Opinion

Opinion

Court
District Court, E.D. California
Filed
Jul 8, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 41.7%

The opinion

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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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7 BRANDO E. CEDILLO ACEVEDO, Case No. 1:26-cv-03614 (AMO)

8 Petitioner,

ORDER RE PETITION FOR WRIT OF

9 v. HABEAS CORPUS

10 WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE Re: Dkt. Nos. 1, 4

ANNEX, et al.,

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Respondents.

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13 This habeas action concerns the detention of Petitioner Brando Cedillo Acevedo, a

14 noncitizen who has lived in the United States since 2019. Petitioner is currently being detained

15 without the opportunity for a bond hearing. This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s writ of

16 habeas corpus and motion for a temporary restraining order. Dkt. Nos. 1, 4. For the reasons

17 explained below, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus and resolves his motion

18 for a temporary restraining order as moot.1

19 I. BACKGROUND

20 Petitioner entered the United States on May 1, 2029, and subsequently applied for asylum.

21 See Dkt. No. 9-2 at 2. His application was denied on October 6, 2021, and his appeal of that

22 denial was dismissed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) on March 9, 2026. See id. at

23 2–12; Dkt. No. 9-3 at 1–5. The deadline to submit a petition for review of the BIA’s dismissal

24 with the Ninth Circuit was April 9, 2026. Dkt. No. 9 at 2.

25 Petitioner was detained to execute his final order of removal on April 29, 2026. Id. He

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1 In setting a briefing schedule on the habeas petition, the Court indicated that it intended to rule

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on the habeas petition and motion for a temporary restraining order together. Dkt. No. 8.

1 filed a petition for review of his removal order several days later on May 4, 2026. Id. “By

2 operation of General Order 6.4(c), [his] removal was automatically stayed” in light of the pending

3 petition for review. Id. Proceeding pro se, Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition on May 11,

4 2026 challenging his continued detention. Dkt. No. 1. He filed an amended petition on May 22,

5 2026 in which he argues that his continued detention without any individualized custody review

6 violates 8 U.S.C. §1226(a) and due process. See Dkt. No. 15 ¶¶ 45–69.

7 II. LEGAL STANDARD

8 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every

9 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)

10 (citing U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in

11 custody upon the legality of that custody, and ... the traditional function of the writ is to secure

12 release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas

13 corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the

14 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has

15 served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its

16 protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, a

17 district court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v.

18 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).

19 III. DISCUSSION

20 The primary dispute between the parties is whether Petitioner may be mandatorily detained

21 under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), or if his detention is controlled by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) which provides

22 for a bond hearing. In general, under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), “when an alien is ordered removed, the

23 Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days,” (i.e.,

24 the removal period). 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). The ninety-day removal period begins on the

25 latest of the following:

26 (i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively final.

(ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders

27 a stay of removal of the alien, the date of the court’s final

immigration process), the date the alien is released from

1 detention or confinement.

2 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B).

3 Once the removal period starts, the government “shall detain the alien[,]” but if the

4 government cannot remove the non-citizen within the ninety-day window, “the alien, pending

5 removal, shall be [released] subject to supervision under regulations prescribed by the Attorney

6 General.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(2)(A), (a)(3); see also Alva v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06676-RFL,

7 2025 WL 2419262, at * 3 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (explaining that the default status after the 90-day

8 removal period is release on conditions). In contrast, “[a] non-citizen who is seemingly detained

9 under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) based on a final order of removal—where administrative review is

10 complete, but removal is stayed by the court of appeals pending review of the case—is treated as if

11 detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).” Hernandez-Castro v. Lyons, No. 1:25-CV-01574 JLT SAB,

12 2025 WL 3771344, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2025) (citing Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053

13 9th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit made this clear in Prieto-Romero, holding that the “Attorney

14 General’s statutory authority to detain [a migrant], whose administrative review is complete but

15 whose removal is stayed pending the court of appeals’ resolution of his petition for review, must

16 be grounded in § 1226(a).” Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1058.

17 Respondents, however, contend that this holding is inapplicable here because Petitioner

18 filed a petition for review of his removal order and a stay was entered after he was detained

19 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). Dkt. No. 9 at 2. In other words, they contend that since Petitioner

20 had a final order of removal in place that had yet to be appealed and stayed with the Ninth Circuit

21 on the date of his arrest, the detention authority cannot shift back to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Id. at 3.

22 This argument does not follow from the text of 8 U.S.C. § 1231 or Ninth Circuit precedent.

23 As to the text, when a removal order is “judicially reviewed and [] a court orders a stay of the

24 removal of the alien,” “the removal period begins” on “the date of the court’s final order.” 8

25 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii). As Petitioner’s removal order is currently stayed and under review at

26 the Ninth Circuit, the removal period has not begun, and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) does not apply. The

27 fact that there was an administrative final order prior to Petitioner’s appeal and stay of the

1 Congress would have intended that DHS’s removal efforts begin as soon as an alien’s removal

2 order is administratively final, see § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), terminate when this court stays

3 removal, see § 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii), and begin anew if and when we finally deny the petition for

4 review.” Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at n.5. As such, where a petition is under review and a stay of

5 removal is in place, the removal period has not begun. Id.2

6 Respondents further argue that Petitioner’s untimely appeal renders detention lawful under

7 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C). The statutory text does not support their interpretation. Under

8 § 1231(a)(1)(C),

9 The removal period shall be extended beyond a period of 90 days and

the alien may remain in detention … if the alien fails or refuses to

10 make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents

necessary to the alien’s departure or conspires or acts to prevent

11 the alien’s removal subject to an order of removal.

12 Respondents have provided no authority with their invitation for the Court to conclude that filing a

13 late petition for review qualifiers as an act of bad faith to prevent removal. Thus, the Court

14 declines it. Indeed, Riley v. Bondi held that the deadline to file a petition for review is non-

15 jurisdictional, indicating that courts of appeal may still consider the merits of a late appeal under

16 certain circumstances. Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259, 227 (2025) (“§ 1252’s 30-day filing rule is

17 not jurisdictional, but because the Government does not wish to press that ground for dismissal, it

18 does not preclude this case from proceeding on remand”). Missing a deadline, without more,

19 cannot be considered an act of bad faith.

20 As § 1231(a) does not apply to Petitioner, his detention “must be grounded in § 1226(a)[,]”

21 under which he is entitled to a bond hearing. Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d 1058. Accordingly, the

22 Court GRANTS the petition for writ of habeas corpus, and orders as follows:

23 1. Respondents are directed to hold a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its

24 implementing regulations within fourteen (14) days. Respondents must release Petitioner if a

25 bond hearing is not held within this time frame.

26 2. This Order resolves all pending motions.

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] 3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case and enter judgement for

2 || Petitioner.

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4 IT IS SO ORDERED.

5 || Dated: July 8, 2026

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RACELI MARTINEZ-OLGUIN

8 United States District Judge

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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