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ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on July 30, 2026.

Scott M. Grossman, Chief Judge

United States Bankruptcy Court

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION

In re:

PERRY LAFRANCE, Case No. 26-10176-SMG

Debtor. Chapter 7

ee

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE WEST PALM

BEACH POLICE PENSION FUND,

Plaintiff,

V. Adv. No. 26-01075-SMG

PERRY LAFRANCE,

Defendant.

ee

ORDER (1) GRANTING SUMMARY

JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT PERRY LAFRANCE

AND (II) DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF BOARD

OF TRUSTEES OF THE WEST PALM BEACH POLICE PENSION FUND

This adversary proceeding arises from a dispute over whether an attorney-fee

award entered in favor of the West Palm Beach Police Pension Fund under Florida

Statutes section 185.05(5) is excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7).

Perry Lafrance is a retired police officer and participant in the Pension Fund.1 After

the Pension Fund denied Mr. Lafrance’s application for service-connected disability

retirement, Mr. Lafrance sought appellate review in state court.2 The court denied

his petition per curiam without a written opinion,3 and then entered an order

awarding attorney’s fees in favor of the Pension Fund.4 Before the fee award had been

liquidated, Mr. Lafrance then filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.5

The Pension Fund commenced this adversary proceeding seeking a

determination that the attorney-fee obligation is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C.

§ 523(a)(7).6 Both parties (the Pension Fund through its motion for summary

judgment7 and Mr. Lafrance through his cross-motion for summary judgment8) now

move for summary judgment.9 The material facts are undisputed and the issue the

Court must determine is a pure question of law. Upon consideration of the record and

for the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the Pension Fund’s motion for

summary judgment and grant Mr. Lafrance’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

1 Dkt. No. 23, at ¶ 10(a); Dkt. No. 24, at ¶ 1.

2 Dkt. No. 23, at ¶¶ 10(h)–(n).

3 Dkt. No. 24, at ¶ 9.

4 Id. at ¶ 10.

5 Dkt. No. 24, at ¶ 11; Dkt. No. 23, at ¶ 10(p).

6 Dkt. No. 23, at ¶ 6.

7 Dkt. No. 23.

8 Dkt. No. 24.

9 Dkt. No. 23; Dkt. No. 24.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.

Mr. Lafrance is a retired police officer and participant in the West Palm Beach

Police Pension Fund.10 He was hired as a police officer on January 5, 2015, and

applied for service-connected disability retirement on August 22, 2022.11

Mr. Lafrance claimed that he became disabled as a result of contracting COVID-19

during his employment.12 The Pension Board twice considered Mr. Lafrance’s

application for service-connected disability retirement – first through an informal

review of the medical records and then after a formal evidentiary hearing – and on

both occasions it was determined that Mr. Lafrance’s permanent disability was not

incurred in the line of duty.13

On March 7, 2025, Mr. Lafrance filed a petition for writ of certiorari

challenging the Board of Trustees’ Final Order denying service-connected disability

retirement.14 On October 14, 2025, a three-judge panel of the Appellate Division of

the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, denied the

petition per curiam without written opinion.15 The state court then entered an order

awarding attorney’s fees in favor of the Pension Fund under Florida Statutes section

185.05(5) and remanded to the lower tribunal to determine the amount.16

10 Dkt. No. 23, at ¶ 10(a).

11 Id. at ¶ 10(f).

12 Id. at ¶ 10(h).

13 Id. at ¶¶ 10(h)–(l); Dkt. No. 26, at ¶ 20.

14 Dkt. No. 24, at ¶ 6.

15 Id. at ¶ 9.

16 Id. at ¶ 10; Dkt. No. 23, at ¶ 10(o).

On January 9, 2026, before the amount of attorney’s fees had been determined,

Mr. Lafrance filed a voluntary chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.17 The Pension Fund

estimates the amount of the attorney-fee award at approximately $30,437.50.18

Mr. Lafrance contests the amount of the requested attorney’s fees.19 The Pension

Fund filed this adversary proceeding requesting that the Court determine whether

the attorney-fee obligation is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7).20

The Pension Fund moved for summary judgment requesting that the Court

enter final judgment in its favor.21 Mr. Lafrance filed a response and a cross-motion

for summary judgment, requesting that this Court determine that the attorney-fee

award is dischargeable.22 The Pension Fund then filed a reply in support of its motion

for summary judgment and in opposition to Mr. Lafrance’s cross-motion for summary

judgment.23

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a)24 requires the Court to grant summary

judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”25 In considering a

motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe all facts and draw all

17 Dkt. No. 24, at ¶ 11; Dkt. No. 23, at ¶ 10(p).

18 Dkt. No. 23, at ¶ 10(p).

19 Dkt. No. 24, at ¶ 12; Dkt. No. 23, at ¶ 10(p).

20 Dkt. No. 23, at ¶ 10(q).

21 Dkt. No. 23.

22 Dkt. No. 24.

23 Dkt. No. 26.

24 Made applicable here by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7056.

25 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986).

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.26 The

moving party has the burden of establishing that there is an absence of any genuine

issue of material fact.27 Once the moving party meets that burden, the burden shifts

to the non-movant, who must present specific facts showing that there exists a

genuine dispute of material fact.28 “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is

genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of

materials in the record . . . or showing that the materials cited do not establish the

absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce

admissible evidence to support the fact.”29 The Court will not weigh the evidence or

find facts at the summary judgment stage. Rather, the Court determines only

whether there is sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable juror could find for the

non-moving party.30

III. ANALYSIS.

The plaintiff and defendant each move for summary judgment on the

dischargeability of the attorney-fee award. To establish nondischargeability under

section 523(a)(7), the debt must (1) constitute a fine, penalty, or forfeiture; (2) be

payable to a governmental unit; (3) be for the benefit of a governmental unit; and

(4) not constitute compensation for actual pecuniary loss.31 The Pension Fund argues

that the attorney-fee obligation is nondischargeable because it satisfies all four of

26 Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997).

27 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

28 Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576 (11th Cir. 1990).

29 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

30 Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 924 (11th Cir. 2003).

31 Stein v. McDowell (In re McDowell), 415 B.R. 612, 617 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008).

these requirements. Mr. Lafrance argues that the attorney-fee obligation fails to

satisfy the first and fourth requirements – that it is not a fine, penalty, or forfeiture,

and that it does not constitute compensation for actual pecuniary loss – and is

therefore dischargeable. Mr. Lafrance does not dispute that the debt is payable to and

for the benefit of a governmental unit.32 Thus, this dispute turns on whether the fee

award is a fine, penalty, or forfeiture that constitutes compensation for actual

pecuniary loss.

A. The Attorney-Fee Award Is Not a “Fine, Penalty, or Forfeiture.”

Florida Statutes section 185.05(5) provides that: “[i]n any judicial proceeding

or administrative proceeding under chapter 120 [the Florida Administrative

Procedure Act] brought under or pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, the

prevailing party shall be entitled to recover the costs thereof, together with

reasonable attorney’s fees.”33 Under Florida law, the phrase “shall be entitled”

creates a mandatory entitlement to attorney’s fees once the statutory prerequisites

have been met, leaving the trial court with no discretion to deny that award except

as otherwise provided by statute.34

Under Bankruptcy Code section 523(a)(7), a debt “for a fine, penalty, or

forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and [that] is not

compensation for actual pecuniary loss,” is excepted from discharge.35 Whether an

32 Dkt. No. 26, at ¶ 14; Dkt. No. 24, at 16.

33 Fla. Stat. § 185.05(5) (2025).

34 See TGI Friday’s, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606, 610–13 (Fla. 1995); Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So. 2d

1036, 1040–42 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).

35 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7).

obligation constitutes a “fine, penalty, or forfeiture” under section 523(a)(7) depends

on whether it functions as a penal sanction rather than compensation or a prevailing-

party fee award.36 Courts make this determination by looking at the purpose of the

underlying statute or disciplinary scheme.37

For example, discretionary attorney-fee awards imposed in attorney

disciplinary proceedings can constitute nondischargeable fines, penalties, or

forfeitures under section 523(a)(7).38 In In re Feingold, a Pennsylvania state court

exercised its discretion under Pennsylvania Rule of Disciplinary Enforcement 208(g)

to recover $44,889.92 in the costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceedings

against Allen Feingold, after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court disbarred him.39 After

Mr. Feingold filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, the disciplinary board argued that

the cost award was nondischargeable under section 523(a)(7).40 The Eleventh Circuit

agreed.41 It explained that the disciplinary costs functioned as a penal sanction

because Pennsylvania’s attorney disciplinary system exists to protect the public,

preserve the integrity of the courts, and deter unethical conduct rather than

compensate the government.42 The court further emphasized that the assessment of

costs was discretionary and imposed as part of the overall disciplinary sanction,

making it “more like a sanction than like the civil litigation analogue of awarding

36 Disciplinary Bd. v. Feingold (In re Feingold), 730 F.3d 1268, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 2013).

37 Id.; see also Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 52–53 (1986) (holding criminal restitution

nondischargeable because it furthered the state’s interests in punishment and rehabilitation rather

than victim compensation).

38 Feingold, 730 F.3d at 1275.

39 Id. at 1270.

40 Id. at 1270–72.

41 Id. at 1276.

42 Id. at 1274.

costs to prevailing parties as a matter of course.”43 Similarly, in In re Charles, a

bankruptcy court held that an attorney-fee award imposed under the court’s inherent

authority and Florida Statutes sections 57.105(1)(a) & (b), (3), constituted a “fine or

penalty” under section 523(a)(7), because it was discretionary and intended to punish

and deter litigation misconduct rather than compensate for actual pecuniary loss.44

Florida Statutes section 185.05(5), however, is fundamentally different from

both Pennsylvania Rule 208(g) and Florida Statutes section 57.105. Unlike the

discretionary sanctions in Feingold and Charles, which were imposed in response to

misconduct and served punitive and deterrent purposes, section 185.05(5) mandates

an award of costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. The statute

provides that the prevailing party “shall be entitled” to recover fees and costs and

does not condition an award on misconduct, bad faith, or other sanctionable conduct.

Nothing in section 185.05(5) ties an award of attorney’s fees to misconduct or to the

need to punish or deter future conduct. Instead, entitlement to attorney’s fees

depends only on whether a party prevails in litigation brought under chapter 185.

Here, the attorney-fee award was mandatory and entered because the Pension Fund

prevailed. It therefore differs from the punitive nature of the discretionary

assessments in Feingold and Charles, which those courts held constituted fines,

penalties, or forfeitures. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the attorney-fee award

43 Id. at 1274–75.

44 Atwater v. Charles (In re Charles), 2014 WL 2930973, at *11–12 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014); Fla. Stat.

§§ 57.105(1)(a) & (b), (3).

authorized by section 185.05(5) is not a “fine, penalty, or forfeiture” within the

meaning of section 523(a)(7).

B. The Attorney-Fee Award Is Compensation for Actual Pecuniary Loss.

The attorney-fee award also fails the fourth requirement because it

compensates the Pension Fund for actual pecuniary loss. Section 523(a)(7) excepts

from discharge only those debts that are “not compensation for actual pecuniary loss.”

In other words, the debt must serve a purpose other than reimbursing the

governmental unit for money it actually expended. A monetary award is

compensatory when it is designed to reimburse a party for actual losses sustained.45

Thus, a compensatory attorney-fee award must be calibrated to the legal fees actually

incurred and may reimburse only those fees attributable to the underlying conduct.46

Under section 523(a)(7), courts look to the purpose of the debt.47 The fact that

a debt is measured by actual costs does not, by itself, make it compensatory.48 Rather,

if the debt serves the government’s penal or regulatory interests instead of

compensating the government for an actual loss, it is not compensation for actual

pecuniary loss.49 The mandatory attorney-fee award under section 185.05(5)

reimburses the Pension Fund for the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs it incurred

in defending Mr. Lafrance’s claim, making it compensation for actual pecuniary loss

and distinguishing it from the discretionary disciplinary costs at issue in Feingold.

45 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 108–09 (2017) (holding that a compensatory

attorney-fee award imposed as a sanction must be limited to the fees actually incurred because of the

misconduct).

46 Id. at 108–09.

47 Kelly, 479 U.S. at 52–53; Feingold, 730 F.3d at 1275–76.

48 Kelly, 479 U.S. at 52–53.

49 Feingold, 730 F.3d at 1275–76.

In Feingold, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the disciplinary costs did not

constitute compensation for actual pecuniary loss, in part because they represented

expenses the government incurred in performing its public duty to regulate the legal

profession, a function the government “would perform . . . whether it could recoup the

costs associated with it or not.”50 By contrast, the attorney-fee award under section

185.05(5) reimburses the Pension Fund only for the reasonable attorney’s fees and

costs it incurred in defending Mr. Lafrance’s claims. Thus, the award serves to

reimburse the Pension Fund for its financial loss, rather than to advance a penal or

regulatory objective and therefore constitutes compensation for actual pecuniary

loss.51 Accordingly, the attorney-fee award falls outside the scope of section 523(a)(7)

and is dischargeable.

IV. CONCLUSION.

For the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that the attorney-fee

award entered in favor of the Pension Fund under Florida Statutes section 185.05(5)

is dischargeable because it is not a fine, penalty, or forfeiture and because it

constitutes compensation for actual pecuniary loss. It is therefore

ORDERED that:

1. Mr. Lafrance’s motion for summary judgment52 is GRANTED.

50 Id. at 1276.

51 This conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Goodyear that a monetary

award is compensatory when it reimburses the prevailing party for actual losses sustained, including

attorney’s fees incurred because of the underlying conduct. Goodyear, 581 U.S. at 108–09. Section

185.05(5)’s attorney-fee award serves the same compensatory function by reimbursing the Pension

Fund for the attorney’s fees it actually incurred in defending Mr. Lafrance’s claims.

52 Dkt. No. 24.

2. The Pension Fund’s motion for summary judgment53 is DENIED.

3. The Court will enter a separate final judgment consistent with this

order.

# # #

Copies furnished to all counsel of record via CM/ECF.

Clerk to serve:

Perry Lafrance

1314 E Las Olas Blvd #1675

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301

Perry Lafrance

5841 Riverside Dr

Coral Springs, FL 33067

53 Dkt. No. 23.