The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JIMMY LAWRENCE NANCE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Civil No. 3:24-cv-1632-RJD
)
SUSAN RUDOLPH, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DALY, Magistrate Judge:1
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Continue Trial Setting (Doc.
80) and Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 84) as well as on Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial
Notice and Motion to Strike (Doc. 92). For the reasons explained below, Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 84) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice and Motion
to Strike (Doc. 92) is DENIED, and Defendant’s Motion to Continue Trial Setting (Doc. 80) is
DENIED as moot.
Background
Plaintiff Jimmy Lawrence Nance, an inmate of the Federal Bureau of Prisons who is
currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution—Greenville, brought this action for
deprivations of his constitutional rights. (Doc. 24, p. 1). Nance alleges that on October 14, 2023,
Warden Thomas Lillard ordered that the outside cell windows of approximately 120 cells at FCI
Greenville, including those in Plaintiff’s cell, be “painted” to block all view of the outside world
and direct sunlight. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff argues that Warden Lillard’s actions create disparate
treatment of similarly situated prisoners because only a select number of inmates lack access to
1 This matter has been assigned to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings through the parties’ consent
sunlight and views of the sky, while other inmates are not being denied access. (Id.). After
threshold review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff was allowed to proceed on
the following claims:
Count 2: Eighth Amendment condition of confinement claim for injunctive relief
against Warden Thomas Lillard for painting the windows in Nance’s cell,
blocking all sunlight and view of the outside; and
Count 4: Fifth Amendment equal protection claim for injunctive relief against
Warden Thomas Lillard for painting the windows in Nance’s cell, blocking
all sunlight and view of the outside.
(Id. at 2, 9).2 The current Warden of FCI Greenville, Susan Rudolph, was thereafter substituted
for Defendant Lillard. (Docs. 76 & 79).
On March 17, 2026, Defendant moved to continue the trial setting of August 25, 2026.
(Doc. 80), to which Plaintiff objected (Doc. 82). On April 28, 2026, Defendant filed her Motion
for Summary Judgment that includes a Statement of Material Facts with proper citation to the
record. (Doc. 84). Defendant also served Plaintiff with a notice under Rule 56.1 advising Plaintiff
of the consequences of failing to respond to the motion or to comply with Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 56”) and Local Rule 56.1. (Doc. 85). On June 3, 2026, Plaintiff
filed a response opposing the motion, including a Response to Defendant’s Statement of Material
Facts. (Docs. 90 & 91-1). Plaintiff also attached to his response a Statement of Disputed Facts,
summarizing the material facts that he argues are genuinely disputed. (Doc. 91-2). Thereafter,
Plaintiff filed his Request for Judicial Notice and Motion to Strike, arguing that Defendant has
waived any argument that the alleged constitutional conduct was reasonably related to a legitimate
penological purpose because this defense was not raised during the prison administrative
2 Plaintiff’s claims for damages were dismissed because Plaintiff had failed to state a claim under Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). (Doc. 24). Plaintiff was
allowed to proceed only on his claims for injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which “provides
jurisdiction for the exercise of the traditional powers of equity in actions arising under federal law,” without
the need for any “more specific statutory basis.” (Id. (quoting Simmat v. United States Bureau of Prisons,
proceedings. (Doc. 92). On June 17, 2023, Defendant filed a reply as well as a response in
opposition to Plaintiff’s motion. (Docs. 93 & 94). On July 13, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Sur-Reply.
(Doc. 95).
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party can demonstrate “that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L.
Ed. 2d 265 (1986); see also Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d
603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of
any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for
summary judgment is made, the adverse party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91
L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863
F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Further, a “nonmovant’s failure
to respond to a summary judgment motion, or failure to comply with Local Rule 56.1, does not, .
. . automatically result in judgment for the movant”; the movant “must still demonstrate that it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Keeton v. Morningstar, Inc., 667 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir.
2012) (citing Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 608 (7th Cir. 2006); Reales v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 84 F.3d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 1996). In considering a summary judgment
motion, the district court views the facts in the light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable
inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d
962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
Compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rules 7 & 56.1
Under Rule 56 and Local Rule 56.1, a party opposing a motion for summary judgment and
asserting that a fact is genuinely disputed must support the assertion with citation “to particular
parts of materials in the record,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), “including page number(s), upon
which the opposing party relies, where available.” SDIL-LR 56.1(b). The Court is not required to
consider material that is not properly cited in a Statement of Material Facts or in a response thereto,
and it will “disregard any asserted fact that is not supported with a citation to the record, unless
the factual basis for the assertion is clearly identifiable from the parties’ related citations or
permissible inference.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); SDIL-LR 56.1(f). “All material facts set forth
in a Statement of Material Facts . . . shall be deemed admitted for purposes of summary judgment
unless specifically disputed.” Local Rule 56.1 “applies equally to represented and pro se parties.”
SDIL-LR 56.1(j). Further, the Court does not accept sur-reply briefs under any circumstances.
SDIL-7.1(a)(4).
Here, Plaintiff’s original response to Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts and his
Statement of Disputed Facts lack any citation to the record. (Docs. 91-1 & 91-2). In his Sur-Reply,
Plaintiff attempts to correct this deficiency by attaching a “corrected” version of his response to
the motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 95, pp. 7-26). However, under Local Rules, the Court
cannot accept any sur-reply, and Plaintiff never sought leave to file a corrected response. He argues
that he did not include citations in his original response because he was unaware of the local rules.
However, along with the Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant served Plaintiff with a Notice
that recited Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule 56.1 verbatim and advised Plaintiff
of the consequences of his failure to comply with them. (Doc. 85).
In any case, Plaintiff’s “corrected response” to Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts
still, in most parts, does not comply with Rule 56 and Local Rule 56.1. In response to most of
Defendant’s factual allegations, Plaintiff cites to certain paragraphs in “Defendant’s response.”
The Court assumes this is a reference to Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts in his Motion for
Summary Judgment. However, to properly show that a factual contention is genuinely disputed,
Plaintiff must cite admissible evidence in the record supporting his version of the events. Merely
citing the Defendant’s factual allegations does not support Plaintiff’s factual contention and is
insufficient to raise a triable issue.
Plaintiff only cites to his own exhibits in his response to Defendant’s factual allegations in
¶¶ 19-20. (Doc. 36, p. 15, ¶¶ 19-20). While not required under Local Rules, the Court will consider
those factual allegations in its analysis. However, all remaining factual allegations set forth in
Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts are being deemed admitted unless they are unsupported
by the cited record based on the Court’s independent review. See SDIL-LR 56.1(g). The Court will
still review these facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. The Court will also not consider any
other arguments Plaintiff raised in his sur-reply, as such filings are not permitted under the Local
Rules.
Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice and Motion to Strike (Doc. 92)
Plaintiff filed a motion arguing that Defendant has waived any argument that the painting
of the cell windows served a legitimate penological interest because Warden Lillard did not
reference security concerns in response to Plaintiff’s administrative remedy requests. This
argument lacks merit. As Defendant points out, neither the Prison Litigation Reform Act nor the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires defendants in a prisoner suit to raise their defenses in
the administrative phase. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e; 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 et. seq; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, 12.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice and Motion to Strike (Doc. 92) is DENIED.
Findings of Facts
At all relevant times, Nance has been incarcerated at FCI Greenville. (Doc. 84, ¶ 53). FCI
Greenville is a medium security federal correctional institution housing over 1,000 male inmates.
(Doc. 84, ¶ 1). Thomas Lillard served as the Warden of FCI Greenville from May 2023 to June
2025, and was the Chief Executive Officer and official custodian for the inmates incarcerated at
FCI Greenville, having administrative and organizational control over the functions of the
institution, including maintaining its security. (Id. at ¶¶ 1-5).
In the months prior to October 2023 and throughout Warden Lillard’s tenure, there were
multiple drone sightings and contraband drops at FCI Greenville. (Doc. 84, ¶¶ 9, 16). This raised
security concerns regarding the inmates housed in Greenville’s perimeter-facing cells. (Id. at ¶ 6).
Those cells had windows with a clear view of the prison perimeter, allowing perimeter staff patrols
to be observed and inmates housed therein to avoid them and to assist with drone-delivered
contraband drops. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-8). The inmates living in those cells come from a variety of
backgrounds, including different races and religions. (Id. at ¶ 24).
In an effort to address this security concern and curb drone contraband drops, in October
2023, Warden Lillard directed the application of Krylon Specialty Privacy Glass on the perimeter
cell windows at FCI Greenville. (Doc. 84, ¶¶ 17-19).3 The spray is semi-transparent, obscuring a
clear view of the outside but allowing indirect natural light.4 (Id. at ¶ 20). While the spray obscures
3 In his “corrected response,” Plaintiff states that he does not disagree with Defendant’s statement, but he
cites to one of his exhibits “for additional information.” (Doc. 95, ¶ 19). The cited exhibit appears to be an
AI-generated Google search summary listing the different types of Krylon Specialty Glass sprays. As
Defendant points out, the AI summaries constitute inadmissible hearsay and also lack any evidentiary
foundation. In any case, Plaintiff does not dispute that factual allegation and merely offered the exhibit for
“additional information,” which is insufficient to create a genuine dispute. (Doc. 95, p. 15, ¶ 19).
4 In his “corrected response,” Plaintiff disputes that his cell receives any “natural light.” (Doc. 95, ¶ 20). He
argues that the diffused or indirect light that passes through his cell window is not “natural light” because
it is not “unimpeded.” He points again to AI-generated Google search summaries, listing several definitions
of terms such as “natural light,” “diffused light,” and “translucent.” (Id.; Doc. 91-3, pp. 3-5). However,
even under the Merriam–Webster Online Dictionary, on which Plaintiff relies in his exhibits, natural light
a clear view of the outside, the outline of items placed on the interior cell window sill can be seen
through the cell window from the exterior of the facility. (Id. at ¶ 21; Doc. 89). This spray was
applied only to cell windows having a view of the outer perimeter of the institution to preclude the
inmates housed therein from viewing outside perimeter patrols to prevent inmates from facilitating
drone contraband drops by assisting in avoiding the patrols. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-23, 25). Moving inmates
out of the perimeter-facing cells is not feasible, as there is not adequate space in the institution to
house all inmates in interior-facing cells. (Id. at ¶ 28). Further, it was unnecessary to apply the
translucent spray to all cell windows, including those facing the institution’s interior grounds, as
the purpose of the spray was to prevent inmates from observing staff patrols along the perimeter
of the prison grounds. (Id. at ¶ 29).
Susan Rudolph, the Warden of FCI Greenville, currently holds the same responsibilities
held by Warden Lillard during his tenure. (Doc. 84, ¶ 31). Warden Rudolph is aware of the security
concerns regarding the introduction of contraband via drone, which led to the application of the
translucent spray in October 2023, and remains a concern. (Id. at ¶¶ 32-34).
Plaintiff is housed in Housing Unit 4A, Cell 244, one of the cells on which windows were
treated with the translucent spray. (Doc. 84, ¶ 55).5 Photographs of Plaintiff’s cell show natural
light entering Plaintiff’s cell from the exterior cell window that has been treated with the
translucent spray. (Id. at ¶¶ 56-57; Doc. 89). There are also photographs of the outside of Plaintiff’s
cell showing that the outline of items placed on the interior cell window sill can be seen through
the cell window from the exterior of the facility. (Id. at ¶ 21; Doc. 89). Plaintiff’s cell also contains
two artificial lights. (Id. at ¶ 58).
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/natural%20light (last visited Jul. 15, 2026). The
light penetrating Plaintiff’s cell window, even though diffused, indirect, or impeded, still comes from the
sun, and is, therefore, natural light. Accordingly, Plaintiff cited record does not support his allegation that
no natural light enters his cell.
5 Plaintiff states in his response that he has since been transferred to Cell 242, whose windows have also
Defendant provided a summary of Plaintiff’s daily activities and his respective exposure
to sunlight. (Doc. 84, ¶¶ 59-97). Plaintiff is in a lockdown in his cell between 9:30 p.m. and 5:30
a.m. (Id. at ¶¶ 59-77). Based on Plaintiff’s daily activities on a typical weekday, Plaintiff only
spends an average of 6 hours in his cell between 5:30 a.m. and 9:30 p.m. (Id.). Specifically,
Plaintiff wakes up at 5:30 a.m., and then generally leaves his cell around 6:20 a.m. to go to the
common area of his housing unit until around 6:45 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. (Id. at ¶¶ 59-61). Plaintiff
then leaves his housing unit and goes to the “main line” dining building for breakfast. (Id. at ¶ 62).
To get to and from his housing unit and the dining building, Plaintiff must walk across the prison
facility’s outdoor campus. (Id. at ¶ 63). After breakfast, at or around 7:15 a.m., Plaintiff returns to
his cell until 7:30 a.m., when he is called for work at the UNICOR facility that is separate from
his housing unit. (Id. at ¶¶ 64-65). To get to and from his housing unit and the UNICOR work
facility, Plaintiff must walk across the prison facility’s outdoor campus. (Id. at ¶¶ 66). Plaintiff
works at his UNICOR job five days a week, Monday through Friday, from 7:30 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.,
and from 11:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. (Id. at ¶¶ 67-68 & 71). Between 11:00 a.m. and 11:30 a.m.,
Plaintiff has lunch in the main line dining building, which is separate from the UNICOR work
facility. (Id. at ¶ 69). After leaving his UNICOR job, Plaintiff typically returns to his housing unit.
(Id. at ¶ 70). Plaintiff is in a lockdown in his cell between 3:30 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. (Id. at ¶ 73).
After 5:00 p.m., Plaintiff participates in “no chow rec” until 6:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. (Id. at ¶¶ 74-
75). During that time, he either exercises outdoors or lifts weights in the prison gym, depending
on the weather and time of year. (Id. at ¶ 76). Then, he typically spends time between the common
area of his housing unit and his cell until he is locked down at 9:30 p.m. (Id. at ¶ 77). On weekends,
weather permitting, Plaintiff typically spends 4 hours per day (Saturdays and Sundays) on outdoor
recreation year-round. (Id. at ¶¶ 81, 84). Plaintiff volunteers for outdoor work, such as weed eating,
and recently completed a six-month outdoor project. (Id. at ¶¶ 85-89).
Besides Plaintiff’s cell, there are other areas in the institution with windows that Plaintiff
can see out of, including the prison visiting room, the hallways between the housing units, the
main line building, the Education Department, and the indoor recreation area. (Id. at ¶¶ 90-95).
Plaintiff also passes through the outdoor campus daily to reach the UNICOR work facility, the
Education Department, and the dining building, and to return to his cell. (Id. at ¶¶ 63, 66, 83).
Discussion
Count 2
In Count 2, Plaintiff raised an Eighth Amendment condition of confinement claim for
injunctive relief for painting his cell window, blocking all sunlight and view of the outside. It is
well settled that the “Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons” but also does not “permit
inhumane ones.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1976, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811
(1994) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2400, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981)
(quotation marks omitted)). The conditions under which a prisoner is “confined are subject to
scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment,” which prohibits “cruel and unusual punishment.” Id.
(citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2479, 125 L. Ed. 2d 22 (1993). To
prevail on his Eighth Amendment claim of unconstitutional conditions of confinement, Plaintiff
needs to show that he was confined under conditions that denied him “the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. Plaintiff must also show that Defendant
acted with a culpable state of mind, that is, knowingly disregarding an inmate’s substantial risk of
serious harm by failing to take reasonable measures to prevent it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847.
Here, Plaintiff argues that he is subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement
because the application of the spray on his cell window deprives him of direct and unobscured
access to sunlight and of a view to the outside. There does not appear to be any binding authority
directly on point. District courts addressing this issue have noted that “direct sunlight itself does
not appear to be a ‘basic human need,’” but an inmate may “establish that sunlight is a necessary
element to his physical or psychological health, or that lack of sunlight otherwise exposes him to
a substantial risk of serious harm.” See Lindell v. Schneiter, 531 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1013 (W.D.
Wis. 2008); see also Homan v. Milwaukee Cnty. Jail, No. 25-CV-1806-PP, 2026 WL 483321, at
*2 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 20, 2026) (dismissing a complaint because the inmate did not state for how
long he was deprived of any exposure to sunlight); Ellis v. Santerelli, No. 20 C 5959, 2023 WL
4976180, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2023) (dismissing an inmate’s Eighth Amendment claim when
there was no evidence that he “suffered any ill-effects on his health” from what the alleged poor
ventilation and lack of sunlight); Gonzalez v. Josephson, No. 14-CV-4366, 2019 WL 1013737, at
*20 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2019) (dismissing pretrial detainees’ claim for inadequate access to sunlight
where even though some of the cells did not have windows, the detainees still had access to the
dayroom and indoor recreation area both of which had large windows and there was no indication
of medical issues as a result of the alleged lack of access to sunlight).
Plaintiff points to a district court case that has noted that the Seventh Circuit has
“suggested” a constitutional right to “sunshine and fresh air.” Passmore v. Josephson, 376 F. Supp.
3d 874, 886 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (citing Jerricks v. Schomig, 65 F. App’x 57, 58 (7th Cir. 2003)). A
closer look at Jerricks, however, shows that the Seventh Circuit did not make such a broad finding.
There, a district court had dismissed for failure to state a claim an inmate’s complaint alleging
unconstitutional conditions of confinement for denial of “yard access, sunshine, and fresh air every
day from July 29, 1999 until October 2000.” Jerricks, 65 F. App’x at 58. The Seventh Circuit
reversed, noting that it has found constitutional violations based on “less severe deprivations” of
yard or outdoor access. Id. (collecting case law). Therefore, the issue there was an inmate’s access
to the outdoors and sunlight in general, not the direct and unobscured access to sunlight from an
inmate’s cell window as Plaintiff asserts in this case.
A closer reading of relevant case law shows that the lack of direct sunlight or outside view
from the cell does not appear to implicate the Eighth Amendment when it is not prolonged, the
inmate has otherwise adequate outdoor access or sunlight exposure, and there is no evidence that
the lack of sunlight exposes the inmate to a substantial risk of serious harm. See Adams v. Pate,
445 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1971) (finding no constitutional violation where an inmate was confined in
7 by 15-foot segregation cell with 8-foot ceiling which was equipped with radiator, running water,
flush toilet, ceiling light and frosted window covered by mesh screen); Jones v. Triti, No. 22-CV-
694-PP, 2023 WL 8653999, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 14, 2023) (dismissing a claim of
unconstitutional conditions of confinement where the windows of the jail had a covering or film
that blocked sunlight from coming into the jail but there was no indication that the inmate did not
have otherwise access to the outdoors); Gaustad v. Frank, No. 05-C-187, 2007 WL 528199, at *4
(E.D. Wis. Feb. 15, 2007) (dismissing a conditions of confinement claim of an inmate who had
been confined in a segregation cell unit with frosted window that obstructed sunlight and outside
view because he had spent less than four months in there and the overall conditions did not rise to
the level of severity that violate an inmate’s rights); Lindell v. Frank, No. 06-C-608-C, 2006 WL
3300379, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 13, 2006) (allowing an inmate to proceed with a conditions of
confinement alleging that he was denied outdoor recreation for all but 2½ hours each week which
negatively impacted his mental health).
Here, the record shows that the spray applied to Plaintiff’s cell window still allows natural
light to come into the cell. Further, Plaintiff has not argued that the two artificial lights do not
adequately illuminate his cell. The undisputed evidence also shows that during a typical week,
Plaintiff receives adequate exposure to sunlight and a view of the outside. Weather permitting,
Plaintiff has at least 8 hours of direct sunlight exposure while outdoors during the weekends.
Further, each evening, he generally spends 1.5 hours on recreation, which can be either outdoors
or in the indoor recreation area that has windows that allow inmates to see outside. Each day,
Plaintiff’s movement to and from the main line dining, his job, and recreation all require him to
go outdoors. Numerous areas of the institution also have windows allowing Plaintiff to see outside,
including the main line building, the visiting room, the indoor recreation area, and the education
department. The hallways traveled by inmates between the housing units of the institution also
contain windows allowing Plaintiff to see outside. Plaintiff also takes the opportunity to do work
outside, such as weed eating, and recently completed a long-term outdoor project.
Plaintiff does not dispute these alternative sources of access to daylight and view to the
outside. He contends, however, that they are irrelevant because he is not “housed” in those areas.
In other words, he argues that he is subjected to cruel and unusual punishment simply because his
cell does not offer direct and unobstructed access to sunlight and outside view, regardless of his
otherwise unrestricted access to sunlight and the outdoors. Yet he cites no authority to support that
the Eighth Amendment warrants such amenities. He only points to non-binding authority that is
readily distinguishable from the case at bar. See Martino v. Carey, 563 F. Supp. 984, 999 (D. Or.
1983) (noting that the Eighth Amendment requires “a minimum level of illumination” through
natural or artificial light in the cells and finding that the inmate’s rights were violated where they
were housed in cells “as dark as a dungeon” with inadequate natural or artificial light); Bono v.
Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609, 617 (7th Cir. 1980) (discussing “poor lighting” even with artificial light that
prevented prisoners from reading); Rutherford v. Pitchess, 457 F. Supp. 104, 112 (C.D. Cal. 1978)
(where inmates went “for many months without even seeing a bush or a tree or any human activity
outside the jail”); Rhem v. Malcolm, 432 F. Supp. 769, 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (“Most detainees at
MHD are unable to see out of the building” and lack “contact with sun, sky, street or the outside
world” with outdoor exercise opportunity not exceeding 50 minutes per week in a small rooftop
area); Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549, 554 (E.D. La. 1972) (windows had “sheet metal
covers and boarding on the outside of the windows”). Plaintiff’s reliance on these cases is
misplaced: his conditions of confinement are readily distinguishable from those faced by the
inmates there.
He further argues that courts have upheld only the blocking of windows for inmates in
segregation, which is short-term and distinct from the extended housing in general population cells.
Yet, at least one district court has upheld the confinement of pretrial detainees for over three years
in cells without windows, where the housing unit had dayrooms and indoor recreation areas with
large windows. Gonzalez, 2019 WL 1013737, at *20.
Plaintiff has also not shown that the lack of sunlight has exposed him to a substantial risk
of serious harm. Plaintiff alleges in his response to the motion that he had an eye hemorrhage on
December 1, 2026, which he attributes to inadequate lighting in his cell. Yet, he has not provided
any medical records or other supportive evidence to show any connection between the alleged
injury and the lack of unobscured direct sunlight in his cell. Plaintiff’s uncorroborated allegations
in his Response are insufficient at this stage to defeat summary judgment. See Stockton v.
Milwaukee Cnty., 44 F.4th 605, 614 (7th Cir. 2022) (“A party who fails to produce evidence
sufficient to establish an element essential to that party’s case on which they bear the burden of
proof cannot survive a summary judgment challenge.”).
Plaintiff argues that the lack of direct sunlight in cells can cause a “myriad of other issues,”
such as depression. (Doc. 91, p. 5). He even attempts to connect a purported suicide by another
inmate to the sprayed cell windows. He offers numerous, mostly unsworn, statements by other
inmates housed in cells with similarly treated windows describing the impact on their mental and
physical health. He further asks the Court to take judicial notice of an expert testimony on a
completely unrelated case regarding the connection between circadian rhythm and certain
ailments. But Plaintiff has not even alleged that he has personally suffered any such consequences,
let alone offered any medical evidence to support any connection between any serious mental
health impact that those inmates have suffered and the spraying of the windows. Neither has
Plaintiff offered any evidence of a risk of serious harm that is “sure or very likely” to occur, given
his typical weekly outdoor access and exposure to sunlight. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50, 128
S.Ct. 1520, 170 L.Ed.2d 420 (2008) (quoting Helling, 509 U.S. at 33) (noting that an “objectively
intolerable risk of harm” must be “‘sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless
suffering’” to trigger protection under the Eighth Amendment).
Based on the record viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, no reasonable jury could
find that Plaintiff has suffered an objectively serious medical need as a result of the application of
the spray on his cell window. “Simply put, under the law as interpreted by the Supreme Court and
the Seventh Circuit, not every inconvenience, uncomfortable, or less than ideal condition violates
the constitution.” Ellis, 2023 WL 4976180, at *11 (citing Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235
(7th Cir. 1988); Shelby Cty. Jail Inmates v. Westlake, 798 F.2d 1085, 1087 (7th Cir. 1986)).
Therefore, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Count 2 of the Complaint.6
Count 4
In Count 4, Plaintiff asserts that his equal protection rights have been violated by the
facility’s decision to apply the translucent spray on the windows of the inmates housed in the
exterior perimeter-facing cells only. He argues that the 200 affected inmates are treated differently
from the facility’s remaining 700 inmates without any disciplinary basis, simply because of their
cells’ location.
6 Defendant argues, alternatively, that dismissal of Count 2 is warranted under Turner v. Safely because the
covering of the windows with the translucent paint served the legitimate penological purpose of securing
the safety of the facility. 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1987). However, the Supreme
Court has clarified that the deliberate indifference standard, rather than Turner’s penological-purpose test,
governs Eighth Amendment claims of cruel and unusual punishment in prison. Johnson v. California, 543
U.S. 499, 511, 125 S. Ct. 1141, 1149–50, 160 L. Ed. 2d 949 (2005); see also Garrett v. Lumpkin, 96 F.4th
896, 901–02 (5th Cir. 2024) (finding Johnson’s relevant language binding and declining to apply Turner’s
Under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, “all persons similarly
situated should be treated alike.”7 United States v. Brucker, 646 F.3d 1012, 1016–17 (7th Cir.
2011) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982)). When the
alleged disparate treatment is “not based on a suspect class and does not affect a fundamental right,
prison administrators may treat inmates differently as long as the unequal treatment is rationally
related to a legitimate penological interest.” Flynn v. Thatcher, 819 F.3d 990, 991 (7th Cir. 2016)
(citing cases). “Prison classifications are presumed to be rational and will be upheld if any
justification for them can be conceived.” Id.
For instance, the Seventh Circuit upheld a prison’s policy of restricting access to
commissary items by inmates in administrative segregation, where there were no allegations of
restrictions based on a suspect class, and allegations indicated restrictions were logically connected
to promoting prison security. Griffin v. Carter, No. 23-1462, 2023 WL 4946734 (7th Cir. Aug. 3,
2023). Likewise, the court found that banning in-person meetings between inmates and reporters
at the Bureau of Prisons’ most secure institutions based on security concerns did not violate the
inmates’ Equal Protection Clause. Hammer v. Ashcroft, 570 F.3d 798, 799 – 801 (7th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff agrees that this case does not implicate a suspected class. He argues, however, that
he has a “fundamental right” in “sunshine and fresh air” under Jerricks. Yet, the application of the
translucent paint on his cell window does not implicate that right. There is no dispute that Plaintiff
still has adequate access to the outdoors during a typical week, as well as access to direct sunlight
in other areas of the facility, which he typically visits daily. Rather, the right asserted here is much
narrower: a convicted inmate’s right to direct and unobstructed access to sunlight and outside view
7 It is well settled that, while the equal protection warranties of the Fourteenth Amendment apply only to
the States, the same protections are extended against the federal government through the “equal protection
component” of the Fifth Amendment. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522,
542 n. 21, 107 S.Ct. 2971, 97 L.Ed.2d 427 (1987). The analysis of equal protection claims under the Fifth
from his cell. See Dep't of State v. Munoz, 602 U.S. 899, 910, 144 S. Ct. 1812, 1822, 219 L. Ed.
2d 507 (2024) (directing that the analysis should begin with a “careful description of the asserted
fundamental liberty interest.”). The Court has not found, and Plaintiff has not pointed to any
authority supporting the existence of such a fundamental right “deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2268, 138
L. Ed. 2d 772 (1997).
Plaintiff further relies on Lock v. Jenkins for the proposition that the inmates housed in the
cells with the treated windows are denied equal protection under the law by being held in
significantly more burdensome conditions without any justification for such treatment. Lock v.
Jenkins, 641 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1981). But Lock dealt with the improper classification between
pretrial detainees, who were subjected to significantly harsher conditions of confinement, and
convicted inmates, who enjoyed better conditions of confinement. The Seventh Circuit explained
that under equal protection and due process mandates, “pretrial detainees may not be treated less
favorably than convicted persons, unless the difference in treatment is justified by a legitimate
government interest.” Lock, 641 F.2d at 497. Here, Plaintiff, a convicted inmate, is not entitled to
the more demanding due process and equal protection standards applicable to pretrial detainees.
See Roundtree v. Dart, No. 23-2576, 2025 WL 401207, at *2 (7th Cir. Feb. 5, 2025) (“a detainee
does not have to satisfy the more exacting standard applicable to a convicted prisoner, who has a
liberty interest only when a punishment results in an ‘atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’”). Accordingly, Lock is inapposite. In
any case, the court there noted that even for pretrial detainees, the more burdensome conditions of
confinement would pass equal protection muster if they were rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest. Lock, 641 F.2d at 497.
Because the alleged disparate treatment here is not based on a suspect class and does not
affect a fundamental right, rational-basis review applies. Defendant has satisfied its burden of
showing that applying paint only to the windows of the exterior-perimeter-facing cells serves the
legitimate interests of preventing the introduction of contraband and maintaining institutional
security. The record shows that the purpose of that measure is to inhibit the introduction of drone-
dropped contraband into the facility, which has been a continuing issue. Defendant has shown that
the translucent spray prevents inmates in those cells from observing staff perimeter patrols and
assisting outside individuals with the introduction of contraband. As Defendant points out, without
knowledge of the timing and presence of perimeter staff patrols, it is more difficult to drop
contraband into the facility successfully.
Plaintiff counters that applying the spray to the windows of the perimeter-facing cells is
ineffective because incidents of drones dropping contraband have increased since the measure has
been adopted. However, the applicable standard in this case is lenient: Defendant only needs to
show that there was some reasonable relation between the legitimate penological purpose of
restricting the introduction of contraband and drugs into the facility and restricting the window
view of inmates in the exterior perimeter-facing cells. The adopted measure need not be narrowly
tailored to that legitimate purpose. See Flynn, 819 F.3d at 991 (“Prison classifications are presumed
to be rational and will be upheld if any justification for them can be conceived.”). Based on the
record, no reasonable jury could find that Defendant has not satisfied that low threshold.
Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Count 4 of the Complaint.
Conclusion
For these reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 84) is GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice and Motion to Strike (Doc. 92) is DENIED, and
Defendant’s Motion to Continue Trial Setting (Doc. 80) is DENIED as moot. This case is
DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly
and close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 15, 2026 Y >
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Hon. Reona J. Daly
United States Magistrate Judge