The opinion
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-1270
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Kristine Williams, individually and as next Friend for J.R.M., R.A.M., and Z.K.M.
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Missouri Department of Corrections
Defendant - Appellant
Bill Stange
Defendant
Billy Loflin; Pierce Yount; Stephanie Noisworthy
Defendants - Appellants
Christy Williams; William L. Johnson, MD, DO; Cynthia Reese, LPC; Centurion
of Missouri, LLC
Defendants
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - Cape Girardeau
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Submitted: January 13, 2026
Filed: August 6, 2026
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Before SHEPHERD, KELLY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
After Kristine Williams’s son, Austen May, died by suicide while in custody
in a Missouri Department of Corrections (MODOC) facility, she filed this action
against MODOC and various MODOC employees, alleging constitutional and state
law claims. As relevant to this appeal, defendants MODOC, Billy Loflin, Pierce
Yount, and Stephanie Noisworthy filed motions to dismiss, each asserting
entitlement to immunity. The district court denied each defendant immunity,
concluding that MODOC was not entitled to sovereign immunity, that Loflin, Yount,
and Noisworthy were not entitled to qualified immunity on Williams’s constitutional
deliberate indifference claim, and that Loflin, Yount, and Noisworthy were not
entitled official immunity on Williams’s state law wrongful death claim. On appeal,
these defendants assert that the district court erroneously denied them immunity.
Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292, we reverse and remand.
I.
This case arises from the tragic death of Austen May while in MODOC
custody at the Southeast Correctional Center (SECC) in July 2021. Prior to his death
by suicide, May previously attempted suicide while incarcerated; in August 2020,
while in MODOC custody at another facility, May was found by a cellmate hanging
by the neck with a sheet tied to a sprinkler head. After this attempt, May was
evaluated by MODOC mental health professionals, who diagnosed him with
adjustment disorder, depression, and anxiety. May also was prescribed medication,
referred for therapy, and, after his transfer to the SECC, he remained under the care
of SECC medical professionals, including defendants William Johnson, a licensed
psychiatrist, and Cynthia Reese, a licensed professional counselor. Over the course
of the next several months, May met with Johnson, Reese, and other mental health
professionals, each time complaining of anxiety and depression. May also reported
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having auditory hallucinations and experiencing difficulty sleeping and a reduced
appetite. During this timeframe, Dr. Johnson diagnosed May with adjustment
disorder with anxiety and cannabis use disorder, and he periodically adjusted May’s
prescription medications.
On July 29, 2021, defendant Bill Stange, the SECC warden, signed an order
placing May in administrative segregation pending the outcome of a disciplinary
hearing scheduled for August 6, 2021. Defendant Christy Williams, a licensed
practical nurse, performed a medical assessment on May prior to his placement in
segregation. In her report, Williams noted that May had existing medical or mental
health conditions and that he was withdrawn and angry.
On July 30, 2021, defendants Billy Loflin, Pierce Yount, and Stephanie
Noisworthy were working in the unit where May was in segregation. Pursuant to
departmental policy, correctional officers Loflin and Yount were required to make
“irregular, but periodic checks, with no fewer than 1 check in a 30 minute window”
of the wing. Further, departmental policy required Noisworthy, who was a sergeant,
to “[s]upervise the housing unit officers assigned to the housing unit [to] ensure that
irregular, but periodic checks, with no fewer than 1 check in a 30 minute window”
were made. Despite these policies, an over two-hour period of time elapsed in which
no checks of May’s cell occurred. At some point during this time frame, May placed
a paper over his cell door window, obscuring the view inside. When Loflin later
approached May’s cell with his dinner tray, he observed the obscured window.
May’s cell was opened, and he was discovered hanging from an air vent by a bed
sheet tied around his neck. May was shortly thereafter pronounced dead. A later
report from a MODOC investigation revealed that 2 hours and 48 minutes elapsed
between the last cell check or staff interaction with May and the time that he was
discovered hanging from the air vent.
Kristine Williams filed this action, individually and as next friend for May’s
minor children, asserting various counts against MODOC and its employees: two
counts of wrongful death under Missouri law against MODOC; one count of failure
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to train and supervise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Stange; one count of deliberate
indifference to a risk of suicide against Loflin, Yount, and Noisworthy pursuant to
§ 1983; one count of wrongful death under Missouri law against Loflin, Yount, and
Noisworthy; and three counts against defendants Williams, Johnson, and Reese,
along with their employer, Centurion of Missouri, LLC for deliberate indifference
pursuant to § 1983 and medical negligence and failure to render health care services
under Missouri law. As relevant to this appeal, MODOC filed a motion to dismiss
the two counts against it, asserting that it is entitled to sovereign immunity.
Meanwhile, Loflin, Yount, and Noisworthy filed a motion to dismiss the deliberate
indifference claim, asserting that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Loflin,
Yount, and Noisworthy also moved to dismiss the count alleging wrongful death,
asserting that they are entitled to official immunity or, in the alternative, that the
public duty doctrine bars Williams’s claim.
The district court denied the motions to dismiss. As to MODOC’s motion,
the district court determined that it was not entitled to sovereign immunity because
Williams plausibly alleged that the dangerous condition exception—which results
in a waiver of sovereign immunity where there is a known and dangerous condition
that creates an unreasonable foreseeable risk of harm and that harm later
occurs—applied and barred immunity. The district court concluded that Williams
plausibly alleged that a dangerous condition existed in a defective video monitoring
system and/or an obstruction of the viewing window into May’s cell; that May’s
death resulted from the dangerous condition, particularly because May previously
attempted suicide while in custody; and that the dangerous condition was foreseeable
because May’s suicide was a foreseeable and natural product of an obstructed cell
window and deficient security cameras. In denying MODOC’s motion, the district
court noted that the cases MODOC cited in support of its motion were decided at
summary judgment, which provides a more substantive consideration of the
dangerous condition exception than in a motion to dismiss.
As to Loflin, Yount, and Noisworthy’s motion to dismiss the deliberate
indifference count based on qualified immunity, the district court determined that
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Williams plausibly alleged a serious medical need—May’s mental state—from
which Loflin, Yount, and Noisworthy knew or could have inferred that May was a
suicide risk. The district court also concluded that Williams plausibly alleged that
these defendants were deliberately indifferent to May’s serious medical need
because, despite May’s risk of suicide, they left him alone and unmonitored for
roughly three hours. Having concluded that Williams plausibly alleged a
constitutional violation, the district court then concluded that that constitutional right
was clearly established because “[c]ase law firmly establishes that a pretrial detainee
has the right to be free from deliberate indifference to his substantial suicide risk and
from deliberately indifferent denials of emergency medical care.”
Finally, the district court denied Loflin, Yount, and Noisworthy’s motion to
dismiss the wrongful death count based on official immunity or the public duty
doctrine. The district court determined that Loflin, Yount, and Noisworthy were not
entitled to official immunity—which protects public officials from liability for acts
arising from discretionary acts performed in the exercise of their public
duties—because Williams sufficiently alleged that these defendants were acting in
ministerial, not discretionary, capacities when they failed to conduct the prescribed
checks every thirty minutes. The district court also noted that, due to the
fact-intensive nature of official immunity, “the determination of this issue cannot be
made at this stage in the proceedings.” The district court similarly rejected Loflin,
Yount, and Noisworthy’s argument that the public duty doctrine—which dictates
that a public employee is not liable to an individual for injuries he sustains resulting
from a breach of a duty that the employee owes to the general public—barred the
claim. The district court concluded that Williams plausibly alleged that Loflin,
Yount, and Noisworthy breached their duty to prevent May’s suicide by failing to
monitor him in light of his history of suicidal behavior. The district court focused,
in part, on what it believed to be the premature consideration of the public duty
doctrine on a motion to dismiss. This interlocutory appeal follows, with MODOC,
Loflin, Yount, and Noisworthy challenging the district court’s denial of their
motions to dismiss based on their claimed entitlement to immunity.
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II.
On appeal, MODOC asserts that the district court erred in denying it sovereign
immunity on Williams’s state-law wrongful death claims. MODOC asserts that the
district court misapplied the dangerous condition exception by extending it to a
failure to supervise claim, that Williams failed to plausibly allege that a dangerous
condition caused May’s death, and that Williams failed to plausibly allege that
MODOC or its employees created the dangerous condition or had actual or
constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition. “This court reviews de novo
questions of sovereign immunity.” Church v. Missouri, 913 F.3d 736, 742 (8th Cir.
2019) (citation omitted).
Under Missouri law, “[s]overeign immunity is a common law judicial doctrine
barring suit against a government or public entity,” Allen v. Missouri 32nd Judicial
Circuit, 638 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Mo. 2022), meaning that “public entities are generally
immune from suits for their negligent acts,” Gilmore v. Missouri Department of
Social Services, Children’s Division, 658 S.W.3d 146, 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 2022).
However, sovereign immunity may be waived. Allen, 638 S.W.3d at 886. Pursuant
to Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.600.1(2), the state and its subdivisions waive sovereign
immunity for “[i]njuries caused by the condition of a public entity’s property,”
known as the dangerous condition exception. Application of the statutory waiver in
§ 537.600.1(1) requires a plaintiff to show four elements:
(1) that the property was in dangerous condition at the time of the
injury,
(2) that the injury directly resulted from the dangerous condition—that
is, that the dangerous condition was the proximate cause of the injury,
(3) that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk
of harm of the kind of injury that was incurred; and
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(4) that a public entity had actual or constructive notice of the
dangerous condition in sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken
measures to protect against the dangerous condition.
Hensley v. Jackson Cnty., 227 S.W.3d 491, 496 (Mo. 2007) (citation omitted). “For
a dangerous condition waiver of sovereign immunity to apply, the dangerous
condition must ‘describe, define, explain, denote or reference only and exclusively
the physical defects in, upon and/or attending to property of the public entity.’” State
ex rel. Div. of Motor Carrier & R.R. Safety v. Russell, 91 S.W.3d 612, 616 (Mo.
2002) (citation omitted). In her complaint, Williams alleges that the SECC was in a
dangerous condition at the time of May’s suicide because MODOC
maintained a defective video monitoring system on its property that it
knew or should have known failed to appropriately display areas
wherein prisoners needed to be monitored, maintained a defective
mechanism for monitoring at-risk detainees in their cells, maintained
an obstruction to the viewing window to Decedent’s cell (i.e., the paper
obscuring the viewing window), was inadequately staffed, and/or
Defendant MODOC’s employees were not adequately trained and
supervised with respect to suicide prevention, medical management of
detainees, identification of at-risk detainees, intake and personal
property management, and detainee monitoring.
The district court concluded that Williams plausibly alleged a dangerous
condition in the form of an inadequate or defective video monitoring system and an
obstruction to the window into May’s cell. This was in error. First, to the extent
Williams’s allegations are focused on the actual physical conditions as they existed
at SECC at the time of May’s suicide, Missouri courts have recognized that “a lack
of warnings, barriers, or similar preventative measures do not constitute a dangerous
condition under the statute.” Boever v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis Cnty., 296
S.W.3d 487, 493 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). Williams’s allegations are, in essence, that
MODOC should have done more to prevent May’s suicide and that a proper video
monitoring system and an unobstructed view into May’s cell would have
accomplished this. But this falls outside the scope of the dangerous condition
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exception because Williams asserts no more than that the facility lacked preventative
measures.
Further, while Williams asserts that defective or inadequate video monitoring
equipment and the obstructed window created a dangerous condition, she does so by
coupling those physical conditions with allegations that the staff did not
appropriately monitor at-risk detainees in their cells. Williams alleges that staff were
not “adequately trained and supervised with respect to suicide prevention.” And
Missouri courts have recognized that the dangerous condition exception to sovereign
immunity does not apply where the plaintiff’s claim is rooted in a failure to supervise
or train. See Maune ex rel. Maune v. City of Rolla, 203 S.W.3d 802, 805 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2006) (“[F]ailure to perform an intangible act, ‘whether it be failure to
supervise or warn’ cannot constitute a dangerous condition of the property for
purposes of waiving sovereign immunity.” (citation omitted)). Williams alleges no
more than the absence of preventative measures and a failure to supervise or train,
neither of which support the application of the dangerous condition exception.
Because Williams fails to plausibly allege a dangerous condition existed at the time
of May’s suicide, we need not consider MODOC’s arguments regarding the other
elements of the dangerous condition exception. Accordingly, the district court erred
in denying MODOC sovereign immunity.
III.
Next, Loflin, Yount, and Noisworthy argue that the district court erroneously
denied them qualified immunity on the deliberate indifference count. They assert
that Williams failed to allege a constitutional violation because the complaint is
devoid of any allegations that they had actual knowledge that May was a suicide risk
and thus they could not have disregarded a known risk to May’s health. Further,
they assert that Williams failed to plausibly allege a violation of a clearly established
right because the clearly established right is one to be protected from the known risks
of suicide, and Loflin, Yount, and Noisworthy were not alleged to have actual
knowledge of May’s risk. “We review de novo the denial of a motion to dismiss
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based on qualified immunity. Because the appeal arises from a ruling on a motion
to dismiss, we accept as true all of the complaint’s factual allegations and view them
in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.” T.S.H. v. Green, 996 F.3d 915, 918
(8th Cir. 2021). “[D]efendants seeking dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) based on an
assertion of qualified immunity ‘must show that they are entitled to qualified
immunity on the face of the complaint.’” Kulkay v. Roy, 847 F.3d 637, 642 (8th
Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
“In considering a claim of qualified immunity, we apply the familiar
two-prong framework, first considering ‘whether the plaintiff has stated a plausible
claim for violation of a constitutional or statutory right,’ and second, ‘whether the
right was clearly established at the time of the alleged infraction.’” Cent. Specialties,
Inc. v. Large, 18 F.4th 989, 996 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). “And, courts are
‘permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of
the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first.’” Nord v. Walsh Cnty.,
757 F.3d 734, 738-39 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “Prisoners have a ‘clearly
established constitutional right to be protected from the known risks of suicide and
to have [their] serious medical needs attended to.’ The Eighth Amendment prohibits
jail officials from acting with deliberate indifference towards risks of suicide.”
Whitney v. City of St. Louis, 887 F.3d 857, 860 (8th Cir. 2018) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted). A deliberate indifference claim involves both an
objective and subjective component. Id. “To prevail on h[er] deliberate indifference
claim, [Williams] must show that (1) [defendants] had actual knowledge that [May]
had a substantial risk of suicide and (2) [defendants] failed to take reasonable
measures to abate that risk.” Id.
We agree that Williams has failed to plausibly allege deliberate indifference
to May’s known risk of suicide. Williams offers only conclusory allegations that
Loflin, Yount, and Noisworthy knew or should have known that May posed a suicide
risk, falling far short of the actual knowledge standard. In her complaint, Williams
alleges that “Loflin, Yount, and Noisworthy knew, or possessed sufficient
information from which to infer, and actually did or could have inferred that,
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Decedent was a suicide risk in light of (among other things) the multitude of signs
Decedent exhibited of being a suicidal offender, both, in the lead up to, and following
Decedent’s placement in administrative segregation.” There are no further factual
allegations supporting this conclusion; Williams makes no allegations that Loflin,
Yount, or Noisworthy were aware of the facts known to the medical professionals
treating May or that they had been notified that May was a suicide risk or had
previously attempted suicide while in custody. Williams alleges that the knowledge
of the healthcare-professional defendants, who evaluated and treated May, is
imputed to Loflin, Yount, and Noisworthy. Without more, Williams’s allegations
are merely that these correctional officers should have known of May’s suicide risk,
which is insufficient to allege a constitutional violation. See Smith-Dandridge v.
Geanolous, 97 F.4th 569, 576 (8th Cir. 2024) (“To establish that defendants had
knowledge of the risk, ‘it is not enough merely to find that a reasonable person would
have known about the risk, or that the officer should have known.’ Rather, if
defendants were ‘exposed to information concerning the risk and thus “must have
known” about it,’ a finding of deliberate indifference may be warranted.” (citations
omitted)).
Even considering the specific facts that Williams alleges were known to
Loflin, Yount, and Noisworthy—that May faced disciplinary proceedings, that he
was being put in administrative segregation, and that he was withdrawn and
angry—they are insufficient to allege that May had a substantial risk of suicide,
which would have necessitated intervention. See id. (“[A]n official’s failure to
alleviate a significant risk that [they] should have perceived but did not, while no
cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of
punishment.” (alterations in original) (citation omitted)). Because Williams fails to
plausibly allege that Loflin, Yount, and Noisworthy had actual knowledge of May’s
suicide risk, she has failed to plausibly allege a constitutional violation. Loflin,
Yount, and Noisworthy are thus entitled to qualified immunity and the district court
erred in denying their motion to dismiss on this basis.
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IV.
Finally, Loflin, Yount, and Noisworthy assert that the district court erred in
concluding that they were not entitled to official immunity on the wrongful death
claim. Specifically, they argue that they were each engaging in discretionary acts as
it related to monitoring inmates and that the district court erroneously concluded that
it could not decide their entitlement to official immunity at the motion to dismiss
stage. “[W]hether Defendants are entitled to official immunity is a question of law
we review de novo.” Letterman v. Does, 859 F.3d 1120, 1125 (8th Cir. 2017)
(applying Missouri law). In considering a motion to dismiss based on official
immunity, we “accept[] all factual allegations as true and view[] them most
favorably to the non-moving party.” Hall v. Woodruff, 121 F.4th 1155, 1157 (8th
Cir. 2024).
“Under Missouri law, official immunity ‘protects public officials sued in their
individual capacities from liability for alleged acts of negligence committed during
the course of their official duties for the performance of discretionary acts.’” Davis
v. Buchanan Cnty., 11 F.4th 604, 629 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). However,
“[t]here is a ‘narrow exception to the application of the official immunity
doctrine—i.e., when a public officer fails to perform a ministerial duty required of
him by law, he may be personally liable for the damages caused.’” Id. (citation
omitted). A ministerial act is “merely clerical,” and “compels a task of such a routine
and mundane nature that it is likely to be delegated to subordinate officials[,] . . . is
‘to be performed upon a given state of facts in a prescribed manner in obedience to
the mandate of legal authority, and without regard to [the public official’s] judgment
or opinion concerning the propriety or impropriety of the act to be performed.’” Id.
(third alteration in original) (citation omitted). “The determination of whether an act
is discretionary or ministerial is made on a case-by-case basis, considering: (1) the
nature of the public employee’s duties; (2) the extent to which the act involves
policymaking or exercise of professional judgment; and (3) the consequences of not
applying official immunity.” K.B. v. Waddle, 764 F.3d 821, 825 (8th Cir. 2014)
(citation omitted).
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Initially, the district court erroneously stated that, because this is a
fact-specific inquiry, “determination of [whether an act is ministerial or
discretionary] cannot be made at this stage in the proceedings.” The Supreme Court
of Missouri has specifically stated that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff
must plead factual allegations affirmatively establishing an exception to official
immunity.” Forester v. May, 671 S.W.3d 383, 387 (Mo. 2023). And indeed, this
Court has reversed a denial of a motion to dismiss based on official immunity under
Missouri law because, based on the allegations in the complaint, the act was
discretionary. Hall, 121 F.4th at 1158. Thus, the relevant inquiry here is whether
Williams pled sufficiently plausible factual allegations that would render official
immunity inapplicable, not whether further factual development would more
definitively answer the inquiry, and the district court erred in denying official
immunity on this basis.
On the merits, Williams has failed to sufficiently plead factual allegations
establishing that the acts in question were ministerial. In her complaint, Williams
alleges that Loflin and Yount failed to conduct checks on May in accordance with
departmental policy and that Noisworthy failed to supervise these checks in
accordance with departmental policy. Williams also specifically alleges that these
duties were ministerial in nature. However, Williams’s mere labeling of the duties
as ministerial does not make them so. The departmental policies dictate that
“irregular, periodic checks, with no fewer than 1 check in a 30 minute window, shall
be made,” which inherently encompasses some degree of discretion in how the
policies are carried out. Either Loflin or Yount could perform the check and
complete it through “verbal or visual” contact. See State ex rel. Love v.
Cunningham, 689 S.W.3d 489, 496 (Mo. 2024) (“[D]uties are discretionary and not
ministerial [when they] could have been completed in various ways by various
people.” (citation omitted)). The checks could also occur more frequently should a
correctional officer wish. Indeed, this Court has recently reached the same
conclusion in considering whether a similar correctional facility policy mandating
periodic checks imposed a ministerial or discretionary duty for purposes of official
immunity under Missouri law. Headley v. Centurion of Mo., LLC, 178 F.4th 429,
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435 (8th Cir. 2026) (“The policy here gives the officer discretion in conducting the
checks. While the policy has a general ‘when’ of ‘three times per hour, or every 20
minutes,’ it does not dictate one manner ‘how’ the officer must conduct the check,
allowing discretion and variation.” (citation omitted)). As the Supreme Court of
Missouri has stated “the central question is whether there is any room whatsoever
for variation in when and how a particular task can be done. If so, that task—by
definition—is not ministerial.” State ex rel. Alsup v. Kanatzar, 588 S.W.3d 187,
191 (Mo. 2019). Here, the policies provide room for variation in the checks, making
these duties distinct from the rubber stamp duties that the Supreme Court of Missouri
views as ministerial. See State ex rel. Morales v. Alessi, 679 S.W.3d 467, 472 (Mo.
2023). The district court thus erred in concluding that the required checks were
ministerial tasks and that official immunity was inappropriate.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand to the district court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
KELLY, Circuit Judge, dissenting as to Parts II and III, and concurring in the
judgment as to Part IV.
The district court found that Williams satisfied the minimum pleading
standards to overcome a motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity (Counts I
and II) and qualified immunity (Count IV). I agree.
Although “we need not accept ‘threadbare recitals of the elements’ as true,”
we have held that a claim survives a motion to dismiss “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Tholen v. Assist Am., Inc., 970 F.3d
979, 982–83 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting McDonough v. Anoka Cty., 799 F.3d 931, 945
(8th Cir. 2015)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In other words,
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the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to make the claims plausible. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678–79 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
Here, Williams plausibly alleged an exception to sovereign immunity,
claiming that: (1) the prison maintained a defective video monitoring system and
allowed an obstruction that covered May’s cell window, which were dangerous
conditions, (2) May’s death resulted from these conditions, (3) the conditions created
a reasonably foreseeable risk of an inmate’s death or injury inside their cell, and (4)
MODOC should have known of both conditions, given that employees were
expected to make regular checks of the cells. These allegations satisfy each element
of the dangerous condition exception. See Hensley v. Jackson County, 227 S.W.3d
491, 496 (Mo. 2007). Whether the physical defect alleged amounts to a dangerous
condition as understood by Missouri courts is a question that is better answered after
factual development that would come with discovery. In my view, and at this stage
of the proceedings, Williams has sufficiently pleaded wrongful death counts against
MODOC (Counts I and II) under Missouri law.
I would also affirm the district court’s finding that Williams plausibly alleged
the officers had actual knowledge of May’s risk of suicide and deliberately
disregarded it (Count IV). The complaint alleges the contents of the MODOC
policies and procedures that address the risk of “offender suicide.” And it alleges the
corrections officers were subject to those policies and procedures. A reasonable
inference is that these officers understood the policies and procedures, which
included “signs of potentially suicidal offenders” that “staff members shall be alert
for.” One “sign” was an offender who received information related to “institutional
proceedings.” Thus, it is plausible the officers knew that May—who was in
administrative segregation pending a disciplinary hearing at the time of his death—
was at a greater risk of suicide. Given the officers failed to conduct even the minimal
required checks despite that risk, the allegations are sufficient to defeat qualified
immunity at this motion-to-dismiss stage. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
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As to the wrongful death claim against the officers (Count VI), Williams
alleged that jail policy required officers to “make irregular, but periodic checks, with
no fewer than 1 check in a 30 minute window.” The checks may be accomplished
by “a visual or verbal contact,” but the discretionary “how”—visual or verbal—does
nothing to diminish the mandatory “when.” But I agree that our recent decision in
Headley v. Centurion of Mo., LLC, 178 F.4th 429, 435 (8th Cir. 2026) forecloses
this theory and, thus, this claim.
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