinarily charged to their
clients.” LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 763 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). “The
fee applicant bears the burden of adequately documenting and itemizing the costs requested.” U.S.
Bank, N.A. v. Byrd, 854 F. Supp. 2d 278, 288 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (citation omitted). Indeed, costs
must be substantiated with invoices or other documentation. See 5316 Church Ave., 2018 WL
6204615, at *4 (citations omitted). “Court filing fees, process servers, printing and photocopying,
messenger services, postage, telephone costs, transcripts, travel, transportation, meals and other
‘[o]ut of pocket litigation costs are generally recoverable if they are necessary for the
representation of the client.’” Hanover Ins. Co. v. D’Angelo, No. 13-CV-4301 (JMA) (ARL),
2018 WL 2729248, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2018) (citation omitted), report and recommendation
adopted, 2018 WL 2727878 (E.D.N.Y. June 6, 2018); see also Duffy v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., No.
15-CV-7407 (NGG) (SIL), 2024 WL 4275247, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 24, 2024) (adopting report
and recommendation, and noting that “[r]easonable expenses include court filing fees, process
servers, postage and transcripts” (citing Hanover Ins., 2018 WL 2729248, at *2)). Only those
costs that are tied to “identifiable, out-of-pocket disbursements” are recoverable. See Moon v. Gab
Kwon, No. 99-CV-11810 (GEL), 2002 WL 31512816, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2002) (quoting
Kuzma v. I.R.S., 821 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d Cir. 1987)).
2. Attorneys’ Fees
Plaintiff requests $555,426.00 in fees. Dkt. No. 177-3 at 12; Dkt. No. 177-4 ¶ 7. There is
no dispute that Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs. See Dkt. No. 184 at 2. Defendants
366 Realty and Mizrahi, however, dispute the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s fee application. Id.
The undersigned now turns to the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s requested fees and costs pursuant
to the above framework.
a. Reasonable Hourly Rates
i. Attorneys
Although this action was commenced in 2017, Plaintiff’s current counsel, McCarter &
English LLP (“the Firm”), did not note any appearances on the record until November 28, 2022.
Dkt. No. 66. They nonetheless assert that their work on this case began in October 2022. Dkt.
No. 177-4 ¶ 3. Plaintiff provides a summary document listing eleven attorneys as having worked
on this case: (1) Sheila Calello, partner; (2) Joseph Lubertazzi, Jr., partner; (3) Jessica Macarone,
special counsel; (4) Danielle Weslock, partner; (5) John Stoelker, partner; (6) Stephanie Pisko,
associate; (7) MarcAnthony Bonanno, associate; (8) Tyler Mitchell, associate; (9) Ethan Whitaker,
associate; (10) Gabriel Slamovits, associate; and (11) Jalen Williams, associate. See Dkt. No. 177-
5 at 2. Only two attorneys have filed appearances on the docket: Ms. Macarone filed a substitution
of attorney form on November 28, 2022, and Mr. Lubertazzi filed a notice of appearance on
February 14, 2023. Dkt. Nos. 66, 68.
Plaintiff states that “[t]he primary attorneys who worked on this matter are Jessica
Macarone, Jalen Williams, and [Joseph Lubertazzi, Jr.].” Dkt. No. 177-4 ¶ 6. To that end, Plaintiff
provides biographical information for only Mr. Lubertazzi, Ms. Macarone, and Mr. Williams. See
id. ¶ 6(a)-(c). The remaining eight attorneys “rendered services for discrete tasks as time demands
required.” Id. ¶ 7.
Given the recent case law in this district, the undersigned first recommends that the hourly
rates proffered by Plaintiff are unreasonably high for Mr. Lubertazzi, Ms. Macarone, and Mr.
Williams, respectively.
Mr. Lubertazzi, Jr. is a 1983 graduate of Seton Hall University School of Law and served
as a law clerk to the Honorable Vincent J. Commissa, then-Chief Judge of the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey, for one year. Id. ¶ 6(a). Mr. Lubertazzi has been
associated with the Firm since 1984, becoming partner in 1991. Id. Mr. Lubertazzi has acted as
the Firm’s Practice Group Leader and currently serves as Chairman of the Firm’s Executive
Committee. Id. Mr. Lubertazzi has “over forty years of experience in commercial litigation,
primarily in the area of creditors’ rights.” Id. Given the length of this litigation, Mr. Lubertazzi
contends that “[h]is hourly rate for services rendered on this matter commenced at $875.00 and is
presently $990.00.” Id. ¶ 6.
Ms. Macarone is a 2001 graduate of New York Law School. Id. ¶ 6(b). She has been
associated with the Firm since 2003 and is special counsel. Id.; Dkt. No. 177-5 at 2. Ms. Macarone
has “over 16 years of experience in commercial litigation, primarily in the area of creditors’ rights
in New York and New Jersey.” Dkt. No. 177-4 ¶ 6(b). Ms. Macarone contends that her hourly
rate began at $595.00 and is currently $745.00. Id. ¶ 6.
Mr. Williams is a 2024 graduate of Rutgers Law School. Id. ¶ 6(c). He became associated
with the Firm upon graduation from law school, and has “approximately one year of experience in
commercial litigation, including in the area of creditors’ rights.” Id. Mr. Williams contends that
his hourly rate initiated at $425.00 and is presently $490.00. Id. ¶ 6.
Plaintiff fails to provide adequate information to demonstrate that its requested hourly rates
for Mr. Lubertazzi, Ms. Macarone, and Mr. Williams “constitute the rates a reasonable client would
be willing to pay in a competitive market under all of the relevant circumstances.” Bank of Am. v.
Viders, No. 10-CV-25 (DRH) (ARL), 2011 WL 4527419, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2011)
(describing the Firm’s request for attorneys’ fees in a similar matter), report and recommendation
adopted, 2011 WL 4440357 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 23, 2011); see also Alexander v. Amchem Prods., Inc.,
No. 07-CV-6441, 2008 WL 1700157, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2008) (Sullivan, J.) (“Other than
Counsel’s conclusory assertion that a $600 rate is ‘reasonable,’ he has failed to submit any case
authority or other evidence in support of the reasonableness of the proffered rate.”). Since the
Firm “has not provided any evidence of the prevailing market rates in this District, the Court has
researched the prevailing market rates in the Eastern District of New York for lawyers in
comparable cases involving real property disputes.” Melnick v. Press, No. 06-CV-6686 (JFB)
(ARL), 2009 WL 2824586, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2009) (citations omitted). “Courts determine
what constitutes a reasonable hourly rate through application of ‘the forum rule,’ which states that
‘courts should generally use the hourly rates employed in the district in which the reviewing court
sits.’” Blue Castle (Cayman) Ltd. v. Astudillo, No. 23-CV-3851 (LDH) (PK), 2024 WL 3813309,
at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2024) (quoting Simmons v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 575 F.3d 170, 174 (2d
Cir. 2009)), report and recommendation adopted, Text Order, dated Sep. 27, 2024.
“The prevailing rates for experienced attorneys in the Eastern District of New York cases
range from approximately $100 to $450, depending on experience level.” Yagui, 2026 WL
1296762, at *18 (collecting cases); see also Kimba Indus. Inc. v. Fortegra Specialty Ins. Co., No.
24-CV-1334 (JMW), 2026 WL 618037, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2026) (“The updated ‘forum rates
in the Eastern District’ after adjusting ‘for inflation and market conditions’ appears now to be in
the ‘$450-$650 for partners, $300-$450 for senior associates, $150-$300 for junior associates, and
$100-$150 for paralegals.’” (citation omitted)); Rubin v. HSBC Bank USA, NA, 763 F. Supp. 3d
233, 243-44 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (“I have rounded out the forum rates in the Eastern District to now
be $450-$650 for partners, $300-$450 for senior associates, $150-$300 for junior associates, and
$100-$150 for paralegals.”). Moreover, “[a]ttorneys’ fees awarded in the Eastern District of New
York for cases concerning mortgages and promissory notes ‘have tended to be lower than in other
cases.’” Blue Castle (Cayman), 2024 WL 3813309, at *7 (citation omitted) (awarding $150 hourly
rate for an associate in a foreclosure action); see also CIT Bank, N.A. v. Zisman, No. 17-CV-2126
(CBA) (RER), 2023 WL 4060083, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2023) (awarding $300 for an associate
appearing as of-counsel admitted to practice in 2007 and $400 for a firm member appearing as of-
counsel admitted to practice in 1973), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 48708
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2024); United States v. Phillips, No. 19-CV-5348 (AMD) (VMS), 2022 WL
256954, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2022) (applying an associate hourly rate of $200 in a foreclosure
action), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 256576 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2022); E. Sav.
Bank, FSB v. Beach, No. 13-CV-341 (JS) (AKT), 2014 WL 923151, at *13-14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 10,
2014) (adopting report and recommendation, and citing mortgage and promissory note cases where
partners were awarded $250-275 per hour and associates were awarded $150-175 per hour).
Higher rates, however, may be justified in more complex cases. See Avail Holding LLC v. Ramos,
No. 19-CV-117 (BMC), 2020 WL 7186794, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2020) (finding an hourly rate
of $350 to be “eminently reasonable” for an associate with only six years of experience when the
mortgage foreclosure action “was a hard-fought, heavily litigated action in which [plaintiff] raised
a host of arguments which [defense counsel] successfully overcame”). “Of course, in light of the
numerous factors that courts in this circuit consider to determine a reasonable hourly rate, ‘the
range of “reasonable” attorney fee rates in this district varies depending on the type of case, the
nature of the litigation, the size of the firm, and the expertise of its attorneys.’” Houston v. Cotter,
234 F. Supp. 3d 392, 402 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (citation omitted).
For Mr. Lubertazzi, Plaintiff provides no case law in support of his contention that Mr.
Lubertazzi is entitled to an hourly rate between $875.00 and $990.00, which is exceptionally high
for this district, especially in foreclosure actions. See Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. C.Y. Gold LLC,
No. 24-CV-1314 (OEM) (RML), 2026 WL 1196137, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2026) (reducing
partner’s hourly rate to $650 in a commercial foreclosure action), report and recommendation
adopted, Text Order, dated Mar. 18, 2026; see also Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. 204 Ellery St., LLC,
No. 23-CV-5343 (ENV) (RML), 2025 WL 1309875, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2025) (reducing
partner’s hourly rate to $650 in a commercial foreclosure action), report and recommendation
adopted, Text Order, dated Mar. 27, 2026; Zisman, 2023 WL 4060083, at *3 (finding, in
foreclosure action, hourly rate of $300 reasonable for associate appearing as of-counsel admitted
in 2007; $400 reasonable for firm member admitted in 1973; and $325 reasonable for attorney
admitted in 1997); U.S. All. Fed. Credit Union v. M/V Kamara Fam., 691 F. Supp. 3d 646, 664
(E.D.N.Y. 2023) (finding, in foreclosure action, hourly rate of $450 reasonable for attorney with
over forty years of experience). Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Mr.
Lubertazzi’s hourly rate should be reduced to $650.00.
For Ms. Macarone, Plaintiff again provides no case law in support of the proposed hourly
rate between $595.00 and $745.00, which is likewise exceptionally high for this district. The
undersigned respectfully recommends that Ms. Macarone’s hourly rate should be reduced to
$450.00. See, e.g., C.Y. Gold, 2026 WL 1196137, at *8 (reducing associate’s and senior practice
attorney’s hourly rates to $450 in a commercial foreclosure action); 204 Ellery St., 2025 WL
1309875, at *10 (reducing mid-level associates’ hourly rates to $450 in a commercial foreclosure
action); Zisman, 2023 WL 4060083, at *3 (finding hourly rate of $300 reasonable for associate
appearing as of-counsel admitted in 2007); M/V Kamara Fam., 691 F. Supp. 3d at 664 (finding
hourly rate of $300 reasonable for attorney with over ten years of experience in foreclosure action).
Likewise, Plaintiff does not provide any case law support for Mr. Williams’s requested
hourly rate between $425.00 and $490.00, which is exceptionally high—particularly for a junior
associate with limited experience. See Dkt. No. 177-4 ¶ 6(c) (stating that Mr. Williams graduated
in 2024); Dkt. No. 177-6 at 154 (showing that Mr. Williams began billing in this action on March
31, 2025). Indeed, Mr. Williams has “approximately one year of experience in commercial
litigation, including in the area of creditors’ rights.” See Dkt. No. 177-4 ¶ 6(c). The undersigned
respectfully recommends that Mr. Williams should be awarded an hourly rate of $150.00. See
Rubin, 763 F. Supp. 3d at 243-44.
Next, as to the eight attorneys for whom Plaintiff provides no biographical or background
information, the undersigned recommends that the Court likewise reduce the hourly rates.
“[B]iographical information concerning the attorneys for whom charges were submitted . . . is
required to evaluate experience levels.” Flores v. Mamma Lombardi’s of Holbrook, Inc., 104 F.
Supp. 3d 290, 305 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). Without this information, “[t]here is . . . no way the court can
engage in any sort of comparative analysis as mandated under the ‘lodestar’ method.” Molefi v.
Oppenheimer Tr., No. 03-CV-5631 (FB) (VVP), 2007 WL 538547, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2007)
(collecting cases); see also Sanchez v. DPC N.Y. Inc., 381 F. Supp. 3d 245, 251 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)
(declining to award any legal fees attributable to entries by a timekeeper for whom no biographical
information was provided). “[T]he lack of detail does not assist in justifying the reasonableness
of the hourly rates sought for each practitioner.” Kizer v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., No. 12-CV-
5387 (JS) (AKT), 2017 WL 9512408, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. July 24, 2017) (“[T]he Court is tasked with
determining whether the hourly rates charged are reasonable. This requires a more thorough
inquiry into each attorney’s educational background and employment experience from the time of
bar passage to the present.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 3411952 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 9, 2017).
Significantly, Plaintiff fails to present “a detailed employment chronology” for any of these
eight attorneys. Id. Nor does Plaintiff provide any indication that these attorneys have experience
in foreclosure or related litigation. Plaintiff “make[s] no effort to compare the rates its counsel has
charged to rates charged by counsel in similar cases or to rates approved by courts in this district.”
Al Thani v. Hanke, Nos. 20-CV-4765 (JPC), 20-CV-8181 (JPC), 2025 WL 1591379, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2025) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (noting that counsel failed
to “describe the background or experience of the attorneys for whom [he] seeks fees, although it
is well-settled that such information is required if the court is to engage in the necessary case-
specific inquiry into the prevailing market rates for counsel of similar experience and skill to the
fee applicant’s counsel”). Plaintiff reports that the eight attorneys for whom no background
information was provided only rendered services “[f]rom time to time” for “discrete tasks as time
demands required.” Dkt. No. 177-4 ¶ 7. These were not the “primary attorneys” who worked on
this matter. See id. ¶ 6. Indeed, seven of those eight attorneys billed eleven hours or less. See
Dkt. No. 177-5 at 2. One associate, MarcAnthony Bonanno, billed 50.5 hours, id., but Plaintiff
curiously did not submit biographical information for Mr. Bonanno or any of these other attorneys.
See Dkt. No. 177-4 ¶ 6.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has not met its “burden of demonstrating the reasonableness” of the
eight attorneys’ requested rates through supporting evidence. See N.A.A.C.P. v. E. Ramapo Cent.
Sch. Dist., No. 17-CV-8943 (CS) (JCM), 2020 WL 7706783, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2020)
(citation omitted). “[W]here a prevailing party fails to provide biographical information on an
attorney for whom fees are sought, courts have discretion to lower the requested rate for purposes
of the lodestar calculation and award fees at the lower end of the prevailing range.” Id. (citations
omitted); see also Pilitz v. Inc. Vill. of Freeport, No. 07-CV-4078 (ETB), 2011 WL 5825138, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2011) (“Where, as here, the moving party fails to provide any biographical
information to support the reasonableness of the rates, the court may use its discretion to award
fees at a lower rate than requested.” (quoting Artemide Inc. v. Spero Elec. Corp., No. 09-CV-1110
(DRH) (ARL), 2010 WL 5452075, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2010), report and recommendation
adopted, 2010 WL 5452077 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2010))).
Therefore, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the hourly rate for partners Sheila
Calello and Danielle Weslock be reduced to $450.00; and that the hourly rate for associates John
Stoelker,6 Stephanie Pisko, MarcAnthony Bonanno, Tyler Mitchell, Ethan Whitaker, and Gabriel
Slamovits be reduced to $150.00. See Rubin, 763 F. Supp. 3d at 243-44.
ii. Staff Members
Plaintiff also seeks fees for ten staff members working on this case: (1) James Greenstone,
research analyst; (2) Pamela Keyl, research analyst; (3) Bonnie Murch, paralegal; (4) Lisa Fenev,
paralegal; (5) Linda Restivo, paralegal; (6) Magalie Desince, research analyst; (7) Emily Kim,
paralegal; (8) Laura Harkins, paralegal; (9) Paul Connelly, research analyst; and (10) Gina
Mancuso, paralegal. See Dkt. No. 177-5 at 2. Again, Plaintiff fails to provide any background
information for the aforementioned paralegals or research analysts. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n for the
Specialty Food Trade, Inc. v. Construct Data Verlag AG, No. 04-CV-2983 (DLC) (KNF), 2006
WL 5804603, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2006) (lowering requested rates for paralegals and law
clerks where movant failed to provide information on the timekeepers’ background and experience,
because the court could not assess the reasonableness of the rates requested), report and
recommendation adopted, 2007 WL 656274 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2007).
The undersigned respectfully recommends that all staff members be awarded an hourly rate
of $100.00. See Moreno v. Cap. Concrete NY Inc., No. 24-CV-3120 (NGG) (PK), 2025 WL
2555609, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 5, 2025) (noting that a reasonable hourly rate for paralegal fees is
$100-$150); cf. Rubin, 763 F. Supp. 3d at 245 (awarding $125 hourly rate for a paralegal with
seven years of experience).
6 Although Plaintiff reports on the summary chart that Mr. Stoelker, who billed 1.40 hours in this matter at
an hourly rate of $550.00, is a partner, he was actually an associate at the time that he worked on this case.
See Dkt. No. 177-5 at 2; Dkt. No. 177-6 at 3, 8. Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends
that Mr. Stoelker’s hourly rate be reduced in line with the associates.
b. Reasonable Number of Hours
Here, Plaintiff seeks a total of $555,426.00 for 858.5 attorney hours and 62.7 paralegal and
research analyst hours. See Dkt. No. 177-5 at 2.
The undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court find that the number of hours
expended on this litigation to be unreasonably unnecessary, excessive, and duplicative. As an
initial matter, this foreclosure matter was overstaffed with eleven attorneys and ten professional
staff members. See Houston, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 404-07 (finding that a matter was overstaffed
when ten different attorneys were assigned to the case). As courts in this Circuit have noted,
staffing a straightforward case “with 10 timekeepers is a recipe for disaster from a reasonable
billing point of view. Duplicate and triplicate review of even the most basic documents makes the
billing unreasonable per se.” Gonzalez, 2022 WL 3701096, at *4. When considering the
reasonableness of counsel’s claimed number of hours, “a district court has discretion to reduce
requested attorneys’ fees where the prevailing party assigned an inordinate number of attorneys to
litigate the action.’” Chrysafis v. Marks, No. 21-CV-2516 (GRB) (AYS), 2023 WL 6158537, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. Sep. 21, 2023) (collecting cases and finding across-the-board reduction of forty percent
appropriate).
A review of the billing records reveals that there are myriad instances of duplicative and
excessive billing. For example, between December 19, 2024 and December 23, 2024, there are
multiple billing entries from different attorneys regarding “revising letters” in connection with a
letter to be filed with the Court on December 24, 2024. See Dkt. No. 177-6 at 84-85. These entries
total approximately 5.2 hours. See id. But that December 24, 2024 filing is essentially a one-page
letter that briefly addresses the undersigned’s November 26, 2024 Report and Recommendation.
See Dkt. No. 115.
Puzzlingly, Mr. Williams billed .60 hours—across two different days—for speaking “with
Attorney from Eastern District of NY regarding the procedures to enter the court and also the
requirements needed to keep your cellphone.” Dkt. No. 177-6 at 167. All court procedures are
available on U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York’s website and, in any event,
this type of administrative task is more appropriately completed by a paralegal or administrative
assistant rather than an associate.
Another example of duplicative and excessive billing is observed in the entries regarding
Plaintiff’s motion to extend the notice of pendency. Ms. Macarone billed .70 hours for
“[c]onsidering” and “attending to” issues regarding such a motion on August 29, 2025. Id. at 184.
Mr. Williams spent 4.90 hours on September 3, 2025 drafting a notice of motion to extend the
notice of pendency, a supporting affirmation, and a proposed order. Id. at 188. On September 4,
2025, Ms. Macarone spent .40 hours “[c]onsidering issues re: responses to inquiries related to draft
motion to extend notice of pendency.” Id. The next day, she spent another .30 hours “[f]urther
considering issues re: motion for extension of notice of pendency.” Id. On November 20, 2025,
Ms. Calello spent .30 hours attending to “issues re: final judgment application and motion to extend
notice of pendency.” Id. at 200. Mr. Williams then spent another hour reviewing and making edits
to the motion on November 24, 2025. Id. On November 25, 2025, Ms. Calello spent another .30
hours reviewing and revising the motion and considering timing of the motion. Id. Collectively,
7.9 hours of attorney time were spent on the motion. See id. at 184-200. This motion, however,
was subsequently filed on December 8, 2025 as a one-and-a-half-page letter. Dkt. No. 172. The
attorney hours spent on such a letter-motion are clearly excessive.
Likewise, between March 2025 and April 2025, three different attorneys collectively spent
16.7 hours researching or “considering” a statute of limitations issue in advance of Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment. See Dkt. No. 177-6 at 152, 153, 154, 158, 159, 160, 161. Such
time does not include the drafting of the portion of Plaintiff’s motion discussing the statute of
limitations, which was only three pages. Dkt. No. 142-30 at 22-24. These 16.7 hours are also
excessive.
Additionally, Ms. Macarone spent 1.60 hours drafting a one-and-a-half-page letter
opposing Defendants’ request for an extension of time (filed at Dkt. No. 77). See Dkt. No. 177-6
at 44. Mr. Lubertazzi also spent .10 hours revising the objection. Id. These hours constitute an
excessive amount of time used to oppose a request for an extension of time and, in any event,
Defendants’ request was granted. See Minute Entry, dated May 3, 2023.
Other entries display Firm attorneys doing work more appropriate for a paralegal specialist
or administrative assistant. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 177-6 at 34 (Mr. Bonanno billing for filing letter),
73 (Ms. Macarone billing for following up “with clerk re: status of filing”), 102 (Ms. Pisko billing
for filing reply memorandum of law), 171 (Ms. Macarone billing for preparing a declaration of
service via ECF). Attorney billing for clerical tasks is not reasonable. See, e.g., E. Sav. Bank v.
Robinson, No. 13-CV-7308 (ADS) (SIL), 2016 WL 3365091, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. May 9, 2016)
(finding attorney billing for revising an affidavit of service and uploading it to ECF to be
unreasonable), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 3102021 (E.D.N.Y. June 2, 2016);
SAC Fund II 0826, LLC v. Burnell’s Enters., Inc., No. 18-CV-3504 (ENV) (PK), 2022 WL
1519515, at *7-8 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2022) (recommending reduction where partner “performed
tasks that could have been performed by a paralegal or associate such as following up with the title
company on service of process issues relating to the estates”), report and recommendation adopted
as modified, 2023 WL 5786820 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 7, 2023), aff’d, 2024 WL 5153943 (2d Cir. Dec.
18, 2024).
Even when work was appropriately completed by professional staff members, some billing
was excessive. For instance, Ms. Restivo, a paralegal, spent a total of four hours preparing to file,
discussing the filing, and then filing the motion to fix indebtedness. See Dkt. No. 177-6 at 60. In
addition, Ms. Kim, also a paralegal, spent .80 hours preparing and filing a notice of appearance for
Mr. Lubertazzi, while Mr. Bonanno, an attorney, spent .30 hours editing that same notice of
appearance. Id. at 22; see also Robinson, 2016 WL 3365091, at *10 (finding associate’s .75 hours
of billing for drafting and filing a notice of appearance to be unreasonable).
The above discussion is not exhaustive of the unreasonable billing seen in the Firm’s
records. Accordingly, an across-the-board percentage cut is appropriate here. See, e.g., Robinson,
2016 WL 3365091, at *10 (recommending an across-the-board percentage cut to account for
excessive or otherwise improper billing “[r]ather than scrutinizing the propriety of each individual
time entry”); H.C. v. Dep’t of Educ., 71 F.4th 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2023) (upholding twenty percent
reduction); Matusick v. Erie Cnty. Water Auth., 757 F.3d 31, 64-65 (2d Cir. 2014) (upholding the
district court’s fifty percent across-the-board reduction of hours “because of concerns regarding
‘unspecified conferences, telephone calls, email correspondence, and reviews’” (citation
omitted)); Chrysafis, 2023 WL 6158537, at *9 (making an across-the-board reduction of forty
percent of the hours billed by counsel); Lopez v. 1923 Sneaker, Inc., No. 18-CV-3828 (WFK)
(RER), 2021 WL 1845057, at *11-12 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2021) (noting a thirty percent reduction of
fees was warranted as the records demonstrated that “multiple employees billed for the same task,”
like reviewing emails and documents), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 1259623
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2021); Reiter v. Maxi-Aids, Inc., No. 14-CV-3712 (SJF) (GRB), 2019 WL
1641306, at *5-6 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2019) (concluding that because “[o]verstaffing of a case can
lead to a reduction due to redundant or duplicative work performed,” a reduction in the number of
hours billed was warranted as a partner, senior associate, junior associate, and paralegal were
simultaneously participating in every aspect of the case, including “review[ing] and/or edit[ing]”
documents); Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp. v. Cutler, No. 15-CV-4420 (PAE), 2015 WL 7444627, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2015) (reducing attorneys’ fees because “various time entries are vague,
referring simply to ‘consideration’ of issues. And some appear to reflect unnecessary work by
high-level personnel on relatively quotidian projects”); Am. Lung Ass’n v. Reilly, 144 F.R.D. 622,
627 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that “use of so many lawyers for relatively straightforward legal
tasks was excessive and led to duplication of work” and deducting forty percent of plaintiffs’
lawyer’s hours).
Here, the undersigned respectfully recommends an across-the-board reduction of thirty
percent to account for billed hours the undersigned finds unreasonable.
***
In sum, based on the hourly rates set forth above and a thirty percent reduction of the hours
billed on this matter, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiff be awarded
$264,645.50 in attorneys’ fees. The below chart further details the recommended fee award.
age | een | ra
Rate
Partner
Jr., Partner
Special Counsel
Partner
Associate
Associate
Bonanno, Associate
Associate
Associate
Associate
Associate
Research Analyst
Research Analyst
Paralegal
Paralegal
Research Analyst
Paralegal
Research Analyst
Paralegal
Pfotal Fees dP RY
29
3. Costs
Plaintiff seeks costs totaling disbursements of $11,628.08. Dkt. No. 177-3 at 12; Dkt. No.
177-4 ¶ 8; Dkt. No. 177-6. Plaintiff contends that these costs are related to “a title search, filing
fees, and service of process.” Dkt. No. 177-3 at 12. Reviewing the Firm’s invoices to Plaintiff,
the requested costs are broken down as follows: (1) $4,720.25 for “Library Research”; (2) $225.90
for photocopies; (3) $1,562.00 for color printing; (4) $323.60 for “Printing W/Slip Sheets,
Staples”; (5) $16.25 for velo binding; (6) $0.90 for “PDF Conversion”; (7) $36.05 in filing fees
for a “successive notice of pendency in the Kings County Clerk’s Office”; (8) $69.36 in filing fees
for “record[ing] a corrected Assignment of Mortgage with the NYC Register”; (9) $351.34 for
FedEx deliveries; (10) an additional $285.61 in postage; (11) $3,642.98 for process servers; and
(12) $393.84 for limousine services. See Dkt. No. 177-6. Although these costs are included in the
Firm’s billing records filed on the docket, no actual receipts are provided for any of the
aforementioned items.
As previously stated, “a court will generally award ‘those reasonable out-of-pocket
expenses incurred by attorneys and ordinarily charged to their clients.’” Saleh v. Pretty Girl, Inc.,
No. 09-CV-1769 (RER), 2022 WL 4078150, at *35 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 6, 2022) (citation omitted);
see also Onewest Bank, N.A. v. Cole, No. 14-CV-3078 (FB) (RER), 2016 WL 11395013, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2016) (noting that “[r]easonable and identifiable out-of-pocket disbursements
ordinarily charged to clients are recoverable” (citing LeBlanc-Sternberg, 143 F.3d at 763)), report
and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 1069951 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2016). “Courts are also
permitted to deduct requested costs where documentation is insufficient.” N.Y. Ass’n for Ret’ed
Child. v. Cuomo, Nos. 72-CV-356 (RJD), 72-CV-357 (RJD), 2019 WL 3288898, at *8 (E.D.N.Y.
July 22, 2019) (citing Rotella v. Bd. of Educ., No. 01-CV-434 (NGG), 2002 WL 59106, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2002) (reducing costs by fifty percent where plaintiffs billed for “copying
costs,” “courier costs,” “long distance telephone,” and “postage costs” in lump sums without
“provid[ing] further breakdowns, descriptions or even dates indicating how and when these costs
were incurred”)).
Here, on one hand, the costs for photocopies, printing “W/Slip Sheets, Staples,” velo
binding, filing fees, FedEx deliveries, postage, service of process, and “PDF Conversion” appear
reasonable and are generally supported by the record. See, e.g., Fabric Selection, Inc. v. A & T
Trading US, Inc., No. 20-MC-864 (ARR) (VMS), 2021 WL 811371, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2021)
(collecting cases and noting that costs for process servers, certified mailings, and other service fees
are compensable), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 810340 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3,
2021); Ctr. for Popular Democracy v. Bd. of Governors. of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., No. 16-CV-5829
(NGG) (VMS), 2021 WL 4452202, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2021) (adopting report and
recommendation, and collecting cases and finding costs for, inter alia, service of process, filing
fees, postage, copying and printing, and courier fees compensable).
On the other hand, the Firm seeks costs that are devoid of any support in the record. For
instance, with respect to the $4,720.25 in costs for “Library Research,” the Firm claims such costs
for nearly every month that they worked on the litigation in varying amounts between $0.60 and
$2,265.60. See Dkt. No. 177-6. Plaintiff provides no explanation of what constitutes these alleged
“Library Research” costs—whether it be for an electronic legal research database or something
else—or why such costs are reasonable in a commercial foreclosure action led by experienced
counsel. Thus, there is no basis to award costs for such vague research costs. See, e.g., Samsonite
IP Holdings v. Shenzhen Liangyiyou E-Commerce Co., LTD, No. 19-CV-2564 (PGG) (DF), 2021
WL 9036273, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2021) (recommending that plaintiff’s request for costs for
“library research,” “translation services,” and “professional services” be denied because the
request was vague and plaintiff did not provide receipts or explain why such costs were reasonably
incurred), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 8805645 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2023);
Reiter, 2019 WL 1641306, at *7 (reducing costs for Westlaw research because the record provided
no information as to who performed the research or its scope, and declining to award costs for
numerous travel and meal costs where plaintiff provided no explanation as to why they were
reasonable or necessary); Bumble & Bumble, LLC v. Pro’s Choice Beauty Care, Inc., No. 14-CV-
6911 (VEC) (JLC), 2016 WL 658310, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2016) (recommending reducing
costs for library research and postage because a review of the billing records demonstrates no
relevant research or mailing activities on or around the stated dates), report and recommendation
adopted, 2016 WL 1717215 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2016).
Plaintiff also requests $1,562.00 for “Color Printer,” see Dkt. No. 177-6 at 63, 138, 164,
172, but provides no information about what documents were printed in color, how many pages
were printed in color, or why color printing was necessary in light of the other expenses for
photocopying and other types of printing. In short, Plaintiff has not “provided sufficient
information regarding the purpose of the copies.” Encarnacion v. Spinner, No. 9:15-CV-1411
(BKS) (ML), 2023 WL 2785745, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2023) (citation omitted).
Finally, on August 4, 2025, the Firm billed $393.84 for a limousine service—although there
was no Court appearance that day. See Dkt. No. 177-6 at 185. Although transportation costs are
ordinarily recoverable when adequately supported by the record, see Hanover Ins., 2018 WL
2729248, at *2, here it is entirely unclear what the limousine services were used for and how they
are connected to the Firm’s representation of Plaintiff.
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiff be awarded $4,951.99
in costs—constituting the requested expenses for photocopies, printing “W/Slip Sheets, Staples,”
velo binding, filing fees, FedEx deliveries, postage, service of process, and “PDF Conversion”—
and that the remainder of Plaintiff’s requested costs be denied.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiff’s motion
be granted in part and denied in part, to wit: that, as discussed above, a Judgement of Foreclosure
and Sale be entered in a form substantially similar to that proposed by Plaintiff at Dkt. No. 189,
and that attorneys’ fees in the amount of $264,645.50 and costs in the amount of $4,951.99 be
awarded to Plaintiff.
A copy of this Report and Recommendation is being electronically served on counsel.
Plaintiff is directed to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation on Defendants and file
proof of service by June 18, 2026.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen (14) days
after service of this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(2); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d) (addressing computation of days). Any requests for an
extension of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge Matsumoto. The “failure to object
timely to a [magistrate judge]’s report operates as a waiver of any further judicial review of the
[magistrate judge]’s decision.” Caidor v. Onondaga Cnty., 517 F.3d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 2008)
(quoting Small v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d. Cir. 1989)). Indeed, “a
party’s failure to object to any purported error or omission in a magistrate judge’s report waives
further judicial review of the point.” Stevens v. Duquette, No. 22-1571, 2024 WL 705954, at *1
(2d Cir. Feb. 21, 2024) (quoting Cephas v. Nash, 328 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2003)). Accordingly,
the failure to file objections within this timeframe or specify the particular issues to be reviewed
precludes further review of this Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140,
145 (1985) (“a party shall file objections with the district court or else waive right to appeal”);
Frego v. Kelsick, 690 F. App’x 706, 709 (2d Cir. 2017) (appellate review barred because plaintiff
failed to object to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation pertaining to the claim on
which plaintiff now seeks to appeal (citing Caidor, 517 F.3d at 604)).
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
June 17, 2026 SO ORDERED.
/s/ Joseph A. Marutollo
JOSEPH A. MARUTOLLO
United States Magistrate Judge