FEGGINS

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

KYLE E. FEGGINS Civil Action No. 26-4049

Plaintiff,

OPINION AND ORDER

v.

July 13, 2026

TOWNSHIP OF MONTCLAIR, et al.,

Defendants.

SEMPER, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Kyle E. Feggins’s (“Plaintiff”) filing of a

complaint, (ECF 1, “Complaint” or “Compl.”), and an application to proceed in forma pauperis,

(ECF 1-2, “IFP Application”), on April 16, 2026. Plaintiff files suit against municipal defendants

Township of Montclair, Township of Nutley, and Township of Bloomfield; Montclair Police

Department defendants Sgt. Travis Davis, Officer Scott McGrath, Officer Stephen Seifried,

Officer Glenda Rivera, Capt. James Romito, Officer Brionna Gippiti, Officer Jorge Martinez,

Officer Ryan Martinez, and Sgt. Davis Osborne; Nutley Police Department defendants Det./Lt.

Eric Stabinski, Lt. Richard Schwarz, Det. Dominic Argentieri, Det. Daniel Thumm, Officer Frank

Caputo, Ptl. Richard Rempusheski, Det. Dominic Scioscia, and Officer Rizzuto; Bloomfield Police

Department defendants Sgt. Salvatore Cordi and Officer Jonathan Heussler; and ten John or Jane

Doe defendants representing unknown law enforcement officers (collectively, “Defendants”).

(Compl. ¶¶ 9-10.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his civil rights under the First, Fourth, and

Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985,

and 1986. Having reviewed Plaintiff’s application, the Court finds leave to proceed in forma

pauperis is warranted and GRANTS the application. Additionally, having sua sponte reviewed

Plaintiff’s submissions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8(a), this Court DISMISSES Counts I and III-VIII of the Complaint without prejudice. Count II

of the Complaint alleging a Fourth Amendment claim may proceed against Officer Rivera and

Officer Gippiti regarding the alleged unwarranted entry at 14 Baldwin. (Id. ¶ 15.) Count II of the

Complaint alleging false arrest may proceed against Officer Scott McGrath and Sgt. Travis Davis

regarding the alleged June 24, 2022 arrest. (Id. ¶ 12.)

WHEREAS a district court may allow a plaintiff to commence a civil action without

paying the filing fee—that is, in forma pauperis—so long as the plaintiff submits an affidavit

demonstrating he or she is “unable to pay such fees,” but must dismiss a case that is insufficient.

A case is insufficient if the claims (1) are “frivolous or malicious”; (2) “fail[] to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted”; or (3)“seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune

from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), e(2)(B); see Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374

(3d Cir. 2021). A district court construes a pro se plaintiff’s papers liberally and holds them to a

less stringent standard than the standard applied to papers filed by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner,

404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court, however, need not credit a pro se party’s “‘bald assertions’

or ‘legal conclusions.’” Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 2d 273, 282 (D.N.J. 2013) (quoting Morse

v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)); and

WHEREAS in Count I of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges a malicious prosecution claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all individually named defendants. (Compl. ¶ 31.) To state a claim

for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant initiated a criminal

proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in his favor; (3) the defendant initiated the

proceeding without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than

bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with

the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding. DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood,

407 F.3d 599, 601 (3d Cir. 2005). Plaintiff’s Complaint does not specifically allege which police

officer initiated criminal proceedings against him in bad faith. Plaintiff alleges the Denville Police

Department and Assistant Prosecutor Kennedy filed charges against him despite them finding he

did not violate the law. (Compl. ¶ 13.) However, neither the Denville Police Department nor

Assistant Prosecutor Kennedy are parties to this lawsuit. Plaintiff also claims that on June 20,

2025, Nutley Police officers engaged in a “mission” to arrest him, but he does not allege that a

proceeding began or ended based on these events. (Id. ¶ 16.) The Complaint references no other

instances where Defendants in this matter initiated a criminal proceeding against Plaintiff that can

sustain a claim for malicious prosecution. Furthermore, courts in this Circuit have found that a

malicious prosecution claim brought against police officers requires a showing of intent to provide

false information to a prosecutor, which Plaintiff fails to allege with any specific facts. See

Henderson v. City of Philadelphia, 853 F. Supp. 2d 514, 518-19 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (“[A]n officer

may be held to have initiated criminal proceedings if he knowingly provided false information to

the prosecutor or otherwise interfered with the prosecutor’s decision[.]”). Thus, Plaintiff’s

malicious prosecution claim brought in Count I is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice; and

WHEREAS in Count II of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the individually named

Defendants subjected Plaintiff “to unreasonable seizures and false arrests in violation of the Fourth

Amendment.” (Compl. ¶ 32.) The Court construes this Count as alleging both unreasonable

searches and seizures. However, Plaintiff fails to name defendants with specificity in this

paragraph as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), and instead engages in conclusory

group pleading by naming nineteen law enforcement defendants collectively. (Id.); see Freeman

v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, No. 24-8181, 2025 WL1248935, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 30, 2025)

(dismissing an amended complaint because it “fail[ed] to specify any of Defendants’ misconduct

with enough specificity … [i]nstead, the Amended Complaint exclusively feature[ed] group

pleading”). However, in construing Plaintiff’s claims liberally in accordance with the pro se

pleading standard, the Court examined the entire Complaint to determine if Plaintiff presented

facts in support of Count II; and

WHEREAS Plaintiff alleges several occasions where he claims his Fourth Amendment

rights were violated. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Officer Rivera “violently busted open Plaintiff’s

door” at 14 Baldwin without his consent. (Compl. ¶ 15.) He also alleges Defendant Officer Gippiti

“escorted … armed civilian investigators directly to Plaintiff’s backdoor” to facilitate a custody

exchange. (Id.) Plaintiff also claims that at the address 8 Maple Ave, officers created a “perimeter

while Officer Barrett narrated a sham investigation of Plaintiff’s daughter eating dinner.” (Id.)

The Third Circuit has held that “[w]arrantless searches and seizures inside someone’s home … are

presumptively unreasonable unless the occupants consent or probable cause and exigent

circumstances exist to justify the intrusion.” Chey v. LaBruno, 680 F. Supp. 3d 161, 182 (3d Cir.

2022); and

WHEREAS, as an initial matter, Plaintiff stated in his Complaint that he does not reside

at 8 Maple. (Compl. ¶ 25.) He also fails to allege that he was an overnight guest at 8 Maple at

any point. (See generally id.) Therefore, he has no reasonable expectation of privacy at 8 Maple

and state actions taken at that residence cannot support his Fourth Amendment claim. See United

States v. Rose, 613 F. App’x 125, 129 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding the protections of the Fourth

Amendment do not apply to guests with no possessory interest in the property). Regarding 14

Baldwin, Plaintiff claims “Officer Rivera violently busted open [his] door.” (Compl. ¶ 15.)

Accepting this fact as true, the Court determines Plaintiff has stated a claim for a potential Fourth

Amendment violation for unwarranted entry at 14 Baldwin.1 The allegations against Officer

Gippiti arise out of the same facts and questions of law as the claim against Officer Baldwin,

therefore she may be joined as a defendant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a). See

Wilson v. Piazza, No. 10-3356, 2011 WL 765806, at * 3 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 2022). Therefore, Count

II of the Complaint may PROCEED against Officer Rivera and Officer Gippiti regarding only the

events that occurred at 14 Baldwin. However, the claims are DISMISSED without prejudice

against all other individually named defendants because Plaintiff fails to attribute specific conduct

to any other officers in support of this Count. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (holding “a plaintiff must

plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has

violated the Constitution”); and

WHEREAS, to present a claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must show the arresting officers

lacked probable cause to believe the person arrested committed the alleged offense. See Wheeler

v. Wheeler, 639 F. App’x 147, 150 n.8 (3d Cir. 2016) (“To state a claim for false arrest under the

Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest

was made without probable cause.” (quoting James v. City of Wilkes–Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680

(3d Cir. 2012))). The Complaint alleges that on June 24, 2022, Officer Scott McGrath and Sgt.

Travis Davis arrested Plaintiff at a graduation ceremony. (Compl. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff also alleges that

he was found not guilty in Essex County Superior Court as to the charges brought. (Id.) Plaintiff

has therefore demonstrated that the defendants effectuated an arrest, and the Court concludes the

probable cause determination is fit for a later stage of this litigation. Groman v. Twp. of

1 Whether the Defendants possessed probable cause or exigent circumstances existed at the time

of the alleged offense is to be decided by this Court at a later stage. See Lane v. New Jersey, No.

22-4239, 2022 WL 17829431, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2002) (deciding issue of probable cause at

the motion to dismiss stage); see also Gurvey v. Twp. of Montclair New Jersey, No. 19-17525,

2022 WL 970303, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2022) (deciding whether probable cause existed for police

to perform a wellness check at the summary judgment stage).

Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding probable cause is generally a factual issue).

Therefore, the Court holds Plaintiff’s false arrest claim made under Count II may PROCEED

against Officer Scott McGrath and Sgt. Travis Davis regarding the alleged June 24, 2022 arrest;

and

WHEREAS in Count III of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Det. Dominic

Argentieri violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures by

submitting him to “an invasive, unconstitutional search that amounted to a sexual assault.”

(Compl. ¶ 33.) Plaintiff uses vague and conclusory language in support of this Count, describing

the alleged incident as “invasive” “unconstitutional” and claiming it “amounted to a sexual

assault.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges a date the alleged assault took place, but he does not state facts

describing how he believes Defendant Det. Dominic Argentieri violated him. (Id. ¶ 17.) Simply

stating that Defendant “committed a sexual assault against Plaintiff under the guise of an invasive

search” does not satisfy the Rule 8(a) pleading standard because it does not give the Court or the

defendant sufficient notice of the exact conduct that at issue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s alleged claim in Count III of the Complaint is DISMISSED without

prejudice; and

WHEREAS Plaintiff asserts a deprivation of property and unreasonable seizure claim

against the Nutley Police officer defendants in Count IV. (Compl. ¶ 34.) The Court construes this

claim as brought against the Township of Nutley since no individual defendants are named.

Plaintiff claims Nutley officers seized his prescription medication and the contents of his

impounded work vehicle. (Id. ¶ 34.) The law is clear in this Circuit that adequate post-deprivation

remedies defeat claims for deprivation of property. Vanderpool v. Christie, No. 10-2030, 2010

WL 2758709, at *9 (D.N.J. July 12, 2010). Plaintiff states that he “served a municipal judicial

order mandating the return of these items upon Nutley Police Lieutenant Richard Schwarz.”

(Compl. ¶ 27.) The fact that Plaintiff received a judicial order mandating the return of his items is

evidence that sufficient post-deprivation remedies are available to Plaintiff. Therefore, Count IV

of the Complaint fails as a matter of law and is DISMISSED without prejudice; and

WHEREAS Plaintiff asserts a civil conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) against

“[a]ll Individual Defendants, Lt. Schwartz, and Court administrators” in Count V. (Compl. ¶ 35.)

First, the Court dismisses the claims alleged against Lt. Schwartz and “Court administrators”

because they are not named as parties in this action. To state a claim for conspiracy under 42

U.S.C. § 1985(3), Plaintiff must allege “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either

directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal

privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4)

whereby a person is injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a

citizen of the United States.” Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing

United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1983)).

To prove a conspiracy, “it is insufficient for [p]laintiff to show merely that [d]efendants had a

common goal or acted in concert; rather, [p]laintiff must show through specific facts that

[d]efendants reached an understanding or agreement to violate Plaintiff’s civil rights.” Rife v.

Borough of Dauphin, 647 F. Supp. 2d 431, 450 (M.D. Pa. 2009); see also Jonson v. Zagori, No.

09-4934, 2011 WL 2634044, at *6 (D.N.J. June 30, 2011) (“The plaintiff must point to specific

facts showing that the defendants reached and understanding or agreement to violate Plaintiff’s

civil rights.” (internal quotations omitted)). Even “when evidence shows communications which

provided an opportunity for agreement, a plaintiff must still produce evidence permitting an

inference that an agreement in fact existed.” Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d

996, 1013 (3d Cir. 1994); and

WHEREAS here, Plaintiff’s allegations merely establish the opportunity for agreement.

Plaintiff’s assertion that police departments in different counties used “inter-departmental

databases to adopt and ratify the prior malicious acts of their co-conspirators,” (Compl. ¶ 35), fails

to meet the specificity required in Rule 8(a). Plaintiff’s assertions regarding the utilization of non-

party individuals as “the central communication hub” to transmit intelligence, (id. ¶ 11), and

“police reports explicitly documenting direct communications between Nutley, Bloomfield, and

Montclair officers,” (id. ¶ 35), only demonstrate the opportunity for an agreement to be made.

Plaintiff’s allegation that officers engaged in a “bad-faith ‘mission’ to effectuate an arrest,” (id. ¶

16), constitutes mere labeling by failing to provide any facts that would color his allegation of a

conspiracy. Finally, Plaintiff’s attempt to use an officer’s unilateral remark regarding the need for

“more manpower,” (id. ¶ 18), is excessively vague and cannot be construed to support the inference

of an agreement between parties. Accordingly, Count V of the Complaint is DISMISSED without

prejudice; and

WHEREAS Plaintiff asserts a failure to prevent conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 against

the supervisory Defendants in Count VI. (Compl. ¶¶ 37.) A claim brought under § 1986 “by

definition depend[s] on a preexisting violation of § 1985, if the claimant does not set forth a cause

of action under the latter, its claim under the former necessarily must fail also.” Rogin v. Bensalem,

616 F.2d 680, 696 (3d Cir. 1980). Plaintiff does not have a viable cause of action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1985(3), therefore Count VI of the Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice; and

WHEREAS Plaintiff asserts a Monell claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Townships

of Montclair, Nutley, and Bloomfield in Count VII. (Compl. ¶ 38.) The Court determines this

claim to be frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A case may be dismissed as frivolous if

it is based upon a “meritless legal theory or … completely baseless factual contentions.” Young v.

Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1399 (3d Cir. 1991). Plaintiff attempts to sustain his Monell claim by

arguing that Defendant’s alleged failure to respond to his email demands and Open Public Records

Act requests constitutes, “deliberate indifference transform[ing] these isolated unconstitutional

acts into official municipal policy.” (Compl. ¶ 38.) The Court declines to hold that Plaintiff has

made the necessary showing of a relevant custom or policy. “To satisfy the [Monell] pleading

standard, [plaintiff] must identify a custom or policy, and specify what exactly that custom or

policy was.” McTernan v. City of York, PA, 564 F.3d 636, 649 (3d Cir. 2009). Furthermore, the

“[m]ere assertion of an entitlement to relief, without some factual showing, is insufficient

under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Here, Plaintiff lists Police Chief

Thomas J. Strumolo, Jr (who is not a party) and Lt. Eric Stabinski as policymakers, (Compl. ¶ 38),

but he does not allege specific facts showing they had knowledge of Plaintiff’s emails or requests.

McTernan, 564 F.3d at 658 (“Custom requires proof of knowledge and acquiescence by the

decisionmaker[.]”). The Court determines that Plaintiff’s argument that the Townships of

Montclair, Nutley, and Bloomfield orchestrated a policy “to ignore the constitutional violations

and orchestrate administrative cover-ups,” (Compl. ¶ 27), is grounded on “clearly baseless factual

contentions” and is therefore suitable for dismissal under § 1915(e). Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d

772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989). Accordingly, Count VII of Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without

prejudice; and

WHEREAS Count VIII of Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges a First Amendment Retaliation

claim against all individual law enforcement defendants. (Compl. ¶ 39.) Plaintiff asserts this claim

on the grounds he “engaged in constitutionally protected speech by filing formal Internal Affairs

complaints” and Defendants retaliated against him by engaging in “a multi-jurisdictional campaign

of harassment … to chill [his] First Amendment rights.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s allegation fails to meet

Rule 8(a) pleading standard as it engages in impermissible group pleading. See Freeman, 2025

WL 1248935, at *3. To sustain a claim against the individually named Defendants, Plaintiff must

assert with specificity how each individually engaged in the conduct giving rise to the claim. Id.

Plaintiff’s argument also relies on a finding that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy, (Compl. ¶

39), which the Court has already declined to find at this stage. Therefore, Count VIII of Plaintiff’s

Complaint is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim under §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). For the reasons stated above,

IT IS on this 13th day of July, 2026 hereby:

1. ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED;

and it is

2. ORDERED that Counts I, III-VI, and VIII of Plaintiff’s Complaint are DISMISSED

without prejudice for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted under

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); and it is

3. ORDERED that Count VII of Plaintiff’s Complaint is hereby DISMISSED without

prejudice on the grounds it is frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); and it is

4. ORDERED that Count II of the Complaint alleging Fourth Amendment claims against

Officer Rivera and Officer Gippiti based on the events alleged to have occurred at 14

Baldwin shall PROCEED; and it is

5. ORDERED that Count II of the Complaint alleging false arrest against Officer Scott

McGrath and Sgt. Travis Davis shall PROCEED; and it is finally

6. ORDERED that Plaintiff may file an amended complaint correcting the deficiencies

identified above within forty-five (45) days of this Opinion and Order.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Jamel K. Semper

HON. JAMEL K. SEMPER

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Orig: Clerk

cc: José R. Almonte, U.S.M.J.

Parties