Satterfield

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

SHAWN SATTERFIELD, CASE NO. 3:25-cv-2724

Plaintiff, DISTRICT JUDGE

JAMES R. KNEPP II

vs.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL JAMES E. GRIMES JR.

SECURITY,

Defendant. REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Shawn Satterfield filed a complaint against the Commissioner

of Social Security seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision

denying his application for disability insurance benefits. Doc. 1. This Court has

jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c). The Court referred this

matter to a Magistrate Judge under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1) for the preparation

of a Report and Recommendation. For the reasons stated below, I recommend

that the District Court affirm the Commissioner’s decision.

Procedural background

In January 2024, Satterfield applied for disability insurance benefits,

alleging a disability onset date of June 9, 2023.1 See Tr. 159. Satterfield

claimed that he was disabled and limited in his ability to work due to

1 “Once a finding of disability is made, the [agency] must determine the

onset date of the disability.” McClanahan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 193 F. App’x

22, 425 (6th Cir. 2006).

intervertebral disc degeneration in the lumbar region of his back. Tr. 212. The

Commissioner denied Satterfield’s application initially and on reconsideration.

Tr. 86, 95. Satterfield then requested a hearing before an administrative law

judge (ALJ). Tr. 102–03.

In January 2025, an ALJ held a telephonic hearing. Tr. 36. Satterfield

appeared, testified, and was represented by counsel at the hearing. See Tr. 36,

Tr. 38–47. Qualified vocational expert James Fuller also testified. Tr. 47–51.

In February 2025, the ALJ issued a written decision finding that Satterfield

was not entitled to benefits. See Tr. 17–29. The ALJ’s decision became final in

October 2025, when the Appeals Council declined further review. Tr. 1; see 20

C.F.R. § 404.981.

Satterfield timely filed this action in December 2025. Doc. 1. In his brief,

he presents three issues for review:

1. Whether the Administrative Law Judge

Properly Evaluated the Medical Opinion

Evidence.

2. Whether the ALJ properly evaluated

Satterfield’s disabling symptoms.

3. Whether the vocational expert’s testimony

provides substantial evidence in support of

the ALJ’s decision.

Doc. 6, at 2.

Evidence2

Personal and Vocational Evidence

Born in 1971, Satterfield was 51 years of age on the alleged disability

onset date. Tr. 208. He attended high school through the 10th grade and later

earned a GED as an adult. Tr. 38, 213. From 2008 to 2023, Satterfield worked

as a computer numerical control (CNC) operator—which Satterfield described

as a “machinist”—for a manufacturing company. Tr. 48, 213.

Medical Evidence

In early June 2023, Dr. Frank Fumich, M.D., performed a lumbar spine

laminectomy and fusion for Satterfield’s lower back pain. Tr. 668–69. The

following summary of medical evidence is taken from the ALJ’s decision:

James Carlier, PA-C, followed up with the claimant

on June 27, 2023, and x-rays showed rod and screw

fixation and the hardware was intact. (Ex. 5F pg.

101).

The claimant was seen on August 8, 2023, by Alec

Curry, PA-C, and he reported that he was doing well,

although he continued to experience good and bad

days. (Ex. 5F pg. 32). X-rays found the claimant’s

hardware was intact, and his examination

demonstrated normal strength. (Ex. 5F pg. 33). Dr.

Fumich followed up with the claimant on September

26, 2023, and his exam showed intact sensation,

along with normal strength in his lower extremities.

(Ex. 5F pg. 30). The claimant underwent a lumbar

spine CT scan on December 19, 2023, and it showed

post operative changes with bulging from T12-L3

with bilateral foraminal encroachment, as well as

2 The recitation of evidence is not intended to be exhaustive and is

generally limited to the evidence cited in the parties’ briefs and relevant to

their arguments.

right-sided spondylosis at L4-5.[3] (Ex. 5F pg. 71). In

January 2024, Alec Curry, PA-C, met with the

claimant and noted that his low back pain was 8/10

on the pain scale due to his daily activities. (Ex. 5F

pg. 23). Physical exam demonstrated normal

strength and intact sensation. (Ex. 5F pg. 24).

Anuj Shah, M.D., saw the claimant for a

consultation on March 1, 2024, and reported that he

had ongoing pain, despite surgery and physical

therapy. (Ex. 5F pg. 20). His exam found a positive

FABER’s test, along with a positive sacral

compression distraction test. (Ex. 5F pg. 21).

Following his exam, Dr. Shah recommended

bilateral sacroiliac joint injections. (Id.). The

claimant underwent bilateral sacroiliac joint

injections on March 19, 2024, performed by Dr.

Shah, and his post-operative diagnosis was

sacroiliac dysfunction. (Ex. 5F pg. 18). Ms. Musser

saw the claimant on April 9, 2024, and reported that

he had ongoing back pain. (Ex. 5F pg. 15). Her

examination revealed tenderness over the

lumbosacral facet joints, positive facet loading, and

normal strength and sensation. (Ex. 5F pg. 16). At

that time, a medial branch block was recommended,

and in April 2024, the claimant had bilateral medial

branch nerve blocks at L2-4. (Ex. 5F pg. 13). He

followed up with Kimberly Musser, CNP, and stated

that he had no relief from the nerve blocks and her

exam showed normal lower extremity strength and

sensation. (Ex. 5F pg. 11).

3 Vertebrae in a person’s spine have letter and number designations

according to their location. The neck—the cervical spine—has seven vertebrae

designated as C1 through C7. See Thomas Scioscia, M.D., Vertebrae in the

Vertebral Column, Spine-health Resources, https://www.spine-

health.com/conditions/spine-anatomy/vertebrae-vertebral-column

[https://perma.cc/R9MM-TBZT]. The twelve vertebrae compromising the upper

spine—the thoracic spine—are labeled at T1 through T12. Id. The five

vertebrae in the lower spine—the lumbar spine—are L1 through L5. Id. The

five vertebrae at the bottom of the spine—in the sacrum—are labeled as S1

through S5. Thomas Scioscia, M.D., Sacrum (Sacral Region), Spine-health

Resources, https://www.spine-health.com/conditions/spine-anatomy/sacrum-

sacral-region [https://perma.cc/S2BR-RBTB].

On June 4, 2024, James Carlier, PA-C, saw the

claimant and he reported constant low back pain,

with fatigue as well as heaviness in his lower

extremities. (Ex. 5F pg. 8). X-rays found intact

hardware, along with moderate disc height loss at

L2-4. (Id.). Additionally, physical examination

demonstrated intact sensation, and normal muscle

strength, except for 4+/5 left hip strength. (Id.). Mr.

Carlier prescribed Tramadol and referred the

claimant for an MRI. (Ex. 5F pg. 8). The claimant

had an MRI of his lumbar spine, which showed

pedicle screw fixation from L4-S1 as well as a disc

bulge and facet arthropathy at L3-4. (Ex. 9F pgs. 10,

15). This caused moderate to severe lateral recess

stenosis. (Id.). Furthermore, the claimant had

moderate to severe disc space loss at L1-2. (Id.).

Following this scan, the claimant was seen by Mr.

Carlier, PA-C, and he recommended an epidural

steroid injection. (Ex. 9F pg. 11). The claimant

underwent a left-sided epidural steroid injection at

L3-4 on July 24, 2024. (Ex. 9F pg. 8). On August 16,

2024, the claimant followed up with Kimberly

Musser, CNP, and noted forty to fifty percent

injection relief for approximately ten days. (Ex. 9F

pg. 5). His strength and sensation were described as

equal and intact at that time. (Ex. 9F pg. 6). Alec

Curry, PA-C, saw the claimant on August 29, 2024,

and reported no significant relief from his injections.

(Ex. 9F pg. 2). Physical examination noted intact

sensation, normal strength, and no midline or

paraspinal tenderness. (Ex. 9F pg. 3). Mr. Curry

referred the claimant for a functional capacity

evaluation and stated that he did not feel additional

surgery was warranted at that time. (Id.).

Tr. 23–24.

Medical Opinion Evidence

In March 2024, Babatunde Onamusi, M.D., performed a consultative

examination on Satterfield. Tr. 548–56. During the exam, Satterfield showed

abnormal cervical spine forward flexion, lateral rotation, lumbar spine forward

flexion, extension, and lateral flexion. Tr. 551. He felt mild tenderness along

the lower lumbar and sacral region. Tr. 556. Satterfield also walked with a

mild antalgic gait, felt back stiffness when getting up to walk, and had

difficulties with squatting and with walking on his heels and toes. Tr. 553, 556.

Satterfield, however, did not require an assistive device to walk, and his stance

was steady. Tr. 556. Further, according to Dr. Onamusi, Satterfield’s gait

“became normalized” as Satterfield walked out of the office. Tr. 556. Satterfield

could grip and grasp with both hands, and he could reach, push, and pull with

his upper extremities as well. Tr. 556.

Dr. Onamusi found that Satterfield’s physical examination results were

consistent with Satterfield’s subjective symptoms. Tr. 556. Satterfield reported

“occasional stiffness” in his neck, weakness in his lower left extremity, and

“radiation of pain down [his] left leg,” but he denied any numbness or tingling

in the extremities. Tr. 554. Satterfield could “sit for 1 hour, stand for 30

minutes and walk half a mile.” Tr. 554. He could also “lift up to 20 pounds” and

“do some light housework.” Tr. 554. He had no difficulty using his hands for

gross or fine motor tasks. Tr. 555. Dr. Onamusi thus concluded that Satterfield

could “sit, stand, walk lower range of frequency, bend to a limited extend

occasionally, climb steps occasionally, lift up to 30 pounds occasionally, and use

the upper extremities for gross and fine motor tasks frequently.”4 Tr. 556.

In October 2024, Satterfield visited Nathan Schroeder for a residual

functional capacity (RFC) evaluation.5 Tr. 689–97, 758–66. Schroeder reported

that Satterfield could sit for almost six hours in a workday and for up to one

hour and 15 minutes at a time. Tr. 697, 766. Satterfield could also stand for a

total of five hours and 20 minutes, and for up to an hour continuously. Tr. 697,

766. In terms of material handling, Satterfield could lift 40 pounds occasionally

and 15 pounds frequently, and he had the ability to carry 35 pounds

occasionally. Tr. 697, 766. Further, Satterfield could occasionally walk, squat,

or perform sustained kneeling, while frequently bending or reaching above his

shoulder. Tr. 697, 766. Schroeder concluded that Satterfield could perform

4 “‘Frequently’ is a term of art in the disability context” and means

“activity that is performed … from as little as 1/3 of the time up to (but not

exceeding) 2/3 of the workday.” See Woodall v. Berryhill, No. 1:17-cv-01289,

2018 WL 3133442, at *8 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 2018) (citing the Selected

Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the Revised Dictionary of

Occupational Titles, Appendix C, U.S. Dept. of Labor (1993) and Soc. Sec.

Ruling 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *6 (SSA Jan. 1, 1983)), report and

recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 3126552 (N.D. Ohio June 26, 2018).

“Occasionally” means performing an activity for “up to 1/3 of the time.” See

Selected Characteristics, supra, and Soc. Sec. Ruling 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at

*5.

5 A residual functional capacity (RFC) is an “assessment of” a claimant’s

ability to work, taking his or her “limitations … into account.” Howard v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 239 (6th Circ. 2002). Essentially, it is the

Social Security Administration’s “description of what the claimant ‘can and

cannot do.’” Webb v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 368 F.3d 629, 631 (6th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Howard, 276 F.3d at 239).

medium-exertion work but advised against kneeling, crawling, static and

dynamic balancing, as well as climbing stairs and ladders. Tr. 689, 758.

State Agency Opinions

John Bradley, M.D., a State Agency physician, reviewed Satterfield’s

claim at the initial review level.6 See Tr. 53–61. He determined that Satterfield

could: lift and carry up to 20 pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently;

stand and walk for a total of six hours in an eight-hour workday; and sit for a

total of six hours in an eight-hour workday. Tr. 58. Dr. Bradley also noted that

Satterfield was capable of: occasionally climbing ramps or stairs; occasionally

kneeling, crouching, or stooping; and frequently balancing. Tr. 59. Dr. Bradley,

however, found that Satterfield could not climb scaffolds, ladders, or ropes. Tr.

59. Nor could Satterfield crawl. Tr. 59. Another physician, Steve McKee, M.D.,

reconsidered the record and reached the same conclusions as Dr. Bradley

regarding Satterfield’s limitations. See Tr. 68.

Hearing Testimony

Satterfield, who was represented by counsel, testified at an

administrative hearing in January 2025. Tr. 36, 38–47. Satterfield described

6 When a claimant applies for disability benefits, the State Agency creates

a record. The record includes the claimant’s medical evidence. A State Agency

disability examiner and a State Agency physician or psychologist review the

claimant’s record and determine whether—and how much—the claimant’s

condition affects his or her ability to work. If the State Agency denies the

claimant’s application, the claimant can ask for reconsideration. On

reconsideration, the State Agency updates the record and a second disability

examiner and doctor review the file and make a new determination. See, e.g.,

20 C.F.R. § 404.1615.

his back pain as “sharp,” “stabbing,” and “constant.” Tr. 40. Although the pain

was concentrated “mostly in [Satterfield’s] lower back,” Satterfield also

experienced some pain in his shoulders and middle back. Tr. 40. Satterfield

had taken opioids and gabapentin to manage his pain, but he did not find the

medications to be effective. Tr. 40.

Satterfield reported that his pain became more severe when he

performed “just normal everyday stuff,” such as bending, leaning over,

walking, and standing. Tr. 40–41. He estimated that he could stand or walk

continuously for about 30 to 45 minutes before taking a break. Tr. 41.

Satterfield stated, however, that if he were required to stand for four

consecutive hours, his pain would persist through the following morning. Tr.

41. Satterfield further explained that his pain becomes “a lot worse” about

twice a week. Tr. 41, 42. On those “bad days,” Satterfield would stay in bed or

on the couch with a heating pad on his back. Tr. 42.

Satterfield lived with his wife, stepdaughter, and two grandsons on a

four-acre plot of land. Tr. 46, 48. His daily routine included: dropping off and

picking up his older grandson at a school bus stop about two miles away;

playing with his younger grandson at home; and running errands or going to

get groceries. Tr. at 43, 44. Except for heavy items Satterfield would unload

most of the groceries from his car. Tr. 46. He could also fuel his car, put air in

his tires, check the engine oil, and clean his windshield. Tr. 46–47. Further,

Satterfield performed most of the family’s cooking, even though his back pain

prevented him from leaning over the kitchen counter. Tr. 44, 45. Similarly,

although Satterfield acknowledged having difficulty leaning forward or

reaching back, he could shower and use a bathroom without assistance. Tr. 44.

In the summer, Satterfield cut the grass on a riding mower for about an hour,

while his wife performed other yard duties. Tr. 46.

Qualified vocational expert, James Fuller, also testified. Tr. 48–51. The

ALJ first asked Fuller whether a hypothetical individual with Satterfield’s age,

education, and work history could perform any work in the national economy

if the individual had the limitations consistent with the State Agency

physicians’ conclusions, including: lifting and carrying up to 20 pounds

occasionally, and up to 10 pounds frequently; standing and walking up to six

hours in an eight-hour day; and sitting up to six hours in an eight-hour day.

Tr. 48–49. Fuller answered that although the hypothetical individual would

not be able to perform Satterfield’s past work, that person could still work as

an assembler, packer, or inspector. Tr. 49. The ALJ modified the hypothetical

to ask Fuller whether the same individual could perform any job if limited to

standing and walking four hours in an eight-hour day and being off-task up to

five percent of the workday. Tr. 49. Fuller testified that the same positions

would remain available, though in reduced numbers. Tr. 49. Fuller also stated

that job opportunities would still exist even if the individual were limited to

sedentary work. Tr. 49–50. Fuller, however, testified that if the hypothetical

individual were off task for more than 15 percent of the workday and absent

from work two or more days per month, these limitations would be work

preclusive. Tr. 50.

The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

1. The claimant meets the insured status

requirements of the Social Security Act

through December 31, 2028.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial

gainful activity since June 9, 2023, the alleged

onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).

3. The claimant has the following severe

impairments: lumbar spondylosis;

radiculopathy; sciatica; status-post L4-5

laminectomy; spinal stenosis of the lumbar

region with claudication (20 CFR

404.1520(c)).

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that meets or

medically equals the severity of one of the

listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d),

404.1525, and 404.1526).

5. After careful consideration of the entire

record, the undersigned finds that the

claimant has the residual functional capacity

to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR

404.1567(b) except no climbing ladders, ropes,

or scaffolds, occasional climbing of ramps and

stairs, frequent balancing, occasional

stooping, kneeling, and crouching, and no

crawling. The claimant should avoid hazards,

including moving machinery, heavy

machinery, and unprotected heights, and no

commercial driving.

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past

relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565).

7. The claimant … was 51 years old, which is

defined as an individual closely approaching

advanced age, on the alleged disability onset

date (20 CFR 404.1563).

8. The claimant has at least a high school

education (20 CFR 404.1564).

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to

the determination of disability because using

the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework

supports a finding that the claimant is “not

disabled,” whether or not the claimant has

transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20

CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education,

work experience, and residual functional

capacity, there are jobs that exist in

significant number sin the national economy

that the claimant can perform (20 CFR

404.1569 and 404.1569a).

11. The claimant has not been under a disability,

as defined in the Social Security Act, from

June 9, 2023, through the date of this decision

(20 CFR 404.1520(g)).

Tr. 19–29.

Standard for Disability

Eligibility for social security benefit payments depends on the existence

of a disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a), 1382(a). “Disability” is defined as the

“inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected

to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than 12 months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 42 U.S.C.

§ 1382c(a)(3)(A).

An ALJ is required to follow a five-step sequential analysis to make a

disability determination:

1. Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful

activity? If so, the claimant is not disabled.

2. Does the claimant have a medically

determinable impairment, or a combination of

impairments, that is “severe”? If not, the

claimant is not disabled.

3. Does the claimant’s impairment meet or equal

one of the listed impairments and meet the

duration requirement? If so, the claimant is

disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the next

step.

4. What is the claimant’s residual functional

capacity and can the claimant perform past

relevant work? If so, the claimant is not

disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the next

step.

5. Can the claimant do any other work

considering the claimant’s residual functional

capacity, age, education, and work

experience? If so, the claimant is not disabled.

If not, the claimant is disabled.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see Jordan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 548 F.3d

417, 422 (6th Cir. 2008). Under this sequential analysis, the claimant has the

burden of proof at steps one through four. Jordan, 548 F.3d at 423. The burden

shifts to the Commissioner at step five “to prove the availability of jobs in the

national economy that the claimant is capable of performing.” Id. “The

claimant, however, retains the burden of proving her lack of residual functional

capacity.” Id. If a claimant satisfies each element of the analysis and meets the

duration requirements, the claimant is determined to be disabled. Walters

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997).

Standard of Review

A reviewing court must affirm the Commissioner’s conclusions unless it

determines “that the ALJ has failed to apply the correct legal standards or has

made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.”

Jordan, 548 F.3d at 422. “‘[S]ubstantial evidence’ is a ‘term of art’” under which

“a court … asks whether” the “existing administrative record … contains

‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.” Biestek

v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019) (citations omitted). The substantial

evidence standard “is not high.” Id. at 103. Substantial evidence “is ‘more than

a mere scintilla’” but it “means only[] ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (citations

omitted). The Commissioner’s “findings … as to any fact if supported by

substantial evidence [are] conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek, 587 U.S. at

99.

A court may “not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or

decide questions of credibility.” Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir.

2007). Even if substantial evidence or a preponderance of the evidence

supports a claimant’s position, a reviewing court cannot overturn the

Commissioner’s decision “so long as substantial evidence also supports the

conclusion reached by the ALJ.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469,

477 (6th Cir. 2003). This is so because there is a “zone of choice within which”

the Commissioner can act, without fear of judicial “interference.” Lindsley v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 F.3d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Felisky v.

Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994)).

Discussion

1. The ALJ Properly Evaluated the Medical Opinion Evidence.

Satterfield first contends that substantial evidence does not support the

ALJ’s RFC determination. Doc. 6, at 9. Specifically, Satterfield argues that

the ALJ “err[ed] in relying upon his own expertise and interpreting the clinical

findings to discount” opinions of Dr. Onamusi and Nathan Shroder. Doc. 6, at

12.

When determining a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must consider all relevant

medical and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). In turn, the ALJ must

evaluate the persuasiveness of the medical opinions by considering the

following factors: supportability; consistency; treatment relationship;

specialization; and other factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)–(5).

Supportability and consistency are the most important factors, 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520c(a), and “[t]o pass muster, the ALJ need only explain ‘how [he]

considered the supportability and consistency factors for a medical source’s

medical opinions.’” Gregory v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 26-5022, 2026 WL

1763752, at *2 (6th Cir. June 18, 2026) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2)).

ALJs are not required to explain how they considered the remaining factors.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).

As to supportability, “[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence

and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his

or her medical opinion[ ] … the more persuasive the medical opinions … will

be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1). For consistency, “[t]he more consistent a

medical opinion(s) ... is with the evidence from other medical sources and

nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) ...

will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2). Put simply, “‘consistency is about how the

medical opinion conflicts with evidence in the record, whereas supportability

is about how the medical opinion was soundly reached.’” Baum v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 1:25-cv-01775, 2026 WL 1753609, at *6 (N.D. Ohio June

18, 2026) (quoting David C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-11292, 2023 WL

7345924, at *2 n.1 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 7, 2023)).

Returning to Satterfield’s case, Satterfield takes issue with the ALJ’s

evaluation of Dr. Onamusi’s opinions. Doc. 6, at 11. As discussed, Dr. Onamusi

opined that Satterfield could sit, stand, and walk on the “lower range of

frequency,” bend to a limited extent occasionally, climb steps occasionally, lift

up to 30 pounds occasionally, and use the upper extremities for gross and fine

motor tasks frequently. Tr. 556. Yet, according to the ALJ, Dr. Onamusi’s own

examination did not support the opinion that Satterfield was limited to only

frequent use of upper extremities for fine and gross manipulation. Tr. 25. The

ALJ also observed that other treatment records, which showed Satterfield’s

“intact strength and sensation,” were not consistent with Dr. Onamusi’s

opinion. Tr. 25. In addition, the ALJ disagreed with Dr. Onamusi’s opinion that

Satterfield could lift up to 30 pounds, instead finding Satterfield to be more

limited—i.e., limited to lifting no more than 20 pounds—based on Satterfield’s

lumbar spine MRI and other evidence. Tr. 25. So the ALJ did what the

regulations require. She evaluated the supportability and consistency of Dr.

Onamusi’s opinion, and cited relevant medical records and examinations in

support of her evaluation. The ALJ therefore provided sufficient explanations

for her decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2) (requiring ALJs to “explain

how they considered the supportability and consistency factors for a medical

source’s medical opinions”); accord. Malkemus, 2026 WL 1396080, at *9.

Similarly, while Satterfield also disputes the ALJ’s assessment of

Schroeder’s opinions, Doc. 6, at 12, the ALJ offered “sufficient reasoning,

scaffolded with references in the medical record to support [her] decision,

enough for a subsequent reviewer to trace the lines of [her] reasoning,” Mertle

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:24-CV-00832, 2024 WL 5160189, at *8 (N.D. Ohio

Dec. 19, 2024). Beginning with supportability, the ALJ acknowledged that

Schroeder’s own examination could support Schroeder’s opinion that

Satterfield was unable to climb stairs or balance, could only occasionally walk,

and could frequently reach above shoulder level. Tr. 26. In terms of

consistency, however, the ALJ found that Schroeder’s opinion was inconsistent

with other evidence in the record. Tr. 26. For example, the ALJ noted that

Satterfield’s consultative examination showed “only a mildly antalgic gait,

normal upper extremity range of motion, and [normal] lower extremity muscle

strength.” Tr. 26.

In challenging the ALJ’s analysis, Satterfield does not explain the way

in which he believes the ALJ failed to comply with relevant regulations. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c). Nor, as the Commissioner points out, does he “even

dispute the ALJ’s discussion of the evidence that justified her findings.” Doc.

7, at 7 (citing Doc. 6, at 11). Rather, the gist of Satterfield’s complaint is that

the ALJ “impermissibly played doctor” when evaluating Dr. Onamusi’s

opinion, Doc. 8, at 2 (citing Herbert v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-cv-00533,

2023 WL 6155984, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 21, 2023)),7 but this argument fails.

Here, “what [Satterfield] characterizes as ‘playing doctor,’ the Sixth Circuit has

consistently characterized as ‘weighing the evidence.’” Snyder v. Comm’r of

7 Citations to Document 8 refer to the CM/ECF-generate page number

shown at the top of the page.

Soc. Sec., No. 3:25-cv-01219, 2026 WL 364319, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 2026)

(citing Coldiron v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 391 F. App’x 435, 439 (6th Cir. 2010)),

report and recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 1505992 (N.D. Ohio May 29,

2026).

Satterfield is correct that “an ALJ should resist the temptation to

substitute the ALJ’s own interpretation of medical records for that of a

physician who has examined the records.” Brown v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 602

F. App’x. 328, 331 (6th Cir. 2015). ALJs, therefore, “‘must not succumb to the

temptation to play doctor and make their own independent medical findings.’”

Simpson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 344 F. App’x. 181, 194 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1996)). That said, “[a]n ALJ does

not improperly assume the role of a medical expert by weighing the medical

and non-medical evidence before rendering an RFC finding.” Coldiron v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 391 F. App’x 435, 439 (6th Cir. 2010). In fact, “[f]ar from

prohibiting ALJs from directly evaluating medical evidence, the law requires

it.” Winans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:22-cv-01793, 2023 WL 7622634, at *5–

6 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 15, 2023). Instead, an ALJ impermissibly plays doctor when

the ALJ “interpret[s] raw medical data beyond her ability.” Rudd v. Comm'r of

Soc. Sec., 531 F. App’x 719, 726 (6th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added).

Satterfield maintains that the ALJ interpreted raw medical data when

she found Dr. Onamusi’s opinions to be inconsistent with Satterfield’s

treatment records indicating “intact strength and sensation.” Doc. 8, at 2, 3;

see also Tr. 25. “Raw medical data,” however, typically refer to testing such as

x-rays, Rudd, 531 F. App’x at 727, MRI images, Holland v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

No. 4:13-CV-10295, 2014 WL 1118521, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 20, 2014), or an

EMG, Kidder v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:18-cv-00661, 2020 WL 1080413, at

*5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 6, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:18-cv-

00661, 2020 WL 5201080 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2020). Medical testing reports and

treatment notes, such as the ones that the ALJ here relied on, are not

considered raw medical data beyond the ALJ’s expertise. Snyder v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., No. 3:25-cv-01219, 2026 WL 364319, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 2026),

report and recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 1505992 (N.D. Ohio May 29,

2026). There is no merit to Satterfield’s argument that the ALJ played doctor

by interpreting raw medical data.

2. The ALJ Appropriately Applied SSR 16-3 in Evaluating

Satterfield’s Subjective Symptoms.

Satterfield next contends that the ALJ “improperly evaluated”

Satterfield’s subjective symptoms under Social Security Ruling 16-3p. Doc. 6,

at 13. Satterfield acknowledges that “an ALJ’s evaluation of a claimant’s

symptoms are left to his or her sound discretion.” Doc. 6, at 14. He also admits

that the ALJ here considered “treatment records after … Saterfield’s surgery”

when evaluating Satterfield’s symptoms. Doc. 6, at 14. Satterfield maintains,

however, that the ALJ “cherry[-]picked the record impermissibly” by ignoring

other medical records that were consistent with Satterfield’s complaints of

back pain. Doc. 6, at 15.

SSR 16-3p governs the ALJ’s assessment of symptoms, which was

formerly referred to as a “credibility” determination in SSR 96-7p.8 Under SSR

16-3p, an ALJ undertakes a two-step process to assess the limiting effects of a

claimant’s symptoms. See Soc. Sec. Ruling 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304. At step

one, “the ALJ will ask whether … there is an underlying medically

determinable physical impairment that could reasonably be expected to

produce the claimant’s symptoms.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234,

247 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a)); SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL

5180304, at *3. At step two, “if … such an impairment exists,” the ALJ “must

evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms on the

individual’s ability to do basic work activities.” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247; Soc.

Sec. Ruling 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *4.

To evaluate the “intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of an

individual’s symptoms,” an ALJ considers medical evidence, the claimant’s

statements, other information provided by medical sources, and any other

8 In relevant parts, SSR 16-3p removed the word “credibility” from its

predecessor and refocused the ALJ’s attention on the “extent to which the

symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical

and other evidence in the individual’s record.” Soc. Sec. Ruling 16-3p, 2017 WL

5180304, at *2 (SSA Oct. 25, 2017). Despite these changes, the procedures for

reviewing an ALJ’s assessment under SSR 16-3p are substantially the same

as the procedures under SSR 96-7p. See Delong v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.

2:18-cv-368, 2019 WL 409364, *7–8 (S.D. Ohio, Feb. 1, 2019). Courts agree that

the prior case law involving SSR 96-7p generally applies to the renamed

“consistency determination” under SSR 16-3p. Whicker-Smith v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., No. 1:18-cv-52, 2019 WL 911084, at *5 (S.D. Ohio, Feb. 25, 2019),

report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 1202361 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 14,

2019).

relevant evidence in the record. See Soc. Sec. Ruling 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304,

at *4; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4). Aside from medical evidence, SSR 16-3p

requires the ALJ to consider: daily activities; the location, duration, frequency,

and intensity of pain or symptoms; precipitating and aggravating factors; the

type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication; treatment, other

than medication, to relieve pain; any measures used to relieve pain; and

“[o]ther factors concerning … functional limitations and restrictions due to

pain or other symptoms.” 2017 WL 5180304, at *4; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3).

To be sure, “[t]he ALJ need not analyze all seven factors, but should show that

he considered the relevant evidence.” Hatcher v. Berryhill, No. 1:18-cv-01123,

2019 WL 1382288, at *15 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2019) (citing Cross v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 373 F. Supp. 2d 724, 733 (N.D. Ohio 2005)).

The ALJ here properly followed SSR 16-3p in evaluating Satterfield’s

subjective symptom complaints. At step one, the ALJ found that Satterfield’s

“medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause

the alleged symptoms.” Tr. 24. Moving to step two, the ALJ found that

Satterfield’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting

effects of these symptoms [were] not entirely consistent with the medical

evidence and other evidence in the record.” Tr. 24. In support of these findings,

the ALJ discussed Satterfield’s daily activities, noting that Satterfield “did the

majority of the cooking” and “could help mow the lawn with a riding mower.”

Tr. 22; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) (requiring ALJs to consider the

claimant’s daily activities in evaluating subjective symptoms). The ALJ also

noted that Satterfield “was in constant pain” and “had bad days about twice

per week,” which would cause him to “lie in bed, or on the couch, and use a

heating pad.” Tr. 24; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(ii) (requiring an ALJ to

consider “[t]he location, duration, frequency, and intensity” of a claimant’s pain

or other relevant symptoms). The pain “worsened with bending and twisting.”

Tr. 22; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iii) (requiring the ALJ to consider

“[p]recipitating and aggravating factors” for the claimant’s pain). The ALJ

detailed Satterfield’s treatment history, including surgery, physical therapy,

and steroid injections. Tr. 23–24; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv), (v)

(instructing ALJs to consider types of medication and other treatments used to

alleviate a claimant’s symptoms).

Satterfield does not deny that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

analysis under SSR 16-3p. Instead, Satterfield cites various portions of the

record that purportedly “shows findings supportive of … [his] complaints.” See

Doc. 6, at 14–15. Yet “[t]he decision of an ALJ is not subject to reversal, even

if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an

opposite conclusion, so long as substantial evidence supports the conclusion

reached by the ALJ.” Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997).

Moreover, “[i]t is well-established there is no requirement that the ALJ discuss

each piece of evidence or limitation considered.” Thomas v. Bisignano, No. 1:23-

cv-00612, 2026 WL 376857, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 2026), report and

recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 775557 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 19, 2026); see also

Conner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 658 F. App’x 248, 254 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding

that an ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence in the record). This is

because “a duty to ‘consider’ the evidence is different than a duty to ‘discuss’

the evidence.” Swain v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., Case No. 1:24-cv-02224,

2025 WL 2322785, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2025). Accordingly, as the Sixth

Circuit has explained, “[a]n ALJ can consider all the evidence without directly

addressing in his written decision every piece of evidence submitted by a

party.” Kornecky v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App’x 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006).

Satterfield’s “cherry-picking” argument also fails for similar reasons. An

ALJ improperly “cherry-picks” evidence when the ALJ simply ignores a conflict

between a medical opinion and the ALJ’s RFC finding, while failing to explain

why she chose to credit one evidence over another. Howell v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., No. 3:25-cv-1206, 2026 WL 1109373, at *17 (N.D. Ohio April 24, 2026),

report and recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 1615242 (N.D. Ohio June 5,

2026). But the fact that an ALJ fails to mention certain evidence in one section

of his decision does not mean that he was cherry-picking evidence; after all,

ALJs are not “require[d] … to discuss every piece of evidence in the record.”

Showalter v. Kijakazi, No. 22-5718, 2023 WL 2523304, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 15,

2023); see also Byler v. Kijakazi, No. 5:20-cv-01822, 2022 WL 980099, at *9

(N.D. Ohio Jan. 21, 2022) (“[W]ith a nearly [two]-thousand-page record, the

ALJ cannot be expected to discuss every piece of evidence that [the claimant]

believes is inconsistent with the RFC.”), report and recommendation adopted

sub nom. Byler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 5:20-cv-1822, 2022 WL

971384 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2022). In fact, courts have recognized that “cherry-

picking-evidence are ‘seldom unsuccessful.’” Kovach v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

Admin., No. 1:24-cv-02506, 2026 WL 1656939, at *6 (citing Delong v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 748 F.3d 723, 726 (6th Cir. 2014)); Phillips v. Berryhill, No. 3:16-

cv-0193, 2017 WL 6045451, *at 5 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 6, 2017); Smith v. Comm'r of

Soc. Sec. No. 1:14-cv-0984, 2015 WL 7460080, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 24, 2015).

Here, the ALJ detailed the discrepancy between medical evidence in the

record and the severity of Satterfield’s complained pain. Tr. 24–25; see 20

C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4) (providing that ALJs “will consider [a claimant’s]

statements in relation to the objective medical evidence and other evidence”).

The ALJ also explained the weight she gave to all relevant evidence and

reasons for that weight. Tr. 24–25; see Howell, 2026 WL 1109373, at *17.

Further, by arguing that the ALJ failed to consider certain records over others,

Satterfield essentially invites this Court to reweigh the evidence and

substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ. This Court, however, “does not

reconsider facts, re-weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in evidence, decide

questions of credibility, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.”

Reynolds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 424 Fed. App’x. 411, 414 (6th Cir. 2011). This

Court should decline Satterfield’s invitation.

3. The Vocational Expert’s Testimony Constituted Substantial

Evidence.

Satterfield lastly contends that Fuller’s vocational-expert testimony at

the January 2025 hearing did not constitute substantial evidence for the ALJ’s

RFC determination. Doc. 6, at 2, 16. This is because, according to Satterfield,

“[w]hen presenting his hypothetical question to [Fuller], the ALJ did not

account for the medical opinions supporting greater limitations than the ALJ

incorporated into his RFC findings.” Doc. 6, at 16.

At step five of the sequential analysis process, an ALJ must consider a

claimant’s age, education, work experience, and RFC to determine “the

availability of jobs in the national economy that the claimant is capable of

performing.” Jordan, 548 F.3d at 422; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). At this

step, the ALJ “must make a finding ‘supported by substantial evidence that

[the claimant] has the vocational qualifications to perform specific jobs.’”

Gainey v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:19-cv-02436, 2020 WL 5798235, at *1 (N.D.

Ohio Sept. 29, 2020) (quoting Varley v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 820 F.3d

504, 516–17 (6th Cir. 2010)).

Relevant here, “for a vocational expert’s testimony in response to a

hypothetical question to serve as substantial evidence … the question must

accurately portray a claimant’s physical and mental impairments.” Ealy v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 516 (6th Cir. 2010). “Hypothetical questions,

however, need only incorporate those limitations which the ALJ has accepted

as credible.” Parks v. Social Sec. Admin., 413 F. App’x 856, 865 (6th Cir. 2011).

Further, “the ALJ may pose a question involving a hypothetical individual with

several limitations—and then later decide that those limitations differed from

the claimant’s limitations.” Kessans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 768 Fed. App’x 531,

536 (6th Cir. 2019) (internal citations omitted). “[T]o hold otherwise would

effectively eliminate the ALJ’s ability to ask any questions about a

hypothetical individual unless he had identified the exact contours of the

claimant’s disability by the time of the hearing.” Id.

In this case, Satterfield’s argument fails. Satterfield does not specify

which limitation the ALJ failed to incorporate into her hypotheticals. Instead,

as the Commissioner notes, Satterfield merely reiterates his earlier challenge

to the RFC determination, asserting that the ALJ should have given more

weight to “medical opinions supporting greater limitations.” Doc. 6, at 16; Doc.

7, at 11. Yet, “[a]n ALJ is only required to incorporate into a hypothetical

question those limitations he finds credible.” Lee v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.

App’x 706, 715 (6th Cir. 2013). Because the ALJ here found these greater

limitations to be unsupported by the record, Tr. 23–24, she need not

incorporate them in hypothetical questions posed to Fuller. Satterfield’s

challenge to Fuller’s testimony thus lacks merit.

Conclusion

For all the reasons stated, I recommend that the District Court affirm

the Commissioner’s decision.

Dated: July 16, 2026

/s/ James E. Grimes Jr.

James E. Grimes Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

OBJECTIONS

Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with

the Clerk of Court within 14 days after the party objecting has been served

with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure

to file objections within the specified time may forfeit the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. See Berkshire v. Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 530–531 (6th

Cir. 2019).