The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
CENTRAL DIVISION
SEARRA PRIOLO, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No.: 2:25-cv-04013-MDH
)
EQUIPMENTSHARE.COM INC., )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant EquipmentShare.com Inc.’s (“EquipmentShare”) Motion
for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 26). The Defendant filed Suggestions in Support (Doc. 26), Plaintiff
filed Suggestions in Opposition (Doc. 33-1) and the Defendant filed a reply. (Doc. 32).1 The
motion is now ripe for adjudication on the merits. For the reasons stated herein, the Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from an alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(“ADA”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and the Missouri Human Rights
Act (“MHRA”). Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a remote worker and performed work for
1 The Defendant filed a motion to strike Plaintiff’s Suggestions in Opposition. (Doc. 31). The Court denied the motion,
ruled that Plaintiff’s Revised Suggestions in Opposition be filed, and the prior Suggestions in Opposition (Doc. 29)
be withdrawn. (Doc. 35). The Court also allowed the Defendant an opportunity to file its response to Plaintiff’s
Statement of Additional Uncontroverted Material Facts and to lodge any objections to said statements. Id. The
Defendant did so, and the Court will include in its analysis Defendant’s Responses and Objections to Plaintiff’s
Statement of Additional Uncontroverted Material Facts. (Doc. 36).
Defendant in Monmouth County, New Jersey. The Defendant is a for profit corporation with its
principal office address in Columbia, Missouri.
On or about July 31, 2023, Plaintiff was hired by Defendant as a senior recruiter. Plaintiff
alleges that at all relevant times, she met or exceeded all of Defendant’s legitimate performance
expectations. On or about November 2023, Plaintiff alleges she engaged in a protected activity
when she raised complaints to Defendant that its general manager hiring practices were
discriminatory. Plaintiff complained that the Dominance, Influence, Steadiness, and Conscientious
(“DISC”) assessment used in the hiring process pressured individuals to disclose disabilities and/or
resulted in lower scores for individuals with disabilities or older individuals, thereby making them
less hirable. Plaintiff states that she made continuous attempts to bring attention to these
discriminatory hiring practices in weekly meetings with Defendant. Plaintiff further alleges that
around this time, she had been instructed not to hire a particular candidate because he was deemed
“too old” by Defendant.
On or about January 18, 2024, Plaintiff’s supervisor allegedly told her to falsify a DISC
score for a lateral general manager candidate. On or about January 25, 2024, Plaintiff, now
reporting to her previous skip-level manager, again explicitly reported her concerns regarding
Defendant’s hiring practices, alleging that individuals were being scored lower due to both age
and disabilities. Plaintiff alleges that despite this, Defendant’s manager condoned and enforced the
rejection of said candidate. Plaintiff alleged that a week before her eventual termination, she
suggested to her manager that Defendant should disclose its assessment practices in job postings
to maintain compliance with hiring transparency. On or about February 16, 2024, the Defendant
terminated her employment for alleged insubordination. However, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
was not able to explain how she had been insubordinate and instead claims that Defendant’s stated
reason was a pretext for discrimination.
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) alleges four counts: Count I - ADA
Retaliation; Count II - ADEA Retaliation; Count III - MHRA - Retaliation (Age); and Count IV -
MHRA - Retaliation (Disability). Defendant brings its current motion arguing that it is entitled to
summary judgment because: Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation under state
or federal law; Defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision to terminate
Plaintiff demonstrate no retaliation occurred; and there is no evidence to establish or suggest that
Defendant’s stated reason for Plaintiff’s termination was pretextual.
STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Reich v. ConAgra, Inc., 987 F.2d 1357, 1359
(8th Cir. 1993). “Where there is no dispute of material fact and reasonable fact finders could not
find in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment is appropriate.” Quinn v. St. Louis
County, 653 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir. 2011). Initially, the moving party bears the burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). If the movant meets the initial step, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to
“set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To satisfy this burden, the nonmoving party must “do more than
simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
DISCUSSION
I. Retaliation under State or Federal Law
Without direct evidence of a retaliatory motive, the courts analyze retaliation claims
(whether under Title VII, the ADA, or the ADEA), under the burden-shifting framework of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).
Stewart v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 196, 481 F.3d 1034, 1042–43 (8th Cir. 2007).2 Under this
framework, the initial burden is on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, consisting of
evidence: “(1) that he or she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) an adverse employment
action was taken against him or her; and (3) a causal connection exists between the two events.”
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 459 F.3d at 914. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the
burden then shifts to the defendant to show a “non retaliatory reason for the adverse employment
action.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). If the defendant can show a legitimate, non-retaliatory
reason for its actions, the burden returns to the plaintiff who “is ‘then obliged to present evidence
that (1) creates a question of fact as to whether [defendant's] reason was pretextual and (2) creates
a reasonable inference that [defendant] acted in retaliation.’ ” Logan v. Liberty Healthcare Corp.,
416 F.3d 877, 880 (8th Cir.2005) (quoting Smith v. Allen Health Sys., Inc., 302 F.3d 827, 833 (8th
Cir.2002)).
2 The requirements for a prima facie case of retaliation under the MHRA are substantively the same. See Heuton v.
Ford Motor Co., 930 F.3d 1015, 1023 (8th Cir. 2019) (“A retaliation claim under the MHRA requires [the employee]
to show that (1) he complained of an MHRA-prohibited activity, (2) [the employer] took an adverse employment
action, and (3) a causal connection exists between the complaint and adverse action.”).
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claims fail under the McDonnell Douglas’s burden-
shifting test as there is no direct evidence in the record of retaliation nor is there evidence of a
causal connection between Plaintiff’s alleged protected conduct and her termination.
A. Evidence of Protected Conduct
“Protected activity is ‘an informal or formal complaint about, or other opposition to, an
employer's practice or act ... if the employee reasonably believes such an act to be in violation of
the statute in question.’” Jeseritz v. Potter, 282 F.3d 542, 548 (8th Cir.2002) (quoting Sherman v.
Runyon, 235 F.3d 406, 409 (8th Cir.2000)). “Although contesting an unlawful employment
practice is protected conduct, the anti-discrimination statutes do not insulate an employee from
discipline for violating the employer's rules or disrupting the workplace.” Donnelly v. St. John’s
Mercy Med. Ctr., 635 F. Supp. 2d 970, 1000 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (quoting Kiel v. Select Artificials,
Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir. 1999)).
Defendant first argues that there is no evidence from which a fact-finder could conclude
that Plaintiff reasonably believed the conduct she opposed was unlawful under any of the statutes
at issue. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s disagreement with Defendant’s use of the DISC
assessment were based on a generalized sense of what she viewed as unfairness, and her
disagreement with using the DISC assessment from a recruiting perspective. Defendant states that
Plaintiff cannot articulate any good faith basis for her belief that the DISC assessment creates the
“possibility” for discrimination. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s testimony reflects her opinion
that Defendant’s use of the DISC assessment is “problematic” and “unethical,” but not illegal
within the meaning of that term under the ADA, ADEA, or MHRA. Further, Defendant states
Plaintiff’s claims that she spoke out against using the DISC assessment from the moment she began
working at EquipmentShare until the moment she was fired is not the type of conduct the ADA,
ADEA, and MHRA are intended to shield.
Plaintiff argues she engaged in a statutorily protected activity on multiple occasions.
Plaintiff contends in weekly staff meetings would point out that the DISC assessment would result
in lower scores for individuals with disabilities, making them less desirable to hire. Between
January 24, 2024, to January 25, 2024, she also reported the Defendant’s alleged discriminatory
hiring practices to Colby Williamson, Plaintiff’s supervisor, and discussed that individuals are
being scored lower on the DISC assessment due to both age and disability.
i. Protected Activity - Age Discrimination
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is a
genuine issues of material fact as to whether Plaintiff engaged in a statutory protective activity. In
the deposition of Plaintiff, the following interaction took place:
Q. Are you aware of any candidate that wasn’t hired because of their DISC
assessment score?
A. Yes.
Q. Who was not hired?
A. There was a candidate that -- I don’t remember his exact name. I did have
it one time before. It was in the Pacific Northwest region, maybe even
Northern California. Chad Guillaumin was the main hiring manager that I
was working with. And it was a candidate that was being hired -- that was
being considered for his general manager role. He did not get hired because
of his age.
Q. How do you know he was not hired because of his age?
A. Well, when I spoke to Chad after he interviewed the candidate, he said that
this person was too old. He did not want to hire him.
(Doc. 29-2, page 81, Lines 1-18). Plaintiff was asked whether she reported this interaction to
anyone which prompted the following interaction:
Q. So did you report Chad allegedly telling you not to hire a candidate because
he was too old? Did you report that to anyone?
A. Yeah. I told Colby Williamson.
Q. Did you tell HR?
A. Well, Cody Brown was in the meeting. He was a part of that meeting, so he
was there to witness it.
(Doc. 29-2, page 125 line 19 - page 126 line 1). Further in the deposition transcript, Plaintiff was
asked further about this interaction:
Q. And did you inform the candidate that he wasn’t being hired?
A. For false reasons, yes.
Q. What reasoning did you give?
A. That he just didn’t have the ability -- he didn’t have the abilities required
for the role.
Q. Why would you lie?
A. Because that’s what I was instructed to do.
Q. Well, but you didn’t have to do so? You could have said, “No. I’m not doing
this.” Why did you lie to a candidate if you knew that that was not the real
reason?
A. I lied because Colby Williamson told me directly to lie, and when you are
under the pressure of intimidation and when you are scared of someone, you
typically just do what you’re told.
Q. But you were scared of Colby?
A. 100 percent.
(Doc. 29-2, page 126 line 22 - page 127 line 15). While the name and the age of the applicant is
unknown, this evidence is enough to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Plaintiff engaged in a statutorily protected activity. Plaintiff was present and discussed
with Mr. Guillaumin the candidate’s qualifications and was informed he was too old and that Mr.
Guillaumin would not proceed with hiring the individual. Plaintiff then reported this conversation
to Mr. Williamson with Human Resources (“H.R.”) present. Mr. Williamson then instructed
Plaintiff to lie to the applicant. Based upon the record, the Court finds that, in viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she
participated in a protected activity for purposes of the ADEA and MHRA.
ii. Protected Activity - Disability Discrimination
Viewing the evidence in light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff did
not engage in a protected activity regarding her claims of disability discrimination. The Defendant
in its Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts (“SUMF”) makes the following statements,
which Plaintiff did not oppose:
Plaintiff testified that she believes the way EquipmentShare hired general managers
was “problematic and discriminatory” in that the DISC assessment “pressures”
candidates to disclose a mental health disability or physician disability. (Ex. 1,
Plaintiff’s Dep. 66:7-20).3 Plaintiff has no medical background or medical training.
No candidate ever informed Plaintiff that they felt pressured by the DISC
assessment to disclose a mental health disability or physical disability. (Ex. 1,
Plaintiff’s Dep. 68: 12-15). Plaintiff does not recall an instance when
EquipmentShare did not hire a candidate because of his or her disability.4 Plaintiff
has never spoken to any type of expert in mental health about whether he or she
believes that the DISC assessment requires candidates to disclose a mental health
disability and/or a physical disability. (Ex. 1, Plaintiff’s Dep. 66:1-6).
(Doc. 27, SUMF 12, 14-17). Plaintiff has provided no evidence to indicate that the DISC
assessment is truly discriminatory to those with physical or mental disabilities. Throughout her
deposition testimony, Plaintiff does not state any basis for why the DISC assessment may be
discriminatory except vague ideas that an applicant may feel pressured to disclose a mental or
physical disability or may score lower based upon certain answers. This is evident from the
following portion of Plaintiff’s deposition transcript:
3 Plaintiff clarified that she believes that the way Defendant hired general managers was “problematic and
discriminatory” due to disabled job applicants potentially receiving lower scores on some of the DISC categories,
which meant they would be a less desirable hire for Defendant. (Doc. 33-1, page 8).
4 Plaintiff clarified that although she did not personally recall an instance when Defendant did not hire a candidate
because of his or her disability, she believes it is possible that a candidate was not hired at Defendant because of a
disability. (Doc. 33-1, page 9).
Q. How did the DISC pressure candidates to disclose disabilities?
A. I think that if you’re taking a personality assessment and you are faced with
questions that you have mental health conditions or other clinical
disabilities, you might feel pressured to provide justification or feel like
well, this is my answer, but it’s because of X, Y, Z. And so that’s how I feel
like it can, you know force people to reveal that.
Q. So at any point on the DISC assessment, is there a question about mental
health conditions or physical conditions?
A. I don’t recall the exact questions. There are questions that -- you know,
along the lines of mood swings, or mood stability or the inability to be
social, interact, make new friends. Those things can -- mental health
conditions can impact those things.
…
Q. Is it your testimony that the questions asked on the DISC assessment would
require an applicant to disclose a mental health disability or physical
disability?
A. No. I did not say “require.”
…
Q. Did a candidate ever tell you that they felt pressured to disclose a mental
health disability or physical disability?
A. No.
(Doc. 27-1, page 65 lines 3 - 23; page 66 line 10 - 14; and page 68 lines 12-15). Plaintiff has failed
to show a reasonable belief that the DISC assessment is discriminatory as to disability outside
vague conclusory allegations that it might cause someone with a mental or physical disability to
disclose that information. 42 U.S.C. § 12203 governs prohibition against retaliation and coercion
and states that “[n]o person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has
opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter”. (emphasis added).5 Even taking the
5 The MHRA has an analogous statute that equally prohibits a finding that Plaintiff’s conduct was a protected activity.
See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.070.1(2).
evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, she has not shown that the DISC assessment
compels disclosure of an applicant’s mental or physical disability, let alone is a proxy to weed out
applicants based upon answers that may relate to said disabilities. In sum, Plaintiff’s complaints
about the DISC assessment do not rise to the level of a protected activity under the ADA or MHRA.
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Count I -
ADA Retaliation and Count IV - MHRA - Retaliation (Disability) is GRANTED.
B. Casual Connection Between Protective Conduct and Plaintiff’s Termination
“‘Generally, more than a temporal connection between the protected conduct and the
adverse employment action is required to present a genuine issue of fact on retaliation.’” Lors v.
Dean, 746 F.3d 857, 865 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Sisk v. Picture People, Inc., 669 F.3d 896, 900
(8th Cir.2012)). Although there is no definitive line drawn to show at what point a temporal
connection establishes causation, we have held that “‘two months is too long to support a finding
of causation without something more,’” Id. at 866 (quoting Sisk, 669 F.3d at 901). See also Smith
v. Fairview Ridges Hosp., 625 F.3d 1076, 1088 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding one month is not close
enough).
Defendant argues that there is no evidence of a causal connection between Plaintiff’s
alleged protected conduct and her termination. Defendant asserts that nearly four months passed
between Plaintiff voicing disagreement and her termination. Specifically, Defendant states
Plaintiff claims she voiced her disagreement with using the DISC assessment to Justin Rechter in
November of 2023 and was terminated on February 16, 2024. Defendant argues four months is
long past the time to establish a causal connection between the alleged protected activity and
alleged adverse employment action. Further, Defendant argues that Mr. Rechter had no role in the
decision to terminate Plaintiff as he had not worked at EquipmentShare for almost two months
before Mr. Williamson made the recommendation to terminate Plaintiff. Defendant asserts that
although Mr. Williamson was aware that Plaintiff did not agree with Defendant’s use of the DISC
assessment, Mr. Williamson was not aware of any report of discrimination based on disability or
age from Plaintiff.
Plaintiff argues that there is a causal connection between her engaging in protected activity
and her termination of employment. Plaintiff states that approximately three weeks passed from
her most recent complaint of discrimination between January 24, 2024, to January 25, 2024, and
her termination on February 16, 2024. Plaintiff states that Mr. Williamson got angry and told
Plaintiff that she should not die on this and to just do what you are told and stop fighting the DISC
assessment in response to her raising the DISC assessment being discriminatory in their weekly
staff meetings. Plaintiff further asserts that after Mr. Williamson became her supervisor in January
2024, she continued to raise the DISC assessment’s discriminatory application toward job
applicants who are older or suffer from a disability, which ultimately led to her termination.
Plaintiff states that at her termination meeting, Defendant told her that she was being terminated
for “insubordination,” which coincides with Plaintiff’s continual reports of the Defendant’s use of
the DISC assessment being discriminatory.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there exists a genuine issue
of material fact regarding the casual connection between the protected activity and Plaintiff’s
termination of employment. It is undisputed Plaintiff was hired as a senior recruited on July 19,
2023. (Doc. 27, SUMF ¶ 1). Plaintiff testified that she voiced her concern that the DISC assessment
was “problematic” from the moment she began working at EquipmentShare until the moment she
was fired. Id. at SUMF ¶ 25. Mr. Rechter was Plaintiff’s supervisor until Mr. Williamson assumed
the position in January 2024. Id. at SUMF ¶¶ 5-6. In November of 2023, Plaintiff told Mr. Rechter
about her belief that the DISC assessment was discriminatory and later made comments in staff
meetings. Id. at SUMF ¶ 29. Defendant placed Mr. Rechter on administrative leave on December
22, 2023, and terminated him on February 5, 2024. Id. at SUMF ¶ 30. Plaintiff stated, and the
deposition transcript showed, that between January 24, 2024, to January 25, 2024, Plaintiff
reported the Defendant’s discriminatory hiring practices to Mr. Williamson and discussed that
individuals are being scored lower due to both age and disability. (Doc. 33-1, SUMF ¶ 61).6 The
following deposition transcript excerpt shows the relevant passage:
Q. And when you say you reported your concerns regarding the hiring
practices, who did you report these concerns to?
A. Many people. I reported it to -- well, which instance are you talking about?
Q. I’m going by your complaint. You say on or about January 25, 2024 --
A. Yes.
Q. -- you are now reporting to your previous skip-level manager and you,
again, reported your concerns regarding Defendant’s discriminatory hiring
practices. Who did you report this to?
A. That instance is when I had the general manager meeting on a Wednesday,
and I reported it to Colby, and I reported it in front of Cody and Hannah.
(Doc. 29-2, page 138 line 14 - page 139 line 5).
The above facts show that Mr. Williamson was Plaintiff’s supervisor starting in January of
2024. Plaintiff reported her concerns regarding the DISC assessment to Mr. Williamson, as well
as H.R. regarding these practices and had long been vocal about her concerns. Shortly after Mr.
Williamson became Plaintiff’s supervisor, he recommended that she be terminated on February 9,
6 Defendant denies this as unsupported by the cited deposition testimony. (Doc. 36, page 12). However, as reproduced
above, the Court finds this fact is supported by the deposition testimony and thus appropriate for evaluation for the
purposes of the summary judgment motion.
2024, two weeks after the January 25, 2024, meeting. (Doc. 27, SUMF ¶ 33).7 On February 15,
2024, the recommendation was approved and Plaintiff was terminated from her position on
February 16, 2024. Id. at SUMF ¶¶ 37-38.8 Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff, the Court finds that based on close temporal proximity from the time Mr. Williamson
became her supervisor, was informed of Plaintiff’s concerns of the DISC assessment, to the time
he recommended her termination is enough to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the
casual connection between Plaintiff’s protected activity and her termination.
II. Reason for Termination
“[a]n employee's attempt to prove pretext requires more substantial evidence than it takes
to make a prima facie case because unlike evidence establishing a prima facie case, evidence of
pretext and retaliation is viewed in light of the employer's justification.” King v. Guardian ad Litem
Bd., 39 F.4th 979, 986–87 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Scarborough v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 996
F.3d 499, 506 (8th Cir. 2021)). To prove pretext, [the plaintiff] must “both discredit the asserted
reason for the adverse action and show the circumstances permit drawing a reasonable inference
that the real reason for the adverse action was retaliation.” Id. (citation omitted).
Defendant argues that it has met its burden of showing a legitimate business reason for its
decision to terminate Plaintiff. In support, Defendant states it terminated Plaintiff for poor
performance as Mr. Williamson reported that Plaintiff refused to do her basic job functions; created
a disruptive environment that hindered the talent acquisition team’s ability to function; Plaintiff’s
7 Plaintiff disputes this claim on the grounds the contents of the email are a pretext for unlawfully retaliating against
Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff does not challenge that Mr. Williamson sent the email to HR or the contents of the email.
(Doc. 33-1, page 11).
8 Plaintiff disputes SUMF ¶ 38 stating she was told that she was being terminated for “insubordination.” However,
Plaintiff does not dispute that she was terminated on February 16, 2024.
colleagues reported that she was rude and unprofessional; and that despite multiple verbal coaching
sessions from her supervisor Plaintiff demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to improve her
poor performance. Further, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s own testimony negates any inference
of pretext as Plaintiff raised her concerns about the DISC assessment for months without
repercussion and therefore Plaintiff cannot show her termination for poor performance was pretext
for alleged retaliation for her voiced disagreement with the DISC assessment.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s reason for termination was pretextual and has no basis in
fact. In support Plaintiff asserts that she never told Mr. Williamson that she did not want to do the
basic work of a senior recruiter; none of Plaintiff’s colleagues ever expressed sentiments that she
was rude or unprofessional; and never received verbal coaching from Mr. Williamson nor was
there a “seek-to-understand” meeting that occurred on January 9, 2024 between Mr. Williamson,
Plaintiff or Ms. Elrod. Further, Plaintiff states she never told Mr. Williamson or anyone at
EquipmentShare that she wanted to work on special projects instead of sourcing and filling
requisitions or that Mr. Williamson did not ask Plaintiff, on January 9, 2024 to send a weekly
update regarding her efforts to fill general manager roles, as she already sent weekly reports to her
stakeholders. Plaintiff asserts that when Defendant terminated her employment, she was told she
was being terminated for “insubordination,” which coincides with her repeated reports of DISC
assessment being discriminatory toward disabled and older job applications. However, Plaintiff
states that when she brought the lawsuit, Defendant shifted its reasoning for terminating her
employment due to purported poor performance issues, unacceptable behavior, and unwillingness
to do the basic functions of her role.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, there exists a genuine
issue of material fact regarding Defendant’s reason for termination. Mr. Williamson was the
decision maker ultimately responsible for EqupimentShare’s Decision to terminate Plaintiff.
SUMF ¶ 31. Mr. Williamson was Plaintiff’s supervisor starting in January of 2024. SUMF ¶ 6.
Defendant states that Mr. Williamson was aware that Plaintiff did not agree with
EquipmentShare’s use of the DISC assessment but was not aware of any report of discrimination
based on disability or age from Plaintiff. (Doc. 27-3, pages 2-3, ¶¶ 7 and 9). On February 9, 2024,
Mr. Willaimson emailed Ms. Elrod, a senior human resources manager for EquipmentShare, to
recommend terminating Plaintiff “based on a lack of willingness to do her basic job functions and
creating a negative environment that is disrupting [EquipmentShare’s] mission as a [Talent
Acquisition] organization. Id at page 6. Mr. Williamson further stated in the email five instances
ranging from December 7, 2023 to January 25, 2024 in which he stated that he had verbal coaching
with Plaintiff; a “seek-to-understand” meeting with Plaintiff and Ms. Elrod; and requested weekly
update regarding Plaintiff’s efforts to fill general manager roles to which Plaintiff failed to share
the requested information. Id. at pages 6-7.
Plaintiff challenges this characterization highlighting what she perceives are the
inconsistencies with Defendant’s SUMF. Plaintiff states that between December 2023 to January
2024 she had worked with Chad Guillaumin who informed Plaintiff he did not want to hire a
candidate because the candidate was too old. (Doc. 29-2, page 81 lines 16-18). Plaintiff reported
this incident to Mr. Williamson who instructed Plaintiff to lie to the candidate as to the reason why
Defendant was not selecting him, which Plaintiff complied with out of fear of being fired. Id at
page 126 line 22 - page 127 line 20. Plaintiff also states that between January 24, 2024, to January
25, 2024 Plaintiff reported the Defendant’s discriminatory hiring practices to Mr. Williamson; that
she never told Mr. Williamson that she did not want to do the basic work of a senior recruiter;
never had a “seek-to-understand” meeting on January 9, 2024; Mr. Williamson did not ask Plaintiff
on January 9, 2024 to send a weekly update regarding her efforts to fill general manager roles, as
she already sent weekly reports to her stakeholders; never received verbal coaching from Mr.
Williamson; and was told she was being terminated for “insubordination” to which Defendant’s
reasons changed after the lawsuit to purported poor performance issues. (Doc. 29-2, page 137
lines 6 - page 139 line 5; page 151 lines 20 - 22; page 152 line 18 - page 153 line 5; page 153 lines
13-17; page 152 lines 7-9; and page 157 line 18 - page 158 line 3).
Here there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the reason for termination
was pretextual based upon the facts asserted by both the Plaintiff and Defendant. If finding
Plaintiff’s version of the facts as accurate, it would discredit the asserted reason for the adverse
action and permit a reasonable inference that the real reason for Plaintiff’s termination was
retaliation. As such, summary judgment on this issue is not proper and best left for the trier of facts
to ascertain at trial. For the reason stated, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to pretext
is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN
PART AND DENIED IN PART. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count II -
ADEA Retaliation and Count III - MHRA - Retaliation (Age) is DENIED. Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment as to Counts I - ADA Retaliation and Count IV - MHRA - Retaliation
(Disability) is GRANTED. Summary judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendant on Count
I - ADA Retaliation and Count IV - MHRA - Retaliation (Disability).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: July 29, 2026
/s/ Douglas Harpool______________
DOUGLAS HARPOOL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE