Porter

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TOMARCUS PORTER * CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS * NO. 24-504

CALEB LEMIRE, ET AL. * SECTION “E” (2)

ORDER AND REASONS

Pending before me is Plaintiff Tomarcus Porter’s Motion to Compel Discovery Responses.

ECF No. 139. Defendants Gavin “Caleb” LeMaire, Dustin Luper, Thomas Mitchell and Lance

Wallace timely filed an Opposition Memorandum, and Plaintiff filed a Reply Memorandum. ECF

Nos. 140, 141. No party requested oral argument in accordance with Local Rule 78.1, and the

Court agrees that oral argument is unnecessary.

Having considered the record, the submissions and arguments of counsel, and the

applicable law, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART

for the reasons stated herein.

I. BACKGROUND

At the relevant time, Plaintiff was an inmate at Rayburn Correctional Facility in Angie,

Louisiana. ECF No. 132 ¶ 3. Plaintiff alleges that correctional facility officers subjected him to a

pattern of abuse, harassment and brutalization after his arrival in January 2021 and through the

incidents at issue in this case. Specifically, Plaintiff has sued four correctional officers alleging

that they used excessive force against him in three incidents (5:15 a.m., 5:37 a.m., and 9:50 p.m.)

on September 8, 2021, which he alleges were in retaliation for a verbal altercation he had with

another officer on September 6, 2021. Id. ¶¶ 4-7, 9, 27, 42-43, 68, 95. Plaintiff brings, among

others, claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force and failure to train and supervise) and state

law assault and battery. Id. ¶¶ 164-185.

Plaintiff issued a First Set of Requests for Production on February 10, 2026, and

Defendants responded on March 20, 2026. ECF Nos. 139-6, 139-7. Plaintiff now seeks an order

compelling Defendants to produce documents in response to RFP Nos. 1, 2, 8 and 13. ECF No.

139. Plaintiff asserts that, as narrowed,1 RFP 1 seeks all incidents of use of force against him, but

1 ECF No. 139-1 at 5 (describing how the requests were narrowed). The full requests (ECF No. 139-6) and responses

(ECF No. 139-7) read:

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1:

All documentation concerning uses of force at Rayburn involving Mr. Porter in the three years prior and in

all years after the September 8, 2021, Incidents. This requested production is proportional to the needs of the

case because the information sought will show, inter alia, the history of interactions between Mr. Porter and

officers at Rayburn and thus contextualize the parties’ subjective knowledge and make plain the

reasonableness of inferences from evidence related to the September 8, 2021, Incidents.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1:

Respondent objects to the extent that this Request is overbroad, not reasonably calculated to lead to the

discovery of admissible evidence based on the allegations and is not proportional to the needs of the case.

First, Plaintiff was not housed at Rayburn for the three years preceding the incident. As alleged in the

Complaint, he was transported to Rayburn as of January 19, 2021 (less than nine months prior to the alleged

incidents). Second, the Request is not limited to incidents involving the Defendants herein, but any “officer”

at Rayburn, which is overbroad and is not proportional to the needs of the case for plaintiff’s allegations

against these defendants on a single day. Additionally, Plaintiff’s allegations claim that the uses of force

stemmed from an incident with Charles Wallace, a non-defendant, stating “Watch my smoke” on September

7, 2021, one day before the incidents, which was characterized as a “personal vendetta” sparked based on the

events of September 7, 2021. Given the allegations in the Complaint, any uses of force prior to the “exchange

of words” on September 7, 2021, which allegedly sparked a “personal vendetta”, are not relevant to these

claims and not proportional to the needs of the case as alleged.

Additionally, none of the subsequent uses of force involving Plaintiff, occurring after these incidents are

relevant to the incidents on September 8, 2021, or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible

evidence as such has no bearing on the allegations and are also not proportional to the needs of the case to

prove the knowledge of the parties and their actions on September 8, 2021. Nothing subsequently occurring

could show the “history of interactions” or contextualize the subjective knowledge of the parties on that date.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2:

All documentation related to uses of force at Rayburn involving Defendants in the five years prior to the

September 8, 2021, Incidents. This requested production is proportional to the needs of the case because the

information sought is likely to show, inter alia: how Defendants deployed force against persons incarcerated

at Rayburn; the administration and effectivization of Rayburn’s policies governing uses of force and reviews

thereof; and the Defendants’ subjective knowledge of those policies.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2:

Respondents object to the extent that this Request is wholly overbroad, unduly burdensome, not reasonably

calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence based on the allegations and is not proportional to

the needs of the case. Plaintiff’s allegations claim that the uses of force stemmed from an incident with

Charles Wallace, a non-defendant, stating “Watch my smoke” on September 7, 2021, one day before the

incidents, which was characterized as a “personal vendetta” sparked based on the events of September 7,

2021. Yet, Plaintiff seeks a five-year history from each defendant, which is not warranted based on the

allegations. Given the allegations in the Complaint, any uses of force prior to the “exchange of words” on

September 7, 2021, which allegedly sparked a “personal vendetta”, are not relevant to these claims from Mr.

Porter, especially uses of force against other individuals in obviously separate circumstances. Such a request

is not proportional to the needs of the case as alleged and creates a significant burden not only on the

defendants to retrieve and produce such documents but also on the litigation in having to litigate each use of

force that may be questioned. The Request is further overbroad in that it does not seek complaints but every

single use of force in five years from every defendant, which is overly broad as it can range from mere

physical restraint to the use of chemical agents to physical altercations. Further, uses of force against other

individuals, in completely different circumstances, are completely irrelevant and not proportional to the needs

of the case regarding the claims of Mr. Porter. Additionally, Plaintiff has not brought any Monell claim and

is not entitled to use such reports to show customs, practices, prior incidents, prior acts, or propensity towards

violations and excessive force as proof of a violation against these individual defendants.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8:

All documents concerning the disciplinary histories of Defendants Luper, LeMaire, and Wallace at Rayburn

in the five years prior to and the two years following September 8, 2021, Incidents, including but not limited

to: (a) formal write-ups; (b) counseling memoranda; and (c) any other correspondence concerning the

possibility of discipline of Defendants Luper, LeMaire, and Wallace. This requested production is

proportional to the needs of the case because the information sought is likely to show the Defendants’ lived

experiences of the accountability systems governing their employment at Rayburn.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8:

Respondents object to the extent that this Request is wholly overbroad, unduly burdensome, not reasonably

calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence based on the allegations and is not proportional to

the needs of the case. Plaintiff’s allegations claim that the uses of force stemmed from an incident with

Charles Wallace, a non-defendant, stating “Watch my smoke” on September 7, 2021, one day before the

incidents, which was characterized as a “personal vendetta” sparked based on the events of September 7,

2021. Yet, Plaintiff seeks a five-year history from each defendant, which is not warranted based on the

allegations. Given the allegations in the Complaint, any discipline prior to the “exchange of words” on

September 7, 2021, which allegedly sparked a “personal vendetta”, are not relevant to these claims from Mr.

Porter, especially to the extent they involve other individuals in obviously separate circumstances. Such a

request is not proportional to the needs of the case as alleged. Further, discipline of the Respondents in

completely different circumstances are completely irrelevant and not proportional to the needs of the case

regarding the claims of Mr. Porter. Additionally, Plaintiff has not brought any Monell claim and is not entitled

to use such reports to show customs, practices, prior incidents, prior acts, or propensity towards violations

and excessive force as proof of a violation against these individual defendants.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13:

All documentation that reflects, describes, or refers to instances in which Defendant Mitchell has initiated,

conducted, or otherwise participated in disciplinary actions or investigations involving employees at Rayburn

in the five years prior to and two years following the September 8, 2021, Incidents. This requested production

is proportional to the needs of the case because the information sought is likely to show the extent of

Defendant Mitchell’s experience with the application of Rayburn’s disciplinary policies and the operative

accountability processes experienced by Defendants and other Rayburn employees during the relevant

period.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13:

Respondents object to the extent that this Request is wholly overbroad, unduly burdensome, not reasonably

calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence based on the allegations and is not proportional to

the needs of the case. Plaintiff’s allegations claim that the uses of force stemmed from an incident with

Charles Wallace, a non-defendant, stating “Watch my smoke” on September 7, 2021, one day before the

incidents, which was characterized as a “personal vendetta” sparked based on the events of September 7,

2021. Yet, Plaintiff seeks a five-year history from Mitchell regarding his participation in disciplinary actions

or investigations of other employees at Rayburn, which is not warranted based on the allegations. Such a

request is not proportional to the needs of the case as alleged and creates a significant burden not only on the

defendant to retrieve and produce such documents but also on the litigation in having to litigate each

disciplinary action that Mitchell may have been involved in. The Request is further overbroad in that it does

not seek such actions with respect to these defendants, but all employees of Rayburn, which is overbroad and

not proportional to the needs of the case based on the allegations. Further, discipline and investigations into

Defendants have produced only those leading up to the September 8, 2021, incident; RFP 2 seeks

documented use of force by Defendants for 5 years before and 2 years after the September 8, 2021,

incident, but Defendants have objected to producing any responsive documents; RFP 8 seeks

Defendants’ disciplinary histories related to use of force for 5 years before and 2 years after date

the September 8, 2021, but Defendants have produced only sustained complaints prior to the

incident; and RFP 13 seeks documentation of Mitchell’s investigations into the officer use of force

incidents from 2016 to date, but Defendants have produced only documents relating to the

investigation of the September 8, 2021 incident at issue. ECF No. 139 at 1-2.

Plaintiff acknowledges the absence of a Monell claim but argues the requested information

is relevant to the supervisory claims, which requires a pattern of similar violations, and scienter

required for excessive force. ECF No. 139-1 at 2, 7-9. Plaintiff argues that other use-of-force

incidents are relevant to show a pattern of unchecked behavior by the officers or efforts to punish

other prisoners, post-incident events are relevant when the claim turns on state of mind or

supervisory notice, and unsustained allegations of excessive force are relevant to show pattern. Id.

at 8-12, 13-14. Plaintiff also argues that Defendants’ boilerplate proportionality objection must be

overruled. Id. at 12-13.

In Opposition, Defendants argue they produced all unusual activity reports regarding

Plaintiff (documents regarding use-of-force or other situations), all disciplinary write-ups through

September 8, 2021, all supervisory reviews conducted by Mitchell on all uses of force (including

Defendants and against Plaintiff or any other inmate) through September 8, 2021, but they object

to 7 years’ of data of use-of-force documents for all prisoners regardless of circumstances and

other employees in completely different circumstances are completely irrelevant and not proportional to the

needs of the case regarding the claims of Mr. Porter. Additionally, Plaintiff has not brought any Monell claim

and is not entitled to use such reports to show customs, practices, prior incidents, prior acts, or propensity

towards certain conduct as proof of a violation against this defendant.

anything after September 8, 2021. ECF No. 140 at 3-4. Defendants also assert that they have

produced all disciplinary records in Defendants’ files but object to producing routine use-of-force

reviews, regardless of inmate at any time. Id. at 4. Citing the elements for an excessive force

claim and failure to supervise or train claims, Defendants argue that post-incident reports and

training have no relevance to the earlier September 8, 2021, incidents, and Plaintiff’s reliance on

broader discovery allowed for a Monell claim is misplaced. Id. at 5-8.

In Reply, Plaintiff asserts that post-incident events are relevant to Defendants’ state of mind

because subjective motivations are relevant to the “malicious and sadistic” factor as well as the

supervisory liability for failure to train. ECF No. 141 at 1-4. Plaintiff also argues that, because a

supervisor liability claim mirrors a Monell claim, broader discovery is proper. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff

concludes by arguing that Defendants have not established burden, and any privacy interests may

be addressed through a protective order. Id. at 5-7.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

A. Standard For Discovery

Courts have broad discretion in discovery matters.2 Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure permits parties to obtain in discovery “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to

any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” In assessing

proportionality, the court should consider the importance of the issues at stake, the amount in

controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the

importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the

proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).

Rule 26(b) is not, however, “a license to engage in an unwieldy, burdensome, and

2 Crosswhite v. Lexington Ins. Co., 321 F. App’x 365, 367 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Scott v. Monsanto, Co., 868 F.2d

786, 793 (5th Cir. 1989)).

speculative fishing expedition.”3 While relevancy in the discovery context is broader than in the

trial context, that legal tenet should not be misapplied to allow fishing expeditions in discovery.4

Thus, while the discovery rules are accorded broad and liberal treatment to achieve their purpose

of adequately informing litigants in civil trials,5 discovery does have “ultimate and necessary

boundaries.”6 Rule 26 instructs the court to limit the extent of discovery if the proposed discovery

is outside the scope allowed under Rule 26(b)(1). FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).

B. Elements of Plaintiff’s Claims

1. Excessive Force

Generally, an excessive force claim requires (1) an injury (2) that resulted directly and only

from a use of force that was clearly excessive to the need, and (3) the excessiveness of which was

objectively unreasonable.7 Because prison officials have the difficult job of balancing the need to

maintain and restore discipline, the core question when an official is accused of using excessive

force in violation of the Eighth Amendment is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to

maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”8 This standard thus

has both subjective and objective components.9

Although one focus of the standard is the official's subjective intent to punish, that intent

is determined by reference to the non-exclusive Hudson factors used to assess whether unnecessary

3 Crosby v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 647 F.3d 258, 264 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

4 Trident Mgmt. Grp., LLC v. GLF Constr. Corp., No. 16-17277, 2017 WL 3011144, at *4 (E.D. La. July 14, 2017)

(citations omitted); Ganpat v. E. Pac. Shipping, PTE, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 3d 305, 311 (E.D. La. 2020) (quoting Crosby,

647 F.3d at 264).

5 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176 (1979) (citations omitted).

6 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507

(1947)).

7 Bangmon v. Alexander, No. 18-41043, 2021 WL 3477490, at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 6, 2021) (per curiam) (citation

omitted); Narro v. Edwards, 829 F. App'x 7, 11 (5th Cir. 2020).

8 Baldwin v. Stalder,137 F.3d 836, 838-39 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation modified) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.

1, 7 (1992)).

9 Mosley v. White, 464 F. App’x 206, 211 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).

and wanton infliction of pain was used in violation of a prisoner's Eighth Amendment right to be

free from cruel and unusual punishment.10 The factors are:

(1) the extent of the injury suffered;

(2) the need for the application of force;

(3) the relationship between the need and the amount of force used;

(4) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials; and

(5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.11

“The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily

excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use

of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.”12 Thus, the court looks to the

“nature of the force”—specifically, whether it was nontrivial and applied maliciously and

sadistically to cause harm.13 In other words, did the officer subjectively perceive a reasonable

threat when he acted or instead acted maliciously to cause harm.14 Of course, not “every

malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.”15

While the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and

unusual punishment even absent serious injury,16 an inmate must allege more than a de minimis

injury from the altercation or excessive force to state an Eighth Amendment claim, unless the use

10 Byrd v. Harrell, 48 F.4th 343, 347 (5th Cir. 2022); Cowart v. Erwin, 837 F.3d 444, 452-53 (5th Cir. 2016); Skinner

v. Gautreaux, 593 F. Supp. 3d 383, 392-93, 395 (M.D. La. 2022).

11 Baldwin, 137 F.3d at 839 (citations omitted). A Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim asserted by a pretrial

detainee, in contrast, does not look to the defendant’s state of mind or subjective intent. The only issue in that case is

whether the officer’s use of force was objectively reasonable under the Fourteenth Amendment. Kingsley v.

Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 391-92 (2015); see also Luke v. Neal/Richard, No. 19-14605, 2021 WL 2635453, at *4

n.16 (E.D. La. June 25, 2021) (Douglas, M.J.).

12 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10 (citation modified) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)); accord. Tarver

v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 752 (5th Cir. 2005).

13 Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 39 (2010) (per curiam).

14 Byrd, 48 F.4th at 348 (citing Bourne v. Gunnels, 921 F.3d 484, 491 (5th Cir. 2019)).

15 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).

16 Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 34 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 4). In Wilkins, the Supreme Court confirmed that the standards

established in Hudson remain the law. Id.

of force is “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.”17 The Fifth Circuit has characterized the

injury requirement as “a sliding scale, not a hard cutoff.”18 This approach treats the degree of

injury—even if minor—as interrelated to the reasonableness and excessiveness of the officer's

force. “Any force found to be objectively unreasonable necessarily exceeds the de minimis

threshold, and, conversely, objectively reasonable force will result in de minimis injuries only.”19

Therefore, to determine whether injury caused by excessive force is more than de minimis, the

court must consider the context in which the force was used and all surrounding circumstances.20

2. Failure to Train/Supervisor Liability

A supervisory official cannot be held individually liable under § 1983 for the actions of

subordinates on a theory of vicarious liability; only the official's direct acts or omissions will give

rise to individual liability.21 A supervisory official may be held liable for the wrongful acts of a

subordinate when the supervisor himself breached a duty imposed by state or local law and that

breach caused plaintiff's constitutional injury.22 Supervisor liability thus results from a § 1983

failure-to-train claim.

To establish a failure to train, a plaintiff must show (1) that the supervisor failed to train or

supervise the officers involved; (2) a causal connection between the alleged failure to supervise or

train and the claimed violation of plaintiff's rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise

17 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10; see Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 34 (overturning lower court decision and finding injuries from

officer's beating inmate consisting of bruised heel, lower back pain, increased blood pressure, migraine headaches,

dizziness, psychological trauma, and mental anguish to be more than de minimis).

18 Buehler v. Dear, 27 F.4th 969, 982 (5th Cir. 2022); see also Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37 (explaining the extent of the

injury is relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry because it “may . . . provide some indication as to the amount of

force applied”).

19 Alexander v. City of Round Rock, 854 F.3d 298, 309 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Brown v. Lynch, 524 F. App'x 69, 79

(5th Cir. 2013)).

20 Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 703 (5th Cir. 1999).

21 Alton v. Tex. A & M Univ., 168 F.3d 196, 200 (5th Cir. 1999).

22 Smith v. Brenoettsy, 158 F.3d 908, 911 (5th Cir. 1998).

constituted deliberate indifference to plaintiff's constitutional rights.23 Thus, the supervisor must

have acted, or failed to act, with deliberate indifference to violations of others’ constitutional rights

committed by their subordinates.24 For deliberate indifference, “there must be ‘actual or

constructive notice’ ‘that a particular omission in their training program causes . . . employees to

violate citizens’ constitutional rights’ and the actor nevertheless ‘choose[s] to retain that

program.’”25 Thus, plaintiff must establish that the supervisor was aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed.26

III. ANALYSIS

Neither party disputes that Defendants have produced records reflecting all uses of force

involving Porter and Defendants, up to the September 8, 2021 incident. ECF No. 139-1 at 1; No.

140 at 3-4.

Defendants’ objection to producing post-September 8, 2021, information is sustained.

Although Plaintiff asserts that the information is relevant to subjective intent (ECF No. 139-1 at

6-9; No. 141 at 1-3), he fails to recognize that an official’s subjective intent is determined through

assessment of the Hudson factors. Nor does Plaintiff articulate how post-September 8, 2021,

events have any possible relevance to the Hudson factors in relation to the September 8, 2021,

incident. Rather, the request for post-September 8, 2021, information appears to be more of a

fishing expedition rather than an effort to obtain evidence relevant to any pending claim or defense

asserted in this matter. Post-incident events or knowledge simply have no relevance to the extent

of injury suffered, the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the

23 Pena, 879 F.3d at 623; Smith, 158 F.3d at 911-12.

24 Johnson v. Harris County, 83 F.4th 941, 946 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Pena, 879 F.3d at 620 (quoting Porter v.

Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2011))).

25 Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 457, 473 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Porter, 659 F.3d at 447).

26 Hassan v. Shaw, 761 F. App'x 429, 433 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Est. of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of N. Richland

Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005)).

amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts

to temper the severity of a forceful response. Thus, post-incident events are not relevant to the

subjective intent inquiry under the Eighth Amendment.

Further, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, courts regularly recognize that broader discovery

is allowed on Monell claims than against a defendant in his individual capacity. As then-

Magistrate, now Circuit, Judge Dana Douglas recognized, courts addressing discovery-related

disputes in § 1983 cases involving Monell claims have routinely recognized that such claims often

require a broad and substantial amount of discovery that would not be involved if the plaintiff sued

only the individuals directly involved in the deprivation of her rights.27 Even when prior incidents

are sought for a Monell claim, the Fifth Circuit instructs that the incidents require “similarity and

specificity; prior indications cannot be for any and all bad or unwise acts, but rather must point to

the specific violation in question.”28 Here, Plaintiff seeks production of every use of force by

Defendants against any other inmate, regardless of circumstances. But even in a Monell situation

where discovery is broader, a plaintiff is limited to discovery of other substantially similar use-of-

force complaints.

Further, Defendants assert that they have produced all use-of-force documents relating to

these Defendants. To the extent Defendants have not produced all use-of-force documents

involving the named Defendants, Defendants must produce use-of-force documents involving the

named Defendants where the named Defendant is alleged to have used excessive force

27 Maurer v. St. Tammany Par. Sch. Bd., No. 19-13479, 2020 WL 12801030, at *2 (E.D. La. June 26, 2020) (citations

omitted); see also Lou v. Lopinto, No. 21-80, 2022 WL 1447554, at *9 (E.D. La. Mar. 24, 2022).

28 Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 851 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation modified) (quoting Est. of Davis, 406

F.3d at 383). Establishing a pattern “requires ‘sufficiently numerous prior incidents,’ as opposed to ‘isolated

instances.’” Id. (quoting McConney v. City of Houston, 863 F.2d 1180, 1184 (5th Cir. 1989)); see Pineda v. City of

Houston, 291 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that 11 incidents of warrantless entry did not support a pattern of

unconstitutional warrantless entry); see also Peterson, 588 F.3d at 850 (affirming the district court's ruling that 27

complaints of excessive force filed over a period of four years were insufficient to establish a pattern of excessive

force).

(1) involving the improper use of chemical spray, (2) pushing and pulling an inmate while shouting

to stop resisting or slamming an inmate to the ground; and (3) tackling an inmate to the ground

and punching him. These are the events at issue and thus the only relevant “pattern” documents.

Documents reflecting other types of use-of-force allegations or allegations involving other officers

and other inmates with no relation to the named Defendants simply have no relevance to any claim

or defense in this matter.

Finally, the parties dispute the appropriate look-back period for production of Defendants’

disciplinary records, with Plaintiff requesting five years and Defendants providing three years’

worth of information in reliance on the undersigned’s time limitation in a difference prisoner

excessive force case.29 Decisions vary the relevant temporal scope depending on the particular

cases, with decisions ranging from two to ten years. Indeed, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, Judge

Roby did not authorize discovery with no temporal limitation in Ladesma v. Walmart, Inc., No.

18-12143, 2020 WL 5311369 (E.D. La. Sept. 4, 2020). Judge Roby limited Interrogatory No. 12

to use of force complaints against the deputy for the 2-year period of 2016-18.30

Neither party identifies how long either of the Defendants has been employed at the facility,

and the parties dispute whether a five-year or three-year period is proper. This Court has

previously found that a three-year review of relevant disciplinary matters is proportional to the

needs of the case in a similar excessive force matter. Accordingly, the Court will again adopt this

three-year time period, thus authorizing discovery from September 1, 2018 through September 30,

2021. This three-year restriction is further supported by the fact that Plaintiff did not arrive at the

facility until January 2021, and thus, the historical information already extends two years before

Plaintiff’s arrival.

29 See Disedare v. Brumfield, No. 22-2680, 2023 WL 3496395, at *11 (E.D. La. May 17, 2023).

30 Ladesma, 2020 WL 5311369, at *5.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Compel (ECF No. 139) is GRANTED IN

PART AND DENIED IN PART as stated herein. Defendants must provide any supplemental

production within 30 days.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 7th day of July, 2026.

Box Yay KC

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

12