Mays-EL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

CLIFTON B. MAYS-EL, ) CASE NO. 1:26-cv-929

)

Petitioner, ) JUDGE BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN

)

v. )

)

JUDGE BRENDEN J. SHEEHAN, ) OPINION AND ORDER

)

Respondent. )

Pro se petitioner Clifton B. Mays-EL (“Petitioner”), a prisoner incarcerated at Richland

Correctional Institution, filed a pleading in this case labeled as a “Writ of Prohibition” against

respondent Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Judge Brenden J. Sheehan. (Doc. 1.)

Petitioner also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2), which is GRANTED.

For the reasons stated herein, this case is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2018, Petitioner was found guilty of multiple crimes, including felonious assault,

kidnapping, domestic violence, endangering children, aggravated menacing, and having weapons

under disability. See State of Ohio v. Clifton B. Mays, CR-18-627206-A (Cuyahoga Cnty. Ct. of

C.P.). He is serving a twenty-four-year prison sentence. Id.

In his Writ of Prohibition, Petitioner complains about his arrest, indictment, and

prosecution in his state criminal case. (See Doc. 1.) His lengthy pleading and attachments are

convoluted and difficult to parse. (See Docs. 1-1-8.) Even the specific defendants Petitioner

seeks to sue are unclear. Although he refers to numerous others throughout, including other state

judges, employees, and law enforcement personnel, his pleading only specifically names Judge

Brenden J. Sheehan as the respondent. (See Doc. 1 at 1, 2, 4-20; see also Doc. 1-1.)1 Petitioner

lists twelve different causes of action on the “Cover Sheet” of his pleading. (Doc. 1 at 2.) But

he does not set forth cogent allegations or specific legal claims against the defendant or other

individuals mentioned therein. (See id. at 4-20.) He makes conclusory references to a “Sham

Legal Process,” a “Mock Conspiracy,” a “Kangaroo Court,” perjury, a lack of evidence,

violations of his constitutional rights, corruption, “abuse of process,” and his “fraudulent

conviction.” (Id.) Petitioner ultimately seeks “relief from [the] fraudulent and void judgment”

against him under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). (Id. at 18, 20; Doc. 1-1.)

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365, 102 S.

Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam). But such liberal construction is not without

limits. Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Liberal construction does not

“abrogate basic pleading essentials in pro se suits.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.

1989). Nor does it allow district courts to conjure up allegations, draw unsupported inferences,

or construct claims on a pro se plaintiff’s behalf. See Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580

(6th Cir. 2001) (citing Wells, 891 F.2d at 594); Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir.

2004).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, district courts are required to dismiss “a complaint in a civil

action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

1 For ease and consistency, record citations are to the electronically stamped CM/ECF document

and PageID# rather than any internal pagination.

governmental entity” if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted” or if it “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir.

2010). To avoid a dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Hill, 630

F.3d at 471 (quotations omitted) (holding dismissal standard under Rule 12(b)(6) articulated in

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009), and Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007), governs dismissals for

failure to state a claim under § 1915A). At bottom, to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, a complaint must give defendants fair notice of a plaintiff’s legal claims and

the facts on which those claims rest. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78.

An action “is frivolous” if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989).

Petitioner’s Writ of Prohibition must be dismissed because, even liberally construed, it

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and is frivolous. A writ of prohibition “is

‘[a]n extraordinary writ issued by an appellate court to prevent a lower court from exceeding its

jurisdiction or to prevent a nonjudicial officer or entity from exercising a power.’” Hughes v.

Martin, No. 22-cv-332, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90256, 2022 WL 1598254, at *2 (M.D. Tenn.

May 19, 2022) (quoting Prohibition, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)). This Court is

not an appellate court, does not serve as an appellate court over the named respondent, and has

no authority to grant a writ of prohibition. See De La Miya v. Branch Cnty. Cts., No. 23-cv-

1235, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218684, 2023 WL 8519257, at *2-3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 8, 2023),

appeal dismissed, No. 24-1250, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 14565, 2024 WL 3106282 (6th Cir. June

14, 2024); Banks v. Soo Song, 17-cv-02017, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164320, 2017 WL 4410247,

at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 4, 2017). Accordingly, Petitioner’s Writ of Prohibition lacks an arguable basis

in law.

To the extent Petitioner’s pleading could be construed as a writ of habeas corpus under

28 U.S.C. § 2254, it must still be dismissed. “[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact

or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is

entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal

remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499-500, 93 S. Ct. 1827,

36 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1973). Petitioner seeks relief from his state court conviction which would

entitle him to release from imprisonment. But he has already sought habeas corpus relief under

§2254 in federal court and was denied such relief. See Mays v. Black, No. 20-cv-01402, 2022

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53970, 2022 WL 1073550 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 18, 2022), R&R adopted, 2022 WL

873793 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2022), certificate of appealability denied, No. 22-3483, 2022 U.S.

App. LEXIS 30027, 2022 WL 17480087 (6th Cir. Oct. 27, 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 622,

214 L. Ed. 2d 367 (2023).2 Before a second or successive petition under § 2254 can be filed in

district court, a petitioner must first seek and obtain permission from the Court of Appeals to do

so. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Petitioner has not demonstrated he has sought and obtained

permission from the Sixth Circuit to file a second or successive § 2254 petition.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, pro se petitioner Clifton B. Mays-EL’s Writ of Prohibition

is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

2 Petitioner was also denied relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Mays v. Pinkney, No. 18-cv-

1059, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137537, 2018 WL 3863455 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 14, 2018); Mays v.

O’Malley, No. 20-cv-2809, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40107, 2021 WL 809330 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 2,

2021).

§ 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: July 8, 2026 ¢

BRIDGET MEEHA NNAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE