Carter

SSiNES DISTRIG re

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EE FILED Cs

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK S □

JUL 15 2026

Appr.

ZAKKIYYA CARTER, LEST ge SY,

ERN DISTRIC\

Plaintiff,

v. 26-CV-166 (JLS)

MARK J.F. SCHROEDER, in his

official capacity as Commissioner of the

New York State Department of Motor

Vehicles,

Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff Zakkiyya Carter filed this action seeking relief under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. See Dkt. 1 at 8-13 |] 50-74.! She also moved to proceed in forma

pauperis (“IFP”). Dkt. 2.

Because Carter meets the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the Court

grants her permission to proceed IFP. The Court, therefore, screens Carter’s

complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For the reasons that follow, Carter’s

Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim—seeking prospective

declaratory or injunctive relief against Defendant—may proceed to service and

' Page numbers refer to the CM/ECF generated numbering in the header of each

page.

Carter’s claims for retrospective monetary relief are dismissed without leave to

amend.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standards

A. Review Under the IFP Statute

Section 1915 “provide[s] an efficient means by which a court can screen for

and dismiss legally insufficient claims.” Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir.

2007) (citing Shakur v. Selesky, 391 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2004)). The court shall

dismiss the complaint if the action is “(1) frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a

claim on which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court must

“accept all the facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all inferences in the

plaintiffs favor.” Larkin v. Savage, 318 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 2008). And it must

construe pro se pleadings “liberally” and “interpret them to raise the strongest

arguments they suggest.” Siao-Pao v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 238 (S.D.N.Y.

2008) (citation omitted).

B. Pleading Standard

When evaluating a complaint, the Court must accept all factual allegations

as true and must draw all inferences in the plaintiffs favor. See Larkin, 318 F.3d at

139; King v. Simpson, 189 F.3d 284, 287 (2d Cir. 1999). Although “a court is obliged

to construe [pro se] pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights

violations,” McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004), even a pro se

complaint must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which

requires a complaint to make “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is “plausible on its face.” Bell

All. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim will have “facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In other words, although a pro se

complaint need not provide every last detail in support of a claim, it must allege

sufficient facts to support the claim. See Shibeshi v. City of New York, 475 F. App’x

807, 808 (2d Cir. 2012) (concluding that district court properly dismissed a pro se

complaint under Section 1915(e)(2) because the complaint did not meet the pleading

standard in Twombly and Iqbal); accord Hardaway v. Hartford Pub. Works Dep't.,

879 F.3d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 2018) (setting forth the same standard of review).

C. Leave to Amend

Generally, a court will afford a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend or to

be heard prior to dismissal, “unless [it] can rule out any possibility, however

unlikely ... that an amended complaint would succeed in stating a claim.” Abbas v.

Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Federal Savings

Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999)). But a court may deny leave to amend

pleadings when any amendment would be futile. See Cuoco v. Mortisugu, 222 F.3d

99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir.

1993) (“Where it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be productive

[] ... it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.”).

D. Section 1983 Claim

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff “must allege that the

challenged conduct (1) was attributable to a person acting under the color of state

law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States.” Whalen v. County of Fulton, 126 F.3d

400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 875-76 (2d Cir.

1994)). Section 1983 “creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for

redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.” Sykes v. James, 13

F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816

(1985)).

To establish liability against an official under Section 1983, a plaintiff must

allege that official’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation; it

is not enough to assert that the official is a link in the chain of command. See

McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 437 (2d Cir. 2004). Moreover, respondeat

superior liability is unavailable in a Section 1983 action. See Hernandez uv. Keane,

341 F.3d 187, 144 (2d Cir. 2003). There is “no special rule for supervisory liability.”

Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020). Rather, at the screening

stage, a plaintiff must plausibly allege “that [a] Government-official defendant,

through the official’s own individual actions [] . . . violated the Constitution.” Jd.

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676).

II. Carter’s Allegations

This case arises from the alleged deprivation of her driver’s license following

a chemical test refusal hearing. Dkt. 1 at 10 1{1 58-67. Carter alleges she was

driving on Fillmore Avenue in Buffalo, New York, toward her residence on

Kensington Avenue. Jd. at 3 { 10. She further alleges she was pulled over by E-

District Patrol Officer Mark Cyrek. Id. at 3-4 J] 12-14. Carter claims the officer

initiated the stop for “unspecified traffic violations.” Id. at 4 q 15.

As a result of the traffic stop, Carter alleges she was charged with “chemical-

test refusal under [VTL] § 1194(2)(), DWI under VTL § 1192(3), refusal to submit to

a breath test under VTL § 1194(1)(b), and other ... violations.” Id. at 4] 17.

Carter further alleges she was charged with “chemical test refusal” even though she

was willing to submit to breath testing and she was not read the refusal warnings

as required under VTL § 1194(2)(f). Id. at 4-5 JJ 18-20.

Following her criminal charges, Carter alleges the New York State

Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV”) initiated a chemical-test refusal proceeding

against her. Id. at 5 | 24. The hearing was held on February 3, 2023, and Carter

appeared with her assigned counsel. Id. at 5 { 25. Carter alleges the hearing

officer “repeatedly interrupted and curtailed [Carter’s] counsel’s efforts to develop

the record, present material arguments based on the body-worn evidence and

meaningfully cross-examine Officer Cyrek on whether the statutory warnings were

given.” Id. at 6 | 29. Further, the hearing officer “permitted Officer Cyrek to recite

the statutory warnings at the hearing and treated his ability to recite the language

as proof that the warnings had been given at the time of the stop.” Id. at 6 { 30. As

a result, Carter alleges the hearing officer sustained the refusal determination and

revoked Carter’s driver’s license. Id. at 6 1 31, 37.

Carter additionally asserts that the parallel criminal charges were dismissed

for lack of probable cause. Id. at 6 | 33. She therefore contends that her driver’s

license was revoked despite the finding that probable cause was lacking to detain

Carter in the first place. Id. at 7 {| 35.

Finally, Carter alleges she sought to appeal the refusal determination, but

her assigned counsel withdrew. Id. at 7 Jj 38-39. Carter asserts her replacement

counsel refused to pursue an appeal and, consequently, Carter pursued the appeal

on her own, but was unsuccessful. Id. at 8 {1 42-45. Asa result, she alleges

continued deprivation of her driver’s license. Id. at 8 { 46.

III. Analysis

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Carter asserts a claim against one defendant, Mark J.F. Schroeder, in his

official capacity as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Motor

Vehicles (“the Commissioner”). Dkt. 1 at 1, 8.

“[A]bsent waiver by the State or valid congressional override, the Eleventh

Amendment bars a damages action against a State in federal court.” Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury

of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)) (emphasis added). “This bar remains in effect

when State officials are sued for damages in their official capacity.” Graham, 473

U.S. at 169 (citing Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90 (1982)). However, “a suit for

injunctive relief challenging the constitutionality of a state official’s actions in

enforcing state law” is permissible. Ford v. Reynolds, 316 F.3d 35 1, 354-55 (2d Cir.

2003) (quoting CSX Transp. v. N.Y. State Office of Real Prop. Servs., 306 F.3d 87, 98

(2d Cir. 2002)) (emphasis added); see generally Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

In determining whether this exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity applies,

the Court must determine whether the complaint: (1) “alleges an ongoing violation

of federal law,” and (2) “seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Ford,

316 F.3d at 355.

i. Ongoing Violation of Federal Law

To decide whether there is an ongoing violation of federal law, the Court

determines whether “the enforcement of the law amount(s] to a continuous violation

of plaintiffs constitutional rights or a single act that continues to have negative

consequences for the plaintiff.” Brokamp v. James, 573 F. Supp. 3d 696, 708

(N.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Brown v. New York, 975 F. Supp. 2d 209, 223 (N.D.N.Y.

2013)). Ifthe former is true, there is an ongoing violation; if the latter is true, the

Eleventh Amendment will bar the plaintiffs claim. See Brokamp, 573 F. Supp. 3d

at 708.

Here, Carter alleges that the Commissioner continues to maintain and

enforce the chemical test refusal finding despite the absence of due process. See

Dkt. 1 at 12 4] 72-73. For screening purposes, the alleged enforcement of such a

refusal finding, therefore, amounts to a continuous violation of Carter's

constitutionally protected property right in her driver’s license. Consequently,

under the facts Carter alleges, there is an ongoing violation of federal law sufficient

to survive screening.

ii. Prospective Relief

Next, the Court evaluates whether Carter seeks prospective relief.

Prospective relief may be injunctive or declaratory. See Brokamp, 573 F. Supp. 3d

at 708 (holding that [1] a permanent injunction against applying New York state

licensing requirements and [2] an order declaring New York’s licensing law

unconstitutional were both prospective forms of relief).

Here, Carter requests the following forms of relief: (1) an order directing the

Commissioner to vacate the chemical-test refusal determination against Carter; (2)

an order directing the defendant to remove all refusal-related entries, restrictions

and consequences on Carter's DMV records and driving abstract; (3) reimbursement

of any fees associated with the refusal determination; (4) an order barring the

assessment or collection of such fees to the extent they flow from the

unconstitutional refusal determination; and (5) an award to Carter for the costs of

this action. Dkt. 1 at 13. Requests (1), (2), and (4) are prospective because they are

declaratory and/or injunctive requests. Requests (3) and (5), however, are not

prospective as they are for retrospective, monetary damages. See JTE Enterprises,

Inc. v. Cuomo, F. Supp. 3d 333, 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding refund from the State

is retrospective relief, not prospective relief).

Therefore—with respect to Carter's request directing the Commissioner to

vacate the chemical-test refusal determination; directing the defendant to correct

Carter’s DMV records and driving abstract: and an order prohibiting further

collection of fees—Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply. For all other

forms of relief requested, Eleventh Amendment immunity prohibits such relief from

being granted and, as such, those claims are dismissed without leave to amend.

B. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process Claim

There are two elements to a procedural due process claim: “(1) the existence

of a property or liberty interest that was deprived and (2) deprivation of that

interest without due process.” Bryant v. N.Y. State Educ. Dept., 692 F.3d 202, 218

(2d. Cir. 2012) (citing Narumanchi v. Bd. of Trustees, 850 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir.

1988)).

Carter alleges a protected property interest in her driver’s license. Dkt. 1 at

94 52. A driver's license is a constitutionally protected property interest that may

not be revoked without procedural due process required by the Fourteenth

Amendment. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Perry v. McDonald, 280

F.3d 159, 174 (2d Cir. 2001); Evans v. City of New York, 308 F. Supp. 2d 316, 323

(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Stoianoff v. Comm ’r of Motor Vehicles, 107 F. Supp. 2d 439

(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“It is settled that a driver’s license is a property interest protected

by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause”). Procedural due process

requires notice to the parties and an “opportunity to present their objections.”

Weinstein v. Albright, 261 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Mullane v. Central

Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). Such opportunity must be

“meaningful” and “appropriate to the nature of the case.” See Bell, 402 U.S. at □□□□

42,

Here, Carter alleges “she was not read the statutory refusal warnings

required by VTL § 1194(2)(c) in clear and unequivocal language.” Dkt. 1 at 10 □ 59.

She also alleges that, at the refusal hearing, her counsel was repeatedly

interrupted, limiting counsel’s ability to present evidence and cross-examine

witnesses. Id. at 11 § 64. Nevertheless, she alleges her driver’s license was

revoked. Dkt. at 6~7 31, 37. Based on these allegations, Carter makes a plausible

claim that she was not given appropriate notice (via the warnings) or an

opportunity to present her objections (at the refusal hearing) before she was

deprived of her driver’s license. Therefore, for screening purposes, she has a

plausible claim that her driver’s license was deprived without due process as

required by the Fourteenth Amendment.

C. Defendant’s Involvement

When asserting a Section 1983 claim, there is “no special rule for supervisory

liability.” Tangreti, 983 F.3d at 618. Rather, at the screening stage, a plaintiff

must plausibly allege “that [a] Government-official defendant, through the official’s

own individual actions [J . . . violated the Constitution.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556

U.S. 676). Further, there is no Monell liability for a State actor. Will v. Michigan

Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989) (“we ... limited our holding in Monell

‘to local government units which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh

Amendment purposes”) (citation modified).

While a “plaintiff cannot recover monetary damages against .. . [government

official] defendants in their official or individual capacity, the Eleventh Amendment

does not preclude suits against state officials acting in their official capacity that

seek prospective injunctive relief.” Branch v. Guadarrama, No. 3:24CV536 (MPS),

2024 WL 1973494, at *2 (D. Conn. May 3, 2024) (citation modified) (emphasis

added). When seeking prospective injunctive relief, a plaintiff need not prove

personal involvement of the defendant. See id. Instead, “claims for prospective

declaratory or injunctive relief are permissible provided the official against whom

the action is brought has a direct connection to, or responsibility for, the alleged

illegal action.” Marshall v. Switzer, 900 F. Supp. 604, 615 (N.D.N.Y. 1995); see Will,

491 U.S. at 71 n.10.

Because Carter names the Commissioner, a state actor, as the only

defendant, she must allege that the Commissioner had “a direct connection” to, or

“responsibility for,” the alleged Fourteenth Amendment due process violation. See

Van Ever-Ford v. New York, No. 13-CV-412, 2019 WL 1922065, at *12 (W.D.N.Y.

Apr. 30, 2019). For screening purposes, Carter’s allegations suffice.2 Accordingly,

Carter’s claim for prospective relief against Defendant may proceed to service.

? Carter alleges “. .. Defendant continued to maintain and enforce the refusal

finding based on the same officer’s assertions, further demonstrating the arbitrary,

unreliable, and fundamentally unfair nature of the procedures used to deprive

Plaintiff of her protected property interest.” Dkt. 1 at 12 73.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, Carter’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due

process claim—seeking prospective declaratory or injunctive relief against

Defendant—may proceed to service. However, Carter’s claims for retrospective

monetary relief are dismissed without leave to amend.

ORDER

IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion to proceed in forma

pauperis (Dkt. 2) is GRANTED; it is further

ORDERED that Carter’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process

claim—seeking prospective declaratory or injunctive relief against Defendant—may

proceed to service; and it is further

ORDERED that Carter’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process

claim—seeking retrospective monetary relief against Defendant—is dismissed

without leave to amend; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall file Plaintiffs papers and cause the

United States Marshal to serve copies of the summons, complaint, and this order

upon the named Defendant without Plaintiffs payment therefor, unpaid fees to be

recoverable if this action terminates by monetary award in Plaintiffs favor; and it is

further

ORDERED that Plaintiff must effect service within 90 days of the date the

summons is issued. It is Plaintiffs responsibility to inquire of the Marshals at 716-

348-5300 whether service has been made and, if necessary, to request an extension

of time for service. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2012). If, within

90 days of issuance of the summons, Plaintiff has not made service or requested an

extension of time in which to do so, the Court may dismiss this action for failure to

prosecute under Rules 4(m) and 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and it

is further

ORDERED that Carter shall notify the Court in writing if her address

changes. The Court may dismiss the action if Carter fails to do so.

SO ORDERED

Dated: July 15, 2026 CO

Buffalo, New York .

i L SINATRA, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE