Farrell

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RANDY FARRELL ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 25-2197

CITY OF NEW ORLEANS SECTION R

DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY &

PERMITS ET AL.

ORDER & REASONS

Before the Court is the motion to dismiss of defendants Jefferson

Parish and Danny Ferrara.1 Plaintiffs oppose the motion.2 For the following

reasons, the Court grants the motion and dismisses two of plaintiffs’ claims

against Jefferson Parish and Danny Ferrara with prejudice and one of

plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Randy Farrell and his company, IECI & Associates LLC (“IECI”),

brought this case on October 27, 2025. Farrell alleges that he is the president

of IECI, a third-party inspection service provider operating in New Orleans

and Jefferson Parish.3 Plaintiffs’ complaint arises from New Orleans’ and

Jefferson Parish’s revocations of their registrations as approved third-party

1 R. Doc. 9.

2 R. Doc. 28.

3 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 1

inspectors, which plaintiffs contend were discriminatory, retaliatory, and

done without required due process.4

Plaintiffs allege that New Orleans, through Director of Safety and

Permits Tammie Jackson, revoked Farrell’s inspection registration in

January 2023 because Farrell maintained a Louisiana contractor license.

The Code of the City of New Orleans allegedly prohibits an individual from

maintaining a contractor license and third-party inspector registration

simultaneously.5 Farrell allegedly continued to operate IECI, which

maintained a separate inspection registration.6 Farrell allegedly attempted

to renew his own inspection registration after allowing his contractor license

to lapse.7 Plaintiffs allege that Jackson denied Farrell’s renewal in

September 2023 because of concerns about IECI’s city code violations,

Farrell’s plea on a tax fraud indictment, and an investigation into Farrell in

another parish for falsifying documents.8

Plaintiffs further allege that in October 2024, Jefferson Parish

suspended the inspection registrations of both Farrell and IECI because of

federal and state indictments of Farrell on charges of conspiracy to commit

4 See id. at ¶¶ 37, 41, 45, 59.

5 Id. at ¶¶ 13–14.

6 Id. at ¶ 17.

7 Id. at ¶ 16.

8 Id. at ¶ 18; R. Doc. 1-2 at 4.

wire fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit honest services fraud, honest

services fraud, conspiracy to falsify documents, falsifying documents, and

forgery.9 Plaintiffs allege that defendant Danny Ferrara is the Director of

Building Permits for Jefferson Parish.10

Plaintiffs allege that in November 2024, Jackson requested detailed

information regarding IECI’s operations.11 Finding Farrell’s December 2024

response insufficient, Jackson revoked IECI’s inspection registration in New

Orleans in February 2025.12

Plaintiffs further allege that, at some point, Farrell reported to the

mayor of New Orleans a toxic environment at the New Orleans Department

of Safety and Permits, leading to the dismissal of two employees from that

department and from the New Orleans Office of Inspector General.13

According to plaintiffs, the revocations of their inspection registrations were,

at least in part, retaliation for Farrell’s alleged whistleblowing.14

Plaintiffs allege that IECI has lost sixteen inspectors and millions of

dollars in revenue.15

9 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 20; R. Doc. 1-2 at 5–6.

10 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 6.

11 Id. at ¶ 21; R. Doc. 1-2 at 7.

12 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 25; R. Doc. 1-2 at 8.

13 R. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 55–56.

14 Id. at ¶¶ 55–58.

15 Id. at ¶ 24.

Plaintiffs sued New Orleans, Jackson, Jefferson Parish, and Ferrara.

As to Jefferson Parish and Ferrara, plaintiffs sued for: (1) violation of the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) violation of the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment through selective

enforcement and discrimination; and (3) violation of the Equal Protection

Clause through retaliation.

Jefferson Parish and Ferrara now move to dismiss under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), asserting that plaintiffs have failed to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court considers the motion

below.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead

enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)), and “that, if true, ‘raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.’” Franklin v. Regions Bank, 976 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir.

2020) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A claim is facially plausible

“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true

and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lormand

v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2009). But the Court

is not bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual

allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court may take judicial notice of

publicly available documents that are “matters of public record directly

relevant to the issue at hand.” Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 783 (5th

Cir. 2011).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Due Process

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that

“[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without

due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To determine whether a

violation of the Due Process Clause has occurred, the Court must ask, first,

“whether there exists a liberty or property interest of which a person has been

deprived” and, if so, then “whether the procedures followed by the State were

constitutionally sufficient.” Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011).

Here, plaintiffs allege that defendants suspended their third-party

inspection registrations with Jefferson Parish without providing an

opportunity for a hearing or appeal.16 Plaintiffs allege that these suspensions

16 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 40.

deprived them of “constitutionally protected liberty and/or property

interests” in their “permit to operate.”17

1. Property Interest

Property interests are created not by the Constitution but by “an

independent source such as state law.” Id. Nevertheless, “federal

constitutional law determines whether a state-created interest rises to the

level of a legitimate claim of entitlement protected by the Due Process

Clause.” Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978).

To have a property interest in a government benefit under the Due

Process Clause, a plaintiff “must have more than a unilateral expectation of

it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Bd. of

Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). When

government officials may grant or deny a benefit in their discretion, the

benefit is not a protected entitlement. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545

U.S. 748, 756 (2005). “To determine whether statutes or regulations create

a protected property interest, [the Court] must ask whether they place

‘substantive limitations on official discretion.’” Ridgely v. FEMA, 512 F.3d

727, 735 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249

(1983)).

17 Id. at ¶ 44.

Plaintiffs have alleged a protected property interest in their

registrations with Jefferson Parish as third-party inspectors. Through the

Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinances (“the Code”) § 8-1-104.7.11,18 the Parish

implemented La. R.S. 40:1730.23, et seq., allowing the Parish to accept

building inspections performed by third-party providers.

Defendants mistakenly contend that § 8-1-104.7.11.3 granted Ferrara,

Jefferson Parish’s Director of Building Permits, broad power unilaterally to

revoke a third-party registration.19 This section states that the Director “may

at any time invalidate a third-party provider registration if said third party

violates the procedures herein regulating their interaction with the Parish.”

Code § 8-1-104.7.11.3 (emphasis added). But defendants have not argued

that plaintiffs violated any “procedures herein,” nor do the facts alleged by

plaintiffs indicate any such violations. Instead, defendants allegedly revoked

plaintiffs’ registrations in response to plaintiff Farrell’s criminal

indictments.20

18 Jefferson Parish repealed § 8-104.7.11 with the passage of Ord.

No. 26924 in January 2025, several months after the suspension of

plaintiffs’ registration. Because the events at issue in this case

occurred before its repeal, § 8-104.7.11 governs this case.

19 R. Doc. 9-1 at 12.

20 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 20.

Nevertheless, the Code did not create a constitutionally protected

property interest in third-party registrations. A protected property interest

exists only when the law explicitly constrains official discretion by providing

mandatory procedures governing the revocation of a benefit. It does not

exist when the law is silent, neither mandating such procedures, nor

explicitly granting official discretion. See Ridgely, 512 F.3d at 735–36

(requiring a Court to look for “explicitly mandatory language, i.e., specific

directives to the decisionmaker that if the regulations’ substantive predicates

are present, a particular outcome must follow” (quoting Ky. Dep’t of

Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462–63 (1989))). The Code was

silent on the process governing suspension of third-party registrations

outside the limited circumstances of § 8-1-104.7.11.3. It certainly did not, as

plaintiffs allege, require a written notice and a “time frame for compliance.”21

Because it did not create mandatory procedures governing suspension of

registrations, the Code did not create a protected property interest in such

registrations.

Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary are meritless. Plaintiffs first argue

that “[t]he Code does not vest unbridled discretion in the Parish to revoke or

21 Id. at ¶ 39.

suspend a license at will without cause.”22 But that is not the applicable test.

Defendants need not show that the Code grants officials “unbridled

discretion.” Rather, plaintiffs must show that the Code “place[s] substantive

limitations on discretion” in order to create a property interest. Ridgely,

512 F.3d at 725. The Code does not do so.

Second, plaintiffs claim that any inspector who meets the Code’s

criteria for third-party registration eligibility “has a legitimate claim of

entitlement to continued registration and licensure.”23 But the Code

nowhere required the Parish to issue registrations to eligible third-party

inspection services. To the contrary, the Code stated that “[t]hird party

inspection services . . . may perform construction inspections which may be

accepted by the Parish of Jefferson.” Code § 8-1-104.7.11 (emphasis added).

Absent a mandate, plaintiffs had only a “unilateral expectation” of their

registrations, not a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to them. Roth, 408 U.S.

at 577 (1972).

Third, plaintiffs appeal to La. R.S. § 37:2158 to demonstrate that,

under Louisiana law, “contractor licenses and registrations are property

interests of the highest order.”24 As plaintiffs contend, La. R.S. § 37:2158

22 R. Doc. 28 at 5.

23 Id. at 5.

24 Id. at 6.

does provide a statutory framework for the revocation of contractor licenses,

though contrary to plaintiffs’ claim, it does not require either “written notice”

or “formal administrative hearings.”25 Crucially, this statute governs

revocation of State-issued contractor licenses; it has nothing to do with

parish-level third-party inspection registrations. Plaintiffs cite no law for

their proposition that, because “such protections apply to state-issued

contractors’ licenses, they apply with equal force . . . to Parish-issued licenses

and registrations.”26 The State has chosen to provide procedural protections

for contractor licenses, but neither the State nor Jefferson Parish has chosen

to do the same for third-party inspection registrations. Plaintiffs therefore

do not have a protected property interest in their registrations.

Finally, plaintiffs’ contention that the Fifth Circuit recognizes

government-issued permits as potentially protected property interests—

though true, see, e.g., Bowlby v. City of Aberdeen, 681 F.3d 215, 220 (5th

Cir. 2012)—is inapposite.27 Plaintiffs possessed registrations, not licenses or

permits. This case therefore bears less resemblance to cases about licenses

25 Contra id.

26 Id.

27 Plaintiffs variously refer to the interest at issue in this case as a

“license,” “permit,” or “registration.” See, e.g., id. at 5. It is a

registration. Code § 8-1-104.7.11.

and permits than it does to cases about local governments’ accepting the

services of private businesses.

Two cases are illustrative. In Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d

925 (5th Cir. 1995), the operator of a towing and wrecker service alleged a

violation of his due process rights when his company was removed from the

county’s rotating on-call list for the removal of cars involved in accidents.

The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to allege a protected property

interest in remaining on the list because no law or regulatory scheme

governed membership of the list. The plaintiff was “essentially claiming a

right to receive a certain class of business referrals from the local

government,” but “the mere existence of a governmental program or

authority empowered to grant a particular type of benefit . . . does not give

the plaintiff a property right, protected by the due process clause, to receive

the benefit.” Blackburn, 42 F.3d at 941. Here, plaintiffs assert a right to a

registration that would enable them to perform inspections accepted by

Jefferson Parish. But the mere existence of the Parish’s third-party

inspection program does not entitle plaintiffs to participation in that

program, and as discussed above, no law mandated their inclusion in the

program.

Similarly, in Baldwin v. Davis, 250 F.3d 943 (5th Cir. 2001), the

plaintiff was a soliciting bond agent licensed to write bonds by the State of

Mississippi. She sued the county sheriff when he removed her from the list

of bondsmen approved to write bonds at the county jail, asserting a protected

property interest in the right to have her bonds accepted at the jail. The Fifth

Circuit held that no property interest exists in the “ability to write bonds

within a limited political subdivision such as a city” and in the “ability to have

bonds written by [plaintiff] accepted by authorities in that political

subdivision” because “Mississippi law expressly leaves the approval of

tendered bonds to the discretion of the responsible officer.” Baldwin,

250 F.3d at 946. Here, as in Baldwin, the mere existence of a parish-level

program does not entitle plaintiffs to participate in that program. Louisiana

law and Jefferson Parish’s ordinances leave to the Parish discretion

regarding the administration of its third-party inspection program.

Plaintiffs therefore have no property interest in the ability to have their

inspection services accepted by Jefferson Parish.

2. Liberty Interest

Plaintiffs nominally assert a liberty interest,28 and defendants

nominally deny the existence of such an interest,29 but neither party

distinguishes liberty interests from property interests in its briefs.

Nevertheless, the Court considers whether plaintiffs have plausibly alleged

the deprivation of a liberty interest, as distinct from a property interest. See

Cowan v. Corley, 814 F.2d 223, 227 (5th Cir. 1987) (analyzing plaintiff’s

claim as a deprivation of liberty where the pleadings, despite making factual

allegations suggesting a liberty interest claim, claimed only a property

interest violation).

“A liberty interest may arise from the Constitution itself, by reason of

guarantees implicit in the word ‘liberty.’” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209,

221 (2005). Liberty interests that courts have recognized include the interest

in pursuing a chosen occupation, see, e.g., Stidham v. Tex. Comm’n on Priv.

Sec., 418 F.3d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 2005), and the interest in operating a

legitimate business, see Texas v. Thompson, 70 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 1995).

Plaintiffs have alleged a deprivation of a liberty interest and alleged

facts suggesting that the liberty interest in question—though never named by

28 R. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 7, 44.

29 R. Doc. 9-1 at 2.

plaintiffs—is the interest in pursuing their chosen occupation of performing

building inspections. Plaintiffs have alleged that defendants’ actions

resulted in IECI’s loss of sixteen inspectors and millions of dollars in

revenue.30

Plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to state a claim for

deprivation of the liberty interest in pursuing an occupation. The bar for

such a claim is a high one. A plaintiff “must plead facts showing that

Defendants ‘effectively foreclosed’ him from practicing his chosen

profession.” Ghedi v. Mayorkas, 16 F.4th 456, 467 (5th Cir. 2021). Even

when the government makes a plaintiff’s “efforts to remain in a given

vocation more difficult or even ‘nearly impossible,’” the plaintiff’s “liberty

interest remains intact.” Adams v. City of Harahan, 95 F.4th 908, 916 (5th

Cir. 2004). “A plaintiff’s liberty interest in pursuing a specific profession is

only violated if he has been completely prevented from working in that field.”

Id.

Here, plaintiffs have pled facts showing that their business was

damaged (though they have not explained what actions by which defendants,

exactly, caused this damage).31 But Plaintiffs have not pled facts showing

30 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 24.

31 Id.

that they have been “completely prevented” from carrying on the building-

inspection profession. In fact, plaintiffs allege that IECI is “a third-party

inspection service provider operating in various municipalities, including

the City of New Orleans and Jefferson Parish,”32 suggesting that despite the

revocation of plaintiffs’ registrations in those two municipalities, plaintiffs

continue to provide inspection services elsewhere. Plaintiffs have therefore

failed to state a due process claim for violation of a protected liberty interest.

3. Process Provided

Even if plaintiffs had alleged a protected property or liberty interest,

their due process claim would still fail because they were provided adequate

process. When a person’s protected property or liberty interest is at stake,

that person must be afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Dusenbery v. U.S., 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002). While the government

ordinarily must provide these procedures before depriving a person of a

protected interest, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542

(1985), exigent circumstances can justify providing only post-deprivation

process, including when the person facing deprivation has been formally

charged with a crime. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 934 (1997). To

determine what process is constitutionally due, the Court balances three

32 Id. at ¶ 1.

factors: “[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;

second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the

procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute

procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest.” Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, (1976).

Here, even if plaintiffs had a protected interest in their third-party

registrations, that interest was outweighed by Jefferson Parish’s “significant

interest in immediately suspending, when felony charges are filed against

them,” third-party inspection providers tasked with certifying the safety of

the buildings they inspect. See Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 932. This is especially

true because the crimes for which plaintiff Farrell has been charged—

including honest services fraud, making false statements on inspection

records, and forgery33—bear directly on the trustworthiness of the

inspections plaintiffs performed and, by extension, the safety of the buildings

inspected. Under these circumstances, plaintiffs were not entitled to pre-

deprivation process.

Finally, plaintiffs were afforded adequate post-deprivation process.

When deprivation occurs without process under exigent circumstances, the

government must provide a “prompt postsuspension” opportunity to be

33 R. Doc. 1-2 at 5–6.

heard. Id. at 932. The Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinances provides just

such an opportunity: “[a]ppeals to the Board may be taken by any party

aggrieved . . . by a decision of the Code Official,” within 30 days of such a

decision. Code § 8-1-105.7.1. Plaintiffs do not allege that they availed

themselves of this opportunity to be heard. They instead protest that the

defendants did not inform them of this opportunity.34 But the opportunity

to appeal is contained in Jefferson Parish’s publicly available Code; if not

actually aware of this opportunity, plaintiffs were at least constructively

aware. No more was required of defendants. See generally City of West

Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234 (1999) (holding that when procedural

remedies are enshrined in published laws, the government need not

specifically notify plaintiffs of the existence of these remedies). Defendants

provided all process that was due, and plaintiffs’ failure to take advantage of

that process defeats their claim of a due process violation.

Plaintiffs have not pled facts plausibly showing a violation of either a

property interest or a liberty interest, and alternatively, they have not pled

facts plausibly showing that the process they were afforded was

constitutionally inadequate. They have therefore failed to state a claim under

the Due Process Clause. The Court dismisses plaintiffs’ due process claims

34 R. Doc. 28 at 9.

against Jefferson Parish and Ferrara for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.

B. Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides

that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Plaintiffs’ third cause

of action is styled as a claim arising from selective enforcement and

discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

Plaintiffs fail to allege selective enforcement by Jefferson Parish and

Farrell. In their third cause of action, plaintiffs allege facts purporting to

show selective enforcement and discrimination by only New Orleans, not

Jefferson Parish.35 Elsewhere in their complaint, plaintiffs allege that

Jefferson Parish suspended their registrations, but they do not allege facts

suggesting that this suspension was an equal protection violation. It could

not have been selective enforcement because it was not an enforcement

action: Jefferson Parish’s suspension of plaintiffs’ registrations was a

discretionary decision, not an enforcement of an ordinance authorizing such

suspension. Moreover, plaintiffs have not alleged facts suggesting that

Jefferson Parish’s action was “motivated by improper considerations, such

35 R. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 43–44.

as race, religion, or the desire to prevent the exercise of a constitutional

right,” as is required for a selective enforcement claim. Bryan v. City of

Madison, 213 F.3d 267, 277 (5th Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs have therefore failed

to state a selective enforcement claim.

Plaintiffs have similarly failed to allege discrimination against

Jefferson Parish. The only discrimination theory that could apply to

plaintiffs is a class-of-one claim, in which they must show (1) that they were

intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and (2) that

there was no rational basis for this difference. Stratta v. Roe, 961 F.3d 340,

360 (5th Cir. 2020); Mikeska v. City of Galveston, 451 F.3d 376, 381 (5th Cir.

2006). Plaintiffs have alleged differential treatment of inspectors with

criminal convictions by New Orleans, but they have not made any such

allegations against Jefferson Parish. Plaintiffs have therefore failed to state

a discrimination claim.

C. Retaliation

In their complaint, plaintiffs characterize their fourth cause of action

as an additional claim under the Equal Protection Clause,36 but they

recharacterize it as a First Amendment retaliation claim in their

36 R. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 54–67.

Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.37 This

recharacterization is appropriate. See Thompson v. City of Starkville, 901

F.2d 456, 468 (holding that a pure retaliation claim sounds in the First

Amendment, not the Equal Protection Clause); see also U.S. ex rel. Bias v.

Tangipahoa Par. Sch. Bd., 816 F.3d 315, 321 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Dismissal is

improper if the allegations support relief on any possible theory.” (citation

modified)).

The government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that

infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in

freedom of speech.” Blackburn, 42 F.3d at 931 (quoting Perry v.

Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)). To state a claim for First

Amendment retaliation, plaintiffs must show that:

(1) they were engaged in constitutionally protected activity, (2)

the defendants’ actions caused them to suffer an injury that

would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to

engage in that activity, and (3) the defendants’ adverse actions

were substantially motivated against the plaintiffs’ exercise of

constitutionally protected conduct.

Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 2002).

37 R. Doc. 28 at 13–14.

Plaintiff Farrell claims that he is the victim of a coordinated campaign

of retaliation by New Orleans and Jefferson Parish for reporting a toxic

environment at the City of New Orleans Department of Safety and Permits.38

Assuming—without deciding—that plaintiffs satisfy the first two

prongs of the Keenan test, they have nevertheless failed to allege facts

plausibly showing that defendants Ferrara and Jefferson Parish suspended

their third-party registration in retaliation for Farrell’s exercise of his First

Amendment rights in New Orleans. Plaintiffs nowhere allege who Detective

Todd Riviera is or for whom he works; why he would be concerned about

events at the City of New Orleans Department of Safety and Permits or Office

of Inspector General; whether he or anyone else communicated with

Jefferson Parish or Ferrara; why Jefferson Parish or Ferrara would suspend

an inspection registration in retaliation for events occurring in a different

parish; or when those events occurred. In addition, the statement that

Farrell “believes the City of New Orleans and Jefferson Parish, along with

others, are working to deprive him of his rights and force him out of

business” is conclusory, lacking any supporting factual allegations.39

38 R. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 55–58.

39 Id. at ¶ 57.

Moreover, facts pled and documents attached to the complaint show a

motivation other than unconstitutional retaliation for defendants’

suspension of plaintiffs’ registrations: that Farrell had been charged for

various crimes related to his inspection services in both federal and state

court.40 Plaintiffs have not pled facts plausibly showing any other motivation

by Jefferson Parish or Ferrara. Plaintiffs have therefore failed to state a claim

for First Amendment retaliation, and their fourth cause of action must be

dismissed as to defendants Jefferson Parish and Ferrara.

IV. LEAVE TO AMEND

Denying leave to amend “is not an abuse of discretion if allowing an

amendment would be futile.” Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat’l Collegiate

Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014); see also Brewster v. Dretke,

587 F.3d 764, 768 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Granting leave to amend is not

required . . . if the plaintiff has already pleaded his best case.”) (citation

modified).

Because plaintiffs cannot plead facts that would overcome both the lack

of a liberty and property interest and the adequacy of the process they

received and have pled no conduct whatsoever by the defendants to support

an equal protection claim, amendment of these claims would be futile. The

40 Id. at ¶20; R. Doc. 1-2 at 5–6.

Court therefore dismisses them with prejudice. The Court dismisses without

prejudice plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants defendants’ motion and

DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE plaintiffs’ second cause of action and third

cause of action against defendants Jefferson Parish and Ferrara and

DISMISSES WITHOUT prejudice plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action against

defendants Jefferson Parish and Ferrara.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 14th day of July, 2026.

Lora Varver

SARAH S. VANCE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

23