The opinion
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
No. 17-917V
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RICHARD K. PARKER, *
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*
Petitioner, * Special Master Jennifer A. Shah
*
v. *
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* Filed: June 26, 2026
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND *
HUMAN SERVICES, *
*
*
Respondent. *
*
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Ramon Rodriguez, III, Siri & Glimstad, LLP, Richmond, VA, for Petitioner.
Sarah Christina Duncan, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
DECISION ON ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS1
On July 7, 2017, Richard K. Parker, (“Petitioner”) filed a petition seeking compensation
under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10, et seq. 2 (“the
Vaccine Program”). ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”). The petition alleged that Petitioner developed Parsonage-
Turner syndrome (“PTS”) as a result of a pneumococcal 13-valent conjugate (“Prevnar 13”)
vaccine he received on November 21, 2014. Id. at 1-2. The petition alternatively alleged that the
subject vaccination significantly aggravated preexisting PTS. Id. at 2.
Former Special Master Katherine E. Oler conducted an entitlement hearing on April 11-
1
Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be made
publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or at
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government Act
of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government
Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance
with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information,
the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that
the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access.
2
The Vaccine Program comprises Part 2 of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10–34 (2018)) (hereinafter
“Vaccine Act” or “the Act”). All subsequent references to sections of the Vaccine Act shall be to the
pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa.
12, 2023, at which Petitioner, his wife, and Drs. Steinman, Carr, Leist, Abrams, and Maverakis
testified. Minute Entry dated 4/12/2023; Tr. at 3-4, 190-91. After the hearing, the parties filed
additional materials. Exs. 77, L. The parties filed post-hearing briefs on July 5, September 5, and
November 7, 2023. EFC Nos. 106, 107, 109.
Both parties agreed that the record was complete on November 13, 2023. ECF No. 110.
This case was reassigned to me on August 13, 2024. ECF No. 112. On July 7, 2025, I issued a
decision denying entitlement and dismissing the petition. ECF No. 121.
On October 31, 2025, Petitioner filed an application for final attorneys’ fees and costs.
ECF No. 125 (“Fees App.”). Petitioner requests a total of $50,997.50 for attorneys’ fees and costs.
Id. at 6, 11. Petitioner affirmed that he did not incur any personal costs. Ex. 81. Respondent
responded to the motion on November 13, 2025, stating “Respondent is satisfied the statutory
requirements for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs are met in this case.” ECF No. 127 (“Fees
Resp.”) at 2. Petitioner filed a reply brief on November 20, 2025. ECF No. 128 (“Fees Reply”).
This matter is now ripe for consideration.
I. Legal Standards
Section 15(e)(1) of the Vaccine Act permits a special master to award “reasonable
attorneys’ fees, and other costs.” § 300aa-15(e)(1)(A)-(B). Petitioners are entitled to an award of
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs if they are entitled to compensation under the Vaccine Act;
furthermore, even if they are unsuccessful, they are eligible for such an award so long as the special
master finds that the petition was filed in good faith and with a reasonable basis. Avera v. Sec’y
of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
If a petitioner is eligible for an award of fees and costs, it is “well within the special
master’s discretion” to determine the reasonableness of such fees and costs. Saxton v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1521-22 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Hines v. Sec’y of Health
& Human Servs., 22 Cl. Ct. 750, 753 (1991) (“[T]he reviewing court must grant the special master
wide latitude in determining the reasonableness of both attorneys’ fees and costs.”). Applications
for attorneys’ fees must include contemporaneous and specific billing records that describe the
work performed and the number of hours spent on said work. See Savin v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 85 Fed. Cl. 313, 316–18 (2008), aff’d, No. 99-573V, 2008 WL 2066611 (Fed. Cl.
Spec. Mstr. Apr. 22, 2008).
Reasonable hourly rates for attorneys’ fees are determined by looking at the “prevailing
market rate” in the relevant community. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984). The
“prevailing market rate” is akin to the rate “in the community for similar services by lawyers of
reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Id. at 895 n.11. The petitioner bears the
burden of proving that the requested hourly rate is reasonable. Id.
A. Good Faith
The good faith requirement is assessed through a subjective inquiry. Di Roma v. Sec’y of
2
Health & Hum. Servs., No. 90-3277V, 1993 WL 496981, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 18,
1993). The requirement “focuses upon whether [P]etitioner honestly believed he had a legitimate
claim for compensation.” Turner v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-544V, 2007 WL
4410030, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 30, 2007). Without evidence of bad faith, “petitioners
are entitled to a presumption of good faith.” Grice v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 36 Fed. Cl.
114, 121 (1996). Thus, so long as Petitioner had an honest belief that his claim could succeed, the
good faith requirement is satisfied. See Riley v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 09-276V,
2011 WL 2036976, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 29, 2011) (citing Di Roma, 1993 WL 496981,
at *1); Turner, 2007 WL 4410030, at *5.
B. Reasonable Basis
Unlike the good faith inquiry, a reasonable basis analysis requires more than just evaluating
a petitioner’s belief in his claim. Turner, 2007 WL 4410030, at *6-7. Instead, the claim must be
supported by objective evidence. Simmons v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 875 F.3d 632, 636
(Fed. Cir. 2017). “[I]n deciding reasonable basis the [s]pecial [m]aster needs to focus on the
requirements for a petition under the Vaccine Act to determine if the elements have been asserted
with sufficient evidence to make a feasible claim for recovery.” Santacroce v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., No. 15-555V, 2018 WL 405121, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 5, 2018).
Although the Vaccine Act does not define the quantum of proof needed to establish
reasonable basis, it is “something less than the preponderant evidence ultimately required to
prevail on one’s vaccine-injury claim.” Chuisano v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 276, 283 (2014).
The Court of Federal Claims affirmed in Chuisano that “[a]t the most basic level, a petitioner who
submits no evidence would not be found to have reasonable basis. . .” Id. at 286; see 42 U.S.C. §
300aa-13(a)(1) (special masters cannot award compensation “based on the claims of petitioner
alone, unsubstantiated by medical records or by medical opinion”). The Chuisano Court agreed
that a petition that relied only on temporal proximity and a petitioner’s affidavit did not have a
reasonable basis. Id. at 290; see also Turpin v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-564V, 2005
WL 1026714, *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 10, 2005) (finding no reasonable basis when petitioner
submitted an affidavit and no other records); Brown v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-
539V, 2005 WL 1026713, *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 11, 2005) (finding no reasonable basis
when petitioner presented only e-mails between her and her attorney).
The Federal Circuit has clarified that “more than a mere scintilla but less than a
preponderance of proof could provide sufficient grounds for a special master to find reasonable
basis.” Cottingham v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 971 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
(finding petitioner submitted objective evidence supporting causation when she submitted medical
records and a vaccine package insert); see also James-Cornelius v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
984 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (finding that “the lack of an express medical opinion on
causation did not by itself negate the claim’s reasonable basis.”).
When determining if a reasonable basis exists, a special master may consider a number of
factors, including “the factual basis of the claim, the medical and scientific support for the claim,
the novelty of the vaccine, and the novelty of the theory of causation.” Amankwaa v. Sec’y of
Health & Hum. Servs., 138 Fed. Cl. 282, 289 (2018). This approach allows the special master to
3
look at each application for attorneys’ fees and costs on a case-by-case basis. Hamrick v. Sec’y of
Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-683V, 2007 WL 4793152, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 19,
2007).
II. Discussion
A. Good Faith and Reasonable Basis
Respondent stated that he “is satisfied the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys’
fees and costs are met in this case.” Fees Resp. at 2. On May 19, 2025, I issued a decision awarding
interim attorney’s fees and costs, finding that the petition was “filed in good faith” and that
“Petitioner ha[d] maintained a reasonable basis for his claim.” ECF No. 118 at 4-5. Moreover, an
entitlement hearing was held in this case with testimony from multiple experts. Minute Entry
dated 4/12/2023; Tr. at 3-4, 190-91. I conclude this case was brought in good faith and maintained
a reasonable basis.
B. Attorneys’ Fees
Petitioner requests a total of $14,847.50 in attorneys’ fees, consisting of $7,499.50 for
Sands Anderson PC (“Sands Anderson”) and $7,348.00 for Siri & Glimstad LLP (“Siri &
Glimstad”).3 Fees App. at 6; Fees Reply at 3.
1. Reasonable Hourly Rate
As noted, a reasonable hourly rate is defined as the rate “prevailing in the community for
similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Avera,
515 F.3d at 1348 (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11). In general, this rate is based on “the forum
rate for the District of Columbia” rather than “the rate in the geographic area of the practice of
[P]etitioner’s attorney.” Rodriguez v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 632 F.3d 1381, 1384 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (citing Avera, 515 F. 3d at 1349).
McCulloch provides the framework for determining the appropriate compensation for
attorneys’ fees based upon the attorneys’ experience. See McCulloch v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.
Servs., No. 09-293V, 2015 WL 5634323 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 1, 2015). The Office of
Special Masters has accepted the reasoning of McCulloch and issues an annual Fee Schedule
based on that decision.4
Petitioner requests compensation for Dr. Ramon Rodriguez III, counsel, for work
performed while at his prior law firm, Sands Anderson, at the following hourly rates: $510.00 for
3
In early 2025, Petitioner’s counsel, Dr. Ramon Rodriguez III, changed firms from Sands Anderson to Siri
& Glimstad. Fees App. at 4 (“On January 31, 2025, counsel for Petitioner left employment at [Sands
Anderson], and on February 1, 2025, transitioned his practice to Siri & Glimstad. . .”)
4
The 2015-2026 Fee Schedules are available at: https://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/osm-attorneys-forum-
hourly-rate-fee-schedules.
4
work performed in 2024; and $563.00 for work performed in 2025. Fees App. at 6; Fees Reply at
3. Petitioner also requests compensation for Dr. Rodriguez’s paralegals while at Sands Anderson
at a rate of $195.00 per hour for work performed in 2024. Id. Additionally, Petitioner requests
compensation for Dr. Rodriguez for work performed at his current law firm, Siri & Glimstad, at a
rate of $563.00 per hour for work performed in 2025; as well as compensation for paralegal work
at Siri & Glimstad at a rate of $210.00 per hour for work performed in 2025. Id.
Dr. Rodriguez’s requested rate for work performed in 2024 is consistent with what he has
previously been awarded and is in accordance with the Office of Special Masters’ Fee Schedule;
however, his requested rate for 2025 requires adjustment, as it is inconsistent with what he has
previously been awarded. See Bodie v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 19-1351V, 2025 WL
2650579, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 20, 2025) (awarding Dr. Rodriguez a rate of $510.00
for work performed in 2024); Coriale v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 24-0328V, 2026 WL
473150, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 16, 2026) (approving Dr. Rodriguez’s “proposed rate of
$547.00 for work performed in 2025”); Massie v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 24-662V,
2026 WL 459222, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 20, 2026) (reducing Dr. Rodriguez’s requested
rate of $563.00 for work performed in 2025 to $547.00). Accordingly, the 2025 rate for Dr.
Rodriguez will be reduced to his previously awarded rate of $547.00. This results in a $184.00
reduction.5
As for the paralegal rates, I find that the requested paralegal rates are reasonable, based on
the Office of Special Masters’ Fee Schedule and what Dr. Rodriguez’s staff have previously been
awarded. See Bodie, 2025 WL 2650579, at *3 (awarding a rate of $195.00 for paralegal work
performed in 2024); Massie, 2026 WL 459222, at *4 (awarding a rate of $210.00 for paralegal
work performed in 2025).
2. Hours Reasonably Expended
Attorneys’ fees are awarded for the “number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation.” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348. Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the rates
charged, hours expended, and costs incurred are reasonable. Wasson v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.
Servs., 24 Cl. Ct. 482, 484 (1993). Ultimately, however, it is “well within the [s]pecial [m]aster’s
discretion to reduce the hours to a number that, in [her] experience and judgment, [is] reasonable
for the work done.” Saxton, 3 F.3d at 1522. Such a reduction may be made sua sponte, even in
the absence of enumerated objections from Respondent. Sabella v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
86 Fed. Cl. 201, 208-09 (2009); Savin, 85 Fed. Cl. at 318.
A special master need not engage in a line-by-line analysis of a petitioner’s fee application
when reducing fees. Broekelschen, 102 Fed. Cl. at 729. Instead, the special master may make a
global reduction to the total amount of fees requested. See Hines, 22 Cl. Ct. at 753 (“special
masters have wide latitude in determining the reasonableness of both attorneys’ fees and costs”);
Hocraffer v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-533V, 2011 WL 3705153 (Fed. Cl. Spec.
5
Applying Dr. Rodriguez’s previously awarded rate of $547.00 for work performed in 2025 results in a
$184.00 reduction (Sands Anderson reduction: $563.00 - $547.00 = $16.00 x 0.50 hrs. = $8.00); (Siri &
Glimstad reduction: $563.00 - $547.00 = $16.00 x 11 hrs. = $176.00).
5
Mstr. July 25, 2011), mot. for rev. denied, 2011 WL 6292218, at *13 (Fed. Cl. 2011) (denying
review of the special master’s decision and endorsing “a global – rather than line-by-line –
approach to determine the reasonable number of hours expended in this case”).
While attorneys may be compensated for non-attorney-level work, the rate must be
comparable to what would be paid for a paralegal or secretary. See O’Neill v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., No. 08–243V, 2015 WL 2399211, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 28, 2015). Clerical
and secretarial tasks should not be billed at all, regardless of who performs them. See, e.g.,
McCulloch, 2015 WL 5634323, at *26. It is well-established that billing for administrative and
clerical tasks is not permitted in the Vaccine Program. Rochester v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 379,
387 (1989).
The overall hours spent on this matter appear to be largely reasonable; however, a minor
reduction is necessary due to time billed for administrative and clerical tasks. Some entries also
were block billed, meaning non-compensable administrative tasks were indistinguishably billed
together with compensable tasks. Most of these entries bill for reviewing filing notices or
formatting exhibits. See Exs. 83-84. Examples include (but are not limited to):
• November 5, 2024: 0.30 hours billed by Ms. Nicole G. Dernelle-Ruhlow, paralegal:
“Format exhibits 78-80 for filing with the court”;
• December 2, 2024: 0.20 hours billed by Dr. Ramon Rodriguez: “Draft, proof,
format, and file reply to response to second motion for interim fees and costs (2.0);
Review United States Court of Federal Claims notice of filing reply brief [document
number 116] (0.1)”;
• August 5, 2025: 0.10 hours billed by Dr. Ramon Rodriguez: “Review United States
Court of Federal Claims notice of filing.”
Id. (emphasis added). These issues have previously been raised with Dr. Rodriguez and his
colleagues, including in this case. See Parker v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 17-917V,
2025 WL 1836689, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 19, 2025) (applying a flat $500.00 reduction
for billing for administrative and clerical tasks); Quinones v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No.
11-154V, 2023 WL 6464905, at *2-3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 2, 2023) (reducing fees by
$6,000.00 for billing for clerical tasks and billing for travel at Dr. Rodriguez’s full hourly rate).
Because these tasks were performed by multiple individuals over a two-year period and billed at
different hourly rates, I will apply a flat $900.00 deduction from the requested attorneys’ fees for
these charges.6
Accordingly, I award Petitioner a total of $13,763.50 in attorneys’ fees.7
6
Sands Anderson’s reduction is $300.00; Siri & Glimstad’s reduction is $600.00.
7
For Sands Anderson, Petitioner is awarded $7,191.50, reflecting Petitioner’s $7,499.50 request for
attorneys’ fees for Sands Anderson minus the $8.00 reduction for Dr. Rodriguez’s work in 2025 and the
$300.00 reduction for billing for administrative tasks ($7,499.50 - $8.00 - $300.00 = $7,191.50). For Siri
& Glimstad, Petitioner is awarded $6,572.00, reflecting Petitioner’s $7,348.00 request for attorneys’ fees
6
C. Reasonable Costs
Petitioner requests a total of $36,150.00 in attorneys’ costs for Sands Anderson for Dr.
Steinman’s expert costs in this case. Fees App. at 6; Fees Reply at 3; Ex. 82. Dr. Steinman billed
31 hours at a rate of $500.00 per hour for work performed in 2018 and 2019, and he billed 43 hours
at a rate of $550.00 per hour for work performed in 2020 and 2023. Ex. 82 at 4. Dr. Steinman has
been awarded his requested hourly rates by other special masters, and I see no reason to disturb his
request. See Noorani v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 16-970V, 2022 WL 780828, at *6
(Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 20, 2022) (awarding Dr. Steinman a rate of $500.00 per hour for work
performed in 2018 and 2019); Mason v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 17-1383V, 2022 WL
4693380, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 8, 2022) (granting Dr. Steinman a “slight rate increase”
from $500.00 to $550.00). I find the overall number of hours Dr. Steinman worked on this case to
be reasonable, and I will award his expert costs in full.
I award Petitioner a total of $36,150.00 in attorneys’ costs.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, I GRANT IN PART Petitioner’s application and award the following:
• Petitioner is awarded attorneys’ fees and costs in the total amount of $49,913.50,8
to be paid through an ACH deposit to Petitioner’s counsel’s IOLTA account for
prompt disbursement.
In the absence of a motion for review filed pursuant to RCFC Appendix B, the Clerk of
Court SHALL ENTER JUDGMENT in accordance with this decision.9
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Jennifer A. Shah
Jennifer A. Shah
Special Master
for Siri & Glimstad minus the $176.00 reduction for Dr. Rodriguez’s work in 2025 and the $600.00
reduction for billing for administrative tasks ($7,348.00 - $176.00 - $600.00 = $6,572.00).
8
For Sands Anderson, Petitioner is awarded $43,341.50, reflecting an award of $7,191.50 for attorneys’
fees and $36,150.00 for costs. For Siri & Glimstad, Petitioner is awarded $6,572.00 for attorneys’ fees.
9
Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), the parties may expedite entry of judgment by filing a joint notice
renouncing their right to seek review.
7